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
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
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THE
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A Religious and Sociological Quarterly

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THE BIBLIOTHECA SACRA

ARTICLE I.

THE TEACHINGS OF CHRIST, AND THE MODERN FAMILY.

BY PRESIDENT CHARLES FRANKLIN THWING, D.D., LL.D.

OF all social institutions, Christ apparently judged the family to be the most important. Respecting its foundation, continuance, conditions, and possible disruption, he spoke more constantly and more directly than respecting any other institution. Either with silence or with brief speech did he treat other social institutions and movements with which society, ancient or modern, is concerned. He declined to be led into discussion regarding the duty of allegiance to the civil authority. He had nothing to say respecting the nature of government. He did not condemn the monarchical, and he did not favor the democratic, form. He spoke no word regarding the evils of human slavery, or the divisions of society, or the reciprocal rights and duties of labor and capital. Regarding education, he also was as silent as he was about the social question. If one result of his coming was the establishment of the church, yet he uttered, regarding its character and functions, purposes and relationships, only a few, even if pregnant words. Like Socrates, he wrote no book. He gave no dissertation on the ethical or intellectual value of many of the theories which concern modern society. But in respect to the family his utterances were, if few, significant; and many of the most funda-

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mental and impressive of his teachings were based upon elements of domestic life and society.

The theology of Christ is interpreted to us more largely in terms of the family than of any other institution. The doctrine of God is declared to us in the word "Fatherhood," and the personality of Christ himself is likewise made known in sonship and brotherhood. Christ and his Father, he affirms, are one. From the Father he comes forth, and to the Father he returns. If he is made known as the Son of God, he is likewise made known as the Son of man. His most tender and impressive prayers are addressed to the Father. The character of children he uses to teach the nature of the Kingdom of God. The fitness of prayer receives illustration in the request of children made to their parents, and the willingness of God to answer is enforced by the nature of the desire of parents to grant the requests of their children. His suggestions regarding conversion are founded upon the figure of birth. The infinite love of God, the degradation of sin, the duty and the possibility of repentance, the fact of forgiveness, are declared in the parable of the prodigal son, which is likewise the parable of the loving Father.

The social teachings of Christ are, like the theological, based upon the figure of the family. The most intimate relations of service to him are suggested through the remark that one may become to him as a mother, a sister, a brother, by the doing of his will. Among his last utterances on the cross are the commending of his mother to his beloved disciple, and of his beloved disciple to his mother. The duty at once of truthfulness and of service, he enforces in the parable of the two sons. Among the most significant words of his last long talk with his disciples, before the crucifixion, is found the assurance that in his Father's house are many mansions or rooms,—the fam-

ily dwelling-place. If the pearl of the necklace of his parables shows the love of the Father and the redemption of the profligate son, it also shows the base and debasing effects of selfishness. The grace of humility, the duty of freedom from giving offense, the beauty of innocence, the sweetness of truthfulness, are illustrated in the character of childhood. The love which he has for man, finds its inspiration in the love which the Father has for him; and the test of the love of the disciples for him is found in their keeping his commandments, even as the test of his love lies in the keeping of the commandments of his Father. His first recorded utterance is the interrogative declaration that he is to be about his Father's business or in his Father's house. If the last word he spoke on the cross is the commending his spirit to his Father, the first of the seven utterances is a prayer to his Father to forgive those, who, in ignorance, crucify him.

It is, therefore, hardly too much to say, that the theological and the social teachings of Christ are largely and impressively embodied and set forth in terms of the family.

The reason of such a presentation is not far to seek. Christ desires to speak to the common experience. Every person is a child. Every person has a father and a mother. The home is as common as it is central. Each person is born into a home. Pathetic, as it is unusual, is the lot of one who is homeless. "Born of the Virgin Mary" was the Christ. If for three years, he was, in a sense, homeless, for thirty years he was a son in a home. He was subject to his parents. Out of his experience, Christ spoke to the experience of all.

The origin of the family is marriage. Marriage is both a status and a contract. Marriage is, says Bishop, "The civil status of one man and one woman united in law for life, for the discharge to each other and the community of the duties

legally incumbent on those whose association is founded on the distinction of sex,"¹ It is also defined by Perkins as the "union of one man and one woman so long as they shall both live, to the exclusion of all others, by an obligation which, during that time, the parties cannot, of their own volition and act, dissolve, but which can be dissolved only by authority of the State."² Schouler says: "The word 'marriage' signifies, in the first instance, that act by which a man and woman unite for life, with the intent to discharge toward society and one another those duties which result from the relation of husband and wife. The act of union having been once accomplished, the word comes afterward to denote the relation itself."³ Marriage, therefore, is both a status and a contract; through the contract the status is created.

Marriage, as the foundation of the family, has several bases. Among them are: (1) the Historical, (2) the Biological, (3) the Psychological, (4) the Sociological, and (5) the Ethical and Religious.

1. The historical basis of the family is enveloped in an impenetrable mist of either ignorance or of conflicting tradition. Sir Henry Sumner Maine says: "I have never myself imagined that any amount of evidence of law or usage, written or observed, would by itself solve the problems which cluster round the beginnings of human society."⁴

One of the most important of these unsolved problems, to which Sir Henry refers, relates to the beginning of the family. Certain scholars hold that the first man and woman were communistic, and that by slow and far-reaching process the modern family has arisen out of that early society. On the other hand, such scholars as Sir Henry Sumner

¹ *Marriage and Divorce*, Vol. i. § 3. ² Perkins, J., 19 Ind., 57.

³ *Husband and Wife*, p. 19. ⁴ *Early Law and Custom*, p. 205.

Maine, Herbert Spencer, and Charles Darwin are not convinced that man ever existed in such a state.

It is, however, extremely difficult for a careful student of early society to believe that marriage, as we understand it, as a union for life between one man and one woman, was the social rule in primitive times. Neither is it easy to believe that polygamy, the strict union of one man with several women, or that polyandry, the strict union of one woman with several men, was the primitive condition. The nearly equal birth-rate of the sexes would shut out the presumption of the universal prevalence of either of these customs. Were it possible to reconstruct the original social status, it would probably be found to contain elements of each of these diverse conditions and practices. If primitive society was not a social chaos, it may yet have embraced domestic relations of every sort. As either passion or expediency dictated, polygamy, polyandry, and even monogamy, may have prevailed side by side. "The original communities of men may have taken," says Sir Henry Maine, "all sorts of forms."¹ It is, indeed, not improbable, on even the grounds of historic credibility, that a family pure and simple may have existed since the beginning of the human race. Either mutual attraction, or a community of interests, or attachment to their children, may have bound a man and a woman together, at least during the child-bearing period of the woman's life.

2. Christ also had respect to the biological basis. The phrase "twain one flesh" is significant. The Author of humanity made humanity, from the first, male and female. He made each to have fitness and attractiveness for the other. The sexual instinct and condition is primitive. Whether this instinct has grown stronger with the passing of the gener-

¹ *Early Law and Custom*, p. 281.

ations of men, it is impossible to indicate. But in the strength or the weakness of this instinct, is embodied one basis of marriage and of the family. From it have sprung the successive generations. Without it, humanity would, without doubt, cease to be. Its presence insures the continuance of the race. In nature is found a corresponding tendency to indefinite productiveness. Be it said that regarding this basis of marriage Christ spoke neither condemnation nor commendation. In and of itself it has no moral quality, any more than the power of the brain for thinking has moral quality. It takes on ethical relations when it connects itself with the highest part of man's being in preventing or promoting the growth of noblest character. That its exercise does minister to the highest in man is true; that its exercise may minister to the lust of flesh and to the lust of the eye must also, with sadness, be confessed. It certainly does embody, above every other basis, the individualistic element.

3. The biological basis of marriage leads up to and passes over into the psychological relation. That the twain become one flesh is as true in the spiritual as in the material sense. The two become one because of non-physical, spiritual, and intellectual affinities. Having these affinities, Christ assumes that each one chooses, and is chosen, by the other. Like-mindedness, like-heartedness, and like-willfulness are the bases of this mutual choice. If the doctrine of opposites has any value at all in the making of the marital union, this value applies to the more superficial and picturesque elements. This union which promotes unity is founded upon the comprehensive element of love. This love is at once emotional and volitional. It represents the function of both heart and will. It embodies at once delight and the choice of the good for the one loved. The love which Christ commanded in his

three great commandments is the origin and source of that love which is the spiritual foundation of marriage. Plato discusses whether marriage with or without love is preferable; but the question which he asks, refers to a love of a different content from that which Christ commands. Plato has in mind intoxicating enjoyment, affection, a passion as of madness, which is blind and deaf except to the object of which it is enamored. Christ intimates that such a love should not be made the basis of important decisions or the foundation of moral conduct. He who commands that the love of God should be of the mind as well as of the heart, must not require that reason should be excluded from the domain of conjugal affection. He who commanded that the love given to God should be of the strength would desire that the love of a husband and wife for each other should find its fountain in the will. Love as a rule of conduct is rather a principle than an emotion.

4. The biological and the psychological basis is individualistic. But marriage is not simply an individualistic institution. It relates to society. It has its basis in the social order; its continuance relates to that order. It is the purpose of Christ to regenerate humanity. He seeks to make all men's good each man's purpose. He wishes to transmute the kingdom of man into the kingdom of God; the kingdom of earth into the kingdom of heaven. Truth, purity, joyfulness, peaceableness, hopefulness, love, are the notes of the song of the Messiah. They are the constituent elements of a perfected society. These conceptions may or may not become embodied in commands. They may or may not assume the forms of large and progressive movements. But in their origin and primary relation they are personal. The kingdom of heaven comes through persons, as well as from, and to, persons. The fam-

ily, therefore, bears a most significant relation to the progress of the divine kingdom, for the family embodies a union of personalities. It is thus a social unity; it is a social group; it is a social force; it is a union and organization of social forces; it is a social condition as well as a social power; a condition of happiness or of misery; a force which acts and reacts for either of the highest welfare of humanity, or for its disintegration and destruction. It is a nucleus about which new interests and relations of humanity gather. It represents the most efficient power and most effective method of human improvement. It embodies the best means for the protection and for the nourishment of the young. The height of the position of any creature in the order of being is measured by the length of its period of infancy. Therefore, the infancy of man is longest. Man is also, of all beings, the most helpless at birth. The nourishment which the infant needs, is assured by the love which marriage represents. It may also be said that all ethical and spiritual qualities, the virtues and the graces, are best promoted through that condition which has love as its regnant force.

One may be allowed to add that love represents self-surrender. Self-surrender is the constant atmosphere of the family. Man attains his highest self only through the surrender of self. As man gives up his own personality does he attain the richest personality. The more he gives, the more he receives. Marriage is, therefore, being essentially self-surrender, the most effective way of securing the highest development of the individual, and so of society. A great interpreter of this fundamental institution has said: "By whatsoever reasoning we arrive at the conclusion that marriage is, as often expressed, a divine institution, the truth that it is such, —or, in other words, that it is a parcel of the wisdom which

entered into the creation of man,—is palpable, and is generally acknowledged. Commencing with the race, and attending man in all periods and in all countries of his existence, this institution of marriage has ever been considered the particular glory of the social system. It has shone forth, in dark countries and in dark periods of the world, a bright luminary on his horizon. And, but for it, all that is valuable, virtuous, and desirable in human existence, would long since have faded away in a general retrograde of the race, and in the perilous darkness in which its joys and hopes would have been wrecked together. And as man has gone up in the path of his improvement, and a purer light has surrounded him, still has this institution of marriage, receiving accessions of glory, remained the first among the institutions of human society. And the idea that any government could, consistently with the general well-being, permit marriage to become merely a thing of bargain between men and women, and not regulate it by its own power, is too absurd to require refutation.”¹ In a word, therefore, marriage, having a sociological basis, represents the progress of mankind. Through marriage the enlargement and enrichment of society are assured. No method can be imagined either so economical or so effective for human betterment.

Christ’s words also indicate that marriage has its basis in the will of God. “What, therefore, God hath joined together, let not man put asunder” (Matt. xix. 6; Mark x. 9). Marriage, having its basis in the will of God, becomes religious. Every worthiest marriage receives the Divine benediction. Marriage seems to represent, not, as is the custom in most procedures, first, the finding out the will of God, and then the doing of that will; but it does represent a process involving,

¹ Bishop, *Marriage and Divorce*, Vol. i. § 12.

first, the will of the two parties in relation to each other, as of primary consequence, and, secondly, the assurance that this will of the two parties themselves becomes the will of God. The will of the man and the woman for each other agreeing in holy marriage represents the will of God. God himself seems by this phrase to subject his own will to the choice of the husband and of the wife. In such an interpretation, marriage, therefore, takes on the highest relation. It becomes divine. It represents the beginning of an apparently eternal process. It is placed in a condition elemental and fundamental. Strong grounds, therefore, has the Roman Catholic Church for calling marriage a sacrament, as I shall hereafter indicate. Every Protestant may well call it sacramental.

These five bases obtain, whether marriage be interpreted as a contract or as a status. If marriage be made a contract only, the biological and the psychological, the sociological and the religious, bases, represent the causes for the husband and wife entering into a covenant. If marriage be interpreted as a status, these same four elements help to constitute the condition. If marriage be judged as both a contract and a status, it is a contract which creates a status in which these same elements are fundamental.

Though marriage has these foundations, yet it is to be observed that Christ gave no command enjoining marriage. At this point he does not fulfill, but he destroys, the Hebrew tradition. Before his coming, marriage was by the Hebrews looked upon as a duty. Among the commandments of the early Hebrew Scriptures are the commandments: "Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth"; "Be ye fruitful, and multiply; bring forth abundantly in the earth, and multiply therein" (Gen. ix. 1, 7). These early commandments seem to have continued as moving forces throughout

the history of the race. Blessings upon the marriage state and upon a multiplicity of children abound. Childlessness is the subject of lamentations. Apparently Christ favored neither the married nor the single life. No inference should be drawn from the fact that he was not married. At once, however, it may be said that he does give intimation regarding the duty of certain people not marrying: "For there are some eunuchs, which were so born from their mother's womb: and there are some eunuchs, which were made of men; and there be eunuchs, which have made themselves eunuchs, for the kingdom of heaven's sake. That those able to receive it let him receive it" (Matt. xix. 12).

Other reasons there are, which should preclude marriage. An inherited disease represents such a cause. It is said that George Combe denied marriage to himself, because he knew he was a subject of hereditary consumption. A friend of the writer does not permit himself to become a father in the fear that his children might become insane. Duties which are inconsistent with certain conditions of the family life should prevent. There are those who owe special duties to the community, the performance of which would interfere with the duties which would be owing to a family. Yet be it said that the celibate life, in Christ's interpretation, assumed no form of sacredness. The duty of living such a life is constituted by causes and conditions which would make wedlock unfitting. These causes and conditions belong to the realm of individual interpretations and choice: they are not ecclesiastical.

The principle, which, in Christ's conception, underlies the development of the family and also underlies the relations of its members to each other, is, as I have already intimated, the principle of love. No other principle is sufficiently great for making a worthy foundation. Christ commanded men to love

God supremely, to love his neighbor as himself, and also, near the close of his life, commanded that men should love each other as he loved them. He loved man into a sacrifice of himself for them. These three commandments, therefore, are embodied in the one commandment of love. The love which is thus commanded, is not simply an emotion, although it may be emotional. It is not simply a volition, although it does bear relation to the will. The love which Christ commands, is the expression of both the will and the heart. It represents the choice of the good of the object loved, and it also expresses delight in the happiness of the object loved.

The general principle of love helps to determine the relation of the members of the family to each other. These relations are: (1) of husband and wife, (2) of parents and children, and (3) of children to each other.

The relation of husband and wife is embodied in love. Under this principle, each is to consult for the other's good, and each is to find satisfaction in the other's welfare. The society into which Christ came, and of which he was a part, demanded of the husband and wife certain reciprocal rights and duties. The duties which rested upon the wife, in relation to her husband, seem largely to have been of a pecuniary nature. All property that came to her after marriage, by inheritance, did not come to her, but only through her, and was regarded as belonging to him; all gains, too, which her property secured belonged to him. These gains included the usufruct of her dowry. Be it said, also, that, in case he had the administration of her dowry, he was responsible for no loss. He also was regarded as her heir-at-law. The obligations which rested upon the husband, were of a larger variety than those which rested upon the wife. Among them are included, in case of sickness, medical treatment; in case

of death, an honorable funeral; in case of captivity, redemption therefrom, and support of her daughters and of her sons, being also his, under certain normal conditions. These provisions, on the whole, rested with heavier weight upon the wife than upon the husband; but, resting upon either husband or wife, they are consistent with methods and results easily arising from the principle of love. It may be as well said here as elsewhere, that Christ himself gave no intimation respecting any doctrine of the inferiority or superiority of either party in a marriage contract. The husband and wife are to him, so far as we are able to see, each *par inter pares*. The name given to woman at her creation, indicated that, as a wife, she was the companion and the equal of her husband. If the transgression and fall of Adam and Eve seemed to result in the inferiority of the woman to the man, it is to be remembered that this result of sin, like other results, Christ came to conquer. In the beginning God created them male and female, and one searches the Gospels in vain to find any intimation in the words or the work of Christ of subordination or of superiority.

Ancient society of every order laid heavier burdens on woman than on man. The exceptions to this interpretation are few and insignificant. The reason lies in the fact that most civilizations have been founded on physical force. Man has greater active physical force than woman, and, therefore, the husband has been regarded as primary, and the wife as subordinate. The advancement of woman has been coincident with the decline of physical force as a constant factor of civilization. Therefore, as intellectual and ethical ideals have come to prevail, the position of woman has enlarged and risen.

It may not be unfitting to say that the current discussion respecting the superiority of man or the inferiority of woman

is as absurd as it is ungracious. It is as absurd as a discussion respecting the superiority of the maple-tree to the oak, or of the oak to the maple. The oak is superior to the maple, in strength; the maple is superior to the oak in grace. In certain respects man is superior to woman, in other respects woman is superior to man. Each should be content with one's own powers, and free from jealousy of the other. The powers of each, each should use, and for the use be grateful. To make any attempt to arrogate the powers of the other to oneself is at once ridiculous and painful.

It is probable that for a long period the place which the Jewish woman held in the community was higher than that which the Greek maiden or the Roman occupied. That place is not for one instant comparable with that which she now fills. For Jewish civilization, in common with other civilizations, was based largely, although to a less degree than obtained among some other peoples, on physical force. Oriental ideas of woman's nature and functions never secured complete control of the Jewish domestic or public life. Racial integrity and autocracy saved the Hebrew from these, as from many other, perils. The list of worthies of the Eleventh of Hebrews represents men whose faith was manifest in action. Naturally the names of women would be less numerous than those of men; but appearing in every century of Hebrew history are women who have helped to maintain or to restore the high position which was originally given to themselves. No one can doubt that Sarah, Rebekah, Leah, and Rachel held a high place in the patriarchal times. Deborah is at once a deliverer and a judge in Israel. Miriam sings a song of deliverance. Huldah is a prophetess. The wisdom and bravery of Esther are declared in a book which bears her name.

Christ, therefore, came into a society in which woman was held in a certain degree of high esteem. One is therefore prepared to find that for women Christ showed a respect no less high, and a regard no less warm, than he showed to man. One of the most significant of his few conversations with a single individual was held with a woman,—the Samaritan,— at the well. The sisters of the home at Bethany were dear to him. For the woman suffering from an offense which ancient law and social judgment have united in considering most heinous, he had pity and pardon. His miracles of healing were wrought for and on women. To a nobleman's daughter and a widow's son he restored life. The woman suffering from a spirit of infirmity and a woman subject to an issue of blood, as well as the daughter of the Canaanitish woman, he healed. Evidence of the regard in which he held them is found in the affection which women had for him. They are among the last at his cross and the first at his sepulcher.

It may, therefore, be said that the first home in which husband and wife were regarded as equals was the home founded upon the principles which Christ taught. By these principles husband and wife may possess varying duties, but the duties are of equal obligation. They may possess varying rights, but these rights represent equality of opportunity and of privilege.

In passing, it may be added, that Christ's words contain no intimations of the worthiness of celibacy. Paul seems to commend the single life, but the commendation is based upon his belief of the near approach of the Parousia. Christ makes no suggestion regarding the body as necessarily evil, and as therefore to be crucified. The Manichæan doctrine did not arise until the third century was well on its way, and it was more than three hundred years after Christ's ascension that the first defin-

itive rule regarding a celibate clergy was promulgated. It is certainly significant that Christ's first miracle was wrought at a wedding.

The principle of love, which constitutes the relationship of husband and wife, also constitutes the relationship of parents to children and of children to parents. The Christian rule supports the teaching of instinct. The love felt by a parent for a child, Christ could not, himself, know as he knew the love of the child for a mother. He came into a community in which parents and children were dear to each other. One need not go beyond the book of Proverbs to learn the strength of parental affection, or the joy that belonged to the filial. The career of the Jewish child was carefully marked out from its birth, and at every stage, the intellect and the heart of the parent were united to give to the child the best condition and environment. The duty of the obedience of the child to the parent is again and again pointed out in the Old Testament; and examples of obedience often occur as inspirations, and of disobedience as warnings. Christ was, therefore, prepared to present the just relation of parents and children to each other. The significance of this relation is most impressive. The relation of the Father in Heaven to his children on the earth is a type of the relation of the earthly father to his sons and daughters, and the relation of the earthly father to his sons and daughters makes vivid and real what the relation of the Father in Heaven to his children either is or should be. Sins against parents are less common in Jewish, than in any other ancient, history. The fifth commandment was among the great commandments, and any breach of it received the severest reprobation.

The love of the parent for the child manifests itself in the service of the older and abler for the younger and feebler,

while the older is in his prime, and the love of the child for the parent manifests itself also in benevolence when the parent has passed into feebleness or helplessness. One can never forget that Christ himself was subject unto his parents, and one also remembers that he asks if he should not be about his Father's business or in his Father's house.

Perhaps the best interpretation of the mutual relations of the parent and of the child is found in the chief of all the parables of Christ. The parable of the prodigal son may also be called the parable of the forgiving father, and, should one prefer the term, the unloving brother might also describe this most significant story. In this parable are seen (1) the love of the father. He follows the younger son's suggestion regarding the division of the estate; he awaits, with yearning heart and eyes, the son's return; he forgives the son's profligacy, and also the older son's hard-heartedness; he rejoices in the son's return to the home, which he ought never to have left. In the parable is also seen (2) the willingness of the father to give unto the son the opportunity of working out his own career,—although knowing that the son might abuse the opportunity,—which is simply an interpretation of the gift of freedom of individual choice. The parable also represents (3) the love of the son for the father, which shows itself chiefly in the form of repentance, on his return. By contrast, also, the parable contains evidence, not of the love of the older son for either his father or his brother,—but of his hatred for his father, and of his jealousy and contempt for his brother. It is significant, that, if "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son," this Son used the domestic relation as a prevailing figure in the most impressive of his parables to teach the manifold lesson of love.

Concerning the relation of brothers and sisters to each

other, Christ has far less to say than of the relation of parents and children; but this relation, it is still evident, is a relation of love. The Jewish family was closely united, member to member. Domestic religion nourished the domestic virtues. Family relationships promoted family intimacies. The observance of the Sabbath fostered personal association: it was a family day. The family was the central unit of Jewish society, and not the individual. To the brothers and sisters were given the duty of its continuance.

The Jewish family, at the time of Christ, had lost in no small degree its sense of clanship. The tribal relationship played a part insignificant, in comparison with the part it had played in the larger share of Jewish history. The family stood distinct and integral. It is the single institution which survived the fall, and it comes forth from the old dispensation into the new, strengthened by Christ's teachings, prepared to maintain its central place.

In ancient society education was more domestic than in modern. Public education is largely a product of democratic society. In Rome the education of a boy was designed to promote his usefulness to the state. In Athens, the education of a boy was designed to promote his usefulness to society. In Jerusalem, the education of the boy was designed to promote his usefulness to religion. If in Rome education was largely forensic, in Athens, æsthetic and philosophic,—in Jerusalem, it was religious and theological; but in Jerusalem education was conducted more largely by and in the family than in the Roman or Greek capital. The first education of the Hebrew youth was that given to him by his mother and his father. The teaching, at home, began early in the life; from the age of three to six, he was trained in the Holy Scriptures, and at six he was sent to school.

This school, usually, was attached to a synagogue. In this school, he continued, usually, until about the age of fifteen. The content of his study was largely the Holy Scriptures and the comments thereon. A rabbi has mapped out the duties and attainments belonging to the youth at various ages: at five years of age, reading the Bible; at ten years, learning the Mishnah; at thirteen years, knowledge of the commandments; at fifteen years, the study of the Talmud; at eighteen years, marriage; at twenty years, active life. Throughout this period, memory was the chief tool of the child, in securing an education. Of that mental discipline which constitutes so large a share of modern education, the Hebrew child took little cognizance. The Talmud compares the student to a well-plastered cistern from which no drop escapes. Josephus boasts of his wonderful memory. The origin of the high place given to this faculty doubtless lies in the sacredness attached to the very words of the Holy Scriptures. It is probable, also, that writing was quite as commonly taught as reading.

The education was not simply mental; it included what is known to-day as manual training and moral and theological instruction. The ten commandments embodied the essence of the theological and ethical instruction. The book of Proverbs represents the character which each Jewish father and mother desired their child to know and to embody; and the Psalms of David sing the songs of a holy and intimate relation to God, which it was the endeavor of the individual as well as the family to make their constant practice.

In the giving of this intellectual, ethical, and religious training, the teacher, who not infrequently was the minister of the synagogue, had the advantage of certain favoring conditions. His compensation he received from the congregation. He

was not suffered to collect fees from pupils. His salary was usually raised by voluntary contributions. The number of hours of a day he taught was not large; and during certain seasons of heat, the lessons were given early in the morning and late in the afternoon. His classes numbered about twenty-five students; if they approached to forty he employed an assistant teacher, and if the number were fifty, there would be coördinate teachers. He was, without exception, a married man. The office of teacher was apparently held in great honor. The contrast between the respect paid to the Jewish teacher and the lack of respect paid to him in most periods of English history is significant.

In addition to the training of the head, and of the heart and of the conscience, education, at the time of Christ, was also manual. Many phrases occur in the writings of the time of Christ regarding the value of a trade. Whoever does not teach his son a trade is as if he brought him up to be a robber is a rabbinical principle. "How highly does the Maker of the world value trades!" It is said that "there were seven years of famine. It will never come to the door of the tradesman, be he one whom his teacher has brought up to a good trade." "There is none whose trade God does not adorn with beauty." The enthusiasm which is to-day found in behalf of the training of the hand, apparently prevailed in the better part of Jewish society two thousand years ago.

To-day, the Jews are a commercial people, but in the earlier times the race was largely given to following a trade. The change from the manual to the commercial relation arose largely from the dispersion of the nation. A scattered people can far more easily become a commercial people than one of carpenters and of workers in iron. Living in Palestine, subject to Rome, commerce was not so easily or largely profitable

as was a trade. In later times and under other conditions, commerce has proved more profitable.

The language in which all this tuition of every grade and of every kind was given, was probably Aramaic, a dialect of the Hebrew. Without doubt, Christ spoke Greek. The prevalence of the Greek language was one of the results of the conquests of Alexander. Latin was, undoubtedly, used in the more important governmental relations; but language was to Christ and to his contemporaries a tool and not a subject of study.

Regarding the general result and conditions of the education of the time of Christ, it may be said that it had concentration with breadth. Few of the subjects which make up the course of study of the modern child were included. Its field of vision was limited to the Jewish horizon. If the child learned Greek, it was for the purpose of conversation, and not for the sake of reading its literature. If the child learned Latin, it was for the purpose of governmental service and not for the sake of bringing him into world relations. History, philosophy, logic, mathematics beyond the simplest elements were comparatively unknown and unrecognized. The education was primarily religious and ethical. It touched the heart and the conscience. In its intellectual relations, it consisted largely of the acquisition of the facts and teachings of the Holy Books; but the intellectual relations fostered the religious and ethical needs, and the religious and ethical needs inspired the intellectual conditions and forces. Such an education is in peril of becoming vague, remote and visionary. It was saved from such a result by manual training. The whole result was embodied in a character far less philosophical and introspective than was the product of Athenian culture, and far less judicial and forensic, than was the result

of Roman training, but all in all it was more ethical and more religious, as well as thoroughly self-respecting, than could be found in the capitals of Greece and Rome.

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE FAMILY.

The family which has been created and developed may be dissolved. Two comprehensive methods of dissolution are evident,—death, and, what is known as, divorce.

For death, Christ intimates, is a dissolution of the marriage relation. Although marriage contains other elements than the physical, yet the physical is an element. When the body ceases to live, marriage may also be said to cease; for, in heaven, they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God. The conclusion, however, that with the death of the body dies the marital relationship should not be suffered to be made too significant. The remark does not mean that the husband and wife may not know and love each other in the realm of spiritual being. Many reasons obtain for the assurance that those who have loved each other in the body may love each other when they have passed out of the body. The conclusion, also, is consistent with the assurance that this love may be found more affectionate under wholly spiritual conditions than under conditions in part spiritual and in part physical. The teachings of Christ contain no word destructive of the hopes of an afflicted husband or wife for the continuance of that spiritual walk and conversation which on earth was the dearest form of their conjugal enjoyment. These words of Christ, however, as well as the evident facts of life, do indicate clearly that the marriage relation as it has existed in the case of a husband and wife, has forever passed away.

Upon the specific, or even general, forms of what relation

may be assumed in the spiritual realm, Christ gives no revelation. Upon this, as upon all conditions of that heavenly condition, Christ is silent; but concerning this, as also concerning every other condition touching life beyond the grave, instinct and affection are not silent. The physiological and scientific reasons which either allow or require one to believe in the deathlessness of the spirit of man, also allow him to believe that death is not a cessation of affection. One need not adopt the lines of Novalis, crying through the mouth of a sorrowing girl,—

“Oh! mother, mother, what is heaven?
Oh! mother, what is hell?
To be with William, that's my heaven,
Without him, that's my hell.”

But one can yet believe, that if heaven be that condition of felicity which the heart believes it to be, one element of the felicity lies in the continuance of the higher and richer spiritual affections, which have been dominant on the earth.

In passing, it is not unfitting to say that the marriage system of the Jews contained the levirate (Latin law term *levir*, a husband's brother). The levirate represented a usage originating in the early times of the Hebrews, by which a Hebrew, whose brother had died without leaving male issue, was under certain conditions compelled to marry the widow. This usage is suggested in the early history of the people and is commanded by Moses in the following passage:—

“If brethren dwell together, and one of them die, and have no child, the wife of the dead shall not marry without unto a stranger; her husband's brother shall go in unto her and take her to him to wife, and perform the duty of a husband's brother unto her. And it shall be, that the first-born which she beareth shall succeed in the name of his brother which is dead, that his name be not put out of Israel. And if the man

like not to take his brother's wife, then let his brother's wife go up to the gate unto the elders, and say, My husband's brother refuseth to raise up unto his brother a name in Israel, he will not perform the duty of my husband's brother. Then the elders of the city shall call him, and speak unto him; and if he shall stand to it, and say, I like not to take her; then shall his brother's wife come unto him in the presence of the elders, and loose his shoe from his foot, and spit in his face, and shall answer and say, So shall it be unto that man that will not build up his brother's house. And his name shall be called in Israel, The house of him that hath his shoe loosed " (Deut. xxv. 5-10).

The reference of Christ to this custom is found in the well-known interview between himself and the Sadducees, in which the Sadducees ask to which of the seven brothers, who had married the same woman in succession, should she in the resurrection belong, as wife.

The levirate was a method, not for the dissolution of the family, but rather for its continuance. In the Anglo-Saxon view, the usage is offensive. More or less offensive, also, to the Hebrew was it. Therefore, it took upon itself various exceptions. A brother or man need not marry his brother's widow, if he had children of his own, living. If, too, he was himself opposed to the marriage, through a legal fiction he might procure his liberty; but apparently, if this liberty he did procure, he was subject to certain legal or technical disadvantages. The law, also, did not affect a brother who already was married. Such a law, subject to so many exceptions, could not have been so offensive to the Hebrew as one may naturally infer; for, in the Hebrew nation, the love of offspring and the respect for the family institution are, on the whole, stronger than obtain among occidental people.

But more serious than death, as a cause of the dissolution of the family, are certain voluntary causes. These causes are at once subjective and objective. They are found in the bosom of the family itself, and they are also found in the conditions outside of the home. These causes are technically comprehended in the term "divorce."

The world into which Christ came, and to which he addressed his words, was a world in which the family was no longer a sacred institution. Notwithstanding the peril of interpreting the social condition of another society, through its baser elements, which are always the more blatant and inconsistent, and not through its nobler elements, which are more quiet and conservative, it is undoubtedly true that, in the later period of the Roman republic, the family had fallen into a state of disintegration or of decay. After the Punic wars, and perhaps in no small degree because of them, manners decayed, and marriage ties became loosened. One never forgets that Sulla, Cæsar, Cicero, Antony, and Augustus divorced their wives. If such things were done in the green tree, what would not be done in the dry? The Roman society and the Roman family had fallen into what was at once the cause and the result of the destruction of each. In the earlier time, voluntary celibacy was regarded as worthy of censure. Laws were passed against it. In the later time, celibacy was preferred to marriage, and childlessness to parenthood. Cæsar offered rewards in the encouragement of marriage. Augustus made decrees against those who remained unmarried, but neither decree nor reward was of value. From the accession of Augustus to the close of the second century, pleasure seems to have been master and mistress of the Roman people. Sexual license and sensual debauchery overthrew the Roman family.

The condition of the Greek family was no better, but rather worse, than the condition of the Roman. In fact, one cause of the decline of the Roman family was the influx of Greek methods of life. With the advent of Greek culture, the frivolity and the morals of Greeks also came. It is probable that the respect of the Greek for the family was never so strong as the respect of the Roman. The place of the *hetaerae* was recognized and honored to a degree in Athens which woman of similar conditions never received at Rome. To the Greek, the family was an institution founded rather on custom than on law. It was also a condition which bound its members together with a tie less strong than that of friendship, and less sacred than that of country. On the part of the wife, fidelity was required; on the part of the husband, laxity was allowed.

The place which woman occupied in Athenian society, was quite unlike that place which Plato ascribed to her. To the girl he gave the same education, in music and gymnastics, as the boy. He would even go so far as to teach her the art of war. All the pursuits of man are the pursuits of woman also. Sexual differences do not necessitate, he argues, a difference of duty. The natural differences which now appear to divide the sexes,—on the one side, larger feelings and sensibilities, and on the other, larger intellect and administrative powers,—may not be ultimate and fundamental differences; but only differences occasioned by education. Another state of society and other circumstances might cause these apparently natural differences to disappear. Plato, therefore, in many respects, would elevate the wife to the rank to be the companion and equal of her husband.

But the noble conception of Plato was not the conception which prevailed in Athens and Greek society. The family was regarded as a convenience, rather than as a necessity. The

early prevalence of religious ideals and methods in the family had largely disappeared as early as the first century before Christ. If the Greek family never fell into that abject condition of absolute disruption and disgrace which seems to have been the rule at Rome in the time of Augustus, it probably for centuries existed upon an ignoble plane in the respect of the community.

The influence of Roman and Greek conceptions of life upon Jewish manners and life was not probably as great as is commonly believed. Among all nations, the Hebrew was the least susceptible to the influence of the foreigner. The Greek influence was probably greater than the Roman, but even the Greek was slight. The causes which, existing in Jerusalem and other centres in Judæa and other provinces, tended toward the disintegration of the family, were largely of native origin.

No doubt can exist that, although divorce was probably not as common among the Jews as among the Greeks and Romans of the century preceding the Christian era, it was, nevertheless very prevalent. The causes upon which divorce was allowed, were many and slight. In fact, the causes seem to have been quite akin to the lax causes which prevail in most of the divorce laws of the United States. Improprieties, such as are involved in bad manners, brawling, unfitting dress, or a bad reputation, were sufficient to secure the desired release; but although this condition prevailed, it is also evident that the practice was discouraged by many rabbis. The Jewish law, moreover, seems to have had peculiar regard for the rights of the wife.

In this condition of mixed feeling and procedure, Christ's words regarding divorce are clear. His utterances are found in three passages. Each of these passages carries distinct and definite meaning, but the relation of two of the passages to

the other passage, creates a serious problem: (1) "And I say unto you, Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery; and whosoever marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery" (Matt. xix. 9); (2) "And he saith unto them, Whosoever shall put away his wife, and marry another, committeth adultery against her. And if a woman shall put away her husband, and be married to another, she committeth adultery" (Mark x. 11, 12); and (3) "Whosoever putteth away his wife, and marrieth another, committeth adultery; and whosoever marrieth her that is put away from her husband committeth adultery" (Luke xvi. 18).

In Mark and Luke, Christ allows no cause as sufficient for divorce. In Matthew, divorce is allowed upon the ground of fornication. These passages awaken several inquiries: (1) Are these statements to be interpreted as laws, statutes, commands, or as intimations and suggestions of the will and purpose of Christ? (2) If these passages are interpreted as laws, statutes and commands, are they to be regarded as taking immediate effect, or are they to be interpreted as ideals towards which the race is to progress? (3) How can these passages, the one in Matthew, which allows divorce upon the ground of fornication, and the two other passages, which provide no permission for divorce, be understood as consistent interpretations of the will of Christ? (4) If adultery be regarded as cause sufficient for the declaration of the destruction of the family, is adultery to be regarded as the only cause, or as simply as an example of conditions which may also allow dissolution?

These questions I shall take up in order.

1. Christ laid down principles rather than laws. He gave intimations of his pleasure more often than he formed rules. He

desired to quicken the conscience, to enlarge the intellect, to strengthen the will, in order that the individual should, of his own desire, see, choose, and do that which was fitting and right. But, in the case of his remarks respecting divorce, the inference seems to be necessitated that he was not following his ordinary methods. In this instance, he was practically and positively laying down a rule and a method of procedure. The contrast between the teaching of Moses and his own teaching is made distinct and sharp. "Moses because of the hardness of your hearts suffered you to put away your wives; but from the beginning it was not so. *And I say unto you*" (Matt. xix. 8, 9). In all the utterances of Christ, it would be difficult to find a contrast more absolute. Between the suffering of Moses and his own direct and positive command is a world-wide chasm.

2. It were indeed to be desired that the command thus given should take immediate effect. Christ wished to re-establish, at once, the Jewish family as it existed in the beginning. Polygamy had already passed away. Divorce had come into the Jewish society. Divorce also should pass away. It were well for the command to have prompt application; but of course Christ knew that his command would not, and could not, result in the prompt reestablishment of the family. He also knew that the command embodied an ideal toward which the Jewish, as well as every other race, should move. Its application was like the application of one's being or becoming perfect. It was to take effect at once, so far as the ability of the individual allowed him to assume this obligation. It was also an ultimate object toward which both the individual and the race were to progress.

3. Regarding the relation of the passage in Matthew on divorce to the passages in Luke and in Mark, it is difficult to

decide which represents the primary thought of Christ. But I, for one, prefer to regard the passages in Mark and Luke as embodying the primary thought and wish. Christ forbids divorce upon any ground whatsoever. This interpretation is borne out by a significant passage in the First Epistle to the Corinthians. In treating of marriage, in the seventh chapter, Paul, writing of marriage, says: "And unto the married I command, yet not I, but the Lord, Let not the wife depart from her husband; but and if she depart, let her remain unmarried, or reconciled to her husband; and let not the husband put away his wife." The integrity of the marriage right is in these words plainly indicated. In another verse (15th), Paul indicates that there may be separation, but not a legal or a formal divorce. It is, on the whole, evident that Christ desires to maintain the absolute continuance of the family under whatever stress or strain it may be subjected to. In this principle, Christ is supported by his great apostle.

The passage in Matthew, with its exception, is to be regarded as later than the original remark found in the other two synoptics. Matthew is more inclined to insert parenthetical or exceptional clauses than is either Mark or Luke. It is also easier, as every New Testament scholar knows, for a clause to be inserted than for a clause to be omitted.

Therefore, the inference to be drawn from the few words spoken by Christ, regarding divorce, is that for no cause whatsoever is this formal disruption of the family to be suffered. He upholds the highest type and the most binding obligation of marriage. He regards marriage not as a contract, but as a status. It represents a condition into which one has entered by his own will. It is indeed a contract, but the contract has created a status. This status contains several elements, such as the actual or possible presence of children. The fam-

ily is the embodiment of the unity of the social order. This status could not, therefore, be voluntarily set aside.

This conclusion is in utter contrast with the practice which obtains in modern society. In every State of the national union, excepting one, South Carolina, divorce is allowed.

The causes existing throughout the United States may be thus summarized (South Carolina, having no divorce laws, is not included in this summary) :—

Absolute Divorce.

1. Adultery: A cause in all the States and Territories.
2. Pregnancy of wife at time of marriage, unknown to husband: Alabama, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming.
3. Illicit carnal intercourse of wife, unknown to husband, before marriage: Maryland.
4. Lewd and lascivious behavior of wife: Kentucky.
5. When wife, prior to marriage, unknown to husband, had been notoriously a prostitute: Virginia, West Virginia.
6. When husband, prior to marriage, unknown to wife, had been notoriously a licentious person: West Virginia.
7. Gross misbehavior and wickedness in violation of marriage covenant: Rhode Island.
8. Crime against nature: Alabama.
9. Concealment of loathsome disease existing at time of marriage: Kentucky.
10. Contracting loathsome disease after marriage: Kentucky.
11. Impotency, physical incapacity, etc., at time of marriage: a cause in all except Arizona, California, Connecticut, Dakota, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, New Mexico, Texas, Vermont.

12. When either party, in consequence of immoral or criminal conduct subsequent to marriage, become impotent: Colorado.

13. Abandonment, desertion, willful absence: a cause in all except New York, North Carolina.

14. Disappearance, absence without being heard from: Connecticut, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont.

15. Living apart (voluntary separation): Kentucky, Wisconsin.

16. When either party has joined a religious sect believing marriage unlawful: Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Hampshire.

17. When either party has been indicted for felony and is a fugitive from justice: Louisiana, Virginia.

18. When a husband is indicted for felony and flees the State: North Carolina.

19. Refusal on part of wife "to remove with her husband to this State," etc.: Tennessee.

20. Cruelty, actual violence or apprehension thereof, inhuman treatment, etc.: a cause in all except Maryland, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia.

21. Indignities rendering condition intolerable or life burdensome: Arkansas, Missouri, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, Wyoming.

22. Conduct rendering it unsafe and improper for wife to cohabit with husband: Tennessee.

23. When husband shall turn wife out of doors: Tennessee.

24. Failure or neglect of husband to provide for wife: Arizona, California, Colorado, Dakota, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming.

25. Habitual indulgence in violent and ungovernable temper: Florida.

26. Attempt by either party upon the life of the other: Illinois, Louisiana, Tennessee.

27. Gross neglect of duty: Kansas, Ohio.

28. Drunkenness, intemperance, intoxication (habitual): a cause in all except Maryland, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia.

29. When the wife shall be "given to intoxication": Wisconsin.

30. When the husband shall be guilty of such conduct as to constitute him a vagrant under the statutes: Missouri, Wyoming.

31. Conviction of felony or infamous crime, sentence to imprisonment, imprisonment: a cause in all except District of Columbia, Florida, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina.

32. Insanity or mental incapacity at time of marriage: District of Columbia, Georgia, Mississippi.

33. Insanity (permanent and incurable) occurring subsequent to marriage: Arkansas.

34. Incurable chronic mania or dementia, having existed ten years or more: Washington.

35. Any cause rendering the marriage originally void: Maryland, Rhode Island; or voidable, Rhode Island.

36. When marriage was within prohibited degrees: Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, New Jersey, Pennsylvania.

37. When either party has a former wife or husband living: Arkansas, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Washington.

38. Procurement of marriage by force, duress or fraud: Connecticut, Georgia, Kansas, Ohio, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Washington.

39. When marriage was solemnized while either party was under the age of consent: Delaware.

40. When one of the parties has obtained a divorce in another State: Florida, Michigan, Ohio.

41. Public defamation: Louisiana.

42. Any other cause deemed by the court sufficient and when the court shall be satisfied that the parties can no longer live together: Washington.

Limited Divorce.

Limited divorce exists in the following States: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota (in favor of wife only), Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania (in favor of wife only), Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin.

The following is a summary of the causes existing in the States allowing limited divorces:—

1. Adultery: Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island.

2. Pregnancy of wife at time of marriage, and unknown to husband: Alabama, Kentucky.

3. Lewd and lascivious behavior of wife: Kentucky.

4. Gross misbehavior and wickedness in violation of the marriage covenant: Rhode Island.

5. Crime against nature: Alabama.

6. Concealment of loathsome disease existing at the time of marriage: Kentucky.

7. Contracting loathsome disease after marriage: Kentucky.

8. Excessively vicious conduct: Maryland.
9. Impotency, physical incapacity at time of marriage: Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Rhode Island.
10. Abandonment, desertion, willful absence: Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin.
11. Disappearance (absence raising the presumption of death): Rhode Island.
12. Living apart (voluntary separation): Kentucky.
13. When either party has joined religious sect believing marriage unlawful: Kentucky.
14. Cruelty, actual violence or apprehension thereof, inhuman treatment, etc.: Alabama, Arkansas, District of Columbia, Georgia, Kentucky (to wife), Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin.
15. Indignities rendering condition intolerable or life burdensome: Arkansas, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee.
16. Conduct rendering it unsafe or improper for the parties to cohabit: Minnesota, New York, Tennessee, Wisconsin (to wife).
17. When one party shall turn the other out of doors: North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee.
18. Failure or neglect of husband to provide for wife: Delaware, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, Tennessee, Rhode Island, Wisconsin.
19. Drunkenness, intemperance, intoxication (habitual): Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, North Carolina, Rhode Island, West Virginia, Wisconsin.
20. When the wife shall be given to intoxication: Wisconsin.

21. Conviction of felony or infamous crime, imprisonment: Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Rhode Island.

22. Insanity (permanent and incurable), occurring subsequent to marriage: Arkansas.

23. When either party had a former husband or wife living: Arkansas.

24. Any cause rendering marriage originally void or voidable: Rhode Island.

25. Procurement of marriage by force, duress or fraud: Kentucky.

26. Procurement of marriage when either party was under age of consent: Delaware.

27. When either party has been charged with an infamous offense and shall actually have fled from justice: Louisiana.

28. Attempt by either party upon the life of the other: Louisiana.

29. Public defamation: Louisiana.

30. Such other cause as the court may deem sufficient: Kentucky.

31. Such other causes as may seem to require the same: Rhode Island.

32. Any ground which was held sufficient in the English courts prior to May 4, 1784: Georgia.¹

It is also to be observed that these causes, so numerous, of so great variety, and in certain cases of so slight value, do represent forces that are actually at work in the disruption of the family. That these causes are actually at work is proved by the mere statement of certain cases in which divorce has been granted:—

1. The defendant (husband) does not come home until ten o'clock at night, and when he does return he keeps plaintiff

¹ Report of Commissioner of Labor, 1889, *Marriage and Divorce*.

(wife) awake talking. Defendant also keeps a saloon, which sorely grieves mind of plaintiff. The husband, replying, says that the "plaintiff should not be ashamed of him because temporarily in the liquor business; that he may do better some day; his father was a high state officer in Germany." But the divorce is awarded to the wife on the ground of "mental" cruelty.

2. Defendant does not speak to plaintiff for months at a time; thereby making life a burden.

3. Defendant made plaintiff climb a ladder to drive nails in the woodshed; not liking the way she drove the nails, he lassoed her on coming down from the ladder, tied her fast to the gate-post, then stuck sticks and straws in her nose and ears, gouged his knuckles in her eyes, and said he "wanted to see if she was Dutch." On untying her, he threw or shoved her into a nest of bees; all of which sorely grieved the plaintiff in body and mind.

4. Defendant sharpened an axe, saying he meant to chop off this plaintiff's head, and he did knock out two of her front teeth.

5. Plaintiff says she is subject to sick headaches, that grow worse when she smells tobacco. Defendant uses tobacco, and thus aggravates her headaches.

6. Defendant quotes verse from New Testament about wives obeying their husbands. He has even threatened to mash the plaintiff, and drew back his hand to do it. In the decree granting this divorce appears the following: "I find that, when plaintiff was sick and unable to work, defendant told her the Lord commanded her to work; that he was also in the habit of frequently quoting scriptural passages, in order to show her she was to be obedient to her husband."

7. For the last three years, defendant has been kicking plaintiff out of bed, compelling her to seek rest on the floor.

8. Plaintiff says: "We lived on the —— river, in —— It was sometimes a month before I saw a white person. The only neighbors we had were —— Indians. We lived in a wooden house of one room, furnished with a bed of wooden boughs. We did not have any chairs, nor even a stove. I did not complain of this; we had bedclothes enough to keep warm, and I would have been happy, but my husband threw into the fire a little curly dog that was my only companion, and then I broke down. The poor little thing was burned to death."

9. While the plaintiff was standing on a chair, defendant suddenly pushed the chair over backwards, and threw the plaintiff violently upon the floor; thereby so seriously bruising her that she became lame in her knee, and was compelled to walk with a crutch. Defendant refused to call a doctor, but attempted to cure the knee himself. He raised a blister on plaintiff's leg that has resulted in an ulcer, making her a cripple for life.

10. "Defendant cut off my bangs by force."

11. From plaintiff's testimony: "During my whole married life my husband has never offered to take me out riding. This has been a source of great mental suffering and injury."

12. Defendant was cruel in this: He caused a letter to be written saying he was dead. Plaintiff ordered a mourning garb, and grieved a long time, but at last learned the letter was a fraud, and that defendant was not dead.

13. Plaintiff says that defendant will not work during the week, but on Sunday he puts on his old clothes, and works hard all day; which conduct sorely grieves plaintiff.

14. Defendant pinched plaintiff's nose until it became red; thereby causing her mortification and anguish.

15. A rich girl, disliking her guardian, went to the hospital with the intention of marrying a dying man, thinking that, as

a widow, she would be freer, and have more control over her estate. She married a man seemingly at the point of death; but the man recovered, and wife brought suit for cruelty and fraud.

16. Husband says: "My wife refused to keep my clothing in repair. She even refused to cook, and never sewed on my buttons." A witness testified that he had seen plaintiff with only one button on his vest. Plaintiff further alleged that his wife would not allow him to go out to fires at night; that if he went she would keep him awake until three o'clock quarreling.

17. Defendant pulled plaintiff out of bed by his whiskers.

18. "My wife called me a good-for-nothing vagabond, and said she wished to God I would go away; that she did not love me, and did not wish to look at me."

19. Defendant took a dose of laudanum, solely to harass and vex plaintiff, causing him to expend much money in medical treatment; and often, to vex plaintiff, defendant goes to bed, and remains there days at a time. One day when plaintiff asked his wife to cook breakfast, she took all the dishes and smashed them on the ground. Defendant would refuse to eat, and pretend to be sick. Once she threw the dishes out of the window because plaintiff sowed grass in August.

20. Defendant took all the covering off the bed, leaving plaintiff to shiver until morning. On one occasion she jumped on him with her knees, and ran a knitting-needle four inches in his arm.

21. Husband testifies in his own behalf: "My wife would not get up in the morning; she wouldn't call me in the morning; she wouldn't do anything I requested of her; she had two brothers, who would come to my house and say they would thrash me and make me do anything my wife wanted me to do."

22. Husband says: "My wife would not talk with me on

Sundays. Once in a tantrum she heaved a teapot at me. She hit me on the side of the jaw because I refused to be worked into a passion; once she pulled out quite a quantity of my hair." Among the papers was a tuft of hair marked Exhibit A.

23. Defendant is a powerful woman, weighing one hundred and ninety pounds; she struck plaintiff with a stove-lid, and broke one of his ribs; on another occasion she knocked plaintiff down with a chair.¹

The summaries of the laws and the great number of instances, which I have given, of the application of these laws, resulting in the granting of divorces, make evident that the American practice is utterly and absolutely at variance with that integrity of the marital relationship which Christ commanded. The present practice and Christ's command represent two opposite procedures. Christ's command indicates that the family was established for society, for humanity. The present practice indicates that the family was established for what seems to be the happiness of the individual members of the family. If society exists in order to gratify the whim or the prejudice of either the husband or wife as the heads of the family, divorces may, and should, be granted for slight causes. For nothing can be more certain than that few conditions are more productive of abject misery than the conditions embodied in a home in which husband and wife contemn or are indifferent to each other. Such a union, which is indeed not a union, creates evil in the husband and wife themselves, blasts the happiness and sound ethical training of children, who have a right to look for happiness and for the conservation of their rights in the united love of their parents. Such a condition also represents a social unity or disunity which is of pestiferous influence. On this ground it seems inevitable that divorce should

¹ Report of Commissioner of Labor, 1889, Marriage and Divorce.

be made easy, and may become, as a natural result, frequent. But, on the other hand, if the family exists, not for itself, but for humanity, the inference is equally inevitable that the overthrow of the family aids in the disintegration of the race and of its institutions. To me, the choice, although it may be difficult in many instances to make, is in itself naturally clear. The family represents an institution fundamental, essential, structural to human society. It is impossible to contemplate the higher society without the family. Therefore, to interfere with it, is to interfere with the relationship, which should be as constant and unerring as is the law of gravitation.

One of the most pregnant remarks made by one of the noblest of social philosophers of the last third of the last century, is the remark of Sir Henry Sumner Maine, to the effect that the movement of modern society is a movement from status to contract. Without doubt, this movement has touched the family relationship, but, in my judgment, this movement touching the family relationship has proceeded altogether too far. A reverse movement should begin and continue. Marriage is both a status and a contract. The contractual side has merged into undue conspicuousness; the status side should now receive emphasis.

By the placing of a stronger emphasis upon the status, which marriage embodies, a strict divorce law would obtain, or possibly it may be said that no divorce law at all would obtain. Marriage once made creates a status, which cannot be unmade. It represents relationships to children; it represents relationships to the social order, which are fundamental, structural, and of indefinite duration.

If it were to be impressed upon the community that marriage represents a condition which only death can change, at least two results would immediately follow. First, foresight

in the making of alliances. Haste, lack of knowledge, influence of emotions, tend towards the making of improper marriages. Such conditions are allowed to have a stronger influence in the choice, or the acceptance of husbands and wives, because of the knowledge that the law may easily be summoned for the correcting of mistakes. A woman once said to me, that she was, in following her profession of a stenographer, often obliged to take her little boy into court with her. Once her son remarked to her, that he was going to marry Susie Day, But the mother said, " You do not know Susie Day very well, and she does not know you, and you may not like each other." But said the little boy, who had heard many a divorce suit, " If I don't like her, I can divorce her." Under a strict divorce law, or the absence of any divorce law, the evils arising from lack of knowledge or passion would at least partially be avoided. A second result of absolute strictness in the law would be to promote mutual self-restraints and amiability. Most husbands and wives can live together if they know they are obliged to live together. Of course one should not blind oneself to the fact that in case there be permanent antagonism in the family, such antagonism tends to promote the forming of illicit alliances outside of the domestic boundaries. Such alliances are, of course, the result of evil, and the cause of evil, and such an evil one must contemplate, as inevitable.

One of the primary difficulties in looseness of the divorce law is that it tends to create the very evils which it is designed to remove. The practice grows by what it feeds upon. A lack of respect for marital obligations tends to create loose laws for the removing of these obligations, and loose laws, which remove these obligations, tend to create a loose practice. The evil is of the same sort which obtains in the case of an unredeemable paper currency. The greater the demand

for such a currency, the greater is the issue; and the greater the issue, the greater the demand. The more loose the practice touching freedom of divorce, the looser become the laws respecting divorce; and the looser become the laws regarding divorce, the looser becomes the practice.

But although Christ thus speaks forbidding divorce, he makes no remark regarding what is called, in modern procedure, "separation." It is not too much to infer that Christ allows separation. Nothing does he say against this method of a partial preservation of the family. But be it affirmed that such a method is an anomalous condition in the social order. It is a condition bad for each of the two parties separated, and also bad for society itself. Against such a separation, this divorce from bed and board, many of the best text writers are united. Of it Mr. Bishop says, "The injured party, in mockery of redress, is kept under all the burdens of matrimony, and cut off from all its benefits. This proceeding, neither dissolving the marriage, nor reconciling the parties, nor yet changing their natures; having, at least, no direct sanction from Scripture; characterized by Lord Stowell as casting them out 'in the undefined and dangerous characters of a wife without a husband, and a husband without a wife'; by Judge Swift as 'placing them in a situation where there is an irresistible temptation to the commission of adultery, unless they possess more frigidity or more virtue than usually falls to the share of human beings'; by Mr. Bancroft, as punishing 'the innocent more than the guilty'; . . . is, while destitute of justice, one of the most corrupting devices ever imposed by serious natures in blindness and credulity."

Yet it would be acknowledged by all, that relief in some form should be given a husband and wife who are in apparently irreconcilable antagonism. No obligation rests upon

two persons to live together as enemies. If they cannot live together as friends, they should live apart. Therefore I beg leave to suggest that, as a means of relief, what is legally known as separation, represents on the whole a less evil than the evil of absolute divorce. By separation, as the term is construed in most States, a husband and wife are still legally married, but they live apart. It is divorce, as the legal term is, from bed and board,—not from the essential bonds of matrimony.

One reason of this recommendation lies in the fact that separation does give relief; a second reason lies in the fact that the substitution of legal separation for divorce tends to make men and women careful in entering matrimony. If a man and woman were certain that the condition of marriage, which they had in contemplation, represented a condition in which they must remain so long as they live, far greater care would be exercised before entering into that condition. No small measure of all the suits for divorce are the resultant of causes operative before marriage, which an ordinarily unprejudiced observer would have suspected, and which through common prudence one would have recognized to be so fundamental and structural as absolutely to prevent marriage.

But, as has already been indicated, there are strong reasons against this limited form of divorce. It may be said that this separation does not give entire relief. It does not. Yet also one may say, that in marriage, as in all other forms of human activity, a husband or individual should be willing to endure the consequences of his own acts. A writer upon this phase of the question says: "We do and must stand by and suffer for our deeds forever; it is the unvarying law of the universe; and from our cradles we are conditioned by circumstances.

Why, then, in a foundation-question like this of marriage, should we imagine ourselves to be exempt from law, and free to follow our wildest fancies? If a particular marriage collapses, the victims must endure the penalty of wrong choice. I do not see that they have the right to rail against the institution in which they were born, and to which all their notions of morality, the restrained 'piety of the affections,' the sacredness of the family, and all the rest of our moral safeguards are owing."¹

It is also to be acknowledged that limited divorce may permit the making of illicit connections. This evil deserves all severe and disgusting epithets. But I apprehend that this evil is far less evil than freedom of absolute divorce. Certainly the history of divorce procedure in the United States leads to the conclusion that freedom of divorce causes frequency of divorce. The desire for release from nuptial bonds produces a lax divorce law, and a lax divorce law, in turn, raises and increases the desire for freedom from the obligations of wedlock. Would it not prove advantageous if the American State were to follow the example set by South Carolina, to allow divorce for no cause whatsoever? Cannot the evils of personal antagonisms, whenever they are found existing in the family, be relieved with less peril to the family through judicial separation than through divorce?

Upon this subject it may be said in general that the individuals composing the American family, like the individuals composing the American commonwealth, are more emphatic in the expression of their desire for happiness than in the expression of their desire to do their duty and to bear their responsibilities. A mighty rage for the merely pleasant pos-

¹From letter in Chapman's *Marriage Questions in Modern Fiction*, p. 153.

sesses the American people. Pain is abhorrent. From ordinary hardships people shrink. The glory of sacrifice is not sung. The agreeable is sought for. "My rights and your duties" are more emphasized than "my duties and your rights." Happiness is presented as life's supreme ideal. I would not preach the gospel of pessimism but, without any intimation of despair, it is fair to say that at the present time the American people are the devotees of pleasure hitherto unknown. In such a condition the family suffers. The family does represent pleasure, happiness, joy, but the family also represents service, sacrifice, surrender, duty. In the severer and more serious relationship of family life, the individual is often so impressed with the burdens and responsibilities of the condition that he is eager this form of life to discard. He fails to recognize the duty which one of the partners owes the other; which both owe to society; and which they also do owe to children if children are born. In the failure to recognize these most solemn responsibilities, divorce, frequent and secured upon slight grounds, is a natural and a necessary result.

ARTICLE II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT
IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

BY THE REVEREND JAMES LINDSAY, D.D.

THE nineteenth century was præeminently the century of science, as the eighteenth was the philosophical century,—the century of Voltaire and the Illumination. A thing of deep and delightful interest is the development of nineteenth-century scientific thought. But the nineteenth-century developments must be looked at in connection with the rise of modern science. Its rise was in our own country. One may very well claim to be heretical enough to dissent from the currently accepted view which makes Lord Bacon, in some sort, the father of all modern scientific achievements, and the pioneer of all scientific movement. Such a view stands in need of correction and serious modification. No doubt it was the merit of Bacon to have presaged and prophetically announced the new ideal and spirit of scientific advance, and to have given useful and healthy directions for the goal being attained. It was Bacon's great merit to have brought into view an empirical principle capable of general application. But his was the defect to have failed to carry out that principle to any fruitful or corporeal issue. He had not, in fact, the patience and the exactitude of a great scientific mind; and he really missed the goal to which he aspired, when it came to the working out of his great visions of reality in actual investigations. Indeed, the Baconian way of gathering facts first, and leaving theorizing to come afterwards, is too easily capable of proving a

rather disastrously fallacious one for research of any sort. It would not be difficult to show how thinkers, early and late,—Aristotle, Hegel, and Tennyson, for examples,—have caught glimpses of really truer modes of thinking. It was Newton who, by his actual scientific patience and brilliant power, laid down the guiding lines of scientific principle, and gave these principles splendid application, so that they rested on sure and permanent basis. The law of universal gravitation associated with Newton in the seventeenth century and the “law of Watt” in the eighteenth, which determined the latent heat of steam condensation at different temperatures and pressures, bring us, in the briefest way, to the nineteenth century. It was the triumph of the nineteenth century to have made science no more a merely national thing, but something international—a European thing; one result of which is, that a truncated or disjointed view of the developments of its scientific thought can be avoided only by looking, not at British science alone, but at the developments of France, Germany, and Britain. This we shall do briefly in turn.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, France had become the chosen home or metropolis of science. It had had, in the seventeenth century, its Descartes, great alike as philosopher and mathematician, in fact, a more original and powerful force in the way of actual contribution to science than Bacon. It is an exceedingly interesting fact that so many of the French philosophers were also eminent mathematicians. There were, for example, Descartes, Pascal, and Malebranche, in the seventeenth century; in the eighteenth, Fontenelle, D'Alembert and Condorcet; and in the nineteenth, Comte, Renouvier, and Cournot. Not a few of the modern sciences had their foundations in France, some of them under the influence of the strictly mathematical spirit. Of these latter were

the science of crystallography and the famous theory of probabilities. Laplace, Lagrange, Legendre, and others were among the foremost exponents of the mathematical spirit. A significant incident of that time was the Emperor's sending for M. Laplace, after his great work on the theory of the heavens appeared, and asking how it was that the name of God did not appear in that great work; to which Laplace replied, *Sire, je n'ai pas besoin de cette hypothèse* ("Sire, I had no need of that hypothesis"). For it showed that already it was understood how science had, as science, its own work to do in the world without calling in the aid of divine action. Laplace was the first to give a great and broad setting forth of the ideas of Newton. Besides the independent footing gained for the mathematical sciences, an altogether new and sure foundation was laid for the science of chemistry by Lavoisier; while that rare exponent of the modern scientific spirit, Cuvier, introduced comparative anatomy and palæontology. As a result, the whole of nature became more completely grasped. Nothing seems, in our view, more striking in French scientific thought than the value set upon strictness of method. In fact, from the days of Descartes on to those of Comte, there has been a tendency in France to make method science itself. There have been constant aim and tendency towards deduction, but yet in such wise that room and play have been found for empiricism in method. The positive philosophy of Comte, it should be remembered, was far enough from giving its sanction to empiricism. Its demand was that observations be explained by theory and combined into a law. Its stress lay on the objectivity of truth.

When we turn to the scientific developments of Germany in the nineteenth century, we find that already the scientific bases had been there laid by men like Kepler, Leibnitz, and Euler.

Humboldt, with his vast attainments, did much to foster science. German equivalents of Laplace and Lagrange and Lavoisier and Cuvier, in France, easily suggest themselves in Gauss and Jacobi, in mathematics; Liebig and Wöhler, in chemistry; Schleiden and Schwann, in biology; Müller and Weber, in physiology, to mention no others. The scientific thought of Germany has been profoundly affected, on its mathematical and physical sides, by the philosophy of Kant, which has indelibly impressed the German intellect with the need for critical study of the principles of knowledge. The ideal of science has, in Germany, been particularly wide and high, and its pursuit has been sedulously cultivated for its own pure sake. Modern biological science has there had no greater representative than Du-Bois Reymond, who had Johannes Müller for his master. Du-Bois Reymond's work is not so widely known in this country as it deserves to be. The science of life, or physiology, ought not, he held, to be a pure morphology, or merely describe the functions of the organs, but ought to investigate the forces of the vital processes or the factors which render them possible. Such forces must not be different from those of chemistry and physics, which are governed by the laws of the conservation of energy and indestructibility of matter and movement. In other words, physiology should be nothing else than analytical mechanics of vital phenomena. Further, experiment and induction must, in respect of such methodical proceedings, take the place of abstract speculation. Du-Bois Reymond's intellect was of the pure rationalistic type, to which everything must be tabulated, analyzed, precisely valued. An ideologist he was who would give a reason for everything by means of a few elementary conceptions. The mechanical view of the study of life was carried through until, in Du-Bois Reymond's own words,

"the pale specter of a vital force could no more be seen." On higher matters, this great German physiologist held not only that consciousness cannot as yet be explained out of mechanism, but that it never will be so explained. For him *ignorabimus* was the word in this connection. Another German scientist whose work is inadequately appreciated amongst us is Helmholtz. Helmholtz was not only great as mathematician, physicist, and physiologist, but was a large and comprehensive spirit, to whom everything vital to the human spirit was of deep interest. Profoundly versed he also was in speculations rooted in the philosophy of Kant, and his investigations in the physiology and psychology of sense-perceptions were of great importance. He made noteworthy scientific advances in laying foundations for the branches of science known as physiological optics and musical acoustics. Associated his name remains with that of our own Lord Kelvin, in connection with the doctrine of the conservation of energy and the theory of vortex motions. In fine, we have in Helmholtz a rare and wonderful combination of intellectual powers of the first order. He was no votary of that blind worship of pure "fact," to which Du-Bois Reymond lent his great influence. Helmholtz thought that knowledge should be examined, its implicit elements analyzed and discovered, and the presuppositions which make it possible investigated. So differs he—for the better—from Du-Bois Reymond, to whom there was nothing *a priori* in knowledge.

The British developments in scientific thought were, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, associated with such great names as the Herschels, Priestley, Cavendish, Davy, Young, Dalton, Faraday, Brewster, Rowan Hamilton, Lyell, and others. Practically over the whole course of nineteenth-century thought, the influence of Dalton's atomic theory of

matter has been felt, even though, after various modifying tendencies, it can hardly yet be said to have reached perfectly stable equilibrium. The same thing is true of the influence of Dr. Thomas Young's undulatory theory of light, with the existence of ether. British scientific thought was too little an organized product—too much the result of scientific individualism. In the second half of the century, natural philosophy was as good as revolutionized under Lord Kelvin and the late Clerk Maxwell. Since 1860, the influence of Darwin has been particularly felt. Great was Darwin's caution of intellect, and enormous the mass of facts on which he rested his great induction—the law of natural selection. Its influence was far-reaching, and statical pre-Darwinian philosophies were almost immediately affected, in their powerlessness to appreciate development. It was felt that neither Comte, nor Hegel, nor Buckle, nor Mill, had done justice by the dynamic and kinetic elements of actual Nature. The full philosophic conception of evolution as a cosmical process has been set forth by Spencer with the varied splendor of a great cosmical law. In fact, the second half of the century was concerned with these three great scientific ideas: (1) Darwin's theory of descent, or the principle of evolution; (2) the law of the conservation of energy, associated with the names of Joule, Thomson, and Helmholtz; and (3) Faraday's conception of electrical phenomena, or the principles of electromagnetic induction and electrolysis. For the scientific man who is also a philosopher, the principles and canons of scientific thought have an interest beyond that of the sciences themselves. These have not lacked expounders in Sir John Herschel, Comte, Mill, Whewell, and the late Professor Jevons. Almost every leading idea in the scientific thought of the century had been long before anticipated, but such precise state-

ment and correct analysis of them had not before been given.

And an altogether new stimulus was given to thought, in the latter half of the century, by the doctrine of the persistence of matter and of force, and the enunciation of the law of natural selection. We have seen that the fundamental conception of Du-Bois Reymond was, that natural causes can be no other than mechanical causes. Of the mechanical interpretation of reality, the complement is found in the theory of evolution. Particular sciences have shown themselves, from their methods of procedure, unable to find a solution for many of the problems raised, and the need has grown more manifest that scientific thought become more deeply penetrated with the method and fundamental conceptions of critical philosophy. In fact, it is just such interpenetration which gives present-day scientific speculation whatever tendencies it has of a more vital character. It ought never to be forgotten that it is only the *how* of the universe which such scientific thought can give us, not its *what*. But that is precisely what both Huxleyan teaching and Spencerian doctrine have failed to understand. It was the merit of Huxley to feel the need of a theory of knowledge, but he did not have a clear consciousness of his own theory of the subject. To him truth easily became the private property of the scientific method; so forgetting that, though all knowledge is capable of scientific treatment, such treatment is by no means exhaustive of reality. A philosophy of reality is still necessary. For science has not the inner life and wealth of concrete reality for its aim and object. Huxley thought we can only understand spirit, if we view it as matter; so making the astonishing mistake of forgetting that the only thing of which we are certain, is spirit. So, too, Spencer failed, in his own way, to distinguish sufficiently between theory of knowledge and metaphysic; pouring,

in fact, a metaphysical signification into the former. Spencer's criterion is a more subjective one than Huxley's: the former speaks of "assuring ourselves," while the latter craves "demonstrability." Both in England and in Germany scientific thought, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, showed an increasing sense of the importance of these questions of epistemology, and the last word is far from having been said upon the subject. Not a little of the stimulus to thought in this direction has been given by Helmholtz, Professor Ostwald, St. George Mivart, and others. The latest scientific thought of our time seems to require always more the abandonment of the naturalistic method, and to call for some interpretation of reality such as may be found in some form of spiritualistic monism.

ARTICLE III.

PROFESSOR PARK'S THEOLOGICAL SYSTEM.¹

BY THE REVEREND FRANK HUGH FOSTER, PH.D., D.D.

THE Bible having now been established as the means of the divine revelation, the doctrines peculiar to the Bible can be introduced. Of these the first examined is

THE TRINITY.

Park's treatment of this theme is determined by his historical situation. New England was not yet out of the period of the Unitarian controversy when he began his professional work, and the antithesis to Unitarianism remained throughout his entire career more distinctive of the theological condition of things than any other element. Hence Park devoted an unusual amount of space to the doctrine of the Trinity. But this did not lead him to go into such discussions as fill Augustine's treatise, or make up what Dr. Hodge would call the "protestant doctrine." The great portion of this unusual space was devoted to the central part of the Unitarian denial,—to the divinity of Christ. As to the rest, Park followed historically, and for substance of teaching, Moses Stuart, who had met many of the Unitarian denials by abandoning indefensible positions and concentrating his forces on the central elements of the truth. Stuart had abandoned the word "person" as descriptive of the three elements of the Trinity, substituting for it the less objectionable word "distinction." With this had gone a great mass of pseudo-biblical and philosophically untenable theological barnacles,

¹ Continued from Vol. lx. p. 697.

such as the "eternal generation" of the Son, and the "procession" of the Spirit. And, in general, Stuart had confined himself to the simple results of Nice and Chalcedon,—one God in three ontological and eternal distinctions, one Christ in two natures, human and divine. Park also refused to advance beyond this point, affirming our ignorance of many things. "On this doctrine," he says, "we must be careful not to know too much." "The profit of the doctrine of the Trinity is derived in some degree from the fact of its mysteriousness." He thus relieved his pupils of many difficulties which proved highly perplexing to others who had been taught to identify all the forms of this doctrine with its substance, when in the process of time, the discussions of the new era of criticism and evolution had begun. They had comparatively little to "unload."

The path of approach to the subject was determined by the inductive method of investigation, which Park had adopted, and of which many an example has already been given in the discussions of the order of his arguments. He begins the Trinity with the doctrine which historically led to it, the nature of Christ; and this he begins at the point nearest to the investigator, the humanity.

As to this, comparatively little is said. The ordinary and simple New Testament evidence of a genuine human body and soul are presented, and the conclusion of true humanity drawn without great elaboration. No special controversy existed in New England over this point. Simple facts, like Christ's ignorance of the condition of the fig-tree, and the time of the destruction of Jerusalem, are noted without further comment. They serve to help prove that Christ was truly man.

When the argument passes to the divinity of Christ, however, the combatant has evidently come forth in his full ar-

mor. The sole question is, "What is the *fact*?" and that fact is the biblical fact. Consequently the whole argument consists in a biblico-theological discussion of the New Testament; but it is conducted in the most elaborate manner, with the marshalling of innumerable texts, and under eleven general heads. Christ is God because (1) he is *called* so; (2) said to be equal with God in *condition*; (3) does the *works*, and (4) has the *attributes* of the Supreme Being; (5) receives divine *honors*; (6) has applied to him in the New Testament the *same* passages elsewhere applied to the supreme God; (7) left the *impression* on his contemporaries that he was God; (8) the Scriptures make this *impression* on the masses of men; (9) Christ's divinity commends itself to the *moral nature* of man; (10) the *concurrence* of these proofs is itself a distinct proof; (11) *no other supposition* will reconcile the Scriptures and consciousness.

As one re-reads the argument to-day, he is struck with its scrupulous accuracy in the use and interpretation of the texts. Under the first head, 1 Tim. iii. 16 is not cited, because "the external [MS.] evidence is against the reading 'God,' although the internal is for it." Nor is Acts xx. 28 adduced, because "God" is also disputed here. In treating Romans ix. 5 the argument is contextual, and the sense is relied on to show that the Christ is called "God blessed forever." The most impressive argument is drawn from Christ's works,—of creation, preservation, raising the dead, the judgment of the earth,—which cannot run off into mere verbal discussion. In fact, Park does not press verbal arguments as strongly as he might. Under head (6) those numerous cases of Old Testament quotations in the New might have been more fully cited, by which it appears that the apostles felt at perfect liberty to apply any text making assertions in respect to Jehovah (in

the Greek LXX. κύριος) directly to Christ, because he too is Lord (N. T. κύριος). It is an altogether inexplicable ~~use~~ if they did not view Christ as God.

I have already said that Park did not advance in any respect beyond the Chalcedon positions as to the person of Christ,—two natures, human and divine, each perfect and entire, in the unity of one person. He consented to follow his Calvinistic predecessors in the Nestorianizing distribution of ignorance to the humanity and omniscience to the divinity in respect to the same thing and at the same time. How was any “unity of person” possible under such a view? Park does not seem to have really raised this question. He illustrates what he himself says of Julius Müller, whom he always styled (while he lived) “the greatest of living theologians,” that “his greatness is nowhere better seen than in this monstrous blunder.” The remark was made of Müller’s efforts, by means of a doctrine of “kenosis,” to solve the Chalcedon paradox. Park was therefore not ignorant of this most strenuous effort of German evangelical theology to solve the difficulties of the theme; but he rejected it. It is not plain that he fully understood it, for he says, in explanation of the remark, that the theory is “absurd.” “A being who is weak cannot by his weakness turn himself into omnipotence.” No kenotic ever thought he could. But one must make such a criticism of the acute and indefatigable Park with caution. If *he* did not understand the kenotics, it is perfectly certain that *they* did not understand one another. Like evolution, kenotism was long in “coming to itself”; if, indeed, it has yet done so.

The chief difficulty of the doctrine of the Trinity was met when the divinity of Christ was proved, for those who have accepted this element have never found special difficulty with

the personality of the Holy Spirit. But Park gives an independent and thorough investigation to this remaining portion of the theme, that, when independently proved, it may lend corroboration, by its reflex influence, to the doctrine of the divinity of Christ. We need not follow him through this proof, which is exclusively biblical. At its close comes the summary of the whole doctrine in the form of definitions of the Trinity. The first and best of these is this: "The Father is God: the Son is God: the Holy Spirit is God. Neither is God without the others. Each has a property incommunicable to the others. There is only one God." There is no attempt at a rationale of the doctrine. Various objections are answered and misunderstandings cleared away; but the doctrine is confessedly a mystery resting on revelation, and only partially revealed. Although Park had studied Hegel under the guidance of no less a man than Kahnis, there is no trace of acceptance of Hegel's "construction," or of interest in it.

The treatment of the Trinity then closes with a couple of sections on the Sonship of Christ, and the procession of the Spirit. The term Son is applied in the New Testament to the historical Jesus Christ, and designates him as miraculously conceived and especially dear to the Father. Modern biblical theology has so generally followed this position that we need say nothing further on it here. But as this was the first distinctive point (formally) of the "New School," and was always introduced by Park as such, it is interesting to note his remarks made here on the characteristics of the school. "The New School," he says, "avoid those technical terms which will suggest a false idea, unless the terms are explained away (e.g. 'eternal generation'). They refuse to convert figurative, poetical phrases into metaphysical dog-

mas (e.g. the phrase 'This day have I begotten thee' (Ps. ii. 7) into an assertion of '*eternal generation*'). They refuse to substitute metaphysical theories for plain biblical teaching." In the first of these sentences speaks the dogmatician; in the second the preacher of the sermon on "The Theology of the Intellect and that of the Feelings"; and in the last the practical New England pastor.

DECREES.

The progress of our study is thus gradually, but only gradually, bringing us to a view of the distinctive theology of Professor Park. Most of his teaching was identical with that of all evangelical theologians. But one great distinctive position has been as yet noticed, and that only partially,—his position on the nature of virtue as applied to the character of God. I do not include the so-called "first peculiarity of the New School," on "eternal generation," because, after all, that is not characteristic or determinative of his thought, however peculiar to the New School it may have been. We are to find our next distinctive position in his treatment of the will. It might conduce to clearness if we plunged at once into this topic. But we actually encounter next, in the course of Professor Park's own development of his system, the subject of decrees; and faithfulness to him, as well as the necessity of letting him speak in his own way if we wish to gain the fullest knowledge of his innermost thought, compels us to attack decrees before the will. It was the *inductive* character of his system that prompted this order. The theory of the will is chiefly valuable as a means of explaining and defending decrees. The fact must come before the theory of the fact, and hence decrees before the will.

Whatever else Park was, he was a Calvinist. He used sometimes to say, that Calvinism was the only "respectable"

theology. This was a specimen of his playful sarcasm; but "many a truth is spoken in jest," and his sarcasm often covered his most profound convictions. He was also a High Calvinist. He was of the strain of Hopkins, in the New England theology, and Hopkins was "higher" than Princeton has ever dreamed of being. Other theologians might weakly leave something to the ungoverned freedom of man, as even Augustine seemed to leave the fall of Adam, but Hopkins, and Park after him, included the fall as fully in the decree of God as the sending of the Son or the election of an individual to salvation. And hence the subject of decrees was begun by Park with a definition: "The decrees of God are his plan so to constitute and circumstance the universe as to secure the *previous certainty of ALL events which actually occur.*" In fact, Park was a supralapsarian, forced to that position against his choice by his theory of the will. True, he treats supralapsarianism in a special section, and rejects it by saying of it that it is "unreasonable and arbitrary"; but he does not give any reason for this condemnation. This is the stranger because he had in his theory of virtue the means of pulverizing it as no theologian before him had been able to do. He might have said: "Supralapsarianism is the theory, that, irrespective of the fall, and without prevision of the same, God, from all eternity, for the glory of his mercy and the praise of his justice, separated men into two classes, and foreordained the one unto eternal life and the other unto eternal death. This theory is *impossible*; for (1) it regards men, antecedent to all sin, either as mere mathematical units, or as merely sentient beings, their moral nature and questions of desert being disregarded. (2) As mere mathematical units they can be the object of no moral judgment, and so neither condemned nor acquitted. (3) As merely sentient, they must

become the objects of the divine *benevolence*, by which God *must choose to do them good, and good only*, and hence none of them can be reprobated. (4) Hence in neither case can there be the separation described." But Park does not say this. Why? The answer, I believe, is to be found in his determinism, which made substantial supralapsarianism necessary to him, however unwelcome. *This discord between the nature of virtue and the theory of the will is the great defect of Park's system, and would have been fatal to it had there not been a corresponding inconsistency in the theory of the will itself.* We are, accordingly, approaching rapidly to the deepest secret of Park's theology. It is his *crux*.

But we must first pause over the subject of decrees. Park derives his doctrine fundamentally from the sovereignty, or supreme causality, of God. His whole theology follows the Calvinistic tendency to exalt God. It is wise, best, desirable, and really accepted by all men (when in their right minds) that God should govern all things. Methodists and Calvinists really agree. If the latter say that God *intends* to do a thing, the former say he does it *intentionally*! And it is a fundamental idea that decrees are no greater, and no other thing in religion than in ordinary affairs. God "*foreordains whatsoever comes to pass actually.*"

The development of the subject is therefore primarily apologetic. The word "decree" is a bad word. "Plan" would be much better. It pertains primarily to what *God himself* will do, and only secondarily to what his *creatures* are to do, as the *certain*, but *not* necessary, consequence of his action. The connection here is made under the Edwardean theory of the will, to which we are soon to pass. God acts, and he knows exactly how men will act, and thus by decreeing his own action, he plans, decrees, secures, but does not force or compel

the action of man. No sooner does Park thus make a definition than he laments its terms; "predestination," "election," "reprobation," are all "unfortunate."

For the sake of illustrating both his doctrine and some of the elements of his method, I subjoin here, as I have hitherto refrained from doing, Park's treatment of one point of the subject of decrees. What follows are merely *heads*: the illuminating and enforcing discussion of the heads, their "development" in no ordinary sense of that word, we must dispense with. It was always extempore, and is gone into the great abyss of time, except as preserved in the memories of hearers. But something of the real Park will here be seen by all readers, and more will be recalled to some who were once hearers.

"2. The doctrine of Reprobation is not inconsistent with benevolence,

"a. It is for the best that God should not prevent sin, and he does not. It is best that he should leave some men to themselves, and he does leave some to themselves. The greater part he elects, the few he permits to perish. We have a right to make the supposition that the proportion of those saved to those lost, in this and other worlds, is as one grain of sand to the myriad grains of the seashore.

"b. It is not unjust for God to leave the reprobate to themselves, for they deserve nothing.

"c. He does leave men to themselves; therefore it is right for him to *decree* to leave them to themselves.

"d. God does place and constitute some men so that they will sin. Then it is right for him to do so.

"e. All the arguments which prove that it is benevolent for God to permit sin, prove also that it is benevolent and just to *decree* to permit sin.

"f. All the arguments which prove that it is best for God on the whole to permit sin, prove that it is for the best that he *decree* to permit sin.

"Remark. All these objections to the doctrine of decrees lose their force when we consider that *men are free, notwithstanding the decrees.*" [Here, as indicated by the notes, Professor Park introduced Lyman Beecher's famous comparison. Election is as if a man should go to a prison, open all the doors and loose every chain, and then call to the prisoners to come out! They will not. Then he rushes in, seizes as many as he can and drags them out. These are the "elect." Those whom he is obliged to leave, all of whom have been set free, and invited to come out, and every one of whom *could*, but *does not, come*, are the "reprobates."]

THE WILL.

We have thus come, by the regular constructive method of Park's system, to that point which may be properly called, as above remarked, its *crux*. If the question of the will can be properly solved, consistency may be brought into the doctrine not merely of the decrees, but of the other saving activities of God. But failure here will involve partial or more complete failure at many another point of the system.

It was both Professor Park's happy and his unhappy lot to follow in the development of a school which had been largely founded by a famous work upon the will by its great leader, Jonathan Edwards. That work made the connection between motives, such as the apple which in a given act I may choose and appropriate, and the agent, a *causative* one. The difference between moral and physical causation lay, in Edwards' phrase, "rather in the terms connected than in the nature of the connection." Hence his theory is one of philosophical necessity or determinism; and he expressly limits our "free-

dom" to our ability to *do* (externally) what we *choose* (internally). To be sure, just what he meant may be subject of much question, and of various interpretation, and may never be known by the ordinary mind, for he was (probably) a Berkeleian idealist, and even the connection of cause and effect in the physical world was ultimately simply a connection of ideas in one's mind! But, at all events, that subjective, idealistic connection of ideas is a certain, infallible, inevitable, unalterable, necessary connection—words meaning here the same thing,—and *such* is the connection of motives and choices in the Edwardean system. The will always is as the greatest apparent good.

Park so admired and revered Edwards that he believed himself at every point in this theory a follower of the master. Why he so thought is one of the mysteries of the subject. He was himself a greater mind than Edwards. Not one important position, not one important argument sustaining his positions, did Edwards himself originate, but took them all bodily from Locke, his own great philosophical teacher, in whose "Essay" they may be read to-day. Park must have known this! Edwards' work was preëminent only for its acuteness, elaboration, comprehensiveness, and mercilessness in the pursuit of what he deemed error. Park's admiration of these qualities, and of the service which Edwards rendered by the perfect timeliness of his writings in saving evangelical theology in America, was so great that it blinded him, apparently, to every other aspect of the matter. This was the easier, because Edwards' phraseology on this most slippery of all metaphysical themes is capable of two quite divergent interpretations, of which the most favorable to Edwards, and the most useful for apologetics, had been already given by Jonathan Edwards the Younger. Park seized this inter-

pretation and declared it the true interpretation, and thus concealed from himself his greatest divergence from Edwards. His further divergences could then the more easily remain hid from his own eyes.

These divergences pertained to three points:—

1. Edwards followed the old division of the mind into the understanding and affections, and subsumed the will under the latter head. He hence confounded the affections and the will, and made a hundred times the fallacy of gliding from "inclination" considered as a desire to inclination as a volition without being conscious of it, which, of course, was the fallacy of "ambiguous term." Park, on the contrary, followed the threefold division into intellect, sensibility, and will, and was always consistent in the distinction.

2. Park denied the *causal* connection between motives and choices. Hence he interpreted the maxim, which he himself preserved, "The will always is as the greatest apparent good," as embodying the *usage*, not the necessitated action, of the will. It *might* at any moment choose the least apparent good; but it never *does*, and it never *will*. This was the younger Edwards' interpretation of his father.

3. Park gave a new meaning, and above all a new force, to the idea of natural ability to choose, which he would have made a real freedom but for the shackles laid upon him by that maxim, which he thought he had evacuated of its mischief, but which, like a tamed cobra, possessed both the power and the will to poison the theory, if not the practical application, of any theology cherishing it.

These divergences were of the utmost importance for subsequent thinkers, but it was chiefly because of their extension and enlargement on account of practical considerations. We now concern ourselves with the theoretical position in which

they left Park's theology. In a word, this was that of supralapsarian determinism.

Park maintains that the will always *is* as the greatest apparent good. Take any human being, from Adam down, and he comes into a world of goods, already fixed independently of his volitional action. His own balance of desires and tendencies, (subjective natural motives, in Park's terminology,) previous to his first choice, is also fixed independently of himself. Now he chooses,—puts forth his *first* choice. It *is* as the greatest apparent good. What that good presented to him is, is independent of himself. What there is about it, or about him, that renders it apparently good is independent of him. The "greatest apparent good" is absolutely *objective* to him considered as a free, choosing, being; and his will *is* as that good. The same is true of every subsequent choice, for if the will, the previous choice, is at any moment operative in determining what he *desires* and thus modifies the "appearance," it was itself not *his*, but was *as* the (previously) apparent good. Hence two things follow:—

1. Such a connection between motives and will is *causative*; and hence Park has not avoided the abyss of Edwards' necessity,—nor that of Spencer or even Spinoza.

What is a causative connection between phenomena? I see a spark applied to powder and then I see an explosion. This is the uniform fact. The explosion always *is* as the application of the spark. I apply heat to ice and it melts. Whenever I see invariable connection of antecedents and certain consequents, I say, the former are the *cause* of the latter. Professor Park elsewhere reasons in this way. He is thoroughly opposed to John Stuart Mill's theory of causation. He says that *whenever* we see the invariability which Mill affirms, we go farther than Mill, and declare that there is *power* there; and

we thus arrive for the first time at the true idea of causation. Apply the same reasoning to his own maxim; and whenever we perceive that the "will *always* is as the greatest apparent good," we say, The good is the *cause* of the action of the will; *and we cannot say anything else while we have the powers of human reasoning left.*

Park, of course, perceived that this objection would be made to him (in fact, like many another student, I made it myself), and his answer was ready. This uniformity is uniformity of *usage*. The will can choose the greatest apparent good freely, as freely as it could a lesser apparent good. And it always *does* freely choose the greatest apparent good. That it always does it freely, however so many times, is evident from consciousness; for consciousness declares of every choice that it is free.

We may rejoin that we are not conscious that every choice is free, for many are not; as, for example, my choice this morning to brush my hair with my brush. But of free choices,—for man does make such, and of these only, is our discussion here,—consciousness not only declares that the choice is free, but it often declares also that the choice is *not* one of "the greatest apparent good." It is an abuse of language as well as of morals to declare that the drunkard choosing the cup believes or feels it in any sense "good"! So that consciousness, if it is for freedom, as it is, is against the uniformity of the Edwardean maxim!

It is the more strange that Park did not see this because, if the will always is as the greatest apparent good, then, on his theory of virtue, *there can never be any sin*. Sin is the choice of the lower instead of the higher or greater good. If a man chooses the greatest apparent good, that is, the thing which on the whole seems best to him, that act is a vir-

tuous act. And as every act is such a choice, according to Edwards, every act is virtuous. This argument can be met only by saying that the "greatest apparent good" is that which appeals more to the man, affords the greatest total present gratification, is the easiest to choose, has the most desire for itself. But if it is these, it is *truly* the greatest good, *unless* the man knows all the time that to choose it he must forsake duty for it, and that the desire it will gratify is an *evil* desire which he ought *never* to harbor. But then it is neither good nor apparently good! It is bad, and nothing but bad.

In fact, the term "greatest apparent good" is another example of the "ambiguous middle" in Edwards' reasoning of which "inclination" is the first and principal. Now it means the preponderating object of the sensibility, and now that of the conscience or of the whole harmonious man. No one can tell when it oscillates from one to the other; and hence *any* argument *may* be vitiated by it, and *most are*.

2. This theory is essentially supralapsarianism. The decrees of God are eternal. They surround the first, equally with every, act of the will. There is never a moment of freedom, of action not predetermined. Augustine made man free in his fall; Edwards and Park made him no more free there than anywhere else. In view of this, all questions of the *order* of the decrees are trivial. Was the decree to make man sin prior or subsequent to the decree to damn him? Who cares? The main fact is that *all* of every man's action and of all men's is decreed,—his fall, his sin, as well as his punishment for sin. God's decree embraces everything. It was not that God *foresaw* man's sin, and then decreed to punish him. He did not *foresee*, he decreed man's sin. There is not one atom of freedom, one moment of personal responsibility, deliberation,

individual and uncaused action on the part of man anywhere. All is necessitated.

Professor Park, of course, elaborately denies these positions, and, as we are about to show, escapes them,—but not consistently. We are now holding him strictly to his theories as they must be interpreted, if he consistently maintains the Edwardean theory of the will, as he says he does. He says, God does not *positively* decree the sin of Adam or of any other man. But he “circumstances and places” man so that he “will certainly sin,” and Adam as much as any son of his. Now that is, in plain words, *surrounding him with motives* leading to sin,—and motives are *causes* producing sinful action. The distinctions utterly evaporate as soon as the maxim, “always is as the greatest apparent good,” is remembered. That is *causation*.

The charm of such a view of the will's action, by which this grim and inhuman theory retained its hold upon the minds of Edwards and Park, is to be found in its relation to the concept of God. God was viewed by them both as unchangeable in all his perfections, in his wisdom, knowledge, blessedness, etc. His government was perfect also. Now, if there had been any true grief in God, his eternal blessedness would have been impaired; if any ignorance, even the slightest, of the future free acts of man, his infinite knowledge would have disappeared; if any failure to control any, even the least act of man, even so little an act as putting the finger *at random* on any square of a checkerboard (which example Edwards elaborately discussed), then there would be no divine government left whatever! The perfection of the logician, of the systematician,—a geometrical perfection,—was thus demanded in respect to life, even the life of God; and these great men continued to demand it in entire obliviousness of the fact

that they were now discussing not the Living God, but an intellectual abstraction, as cold as an iceberg, and as unreal as the Olympian Zeus. A colossal blunder certainly, but one of which "only colossal minds could be guilty."

The third peculiarity by which Park departed from Edwards undid, however, most of the harm of these supralapsarian positions. He gave a new meaning to "natural ability." This he defined as real ability, the ability to choose freely either right or wrong. "Moral ability" is not properly ability at all, since it is mere willingness. But natural ability is true, spontaneous, primal, causality. A man has natural ability to repent, always, everywhere, without the influence of the Holy Spirit, without church or Bible; but he *never* will so repent. He hasn't "moral ability"; that is, he *won't*. But he *can*.

Now, Park himself may have been perfectly consistent here with his Edwardean positions. He may have maintained that "natural ability," while complete, was *never* exercised, even in so small a matter as lifting the finger to brush away a fly, without "moral ability" conjoined, that is, without a balance of motives for such an action. His emphasis on certain positions, however, and the elaborateness with which he defined and removed objections when discussing the subject of decrees, would imply not. The toil would have been so futile unless the pupil, and the master, got for the time out from under the burden of Edwards' "certainty"! His pupils made an adjustment, even if Park did not, and the impression and total outcome of the system for them at this point was something as follows:—

1. The will of man is free. He can, at any moment, choose right or wrong. This is the emphasis which Park constantly threw upon "natural ability." His statements were as ex-

treme as the most ardent devotee of free will could desire. "Man can perfectly obey the law of God, because he can love God supremely and his neighbor as himself, and can maintain such a love, and exemplify it in every individual choice." "He can do right just as easily as he can do wrong." "He can break every decree of God relating to his own conduct." "He can repent at any moment without any aid from the Holy Spirit." Such were forms of expression Park constantly used. And out of them, his pupils drew the doctrine that the will has a true, unchanged, primal causality, by which man truly originates action, and is himself the one, and the only, cause of his own action.

2. Motives, however, have a real influence on man; that is, a real tendency to move the will in this direction or that.

3. God's moral government is exercised through motives, influencing human wills. The action of a man can be determined, within reasonable limits, by his fellow-creatures, as they plan to bring such or such other motives to bear upon him. God can in a far greater sense control men's action by the same method, because he has far greater knowledge of all the conditions, internal and external, which affect the operation of those motives.

4. The scope of this government thus includes the volitions of men, and extends far beyond the reach of finite comprehension. Has it any limits? Only such, whatever they may be, as God himself has given.

5. God set in motion a universe resulting in some degree of sin. Of course, he *purposed* to permit that sin. The explanation of that permission Park has already given. Sin entered by the free act of man; and that man was as able not to commit the sin he did commit, as he was to commit it. But God foresaw that man *would* sin; and he prepared for it.

6. The condition of things now is such that, left to themselves, men will sin. This is not a necessity, but it is a fact.

7. God interferes with the course of sin as largely as he can consistently, and calls some men unto salvation. This is *election*. It is not absolute in the sense that it renders faith necessary, for any elected man *can* persist in sin and be lost; and he can be saved only by exerting this same power of freedom in the way of repentance, faith, and reformation. Are any elect thus lost? Park would say, No! His pupils would say, Possibly some are.

8. Those whom God must, to be consistent with the best interests of all, leave without such influence as will *actually* bring them to repentance, he so leaves. This is "praeterition," passing over, not "reprobation." But there is no absolute, or complete praeterition. Men have grace enough to be saved, every one. And they have "natural power," true freedom, to repent and be saved without *any* grace.

9. God never lets the world get out of his control. No "permissive decree," no "praeterition," ever implies that he stands by as a silent and helpless spectator, and sees the world going evil ways which he cannot hinder. He so guides and controls, even in the darkest times, as to bring all out eventually to his own glory. This is his perfection, but it is a living and not a mere geometrical perfection.

Park thus never accepted for himself fully an idea which is essential to his defense of the benevolence of God in the permission of sin,—the idea of the divine self-limitation. He admitted it in respect to the permission of sin, for he taught that God, having made man as he did and given him the faculty of free-will, *could* not then consistently do so and so. He never explicitly recognized the fact that God limits himself even when he creates matter; for he cannot thereafter

proceed in the universe, matter having its fixed qualities, forces, and laws, exactly as he otherwise could. He expressly rejected, as we have seen, the suggestion of Julius Müller and other kenotics, that the divine Logos limited itself in the incarnation. He really wanted a self-limitation which should be at the same time no limitation; which should explain the permission of sin, and yet not infringe the absoluteness of God's control, foreknowledge, and eternal decree, which with differences was to cover everything alike. He erred here in maintaining a doctrine of the Absolute,—the truly Unconditioned,—which is impossible when once sin, incarnation, atonement, and forgiveness are introduced. He should have listened here to Kahnis with whom he once studied, and to the great Thomasius.

Thus a new thought, new for Calvinism, was struggling in Park's mind, as yet not quite able to come to the birth. It was the idea of freedom. Not of a "gracious freedom," such as Arminians had taught, but a new natural, constitutional, and inalienable attribute of man. On the side of the theory of decrees and the will, it did not find consistent expression; but in the doctrine of sin, it did. It begat a new bearing towards these doctrines, and towards all the doctrines of theology, for it introduced into them, for the first time with completeness and power, the ethical conception. The mind of man is an ethical agent, possessed of freedom and influenced by motives. And all the great processes of redemption—the atonement as well as regeneration, conversion, and sanctification—are to be explained by this conception of his nature. We shall see how thoroughly controlled Park is by this idea as we proceed; and it needs no elaborate exhibition to show every theologian how great a modification in past theories, this fact must produce. It was nothing less than an ethical revolution in the

theological system which New England theology in Park's hands now effected.

SIN.

Park had already laid down the position that all moral agency consists in choosing. Nothing which goes before the choice is part of man's moral agency, and nothing that comes after it. Hence when he came to define sin, he put it tersely as "the voluntary transgression of known law." He proves his proposition from the testimony of conscience and the common opinions of men, and from a long review of the biblical use of the various words for sin.

This view would at once meet with opposition from those who maintain that men are sinners by nature previously to any act on their own part. Many of their objections are met by a more delicate analysis than they had been wont to apply. That "profound" objection that "men generally feel that sin lies deeper than action," is admitted; but it is shown in reply that the chosen definition of sin does not mean that it is only the outward transgression. It is *chiefly* the ethical process, the act of *choosing*. When sin is said by Park briefly to be an act, he always means, an act of the will, a volition. The objection, again, that "sin consists in something permanent, but actions are not permanent," is answered by showing that the sinner is "permanently choosing." Going still deeper, the reply uncovers the nature of character by showing that, even if moral action be interrupted, it always is sinful when resumed, for the sinner "sins whenever he can"; and even the citadel of his opponents is invaded by the further reply, that, "if a man's *nature* is such that he will sin whenever he can, then he may be called a sinner, even though he do not sometimes act it out."

Another definition of sin as "a preference of the less and lower above the greater and higher good"; and of virtue as

"a preference of the greater and higher above the less and lower good"; and still another, "a preference of the world, or of self and the world, above God"; bring Park to the question whether sin may be defined as consisting in selfishness, which he answers in the negative.

Such are Park's definitions of sin. As he defines virtue as consisting in love,—love to God supremely and to our neighbor as ourself, or more abstractly, love to being according to its worth; so he sometimes defines sin as any choice not consisting in such love or intended to carry it into execution. And it is in this sense particularly that the force of his doctrine of "depravity" appears. He makes this *universal* (all men sin) and *total* (none of the moral acts of the individual sinner are virtuous prior to regeneration). In a word, only the regenerate exercise Christian love. Stated thus, the principle seems axiomatic.

But so universal and so deep a fact as sin must have an adequate reason. Its cause, properly speaking, is the will of the sinner himself acting efficiently in producing it. But wills are led to choices by motives. Hence the question rises as to the motives leading to universal and total depravity or its *occasion*. Park specifies two occasions,—the proximate and the remote. Of the former he says: "Total depravity may be referred to a disordered state of man's constitution, existing previously to man's voluntary moral acts and occasioning their uniform sinfulness." He further defines this "disordered state" as consisting in a disproportion in his sensibilities and moral powers. Since universal sin is a fact of man's active life, the cause must be found in his nature, and this cause is his disorder. He is not fitted, in the actual world into which he comes, to lead a perfectly holy life. This disorder of nature being antecedent to every moral act, and oper-

ative from the beginning, it is necessary to conclude that man begins to sin as early as he begins any moral action. Thus he never passes through a period of holiness before beginning to sin. But Park carefully avoids various unwarranted extremes into which theologians had sometimes fallen; such as, that infants begin to sin as soon as they are born.

We are thus brought to the doctrine commonly called "original sin." So far as it taught the corruption of human nature, Park thoroughly accepted it. But when corruption was denominated, in the language of Westminster, as "truly and properly sin," he recurred to his definition of sin as consisting in wrong choice, and denied the name sin to that which has come upon man without his own voluntary action. The central point and chief interest of original sin lay, however, in its connection with Adam. Park is thus brought, as well as by the course of his own argument, to the connection of Adam's sin (the fall) and our general depravity. He answered the question as to the *proximate* occasion of total depravity by saying it was the corruption of man's nature; he now asks the occasion of that corruption, or the *remote* occasion of depravity, and answers it by the fall of man in Eden.

The fall is thus defined: "That sin of Adam by which it was rendered certain that all the moral agents descended from him should be totally depraved, and necessary that all the members of the race (Christ only excepted) should suffer appropriate evil." The proof of such a connection between Adam's sin and ours is purely biblical, and does not differ from that employed by all other Calvinistic theologians.

What, now, is the link that connects Adam's sin and the disorder of nature in all his descendants? Edwards had made it all a "divine constitution," as he was most naturally led to do by his idealistic philosophy, which makes all connec-

tion of things a connection of ideas, and teaches that all ideas arise in us immediately by the operation of deity. It is remarkable that Park adopted the same view, so far as he adopted any. The relation was established by God. Why? We do not know. How? Here he is equally silent. A suggestion at one point that heredity *may* have had something to do with it, is the only hint pertinent to this question. Of one thing, however, Park is certain,—that it was *not* by identification with Adam in his sin (“sinning *in* Adam”), nor by imputation of Adam’s sin to us. We are better off to-day under the larger view of heredity given us by evolutionary studies. We *now* know how necessary it is, in accordance with the very principles which have brought the physical and even the mental nature of man to its present condition, that, when sin has once occurred, every descendant of the sinner should be profoundly affected by it; and how increasing sinning should enlarge the affected area of the soul, how individual sins should become first habitual, then automatic, and then hereditary; so that there should be finally racial tendencies to evil rendering, by the balance of the nature thereby created (“corruption”), actual sins by all the individuals of the race certain.

Park thus set his pupils and successors free from a mass of false reasoning as to imputation and kindred matters. He transferred the matter of sin from the external, the forum, and from the influence of legal methods and analogies, to the inward, ethical nature of the soul. For this service we cannot be too grateful. That he did not furnish us with a philosophy of the universality of sin is the fault of his whole psychology of the will. He depended, when he had once got universal corruption, on the maxim that “the will always is as the greatest apparent good.” We shall have to depend on the multiplicity and complexity of temptations. But in his

affirmation of total depravity, he followed both Scripture and daily observation.

The defects of his positions in these portions of the system are nowhere better brought out than in his treatment of the salvation of infants dying in infancy. He should have said, in consistency with his fundamental principle that sin consists in the "*voluntary transgression of known law*," that infants dying before the age of moral consciousness and responsibility *have not sinned and do not need saving* in the sense in which we speak of saving sinners. Hence their salvation is as certain as that of *angels* who have never sinned. But he only ventures to say that infants *may* sin from the first moment of their birth, and *probably* do sin at an early period. They need regeneration because of their participation in universal human corruption; and they are saved by the atonement. "The whole impression of reason and of the Bible is that infants begin to sin very early. We have an instinctive *hope* that infants are saved. *We cannot perhaps prove it.* The true remark would be: I have an instinctive hope that they will be saved. Yet I cannot prove it, and am willing to leave them in the hands of God."

Yes! so must we all be! But, "shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" And can souls that have not sinned be lost? Certainly Professor Park might have said more at this point! His result falls far below the truth.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

ARTICLE IV.

THE EVOLUTION OF CHASTITY.

BY THE REVEREND HENRY A. STIMSON, D.D.

THIS article has nothing to do with biblical revelation. It raises no question as to God's creating man in his own image. Christian dogmatics as a science detaches itself entirely from the question of how God created man, that it may limit itself to the fact that He did create him, and to the consequent relationship. Man's ultimate moral responsibility unquestionably covers his entire conscious existence, and is to God. Having said this, we are free to study the phenomena of human life and character as they present themselves in the great distinctive groups: the physical phenomena, the moral, and the social.

It is now an accepted truth with the biologist that the embryo, human or animal, reveals in these earliest stages of its history the lines of its subsequent development. It is probable that if we could properly observe we should find in the protoplasmic cell from which the embryo springs an equally clear indication of what the subsequent physical history of the particular organism would be. We could know the man there as definitely as we can in the baby. It seems to be true that no two atoms in the universe are identical, and that each stands related to the group to which it belongs, or to the connection in which its inherent force is to find its subsequent opportunity, in so distinctive a way that its history may be foretold. But whether this be so or not, the important fact is that the line of development of the human embryo is that

of the later development of the man; and as the physical organs unfold in a regular sequence in the embryo, so the faculties, physical, mental, and moral, of the man, have also their fixed natural sequence. They do not all appear together. Man acquires the power to hear, to see, to digest, to stand, to walk, and also to think, to estimate, to measure, to weigh, to forecast, step by step. The moral faculties also obey the same law, and have their true sequence; fear, avarice, love, hate, desire, passion, conscience, all showing a fixed relation to a normal line of unfolding.

With perhaps not the same certainty, but along the same line, it is now generally believed that the life history of a race or a tribe is in the same way foretold in the development of the individual. Men moving together in the mass in the social organism, show the same definite, ordered development as appears in the individual man. Physical traits precede the intellectual, and they in turn the moral. Men, grouped together at first under the guidance of physical necessities, are under the control of physical powers. They need food, or a common defense, or merely physical well-being. Later they seek companionship for intellectual stimulus and gratification; and still later the moral and religious faculties find sustenance and opportunity in the association of man with his kind. So that only relatively late in any particular instance does a social group show the completed form of well-ordered existence in which the spiritual or ethical and intellectual and physical are rightly related and equally matured. In the light of this principle, now so universally recognized in human history, it is manifestly necessary to reëxamine many well-established judgments. We know that with children we do harm when we crowd upon undeveloped minds studies that properly belong only to a later physical and intellectual stage.

And we are unjust and even cruel when we demand moral discernment that lies quite beyond their years. There is, for example, a time when to a child a lie means nothing, when selfishness and greed are but the normal animal instincts, and when passion and violence are only the primitive expression of weakness and fear. Many a child has been punished for an apparent moral obliquity of which it was utterly unconscious, as it has had attributed to it motives of which as yet it was physically (and therefore morally) incapable.

With equal truth we are to measure the moral status of a community or a race only in connection with its ethical age, that is, the stage at which it has arrived in its moral development. Otherwise we are unjust. We may hold up our own standards as an ideal for its future advancement; we may not insist upon them as the measure of its present character. George Eliot says, "The level to which one man strives in vain to rise, is that to which if another falls he is lost." I propose to show the importance of this principle in one relation, and the light it casts upon a single social evil.

The other day a Southern woman, writing on the Negro question, at the South, found difficulty in putting into words the extent of her contempt for Negro women, because of what she esteems their constitutional impurity. She does not believe there is, or at least she never has known, a single negro woman whom she thought chaste. And she proceeded to justify her own antagonism to the race, and the treatment of the negro which is now expressed in Southern legislation and largely justified in Southern society, on the ground that chastity is a sacred trust divinely committed to the Anglo-Saxon race.

There is a general and singular tendency for people to assume that what is committed to them by inheritance, either

in property or personal traits, is characteristic, and marks an inherent distinction which is theirs by the grace of God. The particular possession or trait may be of most recent acquisition and in its nature readily lost. Its origin and history are bravely ignored. The wealthy daughter of the shoemaker who, having made the family fortune, has departed this life, sneers at the son of the successful tailor whose task of money-making is not yet completed; and the wife of the professor in the college town, or of the man of letters or of science in the city, has a comfortable feeling of superiority over her neighbor the wife of the grocer or the butcher. Dr. Johnson's friend who thought all foreigners are fools, has a very flourishing progeny. We none of us can easily escape the comfortable conviction that if in any direction God has given us more than others, it is because of some native and inherent superiority on our part, to which, in the divine providence, external conditions have been made properly in some degree to correspond; in the language of the French nobleman, we think, "God knows a gentleman when he sees him."

Light would be thrown on many burning questions, and something would be done to ameliorate the scorn which is frequently felt for people less favorably circumstanced than ourselves, if the history of the evolution of human society were kept in mind. In the case in hand, chastity, for example, so far from being the characteristic of a particular race or inherent in any one grade of human society, is one of the latest of acquisitions, and one of the most unstable. It pertains characteristically to no stage of human existence, and has proved as difficult to maintain among the highest as in any stage below. Witness the dissoluteness of court life in almost any generation, the immorality of princes as exalted as Louis XIV. or of queens as favored as Mary Stuart or the virgin

Elizabeth, not to speak of the notorious impurity of most European courts to-day. This has always been true. We need not go back for our proofs to the earliest periods of human society, the courts of the Pharaohs or of Sardanapalus. Unchastity was no bar to the position of woman in the best days of Greece, and in Rome the sneer of the satirist told the undisputed truth that the great ladies of the Empire counted the years by their husbands. Even a man of the personal character and refinement of Cicero did not rise above the level of his times, and readily gave away his wife to his friend. The Old Testament, authoritative expression as it is of the mind of God, is by no means a record of the lives of men who can be adopted as examples, and as a book of morals has carefully to be guarded as furnishing principles, but not patterns. Nowhere in antiquity is there evidence that feminine chastity was an original gift to any race, or was a permanent mark of any state of civilization. It is true that Tacitus noted as a characteristic of some of the remoter German tribes that they had a habit of planting their homes in the solitude of the forest, and highly prized the virtue of their women. But this was only an incidental case; and there is no instance of a race acquiring the idea of the chastity of woman as a virtue and holding it as a prized possession, except as the result of a long and bitterly maintained struggle. From the standpoint of the historian, Rénan says that "Tens of thousands of women had to be stoned to death before adultery could be got recognized by them as a crime." The difficulty with which it is held in that position in the feminine mind is illustrated by the constant falling off of public opinion even in the best society, and the manner in which those who depart from the stricter code are tolerated. Even our highly favored American life is gaining a shameful notoriety because of the looseness

of the marriage tie. We justify the sneer of the satirist, that we differ from the Mormons only in this that we drive wives tandem, and they drive them abreast. And shocking as is the evidence from time to time thrust upon us of the moral degradation that exists in neglected rural communities, the frequency with which divorce and prompt marriage with a paramour occur and awaken no condemnation in the topmost social circles in our great cities, is painful testimony to the instability of our moral standards and the prolonged and insistent struggle by which alone they can be secured.

The most brilliant and the most successful attack upon Christianity in modern times was that of Voltaire. It is by common consent the most unspiritual, immoral, and irreligious of them all. The "infamous" thing, as he termed it, against which his main assault was dealt, was simply continence and chastity. To him chastity was the mystic key of the Christian holiness. Voltaire and his friends held that chastity is no virtue at all, but generally an impediment to free human happiness. This, in the testimony of the historian to-day, is the underlying motive of the line of attack upon Christianity which has never ceased from that time to this, and has lost none of its virulence. As a professed doctrine, free love may not be decent, but it is a practical experience into which individuals, even the loftiest, are continually falling and by which whole groups of the most highly developed in human society are continually affected. Indeed, it is safe to say that to-day there is no community, whether in Christian societies or in heathen, so cultivated or so exalted that it is safe from this form of demoralization or is at any time without its numerous instances. Christianity, and Christianity alone, with the possible exception of Judaism in its later development, has proved able to arrest this tendency or to awaken or maintain this concep-

tion of virtue. So far from its being inherent in civilization and refinement, one is never safe to assume its existence. Even among Christian nations the literature which depicts the lives of the higher classes, and which certainly furnishes the reading of those classes, is loaded with suggestions of impurity. A distinguished French lecturer in New York last winter urged his hearers not to judge of the France of to-day by the novels which are produced by its chief writers, asserting that the great body of the French people, the people of common life, and outside the cities, are as pure and as simple as in any land; while at the same time he was compelled to acknowledge the gross impurity of French literature and the correctness of its picture of the most aristocratic French society. Whether we turn to Russian, or German, or Scandinavian, or even English society, the same is true, and our American aristocratic life as we see it in New York, bears its own shameful testimony. A recent visit to the older part of Pennsylvania, settled by the sturdiest and most religious of German emigrants two generations ago, brings to light a condition of impurity existing to-day among their young people that is difficult to put into words. The point to be observed is that the conception of feminine chastity as a supreme virtue, which is so easily assumed as characteristic of a particular race or group, is only a late acquisition, the result of prolonged and painful development, and is maintained only with effort. Everywhere in society, at home or abroad, there is abundant evidence of the feeling expressed by the famous French tragedienne Madame Bernhard, who, when asked by an American friend for her opinion on the Decalogue, replied simply, "*Il y en a trop.*" The truth is, as George Eliot said, that "Man is by nature an unmitigated savage; let him alone, and he lapses into barbarism." The social virtues and refinements

in which we glory and by which we so readily distinguish our superiority above our neighbors, particularly those of another speech or another skin, are often the thinnest veneer; and are at best the result of circumstances in our history or condition the most accidental. Nothing but the grace of God and the most strenuous obedience to the Christian code of ethics will preserve for us what little of permanent moral character we may at any time have acquired. Relax even a little in our watchfulness, and we seem quickly to lose all that we have gained. When, therefore, we find ourselves tempted, as people of Anglo-Saxon birth are very apt to be tempted, in discussing our relations to what we call inferior races, lightly to throw aside moral obligations or justify ourselves in departing from the strictest rule of right, on the ground that the higher code is only for ourselves, we are sure not only to deal unjustly with others but to undermine the very foundations of our boasted superiority. It is simply suicide to imply that for any immediate gain, however desirable, we are justified in setting aside the strictest observance of the moral law. There can be but one true code of morals. It has been hard to learn it, harder to maintain it in practice. But as human society advances, it gains in significance as well as in power. And there never was a time, and perhaps never a community, in which its assertion and its absolute inviolability were more to be insisted upon. We are entering upon a new stage of history. The opportunity of the Anglo-Saxon is coming in new forms of national development and in new relations to other races. The history of such virtues as we possess, and the consciousness of the unsteadiness and weakness of our practice even of those virtues which we claim as peculiarly our own, are so marked that we may well feel ourselves called to walk humbly. We may indeed be proud

of our distinction and our opportunities, but it is well not to forget the path by which we have come into them and the instability of our present tenure. Then we will be not only more just in judging others and more pitiful to those less favorably circumstanced, but also more modest and more honest in judging ourselves. Woman never held a loftier position than the one she occupies in America to-day. No one can impair it but herself. And as for the men, we will do well to try to understand the spirit of that noble-minded London physician and philosopher, the late Dr. James Hinton, who, with all his distinguished doings to choose from and his intimate knowledge of the needs of modern society, said on his death-bed: "If I am to be remembered at all, this is what I would be remembered by: I am the man who said, 'Man is so made that he can rise above the sexual passion and subordinate it to use.' There! even if that be false and all else I have said was true, I would rather be remembered as having said that one falsehood than by all the truths."

There is permanent validity in Lady Mary Wortley Montague's remark that there are but two kinds of people, men and women. This is the one unfading distinction. Upon their holding their true place and moving forward together, each without degrading the other, depends the progress of the race, and the ultimate attainment of the true goal of existence. The worth of the goal may be measured by the difficulty of the contest.

ARTICLE V.

THE READER'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE POWER
OF LITERATURE.

BY OSCAR N. FIRKINS.

It must have fallen at some time to the lot of almost every student of literature who is at once sensitive and observant of his own sensations to notice a disparity between his perceptions and his feelings. Every cultivated man knows that certain attributes in a book ought to awaken pain or pleasure; he knows that pains and pleasures of a certain kind have actually attended the perusal of the book; he has, in other words, two sources or reservoirs of critical knowledge. It seems an easy task—it is certainly a diverting exercise—to associate and compare this double evidence; but the hopes of the inquirer are often dashed by results that are questionable and perplexing. It is easy enough to name merits in writings that please us and faults in writings that we do not like; but the instant we endeavor to establish an equation or a ratio, the instant we endeavor to associate the degrees of our pain or pleasure with corresponding intensities in the beauties or transgressions that excite them, that instant we are baffled and discomfited; we begin to despair of the usefulness of criticism.

The discipline of reflections and experiences such as these conducts us to interesting conclusions. We see that degrees of merit are not deducible from the inspection and comparison of literary traits. We see that any scheme of criticism that rests upon the designation of requirements, and calculations

of the measure in which these requirements have been individually and collectively fulfilled, is a scheme which is certain to be profitless. To adopt the method of the school-examiner, to compute and combine percentages of attainment, is felt to be ridiculous and hopeless. The equations will not balance; the totals will not correspond. Books that have charmed or shaken us in the perusal reward analysis with a shorter list and poorer quality of merits than books which have only pleased; and the work which disgusts or vexes us is found on experiment to be no more assailable than the work which we tolerate or admire. There are novels which we reprobate for slighter infringements of the laws of plot than those we have condoned in Thackeray; there are poems which we chastise for fainter solecisms than those we have allowed in Browning. Works survive in defiance of standards, and perish in conformity with them. We are often nettled, in the reading of criticism, by contact with some long and strenuous indictment,—an indictment the more irritating that its counts are incapable of disproof,—which castigates and mutilates some favorite writer whose worth so far outweighs the proofs of it that truth itself is felt to be a calumny. We are often vexed, in the writing of criticism, to find merit evaporate in the effort to account for it; we are staggered by the paucity of demonstrable beauties and the profusion of indisputable faults. It is sometimes easy to praise what we want to censure, and easy to censure what we want to praise. The feelings and the intellect are both on the jury, and the jury refuses to agree.

The method of Addison in criticising "*Paradise Lost*" exemplifies the difficulty we have been trying to explain. He first lays down four fields or categories of merit,—the fable, the characters, the sentiments, and the language; he appraises Milton's excellence in each, and leaves the reader to deduce

the value of the poem from the average or aggregation of the merits of the parts. The justice of the censure which condemns such criticism as superficial is manifest enough; in feeling the whole may be more or less than the sum of the parts, and the intensity of the generated sentiment is by no means always traceable to commensurate energy in the producing cause.

Since, then, the listing and gauging of strengths and weaknesses confers no prevision of the reader's sentiments, let us turn to the laws of human feeling for an explanation of the apparent disparity between the writer's work and the reader's experience.

It is a matter of universal certainty that our mood, our disposition, the momentary dip or tilt of our inclinations, has a powerful and obvious influence on the quality of our experience. The same scenery, the same poetry, the same novel, appeal with varying force to varying moods of the same percipient. The eye of weariness will find as little pleasure in a cherished landscape as the taste of sickness in a favorite food. A mood of disgust or cynicism will level the best and the poorest of natural or artistic products into an equal incapacity to stimulate or delight us. The fatigue of an extended visit to a picture-gallery will suffice in the end to neutralize all the difference between a painting of Angelo and a common daub. We are subject in the same way to expanding and intensifying influences. The vigor of early morning, the glow of health, the wonder of childhood, the responsiveness of youth, the incentives of sympathy,—all these are things that heighten almost incalculably the power of the outer world upon our consciousness. A willingness to feel, which expands our receptivity, a willingness to be pleased, which purveys its own sustenance, account for half the intensity and half the delight-

fulness which mark our relation to the world around us. It is obvious that works of literature are included in the circle of this law. The effect of a literary work is a question partly of material, partly of the reader's mood. That it is the function of literature to supply the material is admitted on all hands; it is not quite so clearly or universally admitted that it is also its function to supply the mood.

The power of any literary instrument—a description, a witticism, an incident, a simile—is partly dependent on its own worth, partly on the state of mind in which it finds the reader. If it finds him appreciative and receptive, its mediocrity will not prevent its success; if it finds him sluggish or perverse, its excellence will not prevent its failure. The immediate cause of the stimulations and excitements of great literature lies more in the reader's than the author's mind. The materials in *Hamlet* are far better than those in *Gorboduc*; but the good we get from *Hamlet* depends far more upon the sympathetic and receptive mood in which we read it than upon the excellence of its materials. If it were possible to interchange the moods while we kept the matter; if we could read *Hamlet* with the mind we bring to *Gorboduc*, and *Gorboduc* with the mind we bring to *Hamlet*,—we might not find their values interchanged, but we should be amazed at the diminution of the interval.

The operation of disgusting and unattractive work is subject to a parallel law. A book is not ruined by its faults; they are as often as not no greater than the faults of masterpieces; it is ruined by the spirit of cavil and hostility which, originating in some of its faults, becomes the discoverer and magnifier of others. An error has no unalterable value, no fixed and measurable consequence; it may be flagrant in one case, excusable in another, imperceptible in a third. Faults

are not faulty in proportion to the extent to which they are committed; they are faulty to the extent to which they are observed. Good writers do not secure immunity by the avoidance of mistakes; they avert their penalties by a skillful diversion. The blemishes of good writers and the felicities of poor ones are alike certain to be underrated. It is perfectly well known that the bad works of great authors and the bad parts of their better works are received with enthusiasm by the circle of their devotees; their dullness interests and their folly edifies; they are credited with graces which they never meant, and profundities which they never saw. It is easy to forget, in upbraiding the fanaticism of this worship, that the best books are read by the best readers in a spirit which differs from these morbid moods in no other respect than its freedom from extravagance. In the light of these conclusions, the disparity between feeling and perception, which introduced and prompted this discussion, is perceived to be natural and unavoidable. The reader brings or generates half his own sensations; it is therefore useless to search in the author for the explanation of the whole. In ordinary criticism we seek to find in the materials alone the genesis of effects which are traceable in part to the materials, in part to the reader's consciousness. It is unsafe to put any definite values, positive or negative, on the observance or neglect of grammar, on purity or barbarism of diction, on regularity or license of rhyme, on firmness or laxity of plot, on vividness or tameness of character. The power of these elements varies with every combination into which they enter, and the measure of their efficacy in a given case must be tried by the issue of subjective experiment. Such criticisms as those of Macaulay on the poems of Robert Montgomery, or those of Lowell on the style of Merivale, might be charged with narrowness, and even

triviality, if the tangled metaphor and peccant English which the censors specify were actually admitted as the grounds of condemnation. The real sin of the flagellated authors lay not so much in the admission of blunders which might feed an appetite for reprehension, as in leaving the minds of their judges so unoccupied and unimpressed that they had time to remember to be critical and exacting.

The reader's mood is sovereign. What, then, is the source or basis of this mood? Commonly, though by no means always, it is found in the materials themselves: materials embracing, in this usage, thought, emotion, purpose, treatment, style; the sum, in short, of the writer's contributions. The materials often, at least, evoke the mood; but the mood, once evoked, reshapes and transforms the materials. The value of an excellence lies not so much in its intrinsic power to please, as in its tendency to wake and warm the reader's sympathies. The danger of a fault lies not so much in the pain that it inflicts or the pleasure that it cancels, as in its power to check and chill the rising sensibilities. Hence it happens that whatever induces the right mood, whatever ingratiates and wins, whatever whets appetite or inspires affection, is great, perhaps predominant in its literary effect.

This truth is the justification of style. The possession of style, that is of a form of language corresponding to the principles of beauty, enables a writer from the very start to oblige and gratify a sensitive reader; and an obliged and gratified reader becomes forthwith a grateful and indulgent one. This is the true philosophy of the higher or æsthetic properties of style; it is even in no small measure the controlling factor in its lower and less graceful attributes. The evil of obscurity, for instance, lies less in the dimness it entails, or the labor it imposes, than in the vitiated and unfriendly temper which it causes in the reader.

Another truth which these principles elucidate, is the mighty influence of tone in literature. The utterance of thoughts in a certain tone has been designated as the source of literary power. This is the quality which accounts for the surprising difference between works which are reducible to kindred elements and describable in almost the same terms. Now the tone of a work is nothing more than the consequence or reflection of the author's mood; and that the author's mood should govern or at least affect the reader's is clear enough to dispense with demonstration.

Another fact which falls into clearness and relation through a clear grasp of the foregoing principles is the somewhat singular and perhaps ungenerous attitude of readers towards authors whose reputations are confused and diversified by the production of much that is excellent and of more that is commonplace. It would seem, at first sight, as if the only just measure of poets like Wordsworth, consisted in the absolute quantity of superlative or exquisite performance; as if the gauge of value were to be found in the proportion of their merit to those of other writers, and nowise in the proportion of their own grain to their own stubble. It is found in practice, however, that common and critical judgments alike are more or less biased by the latter ratio; and the cause, if not the sanction of this propensity, is found in the principle we have just unfolded. Everything depends upon the reader's receptivity; and the thing which makes him willing and anxious to receive is the assurance, or at least the likelihood, of vivid pleasure. Let this confidence be unsettled by the experience of long tracts of arid and unprofitable work, and the reader finds that he has lost, or at all events impaired, his faculty of self-abandonment. Except in poems or passages where familiarity has confirmed his faith, he approaches the

poet with a mixture of eagerness and misgiving; the dubiousness of the result impairs the completeness of the surrender; and the strong parts suffer from the abundance of their opposites. One opens one's mouth rather charily at the bidding of a companion who has often petted us with bonbons, but has sometimes cheated us with stones and straws.

The diversities of critical judgment on the part of keen and equally receptive minds are clearly explained by the acceptance of our theory. If excellence lay primarily or solely in the merits of the work, it would be hard to account for the wide disparities of verdict revealed by persons who are perfectly qualified to recognize those merits. But if we once perceive that the success of a book depends on the coöperation of the reader, and that this coöperation is liable to be balked or furthered by a score of indeterminable partialities or aversions, disagreement ceases to evoke surprise. If every literary sensation is the outcome of a partnership, it is obvious that the sensation is liable to change through a change in the identity of either of the partners. A hundred circumstances of an extra literary quality contribute to the formation or the dispersion of the fitting mood, and the circumstance which helps with one reader may hinder with the next. Abundance of powerful and moving incident will awaken the interest of one class while it stupefies that of another. The employment of learned and remote allusion will act in one case as the provocative, in another as the extinguisher, of sympathy. The sensual and fervid portrayal of erotic love will act as a spur to the enthusiasm of some, and as a curb to the sympathy of others. There is a difference also in degrees of susceptibility, as well as in the causes which excite or suppress it. Women are as a rule better readers and worse critics than men, because they are more subject to accesses of enthusiasm; they respond

with more alacrity, and hence with less discrimination, to the emotional and literary appeal. There is a degree of sensibility which unfits a mind for the task of criticism; a responsiveness so facile and so absolute that, in awarding its full measure of possible enthusiasm to the incitements of third-rate or fourth-rate books, it has clearly left itself without a standard for the appraisal and distinguishing of higher types.

We have seen that literary success means partly the provision of food and partly the instilling of appetite. It is certain that the appetite is often excited by the food; it is certain, also, that it is excitable by other causes. Let us note a few of the influences, not in themselves literary, which may generate in the reader's mind the feelings proper to great literature.

One of the most efficacious of all the substitutes for literary excellence is the veneration for antiquity; and the most interesting of the phases in which this feeling has declared itself is the passion for Greek and Latin classics. There is no doubt that the contents of the ancient literatures are intrinsically noble; but it is probable, I should say certain, that the effects of these literatures have far excelled the merits of their contents. The temper of mind which merit induces, is induced, in the case of the classics, by feelings external to merit. The reader who cuts for the first time the pages of his Pindar or Catullus brings in most instances to their perusal an intelligence already quickened and prepossessed. The vanity of acquisition, which heightens the zest of every writing in a foreign tongue; the sense, always exhilarating, and particularly vivid in the instance of the classics, of a traversed distance, of a lifted veil, an explored sanctuary; the historic estimate of the value of these languages, and the splendor and dignity of their career; the fine exclusiveness of a pleasure undebased by vulgar participation,—all these things produce

a frame of mind which multiplies by two the excellence of every beauty, and divides by two the harmfulness of every fault. Effects of this kind are indistinguishable in the reader's consciousness—indeed, if our theory is true, they are indistinguishable in simple fact—from the effects of literary merit; the only distinction to be made is that the decisive stimulus which in Milton or Shelley is produced solely by literary merit is engendered in the classics half by the literary merit and half by mere association.

Antiquity, then, may take the place of excellence: by a curious though not abnormal contrast, the same result is found to be accessible through novelty. There is a type of mind, embracing a rather extensive fraction of the minds which occupy themselves with literature, which is quickened to the maximum of interest by that which is recent and contemporary. This kindled and responsive temper so magnifies and transfigures the materials submitted to its view that the second-rate, if new, will affect it like a masterpiece. An exotic and external interest has taken the place, and done the work, of quality. The first successes of rising poets, the popular novels, of whose bright and marvelous careers so many instances have signalized the last decade, not only win the esteem, but actually, for their period of vogue, perform the task, of greatness. People find in current literature the qualities of supreme excellence, because they approach it with the absorbent and receptive temper which supreme excellence alone is competent to perpetuate and justify.

There are other causes which exert a cognate influence. The magnetism of a famous name induces in the correlative faculty an aptitude for apprehension and enjoyment which makes the question of actual desert in the owner of the reputation a matter of inappreciable or at least inferior significance. This

is the temper of docile mediocrity; minds of a wider range and a hardier independence are often equally stimulated by exactly opposite conditions. It is said, that, among the very few propensities which detract from the judicial equipoise of Saint-Beuve, was a disposition to overrate the merit of neglected writers to whose real though not commanding excellence he had recalled the interest of a neglectful public. It would be easy enough to multiply examples of this external and factitious intervention. Every man is a sheaf of feelings and opinions, almost any one of which may act as a furtherance or an obstacle to the production of the requisite mood. If these causes operate in the right direction, he will get the first grade of benefit out of the second grade of performance; he will even secure the profits of literature where the power of literature is entirely wanting. A parent reads the effusions of his child with an intellectual stimulation that is quite as genuine, and perhaps almost as valuable, as that which his taste derives from the monuments of English poetry. In childhood itself we find the aptest and most vivid illustration of the reader's contribution to the fruitfulness of reading. Admitting, for the sake of argument, that receptiveness is the foundation of the enjoyments and benefits procurable from literature, it is evident that, if we could bring about a state of mind which would be constitutionally and permanently receptive,—receptive at least of everything that experience made intelligible,—we should practically have done away with the necessity of literary merit. In the state of childhood, in the state of barbarism, there are conditions of wonder and sympathy which substantiate in a measure the requirements of our hypothesis. It is found accordingly, that with children and barbarians the simplest and rudest efforts of intelligible composition are adequate to the functions of the best and finest lit-

erature. In infancy, whether individual or tribal, the reader does so much, that the writer does, or at least is required to do, very little; the history of literary growth is the record of the increase of exertion and accomplishment by which the writer endeavors to make good the reader's growing indolence and coyness.

The results of my argument may be formulated thus: (1) the immediate cause of literary effects is a heightened receptiveness on the part of the reader; (2) it is the peculiar faculty and task of genius to inspire this receptiveness; (3) materials are more valuable as stimuli than as food; (4) the effects of one grade of literature may be brought about by lower grades where causes of an external kind bring about the needful receptiveness.

I hold that there is nothing in these propositions derogatory to the rank or ascendancy of genius; the gulf between superior and ordinary minds remains just as broad and just as impassable as under the light of any other theory. I am disposed to believe, it is true, that the salutary and nutrient value of materials has been somewhat overestimated. I emphasize the reader's contribution,—the receptive and hospitable mood. But it is clear that in the majority of cases this contribution must itself be evoked by the writer; and it is hard to see why the generation of a mood should not be as hard a task and as honorable a performance as the purveyance of superlative materials. The reader's interest once evoked, however, is a substitute for the writer's power. It requires all the art of the finished history to enchain the thought of the casual reader, but the man who wrote the history found force and spirit in the musty chronicle. It is probable that, if the works of Homer and Dante and Goethe and Shakespeare should be abolished from the libraries, and effaced from the memory of

the cultured world, we should get from writers of the second class a large part of the help and pleasure we now derive from the undoubted masters. The enthusiasm which has hitherto reserved itself for the rarest and most exquisite appeals, would remain, when these appeals had ceased, an enduring property of human nature; it would thirst for expression, for exercise, for activity, it would respond to the summons of less competent writers when no longer preoccupied with the works of their superiors. It would be very far from truth, and very far from falsehood also, to state the proposition thus: Life is so rich and great that even its poorer embodiments and presentations would recompense an earnest scrutiny. But the mind of man is disqualified to cope with this abundance; selection is indispensable; and we use literary genius as a kind of chalk or index to designate the objects of our study. Such an assertion would not be true; but, like many other assertions that are not true, it is instructive. The establishment of relations with elevated minds will always remain among the cardinal satisfactions and benefits of literature; but an advantage and distinction of equal, if not greater, force, is found in its capacity to awaken in the reader the true and beautiful mood, the reverent and docile temper, which could educe power and interest from slighter or inferior materials, and almost makes its own preëminence superfluous.

ARTICLE VI.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE WORDS OF
JESUS, ESPECIALLY OF HIS PARABLES.¹

A CONTRIBUTION TO THE STUDY OF THE INNER LIFE OF JESUS.

BY PROFESSOR JULIUS A. BEWER, PH.D.

JESUS himself in his words, Jesus' inner life, the experiences of his soul as portrayed in his words,—that is the subject of the psychological study to which we will devote our attention. We are not now to determine the exact truth which Jesus meant to teach in his words, but rather to find out, if we can, what the experiences of his soul were, out of which these utterances were born. What were those strange and yet so real undercurrents of his spiritual life which come to the surface in his words? What psychical states do they presuppose?

Men have always wanted to know more about his inner life because they felt that here, if anywhere, must lie the secret of his personal charm. But they have not always kept in mind, that, if we would understand him well in this his deepest life, we must not bring dogmatic prejudice with us, but must try to understand him as a real son of man. For only thus can we ever gain a true conception of his inner life, of the beauty and also of the strength of his great soul. I believe that the parables of Jesus are of especially great importance for this study; for it is universally recognized that the pictures which a man uses to illustrate his ideas reveal quite faithfully the impressions which have been made on

¹ Opening address delivered before the students of Oberlin Theological Seminary, September 24, 1903.

him by the world about him, especially if he uses them in a natural and not in an artificial manner. And thus we gather frequently the illustrations which a man employs, in order to find what influences have been at work to make him what he is; and so we see how this one is influenced by the mountains in the loftiness of his thoughts and the clearness of his vision; that one by the sea, which has written all its mysterious beauty and all its strong, resistless energy into his heart; and the other by the lowland, with its meadows and its flowers, with its woodlands and its streams. All have been influenced by their surroundings. But all have seen the sky and sun and moon and stars with different eyes and in different surroundings; have heard the birds and beasts, but not the same and not with the same emotions. And we know that when they begin to tell about all this they give us something of their inner life. How much more must this be true of Jesus; for the pictures which he paints in his parables are not mere illustrations as the average preacher uses them to-day, but part and parcel of his own experience, and thus must form a real contribution to the study of his inner life. He teaches only what he has experienced; and the power of his preaching lay in this, that even his illustrations were so completely blended with his experience that they reveal his very soul.¹ We see not only Jesus' teaching, but Jesus himself, in his words, and especially in his parables.

His outer world is portrayed here, with the impressions it made on his sensitive mind. It is the world of the working-people, of whom he was one. The pictures of domestic life

¹That is the great thing in Jesus, that he speaks only from his own experience, speaks of the ideas of God and of life which he has won in the struggle of his soul. And this is why his words are so full of tremendous power, because back of them lie the living experiences of the greatest of the children of men.

with its intimate family relations, of industrial and commercial life, of civil and national life,—all are painted with delicate grace. Everywhere,—in the field and in the town, in the yard and in the market, in the chamber and in the banquet-hall, among the farmers and the business men, the fishermen and the slaves, the publicans and Pharisees,—he moved, and kept his eyes wide open; saw the actions of the judge and of the physician, of the housekeeper and of the servants, the relations of father and children, of friends and enemies, noticed the growth of the tree and the leavening of the dough, witnessed the joy and the sorrow of men, looked on man and on nature with open eyes and learned, and taught again what he had learned; for he discerned the underlying relations, and brought with clear vision, almost unconsciously, everything into relation to the great central truth which dominated all his thinking and his living,—the Kingdom of God.¹

It would be of profound interest and importance to notice not merely what things in the world around him made an impression on him, but also what things did not impress him; for it is just as instructive to see what selections he did not make as to see what selections he did make. In both, a man's

¹ We must, of course, not overlook how clearly Jesus has grasped the fundamental principles, and must be careful not to think that all pictures have taught him new truths. But that they made many a principle clearer to him, will appear as we proceed. He uses illustrations because he is always concrete. He uses no abstract forms of speech, because he is always personal. An abstract, philosophical thinker he has never been, and has never wanted to be; but he has recognized the fundamental principles of true religion with a clearness, and has enunciated them with a simplicity, which evidence unrivaled mastery; so simply and so plainly speaks only he who is a master of thought and expression. And nowhere do we look so deeply into the heart of this simple and yet so great Son of man as in his parables. He talks here, in the plain language of the people, of those pictures which dwelt in his mind, and out of the inexhaustible fountain of his soul flow those words which reveal his innermost self.— See, also, Note I.

individuality reveals itself. But we dare not forget that our records of him are very fragmentary, that Jesus uttered many other words, and in all probability all of them no less striking than the words which are handed down in the Gospels; so that it is rather precarious to argue, from the absence of certain images in those speeches which we have of him, to their absence in the treasury of his mind. Still, a good many things are reasonably sure in this connection, and they repay a thorough study. But at present it is not so much our desire to trace the impression which the outward world made on him, however important and suggestive that may be, but rather to press deeper, and look with reverent eye into his very heart, in order that we may understand the better the great struggles of his soul.

It is remarkable with what simplicity he utters the deepest truths, as if they were self-evident! With what sublime tranquillity! The casual reader never notices that the marvelous peace and the hopeful joy are born out of great soul-struggles. We get a few glimpses of this soul-life when we see him struggling in Gethsemane, when he weeps over Jerusalem; but that his soul was burdened with deep anxiety and yet again filled with glorious hope, that it struggled fiercely in the great battle, is seldom noticed, because we see him ever victorious, and in the serene look of his eye and the quiet tone of his voice there is nothing of quivering anguish, nothing of despair. But his heart is full of confidence, because he has *conquered!*

“ Every word that He speaks has been fiercely furnace-d
In the blast of a soul that has struggled in earnest.”

His words help us much in our quest to understand his inner life, if we but ask the question What did they mean for him? not, What should they mean for us? What inner experiences

of Jesus do they presuppose and reflect? not, What did he mean to teach or prove by them? So we will try to study the inner life of Jesus, and try to fill up the gaps in our information by the contributions given us especially by his illustrations,—look thus at his words and at his parables in their relation to his inner life. We can, however, appreciate their value only as we study them in connection with the other data of his inner life.¹

Like every other great prophet, the Nazarene had his great inaugural vision, which is always carefully prepared by previous experiences, and always the culmination of great inward struggles, though the record may not speak of them; for else they would be psychologically inexplicable. The inaugural vision of Jesus came to him at the time of his baptism by John. The vision at the baptism is granted to Jesus, not to John the Baptist. In it the revelation is vouchsafed to him with overwhelming clearness, "Thou art my beloved Son." The record which makes the vision be given to John is due to a theological reflection, and is not the original saying.²

It was the crisis of Jesus' life. The reality of the vision he never doubted; the conviction that he was God's Son, so powerfully wrought in him, could come only through God's Spirit. Of this he is confident, just as he is quite sure later on, when Peter proclaims him as the Son of God, that nothing short of a divine revelation could have convinced Peter of this. But the conviction had to be won, or rather to be defended, in terrible struggles of his soul. At once, we are told, in the wilderness, whither he has gone to prepare himself for the great

¹I wish to refer here to the very suggestive article by Prof. B. W. Bacon, on "The Autobiography of Jesus," in the *American Journal of Theology* (July, 1898, pp. 527-560), which gave me the first impetus to this psychological study of the words of Jesus.

²See Note II.

work by gaining clearness and peace, after the experience which must have stirred him to the very depths of his being, and have overawed and overpowered him, and filled him with great wonder, the doubt is cast into his soul, "Art thou really the Son of God?" The temptation to change the stones into bread to still his hunger does not mean, that he must decide whether or not he would use for his own need the great power of which he has become conscious, but rather this, "Art thou really the Son of God?" Then prove it to thine own satisfaction by working this miracle. Make thyself sure of it. How canst thou know it with certainty? Work this miracle, and thou wilt know! It is not an outward tempter who casts this suggestion into his heart, but it is the thought that surges up in his soul, "Is this revelation really true? Am I really the Son of God?" If he had yielded to the suggestion, he would have doubted his intimate relation of Son towards God, and that would have been disastrous. It would have meant that he would never have entered upon his ministry; for, if the doubt whether he was God's Son or not had taken such hold upon his soul that it voiced itself in concrete act, it would have been of no use for him to proclaim the Fatherhood of God, because only as he experienced this himself could his message have power over others. We see at the same time why it was that he refused so steadfastly to work a miracle when the opponents tempted him. It was a real temptation every time.

How serious that temptation was, we see from the fact that it comes up once more, in another more acute form, when he is on a pinnacle of the temple,—whether actually or mentally matters little. "Art thou really the Son of God?" Then prove it, cast thyself down; for God will surely protect his Son by his angels, as he has said. That would be an evi-

dence! To jump down the precipice, and land safely, borne on the wings of angels! And with it all, perhaps thousands of worshipers would witness the glorious deed—an evidence to them, as well as to himself, of his divine Sonship! If he had done it; if God had not shielded him; if he had fallen; if he had been shattered! These temptations shook the very foundations of his nature, and in their importance they were so immense that we scarcely dare to think what would have been the result if he had not conquered.

There was another set of temptations, coming we may well believe in the most varied forms. The typical form is given in the record where Jesus beholds in vision all the kingdoms of the world, and is conscious that they will all belong to him. The two ways present themselves to him,—spiritual and worldly conquest. Which shall he choose? The one is so hard, the other so easy and so sure; to inflame the people by setting himself up as the worldly Messiah, and conquer the world by force. The temptation reveals an exalted state of consciousness of Jesus. He knows that the whole world will be conquered by him. Without this consciousness,—this is important to notice,—the temptation cannot be explained psychologically.

All these temptations are typical; they extend in one form or other over his life. When, shortly afterwards, the temptation comes again, after he had healed so many sufferers for the first time, when his mind is sorely agitated and troubled, whether he should not after all devote his powers to this glorious work of a miraculous healer, he is true to his first decision; not by any extraordinary or supernatural force, but by purely moral and spiritual working, will he conquer the world for God. And so he enjoins the people not to speak about his cures. And later on, when the end draws near, and he utters that

strange word to his disciples, that they had better sell everything and buy a sword, we perceive that this is the sudden temptation that has come over him,—the temptation of the two ways in another form. But when the disciples show the two swords, he has already conquered. Calmly he wards them off, "It is enough." But his disciples seem never to have understood what he really meant. They did not know that it was one of those moments when "he was tempted in all points like as we are."

There is nothing that reveals the character of a man more clearly and more infallibly than his temptations. How high and how noble and how pure is the inner life of the Master; these very temptations are a crown! He is not a penitent sinner who has gone through the great experience of changing his whole life. There is no great break in his life by which he has become a child of God through renunciation of sin and the world. Moral goodness and true religion are to him the very atmosphere in which he lives. This pure life in communion with God is something perfectly natural for him, the only normal life. There is nothing artificial about him; he dares to be absolutely himself.

We cannot be thankful enough to the evangelists that they have preserved the story of the Baptism and the Temptation. But we would be even more grateful to them, if they had also told us more about Jesus' earlier years. How much we long to know something about his home! Yet, with the exception of the story of his birth and connected events, a hint concerning his experience in the Temple when twelve years old, the reference to the carpenter, to his brothers and sisters,—hints which are all too slight,—they tell nothing of the home life of the Saviour, nothing of those long silent years in which his character was formed for the great work of his life. Were

they not interested in this? Or did they not know more about it? It seems to me that here some parables offer us valuable suggestions. It is highly significant, that, in connection with the parables of the building of the tower and that of the warfare, Luke (xiv. 28-33) reports the saying of hating father and mother and the other relatives, as a condition of discipleship. The terribly great cost of discipleship must be weighed before the decision. Do not press light-heartedly into this service, because it costs much more than you may think at first! In connection with these parables this saying becomes full of intense meaning. In stating these hard conditions, this seems to him the hardest, which will cause many to regret the step,—to leave father and mother, brothers and sisters! He states it with the consciousness that he requires the hardest thing of all, and his words have the ring of one who knows by personal experience what he says. Those struggles of the soul which are so bitter for tender-hearted natures, he passed through. The break with his home must have been exceedingly painful; it is the hardest of all conditions for discipleship! And this need not surprise us; for what kind of a father must Jesus have had "who could present God to the world in the image of a father's face"! How tender must have been the bonds of love which bound him to his mother, to his brothers and sisters, when it seemed to him, later on, the heaviest burden to have had to break off his relations with them, and made him almost harsh in his answer, when his mother and brothers made an attempt to draw him away from his mission, and he practically disowned his blood relationship with them by saying: "Who is my mother and my brethren? Whosoever shall do the will of God, the same is my brother, and sister, and mother" (Mark iii. 31-35). Here is a place where every one feels the profound emotion; but one feels, also, that these ap-

parently harsh words are not directed against his loved ones. He battled in a fierce battle of his soul with the temptation into which the voice of home with its alluring charm had thrown him. But he was true to his high calling, however sweet and irresistible the voice might be. He fights and wins, but his words sound harsh, like the words of a man who masters a profound emotion and is unwilling to have it be seen. But in his heart there settles down the conviction that a man's foes are they of his own household. Need we wonder any longer that the evangelists speak so little of his home and his relations to his family? As a man who has received a deep wound in his heart does not like to touch it, lest it break and pain afresh, so Jesus must have said little or nothing about his inner conflict. He fought it out silently and alone in his heart, as he was always alone in the deepest experiences of his life.¹

How great his love for the home and the family life was, seems also to shine through in that other word of renunciation, about the eunuchs who have become eunuchs because of the kingdom of God. There seems to be back of it his deep understanding of the great soul-struggles through which they had to pass, and it seems most natural to conclude that the longing for marital happiness and family joy has most probably arisen sometimes in his heart also. But if it did arise, he put it down. He must not think of it. Why? There is but one answer possible, Because of his exalted mission. One is reminded of the striking parallel of the tender-hearted Jeremiah, who also must renounce all such desires for the same reason (Jer. xvi.), with this striking difference, that Jeremiah laments over it, while Jesus never pities himself. This renunciation gives us a right to press back of our written information. It must mean that Jesus must have had already, long before his bap-

¹ Compare Note III.

tism with the Spirit, at least a clear presentiment that God had chosen him,—a presentiment which broke through into full clearness of vision, and crystallized into the firm conviction that he was the Son of God at the time of his baptism in Jordan. How long he had this presentiment we do not know. In all probability for quite a long time; for the Orientals marry early, and Jesus was about thirty years old at the time when he entered upon his ministry. In the light of the great vision at the time of the baptism, we may conclude that the contents of this presentiment were perhaps more definite than merely that he would be a prophet. That vision marks, as we saw, the culmination of a long series of struggles, with the resultant consciousness of divine sonship and Messiahship. We perceive that, after all, that brief incident of the boy Jesus in the Temple with the consciousness of God's Fatherhood is not to be so lightly treated. But this is merely a suggestion.

After this vision he can no longer stay at home. He becomes conscious of being the Light of the world, and feels that he cannot be hid any longer,—a conviction which he has expressed so simply and so beautifully in the parables of the City on the Hill and the Light on the Stand. He must go out into the throng of the world, in order to make the tremendous power of his personality felt, to lighten the world! This is so natural to him that it appears preposterous to him not to do it; as preposterous as it would be to kindle a light and put it under a bushel!

It is as prophet that Jesus stands up, as prophet that he begins his preaching by taking up the great prophetic message: "Repent, the end is at hand!" The conviction of the nearness of the end is the conviction of all the prophets; it is also the conviction of Jesus, only that Jesus defined the end as "the Kingdom of God." The term was not strange to the people;

and, though there may have been ever so many who could think of the Kingdom and God only in materialistic forms, they all knew, or at least all might have known ever since the preaching of the prophets, that the test of participation in the blessings of the kingdom would be a moral test.¹

The coupling of the cry to repentance with the proclamation of the near approach of the Messianic kingdom, the great day, was thus nothing new. Jesus takes up the message of the great prophets. But does this mean that he simply repeated the message of the prophets as he had learned it from their writings? That is contradicted by the parable of the New Patch on the Old Garment and the New Wine and the Old Skins, where we are shown that he regards himself as the representative of the New. Not something old and stale which by reason of its familiarity had lost its power, but something new and original he has to bring, which had taken possession of his heart with all the freshness of life itself. This should never be forgotten, for it is essentially the consciousness of the newness of the message which fills his heart with such bold-

¹ "Behold the day cometh, it burneth as a furnace; and all the proud and all that work wickedness, shall be stubble; and the day that cometh shall burn them up, saith Jehovah of hosts, that it shall leave them neither root nor branch. But unto you that fear my name shall the sun of righteousness arise with healing in its wings" (Mal. iv.). So rings out the message of one of the last of the noble procession of prophets, the first of whom had declared:—

"Woe unto them that desire the day of Jehovah!

Wherefore would ye have the day of Jehovah?

It is darkness, and not light.

"As if a man did flee from a lion,

And a bear met him;

Or went into the house and leaned his hand on the wall,

And a serpent bit him.

"Shall not the day of Jehovah be darkness, and not light?

Even very dark, and no brightness in it?"

—AMOS v. 18-20.

ness and victorious assurance. The conviction of the terrible nearness of the Kingdom of God must then have come to his soul directly and with overpowering force, not as something old but as something new. How did it come? Could he read the signs of the times, and was it the result of sober reflection? Assuredly, he read the signs of the times, for once he reproaches the Pharisees very bitterly because they could not read the signs of the times, could not read in them that the kingdom was near. But is this the real explanation of his conviction? Surely not, if he was a prophet; and that he was a prophet admits of no doubt.¹

It has been claimed that the striking conviction of the prophets that the end is near, is due to the fact, that they were readers of the events of history, that they understood the logical outcome of the events by reason of their political or diplomatic insight, and perceived that, if things were going to run their natural course, it must mean the end of Israel. This is not the prophets' own consciousness of it, nor do the data furnished us by their writings vindicate this theory. Their reading of the signs of the times is secondary; the primary factor is what they call the word of God that came to them. The irrepressible, dark presentiment which they cannot explain to themselves, that something terrible is going to happen to the nation, is the fundamental cause of their message. Theirs is a psychological experience, which is parallel to the "second sight" or "sixth sense," with this important point of difference, that with the prophets the ethical element is all-controll-

¹ For though Jesus never uses the prophetic phrase "Thus saith Jehovah," the striking absence of the phrase speaks more loudly than the ever-repeated emphasis on it by those later, post-exilic prophets. Jesus needs no such phrases; his prophetic power is felt by every listener. The people speak of him as *the* prophet; the Pharisee who has invited him says to himself, "If this were a prophet," showing that Jesus was treated everywhere as a prophet.

ing. "*The end*" comes because of the sins of the people.¹

But "the end" is to Jesus the coming of the spiritual kingdom. That is the distinctive note in his opening message. Could he read the nearness of this spiritual kingdom in the events of the times? Yes; if his conception was that the coming of the kingdom meant essentially the punishment of the wicked. Then he could read, in the terrible moral and spiritual indifference on the one hand, and in the empty formalism of his time on the other hand, the reason for the awful wrath of God, who would come with fire, "whose fan is in his hand, and he will thoroughly cleanse his threshing-floor; and he will gather his wheat into the garner, but the chaff will he burn with unquenchable fire" (Matt. iii. 12). But that was not the conception of Jesus. That was John the Baptist's proclamation: *he* read the signs of the times in this way. Jesus had fixed his mind on the surpassing glory of the spiritual kingdom,—a glory which not even he could adequately describe in words. What makes him think that the break of this glorious dawn is near? What does he read in the hearts of men that makes him so certain of its impending advent? Surely he must have known many true, devoted souls; for, however low spiritual religion may be at any time, it is never altogether without faithful witnesses. But they would hardly account for this striking conviction. And we would have to change our estimate of the time altogether if we expected to find its reason in the hearts of these men. He must have found it in his own heart, and here it was the result of that inaugural vision. When he becomes conscious of being the Son of God, he knows also that the Messianic time has come, that the kingdom of God has already begun. Because he himself realizes the fullness of this glorious kingdom in his own heart, he feels

¹ Compare Note IV.

sure that others will realize it also, if they have only once seen the surpassing glory of the kingdom.¹ He is conscious of having been anointed to preach the acceptable year of the Lord. And so he proclaims, in striking contrast to the prophets who had warned the people that their day would be a day of darkness and deep gloom, "Believe in *the good news!* The Kingdom of God is at hand!" No one ever formulated the ethical conditions more clearly and keenly; but, nevertheless, it is joy and good news that he brings. Do we wonder that the people heard him gladly when he spoke, with all the tremendous authority of the greatest prophet, of the good news of the coming of the glorious kingdom?

Two parables lay bare the springs of this conviction,—the parable of the Hidden Treasure and of the Goodly Pearl, where he shows that one will gladly give up everything in order to gain the Kingdom of God. He would show the people the transcendent beauty of the kingdom to awaken a longing for it in their hearts. He does not say here in what this beauty consists, but he shows what it meant to him. He had experienced himself what the Kingdom of God was, and in the full consciousness of its wondrous glory he had gladly given up everything for it; and now he believes that he has simply to show the people this glory, in order to fill them with such a longing for it that they would want to procure it for themselves at any price. He does not emphasize in these parables the necessity of giving up one's possessions, but rather that it is something self-evident, something entirely natural, that one should give everything for the Kingdom of God. One simply cannot help giving up everything, if necessary, for such transcendent glory. It is the very best that can be gained, and no price is too high for it. He knows it, because he has exper-

¹ Compare Note V.

ience it, and has given up everything for it,—home and parents, his native town and his friends, everything that is dear to the human heart! And now he proclaims this evangel of the kingdom, and points to its marvelous glory.

In spreading the good news, he saw that he brought joy to many hearts. But we can say even more. That little parable of the Bridegroom and the Sons of the Bridechamber shows that Jesus was conscious of creating joy and deep satisfaction in the hearts of his friends by his simple presence. The sense of overflowing life took hold of them; so that it was a continual festival for them to be near him. It is simply impossible for them to fast and to mourn; their hearts are so full of joy, that it would be hypocrisy for them to show a sad face. This means much; for in his presence they felt the presence of God, and in their relationship with him they met with God, for they all knew that he was God's prophet, God's representative. And yet, far from being cast down or full of despair, they are full of joy because they met in his presence not with a condemning God, but with a loving Father; they knew through Jesus, to use a technical term, that their sins had been forgiven by God. Psychologically this must lie back of the joy, though in the text it is not directly referred to. Indirectly, however, it is hinted at; for the fasting and mourning had only one reason, namely, to win the favor of God. The great and evidently serious question of the Pharisees and John's disciples (see Matthew) is, What is the reason for such behavior? for they know that Jesus as a prophet wants to bring the people into right relation with God. But can this be done in such a way? His manner is passing strange to them. The psychological yield of this parable, to which we shall have to refer once more later on, is hardly less important than that of the great word, "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy

laden, and I will give you rest." Jesus experiences the power that he has over the souls of men in his contact with them. To him they came, and in his presence people's hearts grew wide and whole. Twisted and unstrung lives felt the Master's touch, and once more the thrill of harmony passed through their soul. Into his eyes they looked; there dwelled eternal peace; and, altogether inexplicable to themselves, they felt the life-renewing, healing touch of God's own life in Jesus of Nazareth. His words stole sweetly into their hearts; and, as a tune we once have heard comes ever back to us, so did his sayings ever come again, and they took hold of all the best in them, and made them better men and women.

With this consciousness of being able to give joy and peace by his simple presence to the heart-hungry, heart-sick people goes hand in hand the consciousness of the certain triumph of the Kingdom of God. The small beginnings do not disturb him; he is confident that they will be followed by exceedingly great results. It seems that Jesus won this conviction as the result of anxious concern, that the mustard-seed and the leaven taught him first the lesson before he taught it to the disciples in the parables. As surely as the small mustard-seed will produce a mighty shrub, as surely as the little piece of leaven will permeate the whole dough, so surely will this small beginning of the Kingdom of God be followed by a mighty development. There is a victorious confidence in the inherent power of growth and of pervasion of the Kingdom which shows the sunny optimism of Jesus at its best.

Yet oftentimes the anxious care about the result of his labors must have been a heavy burden on his soul. He could not always stay with those whom he had influenced by word and deed, could not wait to see what the result of his labor would be. He saw no fruit at once, and secret wonder came

into his soul, whether fruit would come at all. These states of feeling underlie the parable of the Seed which grows of itself.¹ He tells the disciples here what he himself had experienced, what he himself had learned from the sower. The sower sows the seed, and then waits patiently until it springs up and grows. He knows it will sprout, and yield fruit, and he will reap it at the harvest time; and so he is not impatient, but waits. That was a revelation to the Master. It sounded like the Father's voice "Be not anxious." Was not his work also a sowing of seed? Surely, then, he must not be impatient, or disheartened, because he cannot see the results of his work. The fruit will come, for the law of growth and fruitfulness prevails also in the Kingdom of Heaven. He must not expect fruit at once. Here, also, the process of growth is gradual,—“first the blade, then the ear, then the full blade in the ear.” The parable sounds so cheering, so full of refreshing confidence, that we do not always notice that this serenity is born of care. His peace is not the result of carelessness and indifference, but of intelligent trust; and this trust he has gained in the silent hours of care.

At first, when he was so extremely popular with the masses that they always flocked to him in great numbers, he seems to have been bewildered and somewhat troubled, because the bad as well as the good followed him; and sometimes he may have thought whether it would not be best to separate the bad elements from the good, and this desire may have been accentuated by the use which his adversaries made of this fact. But he learns again from the farmer, as he tells us in the parable of the Tares, that it is best to wait till the harvest time; and from the fisherman also, as he tells us in the parable of

¹I am indebted for this point and a few others to Heinrich Weinel's suggestive lecture, "Die Bildersprache Jesu in ihrer Bedeutung für die Erforschung seines inneren Lebens." Giessen, 1900.

the Drag-net, that it is unavoidable, in throwing out his nets for the catching of men, that there will be many bad ones among them. The time of the separation will come; he need not worry about the bad among the good; the sifting and dividing will be done on that great day, when good and bad will be separated with absolute justice. He must go on with his work, sowing the seed of the gospel, and throwing out the nets for the catching of men; and his heart must be free from care, for only then can he do his best work.¹

But when, towards the end of his ministry, the Master looks back on his work, and estimates the result, there is no attempt on his part to make things look better than they really are. He gives his observations, the experiences of his work, in the famous parable of the Sower, which was, in my opinion, not uttered at the beginning of his ministry, but later on, in the latter half of his work. The crowds had come to him at first full of joy, and he had sown the seed. But when he now considered what fruit it had borne, he saw that many had turned away without bringing any fruit whatever. And the reason for this he also clearly perceived. With some it could but be traced to the great enemy who undid the work that Jesus had done. Well did he know of all the various machinations of his opponents, who, by argument and ridicule, by slander and open attack, by all possible means, sought to destroy what he had built, and who in many cases succeeded all too well. He knew the human hearts—knew the shallowness of some, the lack of endurance of others; saw the effect of worldly care and anxiety and the terrible hold of money on countless hearts; he saw it all, and knew it all, and did not blind his eyes to it. But he also knew that all this was not his fault. The high enthusiasm which filled his soul at the

¹ Compare Note VI.

beginning, when the whole world seemed to come to him to be saved, when no mountain of difficulty appeared too high to be conquered, when to his glorious optimism the Kingdom appeared so very near, has given way to sober critical reflection. He has not succeeded so quickly. But, in spite of it all, the calm, firmly-rooted conviction still controls his heart, that the victory is after all with him; for some have borne fruit indeed,—some thirty-fold, and some sixty-fold, and yea some even a hundred-fold. His work has not been without success.

Of what importance the parables become when looked at in this way! when we do not ask, What does Jesus mean to teach in them? but, What do they mean to him? Out of what experiences of his soul were they spoken? It is of profound significance to notice that one of the parables seems to have been the means of calling his attention for the first time to his death,—the parable of the Bridegroom and the Sons of the Bridechamber, which we have already referred to as revealing the consciousness of Jesus that he was able to create the sense of overflowing life in his friends by his very presence, of filling their hearts with great joy. While we see him but now full of the sunny happiness and joy of life as he says that it is impossible for his disciples to mourn and to fast in his presence, we suddenly notice a shadow fall upon his brow. As he muses over this picture of the bridegroom and his fellows, for the first time according to our sources, the shadow of death is cast into his soul. It becomes clear to him that he cannot always be with them; the time will come when he must leave them. "The days will come, when the bridegroom shall be taken away from them, and then will they fast in that day." This sentence is not a part of the parable itself any more, but has grown out of it. The "bridegroom" means

here the Messiah, and in chaste reserve the term covers the thought which as yet he cannot proclaim openly. The picture has become a revelation to his soul. Was it the first suggestion of the end? According to our sources, yes. Did it come with all the terrible clearness at once? We do not know. Later on, when it became ever clearer to him what the end would be, his troubled soul finds rest in another picture, in the analogy of the grain of wheat, which is reported in the Fourth Gospel, and about whose originality there can be no doubt. His death, which might appear as the proof of a life of failure, would in reality mean the liberating of all the tremendous spiritual forces which were bound up in him, and would in very deed be the means of certain triumphant victory.

Scarcely less important is the conviction which Jesus gained in connection with another picture, the simile of the Children and the Little Dogs, which belongs to the story of the Syrophenician woman who came and besought Jesus to heal her daughter. According to Matthew, Jesus does not answer her at first; and the disciples, growing weary of her crying, interceded for her. But Jesus answers, "I was not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel." The defense for his behaviour is his mission. And when the woman thereupon falls down at Jesus' feet, and implores him to heal her daughter, he answers her in a simile: As it is not right to take the children's bread, and give it to the little dogs; so it is not right for me to use the power which belongs to the Jews for the heathen. The woman in her distress answers, also in the form of a simile, using Jesus' own material: But as the little dogs are allowed to eat the crumbs of the children's bread which fall from the table, and do not thereby take away the children's portion, so let me be allowed to receive

simply a little bit of thy strength for my daughter. I shall not thereby have taken away anything from the portion of the Jews. It is evident that there underlies this simile the idea that the power of Jesus was intended merely for the Jews, and not for the heathen, and the woman recognizes this idea. Mark does not report the saying in which, according to Matthew, Jesus enunciates the consciousness of his mission to the Jews, "I was not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel." That Jesus considered himself as being sent to save the lost, we know from other words of his; but that he is sent to none but to the lost Israelites, only this passage says. Now, there could be nothing more foreign to Matthew than to put such a sentence in his Gospel, unless he regarded it as an undoubted saying of Jesus; for Matthew conceived of the gospel as being intended for all the world, and not for the Jews only. And it is to be noticed that this idea which is enunciated in this sentence is presupposed by the simile of the Children and the little Dogs even in Mark. Thus, if we regard the simile as genuine, we must also regard this saying as genuine,—at least in substance, if not in form. But if the story is genuine, and I do not think that there is any force in the arguments advanced to invalidate its authenticity,—we have here a most remarkable revelation of the development of Jesus' consciousness of his mission. He did regard himself indeed at first as being sent only to the Jews, to the lost sheep of the house of Israel, and not to all the world, particularly to the heathen. His mission is limited and not universal. This is a point of extreme importance, and one which cannot be denied if the story of the Syrophenician woman is regarded as genuine. Since Jesus labored so intensely among the Jews, we may well believe that the question as regards the heathen was not so pressing with him as we may sometimes be in-

clined to think. That it may now and then have occupied him is quite possible, but it did not change his conviction that he was sent to the Jews only. Not till he meets this heathen woman did the question really become acute. How shall he behave himself towards this heathen? Evidently at first he decides that this is outside of his mission; that the power given to him must be used for the Jews only, and not for the heathen. However much he may have pitied the woman, his duty seems clear. But now we see the change; the simile which the woman formed out of his own material brings about a highly significant development in Jesus' consciousness of his mission. The glorious universalism of Jesus, which is so strongly marked in the Gospels, was born in this hour by means of one of his pictures.—What a wealth of meaning his pictures and illustrations and parables have when looked at from this point of view, and of what momentous importance this story, with its similes, which attracts every one by its peculiar charm, becomes for the understanding of the inner life of Jesus, especially in the development of the consciousness of his mission, if looked at in this way!

Here the matter is perfectly clear, and we discover with a good deal of certainty his inner experiences. But it is not always so. There are statements which show unmistakably that profound experiences must lie back of them, else they could never have been made; and yet at the same time we hardly dare to do more than to suggest them. With what boldness, with what absolute assurance, does he speak those parables of the Friend at Midnight, of the Unjust Judge, the Asking Son! Earnest, persevering prayer will always be rewarded! Keep on praying earnestly and intensely, and be sure you will receive your petition at last! It is altogether unthinkable that a human father should give his child a stone when he

has been asked for bread; but it is still more unthinkable that the Heavenly Father should not be much more willing to give his children good gifts, in answer to their prayers!

“Ask and it shall be given you;

Seek and ye shall find;

Knock and it shall be opened unto you.

“For every one that asketh, receiveth;

And he that seeketh, findeth;

And to him that knocketh it shall be opened.”

These words sound so confident, so reassuring, that Jesus must have known them to be true from his own experience. He also must have prayed without receiving his request at once; so that it seemed to him as if God did not hear or did not wish to answer. But he prayed more earnestly, and he received his answer. He knows man's tendency to grow despondent, from his own experience, and encourages therefore his disciples with these great words. And the remarkable thing is that no condition is made, God will certainly hear their prayer. Jesus is no theologian, but a prophet. He has no system of theology, and is not troubled about reconciling and harmonizing one statement with another. He speaks out of the fullness of his experiences; and what profound experiences must they have been! Because he knows God as his Father, he proclaims him as the Father of them all; because he knows the power of prayer, he can speak as he does about prayer. He who was altogether filled with the consciousness of God's presence and communion with him, could think of God in no other way. Dogmatic sophistry had no room with him: he speaks of his life's experiences. Thus he knows his God; and thus he proclaims him, unmindful of the metaphysical and theological problems of the day. And we have no right to minimize the tremendous strength, or to soften the severe beauty, of his words. We do so only at the expense

of misunderstanding him; and how slight is the gain when he fits then better into our little system!

It is important to notice, that, in spite of this great power of prayer; in spite of his intimate relation with God, whose Son he is conscious of being,—Jesus' attitude toward God is always characterized by profound reverence; there is no easy familiarity which disregards the deep sacredness of the relationship. For him a real and sincere humility toward his Father is something so natural, so self-evident, that he cannot conceive how a man who is not humble can ever be acceptable to God. How strikingly he gives utterance to this conviction in the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican praying in the Temple! How can any one be proud and self-confident toward God! Humility is a fundamental principle of religion for him; without it the intimate relation between God and man cannot exist. He had given his whole life to God's service, worked as much as ever he could for the kingdom, and yet he carries deep in his heart the consciousness that he does nothing but his duty. He had to do it as a true prophet. Special favor or reward he never thought of. And it appears to him as absurd, as preposterous, that a man should think that he has a right to require something from God as a special reward, as if a servant who has done his duty faithfully during the day should come home in the evening and expect from his master a special reward. Why should he? He has done but his duty! So it seem to Jesus in man's relation to God. So he looks upon his own work, for he has no different standard for himself; he also has done but his duty, and any reward that he would receive would be an act of sovereign grace.

He is profoundly impressed by the sovereignty of God's grace. Surely the Pharisees are right when they protest that

the sinners have not deserved the Kingdom of God. Certainly not. But God gives it to them out of his own free grace, and he is not unjust in doing so; can he not give his grace to whom he will? As the householder in the parable is not unjust when he gives equal reward to those who have earned it and those who have not earned it, but is rather to be judged as being very kind and gracious for giving them what they really have not deserved; so God is not unjust, but rather extraordinarily kind, when he admits into his kingdom out of his own free grace those who have not deserved it. How strange it appears to Jesus that the Pharisees should complain about injustice, when he cannot but rejoice over the great goodness and graciousness of his Heavenly Father, who loves his enemies, and causes it to rain and to shine on those who do not deserve it as well as on those who deserve it. May it not be that we are allowed to see in these parables Jesus' consciousness of God's love towards him, and his choice as God's Son and Messiah, as being also an act of sovereign grace, received by him in profound humility and gratitude?

This humility and reverence on the part of Jesus, this feeling of the sacredness of the relation to God, so far from standing in the way of a real intimacy, rather deepened and enriched the fellowship, in which we see the sources of his strength. For ever on the eve of a great crisis do we find him alone with his God in prayer: after the baptism in the wilderness as well as after his first great day of healing, in every great crisis of his life, just before his self-revelation as Messiah to the disciples, and in that dark hour in Gethsemane. Here are the springs of that serenity and peace that characterize him during all his public life; here he fought out those silent, lonely battles of his soul; here he gained his

inner balance. But here are also the moments of the great revelations which came to his soul, and strengthened his conviction that he was God's Son, and as such filled with God's Spirit.¹

In these hours of prayer Jesus received not only the strengthening of his convictions, but also new revelations. The prophetic consciousness was here not only strengthened, but also enlarged by the revelation, that burst upon him: A prophet is doomed to persecution! It seems that this conviction was gained in a struggle which intensified itself in an outward vision, of which we have a record—unfortunately not all too clear—in the story of the transfiguration, where he learns from the prophets (Moses and Elias) what fate he had to expect. Of course this is merely a climax of the inner conflict, the stepping into the clear light of the sphere of his consciousness of what had already long occupied his subconscious life, beginning, as I believe, at the time when he spoke the parable of the Bridegroom and the Son of the Bridechamber. How important this conviction was for his inner life is made clear by his words, "Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are ye, when men shall revile you and persecute you, and shall say all manner of evil against

¹ And this conviction became to Jesus so all-controlling that it appeared to him the height of blasphemy, when the opponents declared that the wondrous deeds of healing which he performed were done by the power of the devil. Not because they ridiculed him, blasphemed the Son of Man, was he indignant, that was a pardonable sin. But that they should identify the Spirit of God, which dwelt and wrought in and through him, with the Prince of the Demons, that was a sin which could never be forgiven. It is quite important to notice here that he does not identify himself with the Divine Spirit, but regards himself as possessed and controlled by him, as the instrument and agent, which the divine power uses. It is essentially the spirit of the prophet that shines through here in these Beëlzebub parables.

you falsely, for my sake. Rejoice and be exceedingly glad, for great is your reward in heaven: for so persecuted they the prophets which were before you." These words lose their great power if they are divorced from Jesus' own experience; for only in the light of it can we understand the almost exhilarating joy which he commands his disciples to have in persecution, for it had possessed his own heart also, it had made him, moreover, certain, when the great opposing forces were at work, that he stood in organic connection with the prophets. Let me once more point to the similar experience of Jeremiah, who receives comfort and inspiration from the same source: the true prophet has always been persecuted.

With an unflinching determination, through which there throbbed the exalted consciousness of being guided and controlled absolutely by the Spirit of God, he steadfastly set his face to go to Jerusalem to fulfill his destiny. He knows that he must be true to his God, must bear witness to the Truth, even at the cost of his own life. And into his heart there came, as a result of his determination, that strange ecstatic joy which has come since into many a true disciple's heart in the face of certain death. It is significant that, at the height of the conflict with his opponents, he conveys this conviction of his certain death to them in picture form by means of the parable of the Vineyard and the Wicked Husbandman. That he uses a parable for this is at the same time an indication of the correctness of the psychological method of interpretation. Almost defiantly he points out to them: As the husbandmen in the parable have treated the messengers of the owner, so have you, rulers of the people, treated the Son of God; but, as surely as the owner of the vineyard will fearfully avenge the murder of his son,

so surely will God avenge with terrible vengeance the murder of his Son which you are now planning. How significant is here the blending of Jesus' consciousness of standing in organic connection with the prophets with the consciousness of standing in a still more intimate relation to God than they, in the relation of the Son to the Father (elsewhere he has expressed this consciousness by saying that some one greater than Jonah was here, some one greater than Solomon, greater than Moses, over against whose teachings he had placed his own), and the blending of the consciousness that he will suffer at the hands of his enemies a shameful death with the consciousness that God will surely avenge his death, and that he will exalt him to supreme glory! This latter thought, only implied in the parable, is distinctly expressed in the word about the corner-stone, which the evangelists have joined with exquisite tact to this parable, though it appears to form no part of it. Both convictions, proclaimed so openly, were won in the secret recesses of his soul in moments of communion with the Father.

And again we feel, that in these hours of prayer Jesus must have had those great experiences of his soul out of which were born those words which sound to us almost too bold and too daring, but which he meant to be understood just as they were given,—those words about the omnipotence of faith which he clothed in pictorial form: "Verily I say unto you, If you have faith and doubt not, ye shall not only do what is done to the fig-tree, but even if ye shall say unto this mountain, Be thou taken up and cast into the sea, it shall be done. And all things, whatsoever ye shall ask in prayer, believing, ye shall receive" (Matt. xxi. 21-22). What a profound experience of intimate communion with his Father voices itself in the words about the sparrow on the

housetop and the hair on the head! The Father controls his life absolutely, takes cognizance of everything that happens to him. Such words can be spoken only by one who has experienced their truth in his own life; otherwise they would be preposterous.

What unexpected vistas into the soul-life words like these afford! How close we get to him! How much better we understand him! These parables and pictures mean more than a superficial reading would suggest. People in all ages have rightly felt that behind their marvelous simplicity is hidden a depth of meaning which but the true disciple understands. And so they have resorted to explain them allegorically, and have read more into them than the text would warrant, that thus their religious longing might be satisfied. We must discard the allegorical method, must apply the strictly historical and literary method; but we should combine with the literary method the psychological. The psychological gives us that depth which has been divined in these parables, gives us Jesus himself in his parables, and allows us a look into the life of his soul. It is plain that this method should be applied to all his words; for underneath his thoughts and actions lies that mysterious sphere which we call the subconscious life, in which are formed most of our thoughts and decisions, and out of which merge those powerful impulses and feelings which seem to come so often suddenly and unprepared, but which may have been quite long in this subconscious stream out of which they come into the light of consciousness at the given time. Into this region we must press to find a clearer revelation of Christ's inner life.

And incidentally, I may suggest, we shall receive some light on that most difficult of all New Testament questions,—

the Johannine problem; for it seems to me that we must approach it from the psychological side. Comparing carefully the results which the psychological study of Jesus' words in the Synoptists yields with the statements in the Gospel of John, we shall find, for instance, that the word in the Fourth Gospel, "I am the light of the world," is psychologically back of the synoptic saying, "Ye are the light of the world"; and that the statements "I am the bread of life," "I am the water of life," "I am come that they might have life, and might have more abundantly," are expressing, in regard to Jesus himself, what we found to lie back of the parable of the Bridegroom and the Sons of the Bridechamber, in the consciousness of being able to satisfy the deepest wants of the human heart. Conscious of being the physician of the soul, he is able to impart fullness of life. And that remarkable saying in John's Gospel, "And I, if I be lifted up [to glory], will draw all men unto myself" is in fundamental accord with the conviction which lies back of the temptation, in which he sees in vision all kingdoms of the world and their glory, and knows that they shall all be his.

The whole Christ we must have. But we shall not understand him wholly by theological and metaphysical speculations, but rather by a penetrating, sympathetic, psychological study of his words, the richness of whose results this sketch has meant to indicate by pointing out those feelings of his soul which his wonderful illustrations reveal. And, as we try to see the vision of his soul, we shall also hear his voice speak to our soul.

"Go forth, for thou shall see what I have seen,
And break thro' all, till one will crown thee king
Far in the spiritual city!"

And, as we listen, we shall also experience what the pure-

souled youth experienced to whom his loved one spoke these words. For,

"As she spake,
She sent the deathless passion in her eyes
Thro' him, and made him hers, and laid her mind
On him, and he believed in her belief."

And to us, also, will be given the power that this youth received. For, while he spake to one of his brother-knights, this one felt that

" His eye, dwelling on mine,
Drew me, with power upon me, till I grew
One with him, to believe as he believed."

Here lies the secret of Christ's wondrous charm, the great attraction and transforming power of his life; here lies the secret of the Christian's joy and peace, in that most gracious influence of soul upon the soul, in Christ's regenerating touch of life on life.

NOTE I. (page 104).

His purpose was practical, for sophistry he had no time, word-catching he detested. Many problems which we feel as problems to-day, he has not yet felt as such, has not faced them and has not solved them. For him there was only one all-controlling aim,—to establish the Kingdom of God. That was the center of his thoughts and of his wishes, and all his energies he bends to this one aim. He was no social reformer and did not want to be one, although his principles are fundamentally revolutionary. He has felt deeply, it is true, the social evil, for he belonged himself to the working-class; but it does not enter his mind to change outward circumstances, either social or political or both, and thus to bring about his ideal. The root of the evil lies for him deeper; it is in the hearts of men. The hearts he wants to change by bringing them into right relation to the Father God.

It is true, he has felt deeply the distinction of the classes, of rich and poor; has recognized clearly the demoralizing tendency of wealth; has characterized it even as standing in sharp contrast with God; has seen in his work how the poor were more receptive for the kingdom, how hard it is for the rich to feel the power of the high, moral ideal; and so he has called the poor blessed, and on the rich he has pronounced his solemn woe. But a social question this has never been to him: it was, as everything else, a religious question. It is the service of the Mammon that he condemns because it excludes the service of God.

NOTE II. (page 106).

The question whether Jesus regarded the vision as an objective or a subjective reality is, after all, of minor importance. All visions are subjective experiences,—states of mind which are so intense that, at the given time, when the excitement reaches its highest pitch, they are projected outwardly; so that the vision is seen outwardly and not within the soul, the voice is heard as coming from without and not from within. And so the one who experiences the vision thinks of it as an objective reality; and Jesus in all likelihood thought so too. But not so much the manner as the contents of this exalted experience are of fundamental importance. In Jesus' case the vision brought the clear revelation of his divine Sonship.

NOTE III. (page 111).

Here in his home-life lie also the springs of those most beautiful and most evangelical parables of his, of the Prodigal Son, of the Lost Coin and the Lost Sheep, of the Friend at Midnight, and many others. Where but at home had he learned to speak so touchingly of the father's love? Sometimes he has learned the heart of God by contrasting the earthly and the heavenly Father with each other, but more frequently by arguing from the great love of the earthly father to the surpassing love of the Heavenly Father, saying, "How much more!" The highest message which Jesus had for the poor, despairing children of men he has given in these parables, especially in that pearl of all parables, of the Prodigal Son. He would gladly take away everything that makes men feel afraid of God by showing how heartily glad God is over the return of his lost children. The father cannot help being glad,—“It was meet to make merry.” Out of his love-warm heart there wells up the joy over his long-lost son, who has come home at last. Boldly and courageously Jesus compares the noblest traits of a human father with the character of the Heavenly Father, because he knows his Father's heart, for “I and the Father are one.” If a human father acts thus, the Heavenly Father cannot act otherwise. Jesus conceives it to be one of the life-elements of religion, that men should win confidence in the Father God; and he cannot express this conviction better than by pointing to the love of the human father, which had taught him the deepest lesson of trust.

Here in the home-life, also, was laid the foundation for his judgment of values,—his right estimate of things, with its emphasis on the essential and the eternal. The inherent foolishness of laying emphasis on earthly riches, so graphically portrayed in the parable of the Foolish Rich Man, he had already learned at home, where he had in all probability witnessed the scene of the patching up of the clothes, and of the use of old skins for new wine. Can we doubt that he learned here also to lay stress on the inwardness of true religion? He had learned in his intercourse with his Father, that those outward matters which the teachers emphasized so much could throw no shadow between him and God. Purity of heart and conscience was the only condition for him. He saw God with undimmed eye, and stood in intimate communion with him, even when his hands were not levitically clean. The only criterion of his is, whatever does not hinder real childlike communion with God cannot be sin. If his earthly father's love was independent of such outward details, how much more the love of his Heavenly Father!

NOTE IV. (page 115).

Notice, for example, Amos' experience as he himself describes it. First, he has the strange vision of the utter destruction of Israel, and he pleads for the nation; the vision comes again, and troubles the prophet greatly. Then, when he cannot rid himself of the awful sense of approaching danger, he sees the reason for the calamity. Israel cannot stand; it is as impossible for it to stand if it does not live righteously, as it is for a wall that has not been built aright—the fall *must* come. Jeremiah sees those fearful sights of absolute destruction, and hears those awful sounds of the coming enemy. The terrible anguish of soul produces in him even physical pain.

“ My anguish, my anguish ! I am pained
At my very heart;
My heart does rage within me.
I cannot hold my peace.

“ For trumpet-sound my soul has heard
And the alarm of war.
Destruction upon destruction is cried,
For the whole land is laid waste.

“ Suddenly are my tents destroyed,
My curtains in a moment.
How long shall I see the standard,
And hear the sound of the trumpet ? ”

And Jeremiah also finds the *explanation* in the conditions of the time. The primary and fundamental factor in the prophetic consciousness is, that they became possessed of that awful sense of the impending doom,—a sense so strong that it was vain for them to attempt to rid themselves of it. It is not necessary to insist that this primary factor was always the first in time; that they always had this dark feeling before they had reflected upon the sins of the nation, before they had read the signs of the time. In Amos' case it seems to have been so. But, however much they may have reflected on the sin, however profoundly they may have been convinced of the moral corruption of the nation and of the necessity of a radical change or of a terrible punishment, this is not the force that drives them to proclaim the destruction. It comes to them as an *explanation* of this strange feeling which overmasters them, which is intelligible to them only on the supposition that Jehovah had spoken thus to them. Of course, the two factors are combined in their message, and it is quite

natural that their reading of the signs of the time becomes quite prominent with them; for it is on this that they must lay much stress when they address the people. "The end" must be justified to them, they must come to see that their sins must lead to such dire results, and so it comes about that the political element plays a great part in their message. It is not quite certain whether Jesus also spoke of the approaching political end of the nation. If he did, as I believe he did, it was wholly subordinated to the approach of the spiritual kingdom. It is an interesting problem whether the eschatological parables do not really belong for the most part to the beginning of his ministry, when he spoke more of the end, which was so very near, though he always retained that idea.

NOTE V. (page 116).

This gives us the explanation of the strange saying of his that produced such a profound impression on the Scribes, "Son, thy sins are forgiven" (Mark ii. 5). How does it come that Jesus is impelled to say this to the poor palsied man, when he did not say it to other sufferers? And what did he mean by it? Jesus looked into the eager eyes of the man, saw how confidently he came to him who, as prophet, was God's representative, and knew that such childlike trust that has no fear of God can only be in one who has found peace in God. And so, full of glad surprise, he says, "Son, thy sins are forgiven." He does not give him something new, as if he intended to cure the soul first, before he would cure the body. He simply states what he sees in the man. He knows that his sins must have been forgiven, else he could not have this "faith."

That this is the true interpretation is clear from the similar story of the sinful woman in Simon the Pharisee's house (Luke vii. 36-50). There Jesus shows Simon that he must not merely infer the effect from the cause (because a great debt has been remitted, the debtor will love his creditor), but also, conversely, he must infer the cause from the effect (the love which Simon sees here exhibited is due to the fact that the great guilt has been forgiven, "Her sins, which are many, have been [perfect tense!] forgiven"). The explanation of this great love which the woman has just now shown (aorist!) is to be sought in her gratitude for the forgiveness of her sins. She shows this grateful love to Jesus because he must have been instrumental in bringing her God's absolution before the events described in this passage, although we are not told this in so many words.

NOTE VI. (page 120).

Jesus did not deceive himself in regard to his success among the people. His criticism is thoroughly sober. They appear to him like children who are sitting in the market-place to play, but cannot get up a good game because of their capriciousness; neither glad nor serious games find the approval of all, and so it happens that their playing comes to naught, on account of the petulancy of some of the playmates. Just so the people behave towards the truth: when a stern ascetic prophet like John the Baptist appeared, they said, he has a demon; and when a prophet with glad heart and look like Jesus rises, they are again dissatisfied, call him a winebibber and gluttonous man, religiously worthless because he has intercourse with publicans and sinners. When Jesus spoke this parable of the Children playing in the market-place he had already experienced the first disappointments; but he had conquered them so completely that he could speak about them not only with calmness but with a certain amount of humor. They had pained him, but they could not rob him his fresh courage. His hopeful joy is still undimmed, because he knows that divine wisdom will always be justified, his work will not be in vain.

Not only the people in general were clearly understood by him: he looked, also, through his adversaries. And here the little parable pair already referred to—of the New Patch on the Old Garment and the New Wine and the Old Wine-Skins—shows very strikingly the tremendous energy of his opposition to the Pharisaic conception of life and religion. Jesus feels the contrast too strongly to believe that a union between himself and them could ever be effected without the greatest damage. As little as one should think of putting new wine into old wine-skins, since only damage would result; so little should one think that the basic principles of Jesus and his opponents could be united without the greatest damage, because the differences reach down to the very essentials of life. This, in connection with the emphasis on the new, appears to indicate an absolute break with the old on the part of Jesus. That radical break should never be left out of sight. As a true prophet, Jesus was in radical opposition to the prevailing tendencies of his time. But he did not thereby cut himself loose from all the good of the past. How far he was from doing this, he himself shows us in his parable of the True Scribe, who has been trained for the Kingdom of God, and knows how to use the new wisdom and the old, just as a householder knows how to use wisely the old as well as the

new things which he possesses. We perceive that he does not merely give advice, but lives himself according to it. He is conservative as well as radical. With clear eye he discerns that the very essence of this so-called traditional party was in deadly opposition to the great dominating principles of life, which were alive in his own soul with such freshness and originality, and which were in perfect harmony with the eternally old and true. Never saw a man more clearly the issue involved; never faced two parties each other with such determined opposition. The battle between the old and the new! Bitter personal animosity on the one side, joyous conviction of sure victory on the other side. Jesus fought in this conflict in such manner as became his character. But it is a false picture that has been painted by many Christians when Jesus' tenderness has been emphasized at the expense of his strength. It is not necessary here to enlarge on the unyielding strength of his will in his fight against his opponents, on his unsparing criticism, on the relentlessness with which he lays bare their base purposes, on the divine fury which overmastered him when he drove out the money-changers from the temple. But, in the light of it, those words which have troubled so many, assume a new significance: "Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you, bless them that curse you, pray for them that despitefully use you. To him that smiteth thee on the one cheek, offer also the other; and from him that taketh away thy cloak withhold not thy coat also" (Luke vi. 26-29). This is not the counsel of a coward or a weakling, but the advice of the strongest of the sons of men; and he speaks these words with the full appreciation of their profound significance. His strong heart knows that he requires from his disciples something great indeed, when he asks them not to resist him that is evil, knows from his own experience that it meant the full mastery of oneself. To be kind to a friend is nothing; but to show love to an enemy, that is the great deed, and this deed is required. The immediate joining of this thought of the ease with which one loves a friend to the thought of the love of the enemy is of the greatest significance. Jesus knows what it costs, and can therefore appreciate its worth. He has learned it to be one of the fundamental principles of true religion to forgive our debtors. With out such a forgiving spirit there can be no harmony between God and the soul. And this Jesus emphasized not merely in the Lord's Prayer, but in that gracious parable of the Unmerciful Servant (Matt. xvii. 23-35), where he teaches, as it is only just and natural if a king who has shown extraordinary

mercy to a servant in forgiving him his enormous debts, reverses his act of mercy when he finds out that the servant has shown an utter lack of mercy in a similar case; so it is only just and natural if God does not forgive those who do not forgive others. Jesus shows the spirit of love even in his conflict with his opponents. He did not hate them, though they hated him most cordially. But he knows what it means to bless even those who cursed him and his work.

Jesus was never afraid of his opponents; but he was troubled on account of his friends, of those friends who had forsaken him and his cause. He had seen how the quality of his being influenced the people about him, how their lives gained by it their real value, and in one parable he compares this influence to the seasoning power of the salt. When his disciples had received from him this same quality of being, together with his principles of life, they were also filled with this seasoning power by which they would influence the people. But Jesus had made the awful observatoin that the one and the other lost this spiritual power; and it appeared to him that they were then like the salt that had lost its savor and was cast away as altogether useless. One hears the solemn warning ring through these words, though it is not directly expressed, to be careful about this spiritual power lest it be lost; and one perceives, also, what a deep and sad impression this observation must have made on Jesus. That he himself ever felt in danger of losing his great spiritual power, there is no hint whatever.

ARTICLE VII.

CHURCH HISTORY AS AN AID TO CHRISTIAN
UNITY.

BY PROFESSOR ALLEN DUDLEY SEVERANCE.

THERE is no necessity of insisting upon the evils of denominational rivalry. It has been fitly termed "the sin of schism."¹ We are all too familiar with the sad spectacle. On the fine avenues of our large cities there are elegant church edifices of different denominations every few blocks, sometimes on the same block,—altogether too much money locked up in brick and mortar. In the rapidly growing suburbs it is even worse. The denominations seem to act as though possessed by a haunting fear that *their* chance to preach the gospel would be forever lost if they did not hasten to plant a chapel, totally regardless of the needs of the little community; and, on what we are accustomed to call "home mission territory," the state of affairs is even worse. In town after town in the West, there are half-a-dozen weak, struggling churches where one or two would suffice; their pastors underpaid, their accommodations pathetic in the extreme, and their expenses defrayed in large part by home missionary boards in the East, themselves already deep in debt. And what are the conditions on foreign missionary ground? Take Japan as an illustration. Dr. Amory H. Bradford says: "I have seen in one place after another in that country Presbyterians, Baptists, Anglicans, American Episcopalians, Methodists North and South,

¹"The Sin of Schism," by E. Benjamin Andrews, in *Lectures on Church Unity*.

Wesleyans from Canada, confusing natives by different names, insisting on insignificant details of their own organizations, when an impression had hardly been made on surrounding heathenism.”¹ Do not such things justify the indignant words of Bishop Maret? “If, after eighteen centuries, idolatry prevails over the greater part of the globe; if Mahometism desolates once flourishing Christian countries; if a thinly disguised atheism ravages even the Christian world, doubt not that one of the most powerful causes of so many moral and social miseries, so many shameful humiliations, lies in the many unhappy internal divisions of Christians, which constitute schism and heresy.”²

I. Deprecating, as all must, this sad state of affairs, cannot church historians do something to help put an end to it? Let us face the fact that our divisions arise in large measure from (1) ignorance of one another, (2) prejudice, and (3) mistakes. Cannot the study of church history do something to remove all three?

1. *Ignorance*.— One of the arguments commonly urged in favor of the study of general history is “that the limitations of the man who knows nothing of the past are similar to the limitations of him whose observations have been confined to his own country or his own town.”³ If there is a need of knowing the history of other nations and of other times than our own, does not the same argument apply to the history of other communions? Our denominational consciousness is too much magnified. The political jingo is the man who knows nothing about the achievements of other peoples. Is not the spirit of the ecclesiastical jingo essentially the same? What

¹ “The Unity of the Spirit,” by Amory H. Bradford, in *Lectures on Church Unity*.

² Quoted in preface to Döllinger’s *Reunion of the Churches*, p. xiii.

³ Adams, *Manual of Historical Literature*, p. 3.

would be thought of an army corps which fancied itself to be the entire army?

We do not have to go back to the Reformation times to find illustrations of the fact that ignorance of one another's ways keeps churches apart.

On April 22 and 23, 1903, the representatives of four denominations—the Congregationalist, the United Brethren, the Methodist Protestant, and the Christian Connection—met in Pittsburg to take steps toward their union into one body. Dr. William Hayes Ward, of New York, who was present on behalf of the Congregationalists, describes the gathering in a recent number of the *Independent*.¹ Concerning these denominations he says: "No two of them have ever been in close historical or geographical connection with each other. Where one denomination strongly prevails the others are weak. Accordingly they have lived apart without much mutual knowledge. . . . To form a plan of union between bodies so alike, yet so diverse, and so ignorant with each other, was no easy task. The first work must be that of acquaintance. The first long general session . . . was spent in learning each other's ways and views. Many were the questions asked." As a result of the conference, the first step—and that a hopeful one—was taken toward Christian union. Three of these denominations have decided, while retaining their present names and their autonomy in respect to all local affairs, to add to their official title the following: "In affiliation with the General Council of the United Churches." Does not this achievement in recent church history support the truth of the statement, made above, that ignorance of one another is one of the prime reasons for denominational separation?

The *argumentum ad ignorantiam* has had altogether too

¹ April 30, 1903.

prominent a place in church histories of the past. Saintine called history "the lie of the ages."¹ One has but to read certain church historians to feel that the reproach is almost justified. "Eusebius openly avows his intention of relating only those incidents in the lives of the martyrs of Palestine which would reflect credit on the Church, and Milner constructs his whole history on the principle that he will omit all mention of ecclesiastical wickedness, and record only the specimens of ecclesiastical virtue."²

In the interest of polemics, church history has been perverted. "Its sources," says Henry B. Smith, "are buried in the dust of alcoves, and when exhumed, it is seldom with the insignia of a resurrection. They are investigated for aid in present polemics, not to know the past but to conquer in an emergency; as if one should run over American history only in view of incorporating a bank or passing a tariff-bill."³

Protestants have been fond of telling the story of Luther's finding the Bible—"a rare book, unknown at that time"⁴—upon the unknown shelves of a dark room"⁵ of the University of Erfurth. One has to do considerable searching to find in a Protestant history the statement that "this was partly his own fault, for several editions of the Latin Vulgate and the German Bible were printed before 1500."⁶

On the other hand, Roman-Catholic historians have not been at all backward in repeating the calumnies of Bolsec and Audin concerning Luther and Calvin and the other Reformers.⁷

¹ X. B. Saintine, *Picciola the Prisoner of Fenestrella*, p. 13.

² A. P. Stanley, "Introduction to the Study of Ecclesiastical History," in his *History of the Eastern Church*, p. 55.

³ "The Science of Church History," in *Faith and Philosophy*, p. 52.

⁴ D'Aubigné, *History of the Reformation*, p. 41.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

⁶ Schaff, *History of the Christian Church*, Vol. vi. p. 111, note 1.

⁷ Cf. Paul Majunke, *Luther's Lebensende* (Mainz, 1891).

The history of D'Aubigné doubtless needs correction; but Luther was not the demon incarnate that he is painted by Archbishop Spaulding.¹

2. A more fruitful source of our divisions even than ignorance is *prejudice*. Prejudice may be defined as willful ignorance. We are glad to believe ill of those from whom we differ, and we do not take the trouble to inform ourselves of the good that is in them. We do not try to see things from their point of view.

The illustrations referred to under the head of "ignorance" might also be used here; for it is often hard to tell where ignorance leaves off and prejudice begins. The controversies between Romanists and Protestants—and to a lesser extent polemics between Protestant denominations—have been too much conducted along these lines. Church historians, whose motto ought to have been that of Ranke, "Ich werde es nur schreiben wie es eigentlich gewesen war," have too often added fuel to the flames by their misrepresentation of the practices and views of their opponents.

Take, e. g., the average Protestant presentation of the question of Indulgences. In the recent handbook on "the Reformation" by Professor T. M. Lindsay, of Glasgow, we read: "The money was to be got by the sale of pieces of stamped paper or tickets declaring that the purchaser had received pardon for the commission of sins which had been named, valued, and paid for."²

No wonder that our Roman-Catholic friends object to this presentation of the subject. Not a word in the manual from which the quotation has just been made as to the scholastic distinction between the eternal guilt and the temporal punishment of sin, and that the indulgence was the commutation

¹ M. J. Spaulding, *History of the Protestant Reformation*, pp. 71-101.

² T. M. Lindsay, *The Reformation* (Edinburgh, 1884), p. 3.

of the temporal penalties imposed by the church, while the guilt of sin was absolved by the priest on confession and contrition of the penitent.¹ Why does it not suffice to say that the doctrine of indulgences is one that easily lent itself to abuses?—abuses which were recognized by the Council of Trent.² Why do not ecclesiastical historians leave to politicians the joy of “putting the other party in a hole”? All honor to President E. Benjamin Andrews when he says: “The ordinary denominationalist now has no feeling for the old Catholic Church. Usually he hates and despises it. He remembers that it bred Leo X., but forgets that it raised up Luther, Calvin, and Knox. . . . Yet, with all its errors, that old Church was God’s Church, and the net influence of it was not evil but gloriously good. . . . Still it is very easy, as it is very usual, to underrate the evangelical excellence of the church in which Luther had his spiritual birth.”³

3. *Mistakes* often keep churches apart. It is the duty of the faithful teacher of church history to call attention to these mistakes and their disastrous consequences. In this way the present can learn from the past.

In 1675 attempts were made in Germany to bring about the reunion of Romanists and Protestants. On the Protestant side was the great scholar Leibnitz. The attempts at reunion lasted for about thirty years; but they made shipwreck on the rock of mistaken exegesis of Scripture. The first demand on the part of the Catholics was that the Protestants should no longer regard and designate the Pope as Antichrist. Said a contemporary theologian: “All Protestants are so bewitched with this conceit about Antichrist that they fly from Catholics as from snakes in the garden, and think they see a dragon

¹ Cf. Catholic Dictionary, art. “Indulgence.”

² Concilium Tridentinum Session of December 4, 1563.

³ Lectures on Church Unity, p. 73.

or an evil spirit if they meet a Catholic." According to the views of the time, the harlot mentioned in Rev. xvii. 3-6 as seated on the beast and drunk with the blood of the saints, and "the man of sin" in 2 Thess. ii. 3-4, were thought to refer not to pagan but to papal Rome. This matter of calling the Pope Antichrist was not the only difficulty that kept Romanists and Protestants apart; but it engendered a state of mind that made all negotiations futile. The learned Dr. Döllinger wrote in 1872: "Even during the last century these views have had an enormous influence, and have built up a brazen wall between Catholics and Protestants. At this hour they are still deeply rooted and powerful in England and America, and supported by a copious and constantly increasing apocalyptic literature. But in Germany they have long since disappeared from the popular belief, and thereby, as it seems to me, one of the most serious hindrances to a reunion of the two religions is removed."¹

If any one desires other illustrations as to how mistaken views of Scripture have kept Christians apart, let him peruse the eloquent and scholarly pages of the late Dean Farrar's "History of Interpretation," and he will read therein of "controversies waged with a fierceness in proportion to the entire doubtfulness of the question at stake." Of the post-Reformation period, the same author says: "There never was an epoch in which men were so much occupied in discovering each other's errors, or in which they called each other by so many opprobrious names."²

II. But, if the study of ecclesiastical history shows the causes that have kept churches apart, it also has a nobler mission to perform, viz., the engendering of a state of mind that will bring Christians together in mutual love and admiration.

¹The Reunion of the Churches, p. 92.

²History of Interpretation, p. 363.

1. The study of history has been often likened to travel in its broadening effects. Why should we be ignorant of the good in other communions? Will not a knowledge of the beneficent results of practices on the part of other churches toward which we have been brought up to look askance induce us to regard and treat them as brethren?

In this respect we owe a debt of gratitude to Mr. Henry C. Lea for the way in which he has opened the eyes of some of us, and pointed out the good existent in many of the usages of the Mediæval Church—an institution in which the average Protestant finds it difficult—partly owing to ignorance and partly to prejudice—to talk fairly.

Take, for example, the Penitential Books, composed by such men as Theodore, Archbishop of Canterbury, Bæda Venerabilis, and others. In these books, according to the legal notions of the Barbarians, the canonical penance for sins might be compounded by a sort of spiritual *Wehrgeld*. The pamphleteer throws up his hands in horror at this. But Mr. Lea is more just. He says: "Crude and contradictory as were the Penitentials in many things, taken as a whole their influence cannot but have been salutary. They inculcated on the still barbarous populations lessons of charity and loving-kindness, of forgiveness of injuries and of helpfulness to the poor and the stranger as a part of the discipline whereby the sinner could redeem his sins. Besides this, the very vagueness of the boundary between secular and spiritual matters enabled them to instill ideas of order and decency and cleanliness and hygiene among the rude inhabitants of central and northern Europe. . . . It was no small matter that the uncultured barbarian should be taught that evil thoughts and desires were punishable as well as evil acts." ¹

¹ Confession and Indulgences, Vol. ii. p. 107.

In another place, speaking of the Penitentials, Mr. Lea says: "There was a distinct gain for morality in the attempt to enforce in practice the gospel precept that sin may be committed in the heart as well as by the hand, and that he who desires to commit a crime and is unable to execute it is liable to one-half the penance due for an accomplished act. As civilization commenced to dawn again, the Church sought to regulate the relations of man with his fellows by a higher law than that of the crude and often unjust customs of the early middle ages. Whatever might be its self-seeking, it at least kept before mankind a loftier standard of conduct than the prescriptions of secular legislation, and it inculcated; in theory at least, the scriptural injunctions of peace and goodwill. As the sole custodian of morals, its precepts for ages were the only influence leading the vast majority of Christians to a conception of something truer and better than the law of the strongest."¹

The mind cannot but be broadened by a study of (e. g.) the noble lives of the missionaries of other communions. Such a study will lead us not to unchurch those whose labors have been so abundantly blessed. Who stops to inquire to what denominations belonged William Carey, "the consecrated cobbler"; David Livingstone, the missionary explorer of Africa; Henry Martyn, the translator of the Scriptures into Hindoo, Persian, and Arabic; Adoniram Judson, who opened Burmah to Christianity; John Williams, who laid down his life for the gospel in Oceanica; Robert Morrison, the translator of the Bible into Chinese; John Eliot, "the Apostle to the North American Indians"; and countless others whose names are blazoned high on the roll of missionary heroes? We would gladly do honor to these men, were they still in the flesh. Why

¹ *Confession and Indulgences*, Vol. ii. p. 412.

refuse to fellowship with those bodies who sent them out and supported them in their labors?

2. The impartial study of church history will make for the advantage of no one church or denomination. It will enforce the lesson "*Ubi spiritus Dei, ibi ecclesia.*" It will present in a sympathetic light the saints of the church universal—characters too large to be monopolized by the sect to which they belonged when on earth, and in the legacy of whose influence and example all Christians are glad to claim a share.

Lecturing to the students of Oxford in 1857, that broad-minded churchman later to be known as Dean Stanley uttered the following golden words as to "The Advantages of Ecclesiastical History": "We learn that every church partakes of the faults, as well of the excellences, of its own age and country; that each is fallible as human nature itself; that each is useful as a means, none perfect as an end. To find Christ *or* Antichrist exclusively in any one community is against charity and against humility, but above all, against the plain facts of history. Let us hold this truth firmly, and we shall have then secured ourselves against two of the worst evils which infest the well-being of religious communities, the love of controversy, and the love of proselyting."¹ If this advice had been heard and heeded, the realization of Christian unity would be nearer than it to-day appears.

In 1850, Dr. Ferdinand Piper, Professor of Theology in the University of Berlin, proposed in a church-diet at Stuttgart, the following thesis: "The whole evangelical church in German lands is interested in forming a common roll of lives for all the days of the year, to be settled on the foundation of our common history, and thus to be made a bond

¹ History of the Eastern Church, p. 73.

of union of the churches in all the countries.”¹ In imitation of the “*Acta Sanctorum*” of the Romanists, eminent scholars of Germany, France, Great Britain, Holland, Switzerland, and Scandinavia collaborated in writing the lives of “*Die Zeugen der Wahrheit*.” All branches of the church were included in the biographies. To mention only a few names, the Greek writers were represented by Justin Martyr and Athanasius; the Latin writers by Ambrose, Augustine, Boniface, Anselm, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Thomas Aquinas. Huss, Wyclif, Peter Waldo, and Savonarola stood forth as Reformers before the Reformation. As Protestant Reformers, Luther, Melancthon, Zwingli, Calvin, Knox, and Coligny were presented. In post-Reformation times Gustavus Adolphus, Paul Gerhardt, Zinzendorf, Baxter, John Wesley, and others appeared. For twenty-one years these biographies were published in a periodical established for the purpose, and met with great acceptance in Germany. The Imperial Government officially commended the roll of names. In 1879 a selection was made from the German work of the lives of those “*Leaders of the Church Universal*” which it was thought would interest readers in America. To these were added by American scholars the lives of “*Leaders*” in America, Asia, Africa, and Oceanic. Denominations were amongst these “*Later Leaders*” represented according to numerical strength and geographical location. The significant fact is that the book, which had for its title “*Lives of the Leaders of Our Church Universal*,” was issued simultaneously by a large portion of the denominational publication houses of this continent. Thus, to quote the words of the American editor, “Each of these houses courteously introduced to its own communion the

¹ See preface to *Lives of the Leaders of Our Church Universal*, by Ferdinand Piper and Henry Mitchell MacCracken, p. iii.

leaders of the other churches not as 'strangers and foreigners' but as dear brethren."¹ The study of church history need not always be pursued in a divisive spirit.

We do not have to go as far back as the year 1879 to find an illustration of the statement that the impartial study of church history makes for no one denomination. In 1902 about forty of the womens' foreign missionary societies pursued a united study of missions, using as a text-book "*Via Christi*," by Louise Manning Hodgkins, formerly of Wellesley College. As may be inferred from the title, "*Via Christi*" is in reality a history of the Christian church from apostolic to modern times, especial prominence being given to missionary activities. The spirit in which these societies are undertaking the study may be seen from a quotation from the preface to the text-book on India, "*Lux Christi*," which is being used for the year 1903-04. The author, Caroline Atwater Mason, urges an interchange of denominational literature, "in order that each may know all, and that we may see henceforth not Methodist India, or Presbyterian, or Baptist, but *Christ's India*."²

Says Dr. Schaff: "The older historians, both Roman Catholic and Protestant, searched ancient and mediæval history for weapons to defeat their opponents." But the same authority also declares: "Genuine history is being rewritten from the standpoint of impartial truth and justice. . . . The early Lutheran abhorrence of Zwinglianism and Calvinism has disappeared from the best Lutheran manuals of church history. The bitterness between Prelatists and Puritans, Calvinists and Arminians, Baptists and Pædobaptists has given away to a calm and just appreciation."³

¹ See preface to *Lives of the Leaders of Our Church Universal*, by Ferdinand Piper and Henry Mitchell MacCracken, p. viii.

² *Lux Christi*, p. x. ³ *The Reunion of Christendom*, p. 34.

Comparatively recently there was published a "History of American Christianity," written by a Congregational clergyman.¹ In it such full justice was done to other denominations, that, from internal evidence, it would be impossible to determine to which section of the Christian church the author belonged. Such books show that "there is a unity of Christian scholarship of all creeds, which aims at the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth."²

3. The study of church history will inculcate a due denominational modesty.

No one division of the church can claim for itself a monopoly of all the virtues. In the history of each denomination there are pages that the scribe would gladly leave unwritten.

Take, e. g., the matter of persecution. "Nearly all churches have acted as persecutors when they had the chance, if not by fire and sword, at least by misrepresentation, vituperation, and abuse."³ It will not do for the Protestant to rail against the Romanist in this respect. If the one cites Augustine and Aquinas as good men who advocated the death penalty for heresy, the other can retort with the names of Calvin and Melancthon. The argument for toleration has been urged for the most part by persecuted sects, or by those who lacked the opportunity to persecute. Even the Pilgrim fathers of New England sought freedom of worship for themselves, but denied it to others. Religious wars and persecutions have been called the "Satanic chapter in church history."⁴

Intolerance and exclusiveness is the spirit that would persecute, if it had the chance. We do not have to go back to mediæval history for illustrations. Let the self-satisfied denomina-

¹ Leonard Woolsey Bacon.

² Schaff, *The Reunion of Christendom*, p. 3. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁴ Schaff, *Church History*, Vol. vi. p. 57; and vii. p. 693.

tionalist read the minutes of the last heresy trial in his own church, and he will bow his head in shame at the vituperation and bad blood displayed by professed disciples of the Master.

Both Romanists and Protestants, and even our New England ancestors, must take their part of the blame for the Witchcraft delusion—a belief which persisted for fifteen hundred years, and cost the lives of tens of thousands of innocent victims.¹

The perusal of certain church histories shows that the study of ecclesiastical history does teach lessons of denominational modesty. Take up a little book entitled "The Coming of the Friars," by Rev. Augustus Jessopp, D. D., and see the lesson that he reads to the Church of England, of which he is a priest, *à propos* of the treatment accorded the Mendicant Orders by the Church of Rome, and that given to the Wesleyans by the English hierarchy. Says he: "St. Francis was the John Wesley of the thirteenth century, whom the church did not cast out."

"Rome has never been afraid of fanaticism. She has always known how to utilize her enthusiasts fired by a new idea. The Church of England has never known how to deal with a man of genius. From Wicklif to Frederick Robertson, from Bishop Peacock to Dr. Rowland Williams, the clergyman who has been in danger of impressing his personality upon Anglicanism, where he has not been the subject of relentless persecution, has at least been regarded with timid suspicion, has been shunned by the prudent men of low degree, and by those of high degree has been forgotten. In the Church of England there has never been a time when the enthusiast has not been treated as a very *unsafe* man. Rome has found a place for the dreamiest mystic or the noisiest ranter—found a place and

¹ Lecky, *History of Rationalism*, Vol. i. p. 28.

found a sphere of useful labor. We, with our insular prejudices, have been sticklers for the narrowest uniformity, and yet we have accepted, as a useful addition to the Creed of Christendom, one article which we have only not formulated because, perhaps, it came to use from a Roman bishop, the great sage Talleyrand—*Surtout pas trop de zèle!* . . . Rome absorbed them all [the Mendicant Orders]; they became the Church's great army of volunteers, perfectly disciplined, admirably handled; their very jealousies and rivalries turned into good account. When John Wesley offered to the Church of England precisely their successors, we would have no commerce with them; we did our best to turn them into a hostile and invading force."¹

The same lesson was administered to the Church of England by one of her most illustrious sons, the great Macaulay, in 1840. Speaking on precisely this point, he says: "The ignorant enthusiast, whom the Anglican Church makes an enemy, and, whatever the learned and polite may think, a most dangerous enemy, the Catholic Church makes a champion. . . . Place Ignatius Loyola at Oxford. He is certain to become the head of a formidable secession. Place John Wesley at Rome. He is certain to be the first General of a new society devoted to the interests and honor of the Church. Place Joanna Southcote at Rome. She founds an order of barefooted Carmelites, every one of whom is ready to suffer martyrdom for the Church." ²

4. The study of the history of doctrine—a legitimate part of church history—need not be pursued in a divisive spirit.

Says Dr. Schaff: "If we examine and compare the most elaborate systems of Greek, Roman, and Protestant theology, . . . we shall find that the heads in which they agree are far

¹ Jessopp, *The Coming of the Friars*, pp. 47, 49.

² Essay on Ranke's *History of the Popes*.

more numerous and far more important than those in which they differ.¹ The late W. G. T. Shedd, of Andover, in an inaugural on "The Nature and Influence of the Historic Spirit," gave similar testimony as to the value of church history in the following utterance: "But its wide and catholic survey, also enables the historic mind to see as the unhistoric mind cannot, that the line of orthodoxy is not a mathematical line. It has some breadth. It is a path, upon which the church can travel, and not merely a direction in which it can look. It is a high and royal road, where Christian men may go abreast; may pass each other, and carry on the practical business of a Christian life; and not a mere hairline down which naught can go but the one-eyed sighting of either speculative or provincial bigotry."²

Attention has been directed too much to the points on which various branches of the church disagree. The doctrine of the Eucharist has been called "the battle-flag doctrine," because it has so divided Christians into hostile camps. But, after all, the controversies that have waged about this doctrine have been fought as to the *mode* of Christ's presence in the sacrament, while all parties have agreed as to the *fact* of the divine presence.³

To quote again from Dr. Shedd: "But what surer method can be employed to produce and perpetuate this catholic and liberal feeling among the various types and schools of orthodox theology, than to impart to all of them the broad views of history? And what surer method than this can be taken to diminish the number and bring about more unity of opinion in the department of systematic theology? For it is one great effect of history to coalesce and harmonize. It introduces mu-

¹ The Discord and Concord of Christendom, p. 304.

² Bibliotheca Sacra, April, 1854, p. 389.

³ The Discord and Concord of Christendom, p. 305.

tual modifications, by showing opponents that their predecessors were nearer together than they themselves are, by tracing the now widely separated opinions back to that point of departure where they were once very near together; and, above all, by causing all parties to remember, what all are so liable to forget in the heat of controversy, that all forms of orthodoxy took their first origin in the Scriptures, and that, therefore, all theological controversy should be carried on with a constant reference to this one infallible standard, which can teach but one infallible system." ¹

History tells us of doctrinal controversies waged between churches over matters thought to be of vast importance in their day, the very names of which are now forgotten. Such a period was the post-reformation epoch. "The air was full of burning questions that have long ago burnt themselves out. There was the Lutheran and Reformed controversy, the Flacianist and Philippist controversy, the Antinomian controversy, the Osiandrian controversy, the Majorist controversy, the Ubiquitarian controversy, the Synergistic controversy, the Adiaphoristic controversy, the Crypto-Calvinistic controversy, the Arminian and Gomarist controversy, the Calixtine or Syncretistic controversy, the Kenotic controversy, the Rathmann controversy, the Pietist controversy, Amyraldian controversy, the Karg controversy, the Huber controversy, and many more." ² The study of such controversies leads to the hope that the differences that to-day divide Christians may find their solution in the higher unity of the future.

Attention to the history of doctrine should lead us to ask ourselves, whether we have not over-emphasized certain truths in our credal statements, and thus erected walls of separation

¹ *Bibliotheca Sacra*, April, 1854, p. 393.

² *Farrar, History of Interpretation*, p. 362.

between ourselves and our brethren. A distinguished writer in this department has pointed out that "The real emphasis does not always fall where we might think it would, does not always fall where the logical emphasis does; that many doctrines which stand in the forefront of our systems, and for which we have
、 been all too ready to do battle, have been of very minor significance and influence in times when the church has most fully realized and best fulfilled its mission; and that the ignorance or neglect of them has not resulted as disastrously as the ignorance or neglect of other truths of which our systems and our preaching make far less account."¹

In the heat of controversy and in the struggle for supremacy, sects have overstated their own views, and have misrepresented those of their opponents, and have perverted partial truths into unmixed errors. Said a Saxon court theologian at the time of the Thirty Years' War: "For it is as plain as that the sun shines at noon that Calvinism reeks with frightful blasphemy, error and mischief and is diametrically opposed to God's holy revealed word. To take up arms for the Calvinists is nothing else than to serve under the originator of Calvinism, the devil. We ought to give our lives for our brethren, but the Calvinists are not our brethren. We ought to love our enemies: the Calvinists are not *our* enemies but God's"²

In studying the doctrinal controversies of the past, we are in a position to judge dispassionately, and to see how much good was often on the side which was at the time declared to be wrong, and how much wrong on the side that history has pronounced to be in the main right.³

Thus the church, as a whole, has decided to stamp with the

¹ A. C. McGiffert, art. "The Historical Study of Christianity," *Bibliotheca Sacra*, January, 1893.

² Andrews, *Institutes of General History*, p. 310.

³ Zenos, *Compendium of Church History*, p. 9.

name of Orthodoxy the theology of Athanasius. Nevertheless, one of the leading ecclesiastical historians of England has these good words to say for Arius, who has often been branded with the title of heresiarch: "His aim was not to lower the person of the Lord or to refuse him worship, but to defend that worship from the charge of polytheism. . . . Arianism was at least so far Christian that it held aloft the Lord's example as the Son of Man, and never wavered in its worship of him as the Son of God. Whatever be the errors of its creed, whatever the scandals of its history, it was a power of life among the Northern nations. Let us give Arianism full honor for its noble work of missions in that age of deep despair which saw the dissolution of the ancient world."¹ With equal justice, Professor Gwatkin, from whom the above quotation has been made, points out the intriguing, violence, and self-seeking of the champions of so-called orthodox views.

Will not the study of such instances lead us to the belief that there may be much of good in the views of those churches and communions from which we are to-day estranged?

5. The study of hymnology—a legitimate part of church history—should bring Christians of different denominations together in mutual love and admiration. If the study of creeds and confessions tends to become polemic, the hymnal is the church's irenicon. All branches of the Christian church sing with fervor and spiritual uplift hymns composed by members of communions with which they might hesitate to fellowship. It is a great thing to write a hymn that shall voice the religious aspirations of one's fellow-Christians, irrespective of creed or confession. The "Art thou weary, art thou languid?" of our hymn-books was suggested to John Mason Neale by a few words of an old monk

¹Gwatkin, *The Arian Controversy*, p. 3.

of the Greek Church; but who stops to inquire? "Lead, kindly Light," is a great favorite with Protestants, though composed by one who a little later entered the Church of Rome, in which he became a Cardinal. It is said that at the Parliament of Religions in Chicago, representatives of every creed known to man found two things on which they were agreed,—they could all join in the Lord's Prayer, and they could all sing "Lead, kindly Light."¹ Many Protestants derive help from the singing of

"My God, I love Thee; not because
I hope for heaven thereby,"

in blissful ignorance that it is attributed to a Jesuit, the heroic Francis Xavier.

"O Sacred Head once wounded" has done duty in three languages, and in more than three confessions. The hymns of Isaac Watts, the Dissenter, and of the Wesleys, the founders of Methodism, are included to-day in the collections of the Church of England. Forgetful of past quarrels, Calvinists to-day sing Luther's grand, old hymn "A mighty fortress is our God." "Nearer, my God to Thee" and "In the Cross of Christ I glory" were written by devout Unitarians, and yet to-day they are found in every trinitarian hymnal. "Lord of all being, throned afar," also written by a Unitarian, is similarly honored. The Quaker poet, Whittier, has contributed "Immortal Love, forever full. "Jesus, still lead on," comes to us from the saintly Moravian Zinzendorf. In fact, the more we study hymnology, the more we realize the invidiousness of our division into sects and denominations.

Among English-speaking people "Rock of Ages" is acknowledged to be the favorite hymn. Yet it was composed under peculiar circumstances. Its author, the Rev. Augustus

¹ W. T. Stead, *Hymns that have Helped*, p. 107.

M. Toplady, an uncompromising Calvinist, was very much stirred up over the Arminian teachings of the Wesleys. Of Toplady, John Wesley wrote in 1770, "Mr. Augustus Toplady I know well; but I do not fight with chimney-sweepers. He is too dirty a writer for me to meddle with; I should only foul my fingers." He finally entered into a regular controversy with Toplady, who retorted by calling Wesley "Pope John"; spoke of his "hatching blasphemy"; said that his forehead was "impervious to a blush"; and accused him of writing "a known, willful, palpable lie to the public."¹ At one stage of the controversy, Toplady, resorting to verse, published in *The Gospel Magazine* of 1776, the hymn that was to render him famous. This hymn was entitled "A living and dying prayer for the holiest believer in the world," and the lines "for the holiest believer in the world," and the lines

"Not the labors of my hands
Can fulfill thy law's demands.
.....
Nothing in my hand I bring;
Simply to thy cross I cling,"

were especially aimed at the Wesleyan doctrine of entire sanctification.² The controversy between the Wesleys and Toplady has been forgotten. But "Rock of Ages," by Toplady, and "Jesus, Lover of my Soul," by Charles Wesley, will continue to illustrate the truth that "sects meet in hymnology."

6. The study of church history should, above all things, teach charity and catholicity. A knowledge of the history and antecedents of other communions should lead us to make allowances for the views of other men that we ourselves cannot accept.

In lecturing to the students of Andover Theological Sem-

¹ S. W. Duffield, *English Hymns*, p. 466.

² Stead, *Hymns that have Helped*, p. 140.

inary upon the "Value of the Study of Church History in Ministerial Education," a former professor in that institution used these words: "I would like to suggest the value to the preacher of learning to think other men's thoughts after them, and so gaining the power fairly to state opinions different from his own. Lawyers gain a breadth and fairness in discussion which ministers need discipline in order to secure. . . . We do not, moreover, understand any man, until somewhat sympathetically we have lived through his history. We are not at our best in helping him. History trains us in going beyond ourselves and entering into other lives. Especially is it through the right study of History that the narrow theological prejudices, the partisan strifes, the sectarian controversies, which have disfigured our religious history, are to be abated. Nothing, indeed, but the might of the Holy Spirit can remove these great evils. But among the agencies which he employs, in addition to that of the written word, no one is more powerful and hopeful than the broad and faithful study of the History of the Church—a study begun by the minister of the land before opinions are fully formed, and prosecuted even amid the shock and raging of the battle."¹

Said a former President of the American Historical Association: "Surely it is a high office to fulfill—that of rescuing from unmerited reproach the men of the past whose names have been clouded by defamation, and who can utter no word in their own defense. It is a high office, not less, to strip from the unworthy the laurels which they have no right to wear."² Such occupations cannot but instill a spirit of justice and fairness in dealings with our present-day brethren.

¹ Egbert C. Smyth, *Value of Church History in Ministerial Education*, p. 28.

² G. P. Fisher, "The Historian as a Judge of Historic Persons," in *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 1898, p. 33.

The only personal controversy in which Charles Kingsley indulged was one with John Henry Newman at the time of the Oxford Movement,¹ when so many clergymen of the Church of England went over to Rome. Kingsley used some severe language about the Church of Rome, and yet no one could say more appreciative things about the mediæval church than his utterances concerning "The Clergy and the Heathen," and "The Monk as a Civilizer," in his lectures on "The Roman and the Teuton," delivered at the University of Cambridge. Professor F. Max Müller says that these lectures extorted even from unfriendly critics the admission that certain chapters displayed in an unexpected way Kingsley's power of appreciating the good points in characters otherwise most antipathetic to himself.² Shall we not learn a lesson from Kingsley's treatment of another confession? Also, may we not attribute his charity and catholicity in large measure to his historical studies?

That venerable church historian, the late Philip Schaff, was a wonderful example of the charity and catholicity that come from historic studies. From the perusal of his histories came the suggestion for the title of this article, as well as many of its illustrations.

Dr. Schaff's knowledge of the good in other churches was so extensive that, in the last public address ever delivered by him,³ he welcomed to the reunion of Christendom "all denominations which have followed the divine Master and have done his work." "Let us," he said, "forgive and forget their many sins and errors, and remember only their virtues and merits." After passing in review the glorious services rendered by various branches of the Christian church, he concluded: "There

¹ Cf. Charles Kingsley, *Letters and Memories of his Life*, p. 258.

² Charles Kingsley, *Roman and Teuton*, p. xii.

³ *The Reunion of Christendom*, pp. 40, 45.

is room for all these and many other Churches and societies in the kingdom of God, whose height and depth and length and breadth, variety and beauty, surpass human comprehension."

May historic studies contribute somewhat toward bringing about that good understanding and mutual appreciation between the various divisions of the Christian Church for which he so labored. They will not be fruitless, if pursued in the spirit that animated dear, old Dr. Schaff, and which lead him to say: "Let our theology and our charity be as broad and as deep as God's truth and God's love."¹

7. The scientific and impartial study of the Middle Ages is already beginning to create somewhat of a *rapprochement* between Protestants and Roman Catholics. An illustration will suffice.

President E. Benjamin Andrews received the historical training of the German universities. Inspired by the impartiality of the historian, he could utter these brave words before the faculty and students of a Presbyterian theological seminary: "Nor did the reformers export from that old Church all the good it contained. Men as holy as they preferred to remain in it; men as holy as they have been in the old establishment ever since. I am a strong Protestant enough not to be afraid to admit that there are at this moment multitudes of true and faithful Christians in the Romish communion. It is a part of that Holy Catholic Church in which we all believe. I would speak and think respectfully even of the Pope. He is head pastor of one of the oldest, noblest, and most useful congregations on earth, the one to which St. Paul directed the epistle reproduced in our Bibles."²

¹ The Discord and Concord of Christendom, p. 310.

² "The Sin of Schism," in Lectures on Church Unity, p. 74.

8. If a knowledge of church history makes for Christian unity, is not this an added reason why the study of ecclesiastical history should have a place in the curricula of our colleges and universities as well as in those of our theological seminaries? Should not the educated young men and women who sit in the pew be taught something about the history of other churches as well as of the one they attend? Will the laity, who provide the sinews of war, be content to continue contributing to the propagation of sectarianism, when once they learn how small and trivial are the differences that divide the various branches of the church of Christ? Is not this one way to help remove the divisions that are the scandal of our common Christianity?

ARTICLE VIII.

NOTES.

INFLUENCE OF THE RUSSIAN LITURGY.

IN a journey across Asia three years ago, occupying several months, I was deeply impressed by the many evidences of the leavening power of Christianity throughout the Russian Empire. In Japan, one of the most successful and influential Christian missions is that of the Russian Church, under the leadership of Bishop Nicolai, at Tokyo. My first attendance upon a Russian church service was at Port Arthur, where I found myself crowding for standing room with an indiscriminate company of Cossacks of the rank and officers of every grade, including Admiral Alexieff, and hearing, as ever afterwards in the Russian service, the crying of infants in arms, who are regularly brought by their parents to the church service, to receive the communion. Later, while journeying upon the construction train which penetrated Manchuria, I spent some days in the company of a benevolent-hearted inferior church official who was collecting money for alms to be administered by the church. Everywhere his reception was most cordial by all classes.

In all the villages and cities of Siberia and Turkestan, the priest, with his family, evidently occupied a position of great respect and influence, and was looked to with unfailing confidence by the poorer classes for sympathy and help. Repeatedly fairs of the Red Cross Society were encountered, engaged in raising money to provide nurses and assistance, not only for the hospitals in the army, but for those which are erected at the prominent points frequented by emigrants and exiles. In all the post-houses throughout a fourteen-hundred-mile drive through Turkestan, copies of the New Testament, furnished by the Imperial Bible Society at St. Petersburg, and

bearing the imprint of the British and Foreign Bible Society, were found in the waiting-rooms.

In the wilds of Transbaikalia, as well as in the deserts of Turkestan, penetrated by the railroad, cars were met, provided with priests, and singers, and all the paraphernalia necessary for a church service. At one place in Transbaikalia, where a church car was sidetracked for a few days to meet the wants of the locality, our train stopped long enough for such a service. The third and fourth-class passengers immediately surrounded it, and participated with the greatest reverence. In the larger churches in Irkutsk and Krasnoyarsk, we encountered beautiful young women of good estate, conducting classes of untrained boys to the services, and watching over them with all the interest displayed by those connected with the "settlements" in our own country. In fact, everywhere we were surrounded by that indefinable atmosphere which we characterize as Christian civilization, and which is in as striking contrast with heathen civilization as light is with darkness.

In broader lines, also, the influence of this leavening power of Christianity is seen everywhere throughout the Empire. It was the Tsar of Russia who summoned the peace congress through which the Tribunal of the Hague was established. It was the Tsar of Russia who initiated, and pushed to completion, the emancipation of the serfs,—a work far greater and far more successfully accomplished than that of the emancipation of the slaves of America. Russia, indeed, is full of philanthropists and those engaged in promoting social reforms, of whom Tolstoy is one of the most extreme and unpractical examples.

All this, and much more, can be said illustrating the leavening power of Christianity in the Empire, without abating our condemnation of the many great evils still inherent in the church polity and in the body politic. For, there can be no question that in some way the main facts of Christianity are held up before the Russian people of all classes, and that these facts have a most powerful, controlling force in the lives of the masses of the people.

The manner of the dissemination of this Christian truth is an interesting object of study. Preaching occupies but a small place in the Russian church services. Though the Bible is freely disseminated, the illiteracy of the people interferes with its general reading. But it is read extensively in the church service; while pictures of Bible scenes fairly cover the walls of the churches, and every one learns their meaning. Russian pilgrims to Palestine are far more numerous than from any other country, and are mostly from the peasant class. These make the rounds of the sacred places with apparent discrimination and intelligence. In the appropriate season of the year crowds of them may be found wending their way on foot from Jerusalem to the Jordan, to Bethlehem and Hebron, and to the well of Sychar. Dense crowds may be seen gathering about the sacred places, listening to addresses from well-informed guides with far more interest and with closer attention than is shown in a personally conducted Cook's tour of visitors. The information which these pilgrims, on their return, scatter throughout Russia, can hardly be overestimated.

But most prominent of all must be mentioned the liturgy of the Russian Church as it is artistically set to music by composers of the highest rank, and most effectively and beautifully rendered by trained choirs.

The favorite liturgy is that written by the "golden-mouthed" St. John Chrysostom, the most famous of the fathers of the Greek Church of the fourth century. This, like all the Russian church services, is translated into the language of the people. The dialect, indeed, is archaic, which has led many to suppose that it is unintelligible to the common people. The same might be said with some degree of truth concerning the English Prayer Book, though it is by no means so archaic as is the Russian liturgy. Still, in both cases, by reason of frequent repetition, the language evidently becomes comprehensible to all; so that it cannot be doubted that every peasant in the Empire becomes from his earliest years familiar with this noble embodiment of the great facts and doctrines of Christianity.

The mere reading of the words can but be a means of grace ; while to have it given, as it is in all the Russian churches, by well-trained choirs in the effective setting of the music of the greatest masters, is impressive beyond expression, and is in striking contrast to the diluted sentimentalism characterizing so much of the popular Sunday-school music of America, and to the musical compositions which are current so largely in Protestant services, but which are adapted rather for the concert-hall than for worshipping congregations.

Tchaikovsky¹ (1840-1893) was the ranking genius among Russian musical composers of the last half century, and was scarcely inferior to any, except Wagner in Western Europe. His operas, symphonies, sonatas, and shorter pieces for the piano are everywhere popular among the highest class of musicians ; but it is not generally known that he devoted a considerable portion of his strength and genius to the perfecting of the Russian sacred music. Several volumes of Bortniansky's compositions, which are most widely used in the Russian Church, have been harmonized by him in accordance with modern ideas. One of his own principal works, also, is an original composition adapted to the entire liturgy.

I have stood in the Russian churches, great and small, in Siberia and Turkestan, and in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and have been not only entranced myself by this service, but filled with wonder and delight while seeing horny-handed peasants, with careworn faces, listening with streaming eyes to these profound, inspiring, comforting, and most beautiful conceptions of Christian truth as they were wafted to our ears upon the dignified, appropriate, and tender strains of music of the great Russian composer. Who could help being moved to better things as he is led thus to adore "the Maker of all things, who for us sinful men, and our salvation, came down from heaven, and was incarnate of the Spirit and the Virgin Mary ; and became like unto men, and was crucified under Pontius Pilate, and suffered, and was buried, but rose on

¹The erroneous spelling of this name, "Tschaikowsky," arises from its transliteration into English through the German.

the third day according to the Word, and ascended into heaven most high, and now sitteth on the right hand of God, and who shall come again to judge the quick and dead"! To see, as I often did in these services, men and women, both of low and of high estate, advance to kneel and kiss the gilded feet of the painting of the Man of sorrows, was to witness something far more than a mere formality.

This liturgy I have translated into English, adjusting the words to the rhythm of the music, for use by the Oberlin choir. In order to introduce us to one of the secrets of the power of the Russian Church, and to justify the words of encomium just passed upon it, the translation is reproduced below.

We are far from contending that the so nearly exclusive dependence of the Russian Church upon the sacraments and liturgy and upon pictorial representation is altogether safe and wise. But, if the non-liturgical churches attain their object more successfully, their preaching and their Sunday-school and Bible-class instruction must continue to be animated by a well-grounded and fervent belief in the doctrines and objective facts of the Bible. Jesus Christ must be evidently set forth before the eyes of the people crucified among them as was done by Paul before the Galatians. Only a thoroughly prepared, perfectly sincere, and highly spiritual ministry, whose intellect and entire being is possessed by the reality of the Christian doctrines, can compete successfully with such an organization and liturgy as those of the Russian Church. The agnostic criticism which is rapidly throwing a haze of doubt over the historical facts of Christianity, if it succeeds, will lead to the decadence of preaching, and bring dearth upon our non-liturgical churches; for it obscures the lifegiving truth of the gospel, and turns the story of redemption into apples of Sodom, which crumble to dust with our handling.

LITURGY OF ST. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM.

SET TO FOUR-PART CHORAL HARMONY COMPOSED BY

P. TCHAIKOVSKY, OP. 41.

1. *Response to the invocation, which closes with the proclamation, "Send thy blessing upon the people."* [KYRIE ELEISON.]

Amen. Lord our God, have mercy. Hear thou our petition. Unto thee we cry, Lord. Hear thou our petition. Unto thee we cry, Lord. Hearken to our prayer, Lord. Bow thine ear, and hear us. Hearken to our prayer, Lord. Show us, Lord, thy mercy. Grant us our petition. Bow thine ear, and hear us. Merciful and gracious. Merciful and gracious. O Lord, hear our prayer. Amen.

2. *After the first antiphon.* [GLORIA.]

Lord, our Lord, have mercy. O Lord, hear our prayer. Amen. Glory to God most high, to Father, Son, and Spirit, both now, and forever, and forever, and evermore. The only Son of God, the everlasting Word of God, he who deigned for our salvation to become incarnate; he who deigned to humble himself, and to become incarnate through the Virgin Mary; he, the Lord of all might, became incarnate. Christ our Lord was crucified. Death and the grave were vanquished. O blessed and triune Person, we beseech thee, hear our cry. May the Holy Spirit hear. Hear, oh, hear, our cry. Lord our God have mercy. Hear thou our petition. Lord, most merciful. Amen.

3. *After the second invocation.*

Let us worship and adore him, bow down before Christ the Lord. Bless ye the Lord our God, for he hath risen; risen. The Lord will forgive. Alleluia, Alleluia, Alleluia.

God of love, most merciful and gracious, listen unto our prayer. Amen. Glorious Father, God Almighty, the Everlasting, have mercy, Lord. Glorious Father, God Almighty, the Everlasting, have mercy, Lord. Glorious Father, God Almighty, the Everlasting, have mercy, Lord. Glory to God, and to the Son, and Holy Spirit, forever and ever, and evermore. Amen. O Lord, have mercy, have mercy on us. God most holy, Mighty Father, Almighty God, have mercy upon us.

4. *After the reading of the APOSTLES' CREED.*

Alleluia, Alleluia, Alleluia. Grant thy blessing, Holy Ghost. Glory be to thee. Glory be unto thee.

5. *After the reading of the GOSPELS.*

Glory be to thee, O Lord, glory to thee. Gracious Saviour, hear us. Hear us, gracious Saviour. Hear us, gracious Saviour. Gracious Saviour, hear us. Amen. Gracious Saviour, hear us. Unto thee we cry. Amen. Gracious Saviour, hear us. Amen. Gracious Saviour, hear us. Amen.

6. CHERUBIM SONG.

What are these cherubic forms, cherubic, heav'nly forms, bending low, bending low the knee? To the life-bestowing Trinity do we raise our song, do we raise our song, loud, triumphant song, loud, triumphant song; sweetest song of praise; sweetest song of praise. Now do we drive every care, every care far away to-day; every earthly care now we drive, far away, far away, far away, to-day. Amen. As the Lord most holy, we hail thee. As the Lord most holy, we hail thee, now most holy. We hail thy consecration; now do we hail thy consecration; we hail thy consecration. Alleluia, Alleluia, Alleluia [etc.].

7. *After the CHERUBIM SONG.*

Lord our God, have mercy. Come near, gracious Lord. Oh, hear thou our prayer. Amen. Oh, hear thou now our cry, Lord. The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, adore we. Blessed, triune God, the Father, Son, and Spirit, we adore.

8. *The CREDO.*

I believe in one God, in the Father in heav'n, God Omnipotent, the Maker of heav'n and earth, all things visible and invisible.

And in the only-begotten Son, Jesus Christ, Jesus Christ, Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son; in the only Son begotten before worlds begun. Light of Light is he; and is truly God; from the true God most high begotten; the uncreated; one substance with the Father; Maker of all things. Who for us sinful men, and for our salvation, came down from heav'n, came down from heav'n, and was incarnate, incarnate, of the Spirit and the Virgin Mary; and became like unto men. And he then was crucified under Pontius Pilate, and he suffered, and he was buried. But he rose on the third day, according to the Word, and ascended into heav'n most high, and now sitteth on the right hand of God. And he shall come, come again, to judge the quick and dead, judge the quick and dead. To his kingdom there is no end, there is no end.

And in the life-giving Holy Ghost, proceeding from the Father; who with the Father and Son is worshiped and glorified, who with the Father and the Son is glorified, as it was spoken by holy prophets. I believe in the Holy, the Catholic Church, in the Apostolic Church. And freely confess the cleansing of one baptism for the remission of our sins; and look for the resurrection of the dead, and for the everlasting life. Amen.

9. *After the CREDO. [AGNUS DEI.]*

Gracious, lamb-like Victim, we praise thy name. Ne'er was sorrow like thine, merciful and gracious Lord. Worthy is the Lamb that was slain to be worshiped with the heav'nly Father and the Holy Spirit; consubstantial with the Father, though yet invisible. Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord God of Sabaoth. The heav'n and earth are full of thy glory. Thy glory fills the sky. Hosanna, Hosanna in the highest, Hosanna in the highest, in the highest. Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord. Hosanna in the highest. Amen.

10. *After the reading of Psalm xcvi., followed by the proclamation, "We are the sheep of thy flock."*

O thou from whom all blessings come, thanks to thee o'erflow, thanks to thee o'erflow. Gracious God, we cry unto thee, we cry unto thee. Forgive our sins, O Lord our God. Forgive our sins, O Lord. Hear us, Lord. Lord, hear thou our cry. Have mercy on us, O Lord. We cry unto thee. Hear us, Lord. Hear us, Lord. Hear us, Lord.

11. *After ascriptions by the priest to the most holy God. [This in the original involves such ascriptions of praise to the Virgin Mary as would be offensive to Protestant ears. Liberty, therefore, has been taken to transfer it all to Christ, which can be easily done.]*

Forever worthy is the Lamb, for he is truth and light. Beautiful, beautiful, are his ways. Forever blessed is he. His is glory without end. Beloved of God is he, is he. Cherubic angels sound his praise, sound his praise on high. Seraphic notes beyond compare, sound his praise above. Incorruptible, incorruptible, Jesus Christ our Lord was born. My soul longeth to be like thee. Glory to thee, glory be to thee, O Lord most high. Glory to thee, thou all in all.

12. *Response to the priest's exhortation, "Permit us to praise thee with our lips."*

Amen. Send thy spirit, O Lord. Lord our God, have mercy. Help us now, O Lord. Glory be to thee.

13. *The LORD'S PRAYER.*

Hear our prayer. Our Father who art in heav'n, hallowed be thy name. Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done, as in heav'n, so on earth; as in heav'n, so on earth. Give us this day our daily bread. And forgive us our transgressions as we have forgiven, those indebted to us. And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from the Evil One. Amen. Thine the kingdom is, O Lord. Glory be to thee. Amen. Light of all, thou only Lord, Jesus Christ our Lord. We praise our Father in heav'n. Amen.

14. *Rejoicing over sins forgiven.* [*After the COMMUNION.*]

Sing praises to God most high, to God most high. Sing praise unto the Lord. Sing ye praise to the Lord. Sing ye praise to the Lord in the highest. Sing praises to the God above. Sing praise in the highest. Sing praises to the God above. Sing praise in the highest. Alleluia, Alleluia, Alleluia [etc.].

15. *The benediction, following the exhortation to fear God, closing with prayer for the ruling authorities of the Empire.*

Oh, give us, Lord thy benediction and blessing. God of mercy, oh, show thy face. Show to us thy truth, O Lord, most gracious. O Holy Ghost reveal unto us thy truth. I believe in one true and invisible Creator. Hallowed be his name. Save us, Lord, from evil. Amen. Let our lips sound forth his praises, praises unto God, our loving, gracious God; for the heav'ns o'erflow with his great glory. For he alone did condescend to our estate, the holy Son of God, immortal Son of God, life-giving Son of God most high. Sanctify to us thy holy passion. Daily draw us nearer to thee through thy truth. Alleluia, Alleluia, Alleluia. Lord our God, have mercy. Glory be to thee. Amen. O blessed Lord and Master, blessed Lord, have mercy. Amen. Sing ye praises to God henceforth, and forever, and ever, and forever. Sing ye praises to God henceforth, and forever, and ever, and forever. Sing ye praises to God henceforth, and forever, and ever, and forever. Amen. Glory to Father, Son, and to the Holy Spirit, both now and forever, and forevermore. Amen. Hear us, blessed Saviour. Hear us, blessed Saviour. Blessed Saviour, hear us. Bless us, O Lord.

NOTES ON BRITISH THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

A REALLY good book—and one that meets a real need—is something rarely met with in British theological literature. Such a book is “The Fatherhood of God,” by J. Scott Lidgett, M.A., Warden of the Bermondsey Settlement.¹ Mr. Scott Lidgett’s work combines, in a very felicitous way, systematic completeness with interesting and suggestive writing. His work is that of a fresh and live thinker,—the kind of book to keep alive interest in theological issues in days when the churches of England and Scotland alike tend to sink into the quagmire of mere ecclesiasticism. An excellent synopsis of the work is given in the Contents, and there is a useful Index at the end. In printing and binding, the work is enhanced by every quality to be expected from a firm to which theological scholars have, for so long, owed so much,—Messrs. T. and T. Clark, of Edinburgh. A striking feature of Mr. Lidgett’s treatment is the way he keeps close to palpitating spiritual reality, and does not allow himself to be overborne by abstractions. Fatherhood is to him something so far in advance of abstract theological propositions that never through these alone can we know the power and inspiration of the doctrine. When he has carefully dealt with the New Testament doctrine of the Fatherhood of God and its place in theology, he passes to discuss the Old Testament doctrine. This is followed by a most valuable chapter on “The Fatherhood of God in Church History,”—a thing we have often wished to see well done, as it certainly is here. For there are not many points to which one would take exception. Next, the “validity” and “content” of the doctrine are interestingly treated, and our author then proceeds to discuss the constitution, spiritually, of the world, the redemption of mankind, and the consummation of all things. The discussion is everywhere marked by sanity, breadth, clearness, insight, good sense, spiritual and intellectual power of marked quality, ¹Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. American Agents: Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York. Pp. xxiv, 427. 1902. 8s., net.

whereby the sovereignty of Fatherhood is brought out in all "the greatness of its motives" and "the awfulness of its sway." In the heartiest manner possible I commend the book,—learned without being pedantic, systematic without being dull, and spiritual without ever becoming unctuous or unreal.

"The Pathway to Reality" is the title of the Gifford Lectures at St. Andrews University, by the Rt. Hon. R. B. Haldane, M.P.¹ This volume, so beautifully printed and admirably got up by the famous publisher, must take rank as one of the best Gifford Lectures yet issued. Its treatment is another welcome token of that revived interest in metaphysical inquiries which we hail as one of the most hopeful features of the time. In Mr. Haldane's hands we have metaphysics made delightful,—an extremely difficult thing to do. His exposition of Ultimate Reality—a theme of deepest and most unceasing interest—is so clear, so timely, so excellent, that St. Andrews University may well be congratulated on its choice of a lecturer. The Gifford Lectures will never grow stale while such fresh fruits rise from this foundation. These lectures are not less valuable for the criticism they contain, than for their expository virtues and constructive excellences. They are most cordially to be commended to all readers of the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA, who have any special interest in the great themes which they so powerfully and instructively expound, and present in so attractive a garb. These terms of praise are perhaps more to the author's credit, because they proceed from one not quite in entire agreement with all Mr. Haldane's criticisms or his estimate of Hegel. Our author eschews the method of certain well-known neo-Hegelian expositions, in which the Universe is presented in terms of universals or thought relations. Mr. Haldane's method secures more justice to the individual experience. And, while the relations of Aristotle to Hegel are, of course, not new to any philosophical scholar, yet Mr. Haldane's mode of setting them side by side is very interesting and serviceable, even though one feels it

¹ London: John Murray. Pp. xix, 316. 10s. 6d., *net*.

strange at times to have Hegelian idealism—as we have so often known it—set in such relation. It seems to me Mr. Haldane will have to do with much more than Trendelenburg's criticism in showing that the Hegelian system does not make experience a thing really of universals. He will have to justify, on this score, almost every neo-Hegelian exposition of note in the English tongue. Nor do I think Mr. Haldane wholly succeeds in his criticisms of Professor Pringle Pattison. Take the second of these (p. 124). It is a much too easy way of criticising Professor Pringle Pattison's objection merely to say, that it is founded on a "too narrow view" of the case, and "seems to assume" separation of "the universal of thought from the particular." The matter cannot be glossed over in this way. It is not a question of assumption at all. On page 123, we are told "Hegel took human experience as he found it." But that is just the point. Has Hegel done so, and been true to its needs and its claims in setting forth its relations to the Universal Thinker? Mr. Haldane has not, at any rate, justified him. Again, as to the third objection of Professor Pringle Pattison, that reason or thought has a too exclusive stress in Hegel's system, it is certainly no settlement of the difficulty to show that Hegel did not divorce intelligence from will. The real point is, that a system may yet be too much under the one dominating aspect as its ruling idea to be either adequate or satisfactory. And indeed this intellectualistic tendency or defect colors Mr. Haldane's own treatment of "personality"; "reflection" plays the whole part, and the elements of moral self-determination are, as so often with Hegelian expounders, rather painfully wanting. And these things I say as a theologian who takes God for the Absolute Reason, and believes the universe to be shot through and through with reason. For intellectual apprehension is another thing from moral will or personality.

A point which strikes one as rather curious is the earnest and persistent way in which Mr. Haldane's Lectures contend for the reality of the individual experience, and then, as soon

as this has been secured, go on—in Bradleyan fashion—to show that this self-same reality is, after all, “mere appearance” (pp. 131, 137). Also, Mr. Haldane seems too uncritical of writers like Professors Royce and James, and too inappreciative of Lotze’s criticism of Hegelian dialectic. And, further, his vindication of the troublesome Hegelian philosophy of nature is more clever than wholly convincing. But, despite these and other detailed points of criticism, Mr. Haldane’s work remains a most interesting, able, and substantial contribution to the subject of which it treats, and it will amply repay every reader who goes to its fresh, well-informed, and suggestive pages.

Another noteworthy philosophical work is “Spinoza’s Political and Ethical Philosophy,” by Robert A. Duff, M. A., Lecturer on Moral and Political Philosophy in the University of Glasgow.¹ Mr. Duff’s work is a model of what detailed and patient exposition of a great system should be. It is a genuine pleasure to commend a work which owes its existence to no more exterior demand than the author’s continuous, careful, and sympathetic study of a most worthy subject. In the excellence of its detailed exposition, Mr. Duff’s work leaves nothing to be desired. Even philosophical scholars will rise from its perusal with a heightened sense of the intellectual grandeur and imposing consistency of Spinoza’s system. The writing is always good, the thought often acute, and the exposition very lucid and frequently most suggestive. One hardly needs to say that the name of the publisher is guarantee for the excellence of the entire get-up of the book, which is admirably printed and finished in every respect. Mr. Duff has laid all admirers of Spinoza’s splendid devotion to the life of philosophic thought under obligation by his excellent contribution to the literature of this important subject. There can be no finer justification of our universities than the appearance of such works as this from time to time.

Mr. Duff’s attitude is that of being content to elucidate the

¹ Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons, Publishers to the University. Pp. xii, 516. 1903. 10s. 6d., *net*.

thought of Spinoza without constituting himself either critic or advocate of it. Still, his exposition is so sympathetic that most readers, I fancy, will think him more closely related to the latter function than the former. If criticism is to be,—and it is certainly most difficult not to criticise Spinoza,—it must be after such work as Mr. Duff's, and on its basis. His position, that Spinoza was interested in metaphysics, not for its own sake, but for its bearing on those ethical and political problems which profoundly interested him, will certainly provoke questioning. And indeed, if the opposite view were maintained, and his ethical system held to be included to his metaphysics, I think a great deal could be said in support of it, so purely and clearly metaphysical is the system on which his ethical interpretations rest. However, as Mr. Duff has held off from criticism, I shall do the same, contenting myself with the expression of regret that a thinker so careful, acute, and ingenious, should not have entered the list of Spinozan critics also. We have had none too much of learned and minute exposition, however, and we therefore accord Mr. Duff's patient and brilliant exposition a cordial welcome. Our philosophical heroes we must have, and Spinoza will always be one of them, albeit he can be no more guide to us than is involved in being a schoolmaster to bring us to some better form of idealism than his own.

JAMES LINDSAY.

Kilmarnock, Scotland.

ARTICLE IX.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

LIGHT FROM BABEL ON THE BIBLE.

BABEL UND BIBLE. Ein Vortrag. Von FRIEDRICH DELITZSCH. Mit 52 Abbildungen. 51. bis 55. Tausend. Vierte durchgesehene Ausgabe. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs. 1903. M. 2.

This is the title of the lecture which the famous Assyriologist gave before the German Emperor on January 13, 1902, and which created such a profound sensation in Germany. Delitzsch could not anticipate this result, since he had intended merely to state within the compass of a lecture the relation of the great results of the excavations in Assyria and Babylonia to the study of the Old Testament, and in this way arouse more interest in these excavations. That he has done this in a brilliant manner no one will deny who has read this lecture, which is very beautifully written. But the people did not know that Delitzsch merely summarized well-known material, and that not all the conclusions which he had reached were shared by other specialists. The fact that the lecture had been delivered before the Emperor, who was so much interested in it that he asked Delitzsch to repeat it, gave extraordinary prominence to it. The press seized upon this; it was widely discussed, everybody spoke about it,—the scholars in the universities and the cabbies on the street, even the comic papers adding their share to the discussion. Quickly party cries arose. Instead of Delitzsch's Babel and Bible, Babel *against* Bible was heard. The Bible was said to be refuted by the Babylonian excavations, and the conclusion was at once drawn that the Bible had to go. On the other hand, many Christian laymen and clergymen protested vehemently against Babel, denying emphatically that the Bible had ever been influenced by Babel; they felt very much alarmed that the

Emperor, who is also the *summus episcopus*, should entertain such radical views as Delitzsch had proclaimed. The Jews, also, participated in the controversy, fearing that their old glory as God's elect nation was endangered. Delitzsch vexed, it would seem, by the attacks of his antagonists, issued another lecture, in which he expressed his strong doubt as to the presence of revelation in the Old Testament. It should be noticed that he left herewith his own special field, Assyriology, and employed theological arguments. However great a philologist Delitzsch is, he is not a theologian, and not familiar with modern theology; and it is a matter of sincere regret that he published this second lecture. It so happened that it was published on the same day that the Emperor wrote the notable letter in which he stated that he was not an adherent of Delitzsch's views; once more popular interest was aroused. Out of the great mass of writings which were published as the result of the Babel-Bible controversy, the following appear to be the most important:—

ISRAEL UND BABYLONIEN. Der Einfluss Babyloniens auf die israelitische Religion. Von Prof. Dr. HERMANN GUNKEL. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 1903. M. 1.20.

DER KAMPF UM BIBEL UND BABEL. Von Prof. Dr. SAM. OETTLI. Vierte, erweiterte Auflage, mit Berücksichtigung des zweiten Vortrages von Friedrich Delitzsch. Leipzig: A. Deichert Nachf. (Georg Boehme). 1903. M. 0.80.

DIE BABYLONISCHEN AUSGRABUNGEN UND DIE BIBLISCHE URGESCHICHTE. Von Prof. Dr. RUD. KITTEL. Vierte, erweiterte Auflage. Leipzig: A. Deichert Nachf. (Georg Boehme). 1903. M. 0.80.

DER BABEL-BIBEL-STREIT UND DIE OFFENBARUNGSFRAGE. Ein Verzicht auf Verständigung. Von Prof. Dr. RUD. KITTEL. Zweite, unveränderte Auflage. Leipzig: A. Deichert Nachf. (Georg Boehme). 1903. M. 0.50.

FRIEDE FÜR BABEL UND BIBEL. Von Prof. Dr. FR. GIESEBRECHT. Zweite Auflage. Königsberg i. Pr.: Thomas und Oppermann. 1903. M. 1.

IM KAMPFE UM BABEL UND BIBEL. Ein Wort zur Verständigung und Abwehr. Von Dr. ALFRED JEREMIAS. Vierte, abermals erweiterte Auflage. Mit einem Vorwort: "Offenbarung im alten Testament" als Erwiderung auf Friedrich Delitzsch's Vorwort "Zur Klärung" in den neuen Auflagen von Babel und Bibel II. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs. 1903. M. 0.60.

BABEL UND BIBEL. Eine kulturgeschichtliche Skizze. Von Prof Dr. EDUARD KOENIG. Zehnte, abermals erweiterte Auflage mit Beurteilung von Delitzsch's zweitem Vortrag und der andern neuesten Babel-Bibel-Literatur. Berlin: Martin Warneck. 1903: M. 1.

DER IHWH-FUND VON BABEL IN DER BIBEL. Von Dr. D. LEIMDOERFER. Hamburg: C. Boyesen. 1903. M. 1.

Two points in Delitzsch's first lecture were of special interest: (1) the reading of the name on a tablet from the time of Hammurabi *la-a'-ve-ilu*—"Jahve is God" (Jahve=Jehovah). From this, Delitzsch concluded that Jehovah was already the god of the Canaanitish tribes who ruled at this time in Babylon; Jehovah is, therefore, not a distinctively Israelitish deity. This reading has been questioned by other Assyriologists; but it will have to be admitted that the signs *may* be read in this way, and that it is at least possible, to say nothing more, that "Jahve" (Jehovah) is a constituent element of the name. That the name Jahve is older than the nation Israel is also the belief of the book of Genesis. (2) The other point of interest was Delitzsch's assertion that we find in this same period traces of *monotheism* in Babylonia in such names as *Ilûma-ilu*, "God is god," etc. This argument from the names is, however, not cogent. But Delitzsch has adduced another argument from a tablet where all deities are regarded as manifestations of the one God Marduk; so Addu is Marduk as the god of rain, Shamash is Marduk as the god of everything that is right, etc. The monotheistic speculation cannot well be denied here. The tablet belongs, however, to the neo-Babylonian period, i. e. to a time long before which we meet monotheism in Israel. At any rate, so much is certain that Delitzsch has not proved that the monotheism of Israel is due

to Babylonian influence; even if we have this monotheistic speculation in Babylonia. The difference in the monotheism in Babylonia and in that of Israel lies in this, that in Babylonia it remained the property of a few, the mass were polytheists; in Israel it was the property of the whole people.

The result of the whole controversy, as far as can be determined now, is threefold: (1) we must recognize the presence of Babylonian influence in the Old Testament; for instance, in the story of the creation, of the deluge, of paradise, etc. But we must not go to the extreme. We must also (2) recognize the originality of the Old Testament. In its central, vital points it is not influenced by Babylonia, but independent; only the religious genius of Israel and divine revelation account for that which is specifically Israelitish. (3) Though the reality of God's revelation must be maintained with all force, the old theory of verbal inspiration cannot be held any more. The doctrine of Progressive Revelation must be adopted.

There will be large gains, though they are not new gains for the modern theologian.

In this connection must be mentioned certain books which are directly or indirectly related to the Babel-Bible controversy.

DIE BABYLONISCHEN BUSSPSALMEN UND DAS ALTE TESTAMENT. VON HANS BAHR. Leipzig: A. Deichert Nachf. (Georg Boehme). 1903. M. 0.80.

Going out from the right observation that the people should be enabled to judge for themselves in the Babel and Bible controversy, Bahr has published nine penitential psalms, which he regards as the finest flower of the religious literature of the Babylonians, and has appended at the end of his pamphlet the Babylonian Confessional. In this way he has placed before the people the material for an independent comparison between the Babylonian and the Israelitish religion.¹

¹Extracts from one of these psalms were published in the *Biblical World*, July, 1903, pp. 49 ff.: "The Cry of the Penitent, A Babylonian Prayer," by Louise S. Houghton. This article is in so far misleading as

He proceeds to make the comparison himself, but he is not impartial enough: he is too much prejudiced in favor of Israel, and thus not able to appreciate enough the genuine, profound religious feeling in the Babylonian psalms. There are unguarded statements on pages 27, 35, 36, 41, 42 and 45, into the details of which we cannot enter. Certainly Bahr's final conclusion is correct, that "the Old Testament is no episode of the Babylonian religion, much less can it be influenced from thence in its central significance." But why should it be necessary to depreciate the Babylonian religion so much in order to save the superiority of the Old Testament religion?

Babel had been looked upon in the controversy mainly in the light of the Bible. This must lead to a rather narrow view, and so it was most timely that we should be reminded of the larger outlook. This is done in

BABYLONIENS KULTURMISSION EINST UND JETZT. Ein Wort der Ablenkung und Aufklärung zum Babel-Bibel-Streit. Von Professor C. F. LEHMANN. Leipzig: Dieterich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Theodor Weicher. 1903. M. 1.20.

Professor Lehmann, noted scholar and explorer, professor of ancient history in the University of Berlin, calls the attention of the public to the many fields outside of the Bible where Babylonian civilization has influenced the generations even down to our own times. He points out this Babylonian influence in astronomy, mathematics, and chronometry, in the order of the world's commerce and intercourse, in the weaving of colored stuffs and carpets, in the faience and majolica-industries, in sculpture and glyptics, etc. For more detailed treatment, Lehmann selects (1) the history of religion, (2) measurements of time and space, and (3) the legal system. It would lead us too far even to sketch here the rich contents of these chapters. The suggestive and instructive little book will be read with great profit by everyone who is interested in such a theme, and may fairly be regarded as one of the very

it gives only the choicest extracts from that psalm. It can, therefore, not be used for an impartial comparison. The scholar will compare H. Zimmern's *Babylonische Busspsalmen* (1885).

best pamphlets published in connection with the Babel and Bible controversy.

Into the same class with Lehmann's book belongs Dr. Hilprecht's pamphlet

DIE AUSGRABUNGEN DER UNIVERSITAET VON PENNSYLVANIEN IM BEL TEMPEL ZU NIPPUR. Ein Vortrag. Von H. V. HILPRECHT. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs. 1903. M. 2.

The story of the great excavations of the University of Pennsylvania and the main results of these excavations are given here in the most interesting manner by Professor Hilprecht. Fifty-six carefully selected illustrations and a map accompany the handsome volume.

The last pamphlet which must be referred to here, though by no means the least important, is

DIE WEITERBILDUNG DER RELIGION. Ein Kaiserwort, ein Beitrag zur Verständigung über "Babel und Bibel" vom religionsgeschichtlichen und religionsphilosophischen Standpunkt aus. Von Prof. Dr. PAUL SCHWARTZKOPFF. Schkeuditz bei Leipzig: W. Schäfer. 1903. M. 1.

The "Kaiserwort" to which the title refers, is contained in the letter of Emperor William which he wrote in response to criticisms by conservative churchmen.¹

Schwartzkopff discusses the problem of the divine revelation in the Bible from the point of view of the history of religions. He claims not only for the religions of the Old and New Testaments, but for every religion, a personal revelation of God, and asserts that there is no sharply drawn contrast between evolution and religion, but that we find in the history of the world, genuine divine revelation in a continuous development. He views the great religions in general, and finds that they all have been gradually developing from cruder to higher forms. Israel does not stand outside of the great process of development; also the Israelitish religion is subject to the law of historical development. The great epochs of this

¹ A translation of the letter was published in this journal, April, 1903, pp. 383-385, under the title "Emperor William's Creed concerning the Bible."

onward march are ushered in by the religious geniuses, the prophets and seers. Israel is especially blest by the continuity of its prophethood; and, as such, its religion becomes the central line of the religious development of humanity, the beginning of which is in Babylonia and the end in Jesus Christ.

Accepting the tradition of Abraham's migration from Babylonia as historical, it would be altogether unnatural if there were no connection between the Babylonians and the Hebrews also in regard to their religion. The Babylonian religion is indeed the preparatory step for the Israelitish. Both are the result of God's revelation; the one God revealing himself ever more fully as the capacity of his people increases. All are his people,—the Babylonians as well as the Hebrews,—and to all the peoples he reveals himself. The revelation is in every case the revelation of the same God: only that the one is clearer and higher. All religion, being due to divine revelation, is divine: there is no natural religion. The revelation is made to men and through men, religious geniuses; the revelation through books is secondary. The capacity of the religious geniuses becomes ever more developed and revelation ever deeper. In Christ we have the greatest religious genius. God's self-revelation in Christ will never be surpassed as regards its contents: the forms will change, the contents remain.

As will be seen from this rough sketch, we have here a very suggestive little book. It is true more than once that the arguments and positions, however interesting, are not convincing. A large amount must, from the very nature of our limited knowledge, be speculative. But there is something prophetic in the book; it seems to me that the author sketches, in the main, correctly the positions that will have to be taken when our knowledge shall be more complete on this gigantic problem in the history of religion.

The best way to inform oneself of the great religious and historical questions involved in the Babylonian and Assyrian discoveries is, to study the religion of Babylonia and Assyria well; and, on the whole, there is probably no better book than

DIE RELIGION BABYLONIENS UND ASSYRIENS. Von Prof. Dr. MORRIS JASTROW, Jr. Vom Verfasser vollständig durchgesehene und durch Um- und Uebersarbeitung auf den neuesten Stand der Forschung gebrachte deutsche Uebersetzung. Lieferung IV. Giessen: J. Ricker'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. 1903.

We have spoken already, in the last issue, of the first three numbers of this German translation. It is necessary here only to call attention to the collection of well-selected illustrations which will be prepared and issued, after the completion of the book, in a portfolio, and will doubtless form a very valuable addition to the book.

In England and in this country the results of the great excavations, together with studies on their relation to the Old Testament, have been given to the public in many different ways; and it may be said that educated people, as a rule, are more or less familiar with these matters. This is one of the reasons why the Babel and Bible controversy made so little impression in our country. The excavations were not so generally known in Germany before Delitzsch's lecture. But it must not be supposed that the Germans are doing nothing to popularize the results of the archæological and historical investigations. In fact, there is nothing in English that can be compared to the collection of essays published under the title

DER ALTE ORIENT.

The *vorderasiatische Gesellschaft* in Berlin, a society for the promotion of Western Asiatic studies on the basis of the monuments, publishes "*Mittheilungen der Vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft*" of a technical character, and, under the title "*Der alte Orient*," a collection of popular pamphlets of exceptional merit. The *translation of the laws of Hammurabi* by Dr. Hugo Winckler, to be referred to later, is one of the numbers. The small pamphlets, written by experts, contain the results of exact philological and historical studies in a thoroughly popular manner of presentation. They are exact and careful pieces of work, and not excelled by anything I know

for reliable information in such compact and interesting form. Their price (M. 0.60 for each number) is low enough to put them within the reach of every educated man and woman who is interested in ancient oriental affairs.

The two numbers before us have been written by eminent Assyriologists, Dr. Alfred Jeremias and Professor Heinrich Zimmern, and both numbers are works of recognized worth.

HOELLE UND PARADIES BEI DEN BABYLONIERN. Von Dr. ALFRED JEREMIAS. Zweite verbesserte und erweiterte Auflage mit zehn Abbildungen. Unter Berücksichtigung der biblischen Parallelen und mit Verzeichnis der Bibelstellen. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs. 1903. M. 0.60.

The Babylonian conceptions of Hell and of Paradise are sketched in a masterful way; quotations from the sources are freely given, enabling the reader to control the statements. Numerous footnotes point out the interesting relation of the Babylonian and the Hebrew conceptions. Ten well-chosen illustrations enliven the text. A monograph of great value!

It is gratifying to see that Professor Zimmern's work appears already in the third edition. Its title is:

BIBLISCHE UND BABYLONISCHE URGESCHICHTE. Von Professor Dr. HEINRICH ZIMMERN. Dritte mehrfach veränderte Auflage. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs. 1903. M. 0.60.

A more brilliant presentation of the comparison of the biblical narrative of the creation, the paradise, the antediluvian patriarchs, and the deluge, with their corresponding Babylonian parallels, and their relation to each other, within the compass of forty pages, cannot easily be found anywhere else. Zimmern agrees substantially with Gunkel, whose book on the "Legends of Genesis" is well known in this country. He is a good representative of the modern school of criticism.

While the Babel-Bible controversy was made very little of in this country, the minds of all educated people were occupied with a great Babylonian discovery,

THE CODE OF HAMMURABI.

This famous code is the most important document of Babylonian civilization that the spade of the explorer has brought to light. It is the oldest legal code in existence, and, as such, of the utmost importance for the history of civilization. Its value has, however, been enhanced by the fact that Hammurabi is the Amraphel of Genesis xiv., the contemporary of Abraham.

The code was discovered by the French expedition at Susa towards the end of 1901, and was made accessible to the general public already in 1902 by the Assyriologist of the expedition, Father Scheil. Soon afterwards the brilliant Berlin scholar Winckler published a German translation.

GESETZE HAMMURABIS, Königs von Babylonien um 1750 v. Chr. Uebersetzt von Dr. HUGO WINCKLER. Dritte durchgesehene Auflage. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1903. M. 0.60.

This is already the third edition of the translation. It contains not merely a good modern rendering, but also numerous footnotes, an introduction, and a good index of subjects. It also contains a picture of the inscription representing Hammurabi as standing before the Sun-god, and receiving the laws from him, which is also reproduced.

One of the great questions that was in every mind after the discovery became known was, What is the relation of the law of Moses to the law of Hammurabi? Was Moses influenced by Hammurabi's code? The two following essays deal with this problem:—

MOSES UND HAMMURABI. Von Dr. JOHANNES JEREMIAS. Leipzig: J. G. Hinrichs. 1903. M. 0.70.

After drawing a sketch of the highly advanced civilization revealed by the Code Hammurabi, and stating in detail, and succinctly, (1) the laws concerning marriage and inheritance, (2) concerning property, (3) the criminal law, (4) the order of procedure in suits in court, he compares the material thus collected with the Pentateuch, especially the Book

of the Covenant (Ex. xx. 22-xxiii. 33), with which he finds no less than twenty-four definite analogies in Code Hammurabi, and concludes that there must exist a real connection between the two codes. But the relation is not one of direct literary dependence; the two codes go back to a common tradition, namely, the ancient Arabic law of custom. Adopting on the one hand Winckler's plausible suggestion that Hammurabi was not a Babylonian but an Arab, he points to the commercial intercourse which existed between Arabia and Babylon since Gudea's time, and on the other hand recalls the influence of the Arab Kenite Jethro on Moses in regard to the method of judicial procedure (Ex. xviii. 14 ff.) and in conclusion refers to the very close analogies in the pre-Islamic law of the Arabs.

Jeremias has stated not only the agreements but also the differences of Code Hammurabi with the Torah, and has rightly emphasized the distinctly religious spirit which is controlling in the Torah, but lacking in Code Hammurabi. He closes his comparison with the statement that his conviction of the divineness of the Torah has been deepened by the study of the Babylonian code.

The other sketch is by a Catholic scholar, who is well known to every Old Testament student by his important contributions to the study of the principles of Hebrew poetry.

DAS GESETZ CHAMMURABIS UND MOSES. Von Professor HUBERT GRIMME. Köln: J. P. Bachem. 1903. M. 0.80.

In order to enter into the spirit of Code Hammurabi, Grimme sketches briefly (1) the social organism, and (2) the industrial order of Babylon as revealed in the code. Then follows a discussion of the great underlying judicial principles. The two controlling ones are the anxiety for the preservation of the class of the free and for the protection of property.

The great influence of the code on Western Asia as far as the Mediterranean, Grimme admits unreservedly; yea, he even points out that the patriarchs have been much influenced by it; but he denies absolutely that the Mosaic law

shows any trace of Babylonian influence. The significant analogies of the Book of the Covenant to Hammurabi's Code he explains by the ancient Semitic law, which was in force long before Hammurabi, and which is the source of both the Mosaic and the Babylonian law.

It is interesting to see that both the Protestant and the Catholic scholar agree in finding the reason of the close relation between the two codes in their common source, the ancient Semitic law. And indeed a direct literary dependence of the Book of the Covenant is very improbable, but it seems rather unlikely that the relation can be explained altogether satisfactorily by this hypothesis. The predominance of Babylonian civilization in Western Asia during the second millennium B. C. is so well established by the Tell El-Amarna letters that the assumption of Babylonian influence also along legal lines can hardly be escaped.

THE TELL EL-AMARNA LETTERS.

These were discovered in 1888, and are priceless documents from the middle of the second millennium B. C. They are the subject of an extremely interesting and instructive lecture.

EIN DIPLOMATISCHER BRIEFWECHSEL AUS DEM ZWEITEN JAHRTAUSEND VOR CHRISTUS. Von Prof. Dr. AUGUST KLOSTERMANN. Zweite Auflage. Leipzig: A. Deichert Nachf. (Georg Boehme). 1902. M. 0.80.

Klostermann sketches the civilization that is revealed in these letters: the predominance of Babylonian culture in the second millennium B.C. all over Western Asia and Egypt, even in spite of the *political* predominance of Egypt, as evidenced by the fact that the Babylonian language and script is the official diplomatic language and script in which even Egyptian vassals report to the Pharaoh; the characteristic Egyptian diplomacy; the conditions in Palestine at this time; the forms of diplomatic intercourse between different states and courts by letter and despatch, interpreters and embassies; the intermarriage between royal families; and the interesting style of these letters in comparison with our modern style of letter-

writing. The impression produced is that "the letter-writers belong to a highly cultivated society which is not altogether foreign to our own." In conclusion, Klostermann points to the fact that, shortly after this time, Israel appeared upon this very scene. What a mass of conclusions must be drawn, and have already been drawn, from this find for the Old Testament!

One other pamphlet remains to be noticed:

ABRAHAM ALS BABYLONIER, JOSEPH ALS ÆGYPTER. Der weltgeschichtliche Hintergrund der biblischen Vätergeschichten auf Grund der Keilinschriften dargestellt. Von HUGO WINCKLER. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs. 1903.

The history of Palestine is rightly understood only when seen in the light of the history of the world: it is determined by the great empires which control the fate of Western Asia. Winckler sketches the historical background of the Abraham stories as follows: In Hammurabi's time, Babylon becomes the new capital, and the god of Babel, Marduk, becomes the supreme deity; a religious reformation goes hand in hand with the political revolution. The centers of the more ancient cult are Ur and Harran, where the new religion is also to be introduced. This is the historical background of the Abraham stories, in which this situation is well remembered; for, according to them, Abraham leaves Ur because of his religious convictions. He seeks a backing in the other ancient center, Harran, but does not find it there, and migrates westward to Palestine; in other words, the biblical tradition means to say that the Israelitish religion originated in opposition to the new Babylonian doctrine in the time of Hammurabi. The historical background for the Joseph stories, Winckler sees in the monotheistic reformation of Amenophis IV (Chuen-aten). He identifies the viceroy of Palestine, Janchamu, with Joseph. Here, then, we have the connection of the monotheism, which is the essence of Israel's religion, with the monotheistic tendencies in Egypt.

The theory is a very attractive one. It involves the recognition of the all-controlling influence of Babylon and the giv-

of the idea of the "splendid isolation" of Israel also on. The origin and development of Israel's religion conditioned in a real sense by Babylon and Egypt. Historicity of the biblical Abraham and Joseph is of not proved by this theory.

JULIUS A. BEWER.

RECHT JAHWES DES DEUTEROJESAIA. VON Prof. Dr. GIESEBRECHT. Königsberg i. Pr.: Thomas und Oppermann. 1902. M. 5.60.

Giesebrecht has given us in this volume a contribution to the question of the "Servant" passages in Isaiah xl. ff. He maintains his thesis that the servant is not an individual, but the people of Israel, with a great deal of force and acumen. The author of the servant passages is "Deutero-Isaiah," who incorporated them himself in his book. The discussion is not merely a presentation of Giesebrecht's thesis, but a refutation of opponents. Here the arguments are all pointed, sometimes rather too personal and too sharp. All in all, it is the most important contribution to the "servant" question that has appeared in recent times.

J. A. B.

SCHICHTLICHKEIT DES SINAIBUNDES, untersucht von Dr. FR. GIESEBRECHT. Königsberg: Thomas und Oppermann. 1900. M. 1.20.

This is a beautiful specimen of acute reasoning, of calm and passionate weighing of evidence. Over against the view of Wellhausen, etc., that the covenant at Sinai was a historical fact, but the result of the prophetic teaching, Giesebrecht, who is himself one of the foremost critics of the Wellhausen school, shows convincingly that the evidence points unmistakably to the historicity of the covenant at Sinai. This pamphlet is of great importance for the study of the history of the Israelitish religion; it marks the beginning of the back-swinging of the pendulum: the gradual retrogression from extreme positions in criticism.

J. A. B.

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DIE GESETZESSCHRIFT DES KOENIGS JOSIA. Eine kritische Untersuchung. Von Dr. S. A. FRIES in Stockholm. Leipzig: A. Deichert Nachf. 1903. M. 1.80.

Dr. Fries is convinced that "the book of the law" which was found in the temple by Hilkiah (2 Kings xxii., xxiii.) had no direct significance for the reformation of King Josiah. The celebration of an extraordinary Passover was the only result of the find. He denies that Deuteronomy prescribed the absolute centralization of worship in Jerusalem. Therefore, Josiah intended to centralize the worship absolutely in Jerusalem, he cannot have appealed to Deuteronomy as his authority. But he intended nothing of the kind. His reformation is merely a purification of the Israelitish religion from idolatrous practices. And this purification was not the result of the finding of the book of the law. The immediate consequence of the covenant which the people made, as a result of the finding of the book, was the celebration of the Passover.

What, then, was Josiah's book of the law? Clearly the book that teaches the specific ritual of the Passover, as it was celebrated at this time. The distinctive point in this passover is, that special pains were taken to complete the sacrifice before night, to be enabled to distribute the sacrificial meat, the sheep as well as of the cattle, among the people. This peculiar rite must have been prescribed in the newly discovered book which caused such a panic. Dr. Fries finds this prescription in "the little book of the Covenant" (Ex. xxxiv. 26) where he reads the text with the following vocalization *yālîn labbaqqar zeboach chag*, which he translates: The sacrificing of the festive offering of the Passover may not, as far as the cattle is concerned, continue over night,—i.e., after night fall. The little book of the Covenant in Exodus xxxiv. is, therefore, the book of the law, which was found by Hilkiah and given to King Josiah. *Sepher* is not necessarily a book, but may be a leaf, and is such in this case.

This is the new hypothesis which Dr. Fries puts forward in a lucid and suggestive manner. (What he has to say in

the time of the composition of Exodus xxxiv. and Deuteronomy is of secondary importance.) I fear it will be unconvincing. His arguments for the assertion that there is no real connection between the law book of Josiah and the Pentateuch, as well as for the conclusion that Deuteronomy was intended to centralization of worship in Jerusalem, are open to serious objections, and are by no means convincing. And again, his suggestion as to the distinctive character of Josiah's Passover, will hardly commend itself as probable. Moreover, the reading *labbaqqar* after *yālin* is too uncertain, and with this the identification of Exodus xxxiv. with Josiah's law book falls to the ground.

J. A. B.

XIII. P. M. * CARMINA, INSCRIPTIONES, NUMISMATA. Vollständige Ausgabe mit Einleitung und Anmerkungen. Von Dr. JOSEPH BACH, Director des Bischöflichen Gymnasiums zu Strassburg i. E. Köln: J. C. Bachem. 1903. 8vo; bound, M. 4.20.

A new edition of Pope Leo's poems, containing all poems known; and more complete than any other edition ever published. Here is not the place to speak of the poetic value of these verses. Leo wrote elegant verses, but little poetry. The value of his poems is not in the poems themselves. It grows out of the importance of the man; and, in that respect, it is considerable. The introduction by Dr. Bach is an appreciation of the poems, very sympathetic, as might be expected, but not altogether without critical candor. In the poems there are also given the Inscriptions and the Letters of the Pope, the latter with a German translation in the original. A good portrait of Leo forms a beautiful frontispiece to this handsome volume.

J. A. B.

TESTAMENT HISTORY. (International Theological Library.) By HENRY PRESERVED SMITH, D.D., Professor of Biblical History and Interpretation in Amherst College. Pp. xxv, 512. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.50, net.

It is an advantage, for the discussion of the so-called High Criticism, that several of its conspicuous representatives

are now engaged in an effort to popularize its results, and put forth something positive which we are to substitute for the so-called traditional views. In other words, they are trying to establish a new tradition, which readers of literary knowledge are to accept upon the strength of their confidence in the scholarship, good sense, and honesty of the new school of critics who have set themselves up as umpires in the discussion. As among the most conspicuous of these, Dr. Smith's work deserves particular attention, as being representative of the whole class. That the critics suppose themselves to have now reached that position in which they can speak as arbiters is indicated by the author in his Preface, where he affirms, that "what the specialist knows his readers have a right to know. They have a right to see the picture as he sees, and to see it in the way in which he sees it. . . . We have the right, and it is my duty, in making an historical picture, to draw these figures upon my canvas as firmly and distinctly as I can draw them. But, as we fill in the picture, we are conscious that many details must be less sharply outlined; some are in the shadow so deeply that we cannot make them out. The successful historian I take to be the man who is able to reproduce the lights and shadows so that readers will be able to see the picture just as he sees it. To do this without the monotonous and irritating repetition of 'perhaps,' 'probably,' or 'it seems to me,' is a matter of no little difficulty. Happy is the man who is able to feel that he has solved the problem with even a moderate degree of success" (p. xiii). How successful the author may have been is to be determined by an examination of the results.

While we do find frequently the modifying words which the author endeavors to eschew, it must appear to a candid reader that they should have been introduced much more frequently than they are. We find, for example, the author asserts without any qualification, that the two parallel histories found in the book from Genesis to Second Kings are identical in the book of Chronicles, with its continuation in Ezra and Nehemiah, "present so many points of divergence

can in no way be made to give an homogeneous t" (p. 2). This position, of course, the author feels to substantiate. He does this, first, by dwelling upon historical facts found in the book of Kings which are different from the book of Chronicles. This he well attributes to the motive which actuated the chronicler, namely, the edification of the reader. The writer of Chronicles wished to glorify the ceremonial law and other matters which related to the external glory of the kingdom of Israel. He therefore has no interest in the backslidings of Israel and in the unimportant things connected with David's life and the rebellion of his sons. Therefore "the good man rewrote the history without the shadows" (p. 4).

Even if this may be true. But, without particulars, it is a dangerous assumption on the part of our author, and the reader to whom he represents, that the two histories are irreconcilable. The backslidings of Israel and of Israel's kings which are not at all inconsistent with the general statement that they were the instruments through which God was working most effectually in the world. Biographers and historians are not compelled to put in the foreground all the failings of their heroes. Much less are they compelled to do so when, for a special purpose, they are traversing ground which has already been covered in a popular manner. In writing biographies of Calvin and Luther, it is by no means necessary to dwell at great length upon all their shortcomings and fail-

In the chapter upon "The Origins," we find our author say without any "perhaps," that the genealogies in the book of Genesis "are the work of the priestly author, who wrote them only after the year 500 B. C." (p. 11). But, in order to carry out his theory through, he has to accept "a slight alteration of the received text," which consists in transferring a verse from the beginning of the second chapter to the beginning of the first, though he does not inform the general reader of the serious and arbitrary nature of this performance. This is very much like taking advantage of the ignorance of

the reader. It is not true, as the author asserts, that "the sketch of the creation has the subscription 'This is the Book of Genealogy of Heaven and Earth.'" That clause stands at the end, and not at the beginning, of the sketch, and introduces another subject. And this the general reader has a right to know before he accepts the dogmatic assertion of the critic.

In similar strain, the author proceeds to say, that "it does not seem venturesome to declare that this cosmology [that of Genesis ii.] is different from that in the other in that it took its origin in the desert" (p. 12). But, in his presentation of the subject, he omits entirely reference to the ordinary, and what would seem to be the reasonable, interpretation, that, in introducing the particular account of the fall of man, the author skillfully employs the literary device of recapitulating in a few words the previous full account, in order to get started upon the new chapter in the history. There is no such contradiction between the accounts as the author asserts, except as it is imposed upon the subject by a questionable interpretation.

In similar strain, we find the author asserting, that, in Genesis vi. 1-4, which speaks of the sons of God marrying the daughters of men, this phrase "sons of God" refers to angels, or, as he prefers to say, using the Arabic word, to *jinn*, which are supposed to be mythological beings. In the references in the footnote to substantiate his interpretation, we find only those passages referred to which occur in poetical books, and a passage in the book of Daniel quoting a heathen conception. The footnote does not, as it should if it is designed to give the reader a fair basis for inference, refer to those numerous passages where the chosen race are spoken of as the sons of Jehovah and of the living God, referring, by contrast there as here, to the heathen, who had forgotten God and were monumental in their wickedness.

Of course the author must say something of the Nethinim; and here, as usual, he omits to say "perhaps" or "it

seems to me," and lays down as a dogmatic proposition which is proper to be taught, that these "giants" are mythological productions of the author's brain, by which he is trying to account for the "gigantic races" which "were thought to have dwelt in Palestine before the coming of the Hebrews" (p. 15). The more reasonable interpretation, which certainly deserves some consideration from the fact that many of the most learned interpreters of the Bible have accepted it, and do still accept it, is that these Nethinim are the gigantic specimens of wickedness that aided in making the world so corrupt that the catastrophe of the Flood was necessary.

In a later paragraph, however, Dr. Smith does refer to a theory which floated more or less distinctly before the mind of a late editor of the documents, and which has been widely accepted since his time, namely, "that two types of humanity which may be labeled the good and the bad, of the pious and the depraved, existed from the beginning. The tribe of Cain represents the sinners, the ungodly, the heathen; while in the tribe of Seth we find the pious, the righteous, the people of God" (p. 26). But he is not generous enough to assign the passage concerning the marriage of the sons of God to the daughters of men to this late theorizer. In this connection it is refreshing to find one sentence with a qualifying clause. The Garden of Eden "was probably the oasis of Damascus."

Like many other critics of his class, Dr. Smith dispenses with the patriarchs. But it is gratifying to see that he has some hesitation in so doing. Still, his hesitation is not sufficient to qualify his assertions to any great extent.

"Our conclusion," he says, "is that there is no sufficient warrant for supposing individuals Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob to have been the ancestors of the people. That Jacob or Israel was the name of a clan (or that they were the names of two separate clans) seems to be made out. Isaac and Abraham are as yet unaccounted for—that is, we know of no two tribes or clans that bore these names. Probably both were creations of the legend-building imagination working under the necessities of the patriarchal theory. Isaac represents the unity of Israel and Edom; Abraham represents a larger unity—the

early Israelites were conscious of their relationship with Moab, Ammon, Ishmael, Midian, Edom, and other tribes of the region. This implies that all these peoples had a common ancestor. A natural name for such an ancestor would be *Father-of-a-crowd-of-nations*, which the Hebrew author thinks to be the meaning of the name Abraham. The precarious nature of biblical etymologies is admitted on all hands. But until a more probable derivation for the name Abraham is put forward, we may accept this one. In this case Abraham is a genealogical construction originating in the necessities of the early theory of history. It is possible that the other name of the patriarch, Abram, which means *Exalted-Father*, is a similar invention intended to mean *Great Ancestor*" (pp. 50-51).

And so on to the end the reader is treated to a succession of oracular statements upon all disputed points and many that have never before been disputed. The story of the Amalekite's bringing the news of Saul's death to David is so obviously impossible as to compel us to reject it. The removal of the ark to the capital by David is an idea of later times imported into the transaction. "David had no idea of making a single central sanctuary for the whole country" (p. 143). The story of Uzzah's death is, however, "substantially correct" (p. 144). This admission seems to be made because the account is discreditable to the intelligence of the time.

In looking at the authorities upon which the author depends, we find a notable lack of references to Babylonian discoveries bearing upon the subject, and an almost total lack of reference to critics who take a different view from the author. Why the author should neglect to refer to Professor William H. Green's book upon "The Unity of the Book of Genesis," unless from fear that the reader should be directed to an effective refutation of his main positions respecting the book of Genesis, is difficult to surmise. He certainly was not ignorant of the work.

Such is the history which is being taught to the unsophisticated students of one of the leading evangelical colleges of New England, and such is the undigested material which

is being put forth by the school of critics who would write anew and overturn the history of Israel, the story of the patriarchs, and the whole plan of salvation, as ordinarily understood, which has led up to Christ and the establishment of his kingdom. It does not seem possible that such crude handling of sacred history should long be popular in this scientific age.

ULTIMATE CONCEPTIONS OF FAITH. By GEORGE A. GORDON, Minister of the Old South Church, Boston. Crown 8vo. Pp. xix, 399. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1903. \$1.30, *net*.

This volume consists of seven lectures given before the students of Yale University in 1902 on the Lyman Beecher foundation, with two chapters added to complete the course of thought. The topics are "The Preacher as a Theologian," "The Quest for a Theology," "The Categories of Faith," "The Individual Ultimate: Personality," "The Social Ultimate: Humanity," "The Historical Ultimate: Optimism," "The Religious Ultimate: Jesus Christ," "The Universal Ultimate: The Moral Universe," and "The Absolute Ultimate: God."

It has, therefore, both the advantages and disadvantages of the lecture form. The information is imparted through attractive rhetoric, though in somewhat diluted form, but the author does not fail thereby to grapple at close hand with the mighty problems which the preacher is constantly compelled to consider.

Dr. Gordon's definition and defense of optimism is specially to be commended, though it is difficult to tell just how far he would carry it. If his faith leads him to believe confidently in the ultimate extinction of all sin in the universe, it would seem that the principles upon which he bases such faith would lead him to discredit either the divine goodness or the divine power which has permitted sin to come into the universe and to work such havoc as the author himself clearly recognizes. In line with the prevailing comment upon Jonathan Edwards, Dr. Gordon deplores the fact that this great teacher preached

a sermon on "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God," but he fails to notice that the proportion in which Edwards dwelt upon the punishment of sin, to the rest of his writings, is not greater than is that of the words of Christ upon the same subject to his teaching, and that the material figures used by Christ are as harrowing as those used by Edwards. These writers seem to forget that there is a time for all things, and that the full portraiture of Christ's love cannot be drawn except upon the background of the awful nature and consequences of sin. The extent to which underhand chicanery is prevailing amid the business methods of the present time, and the difficulty of dealing with the guilty parties through the clumsy instruments of the law, can but make one who duly reflects upon the facts wish that there were some preacher of the present day who would portray as Edwards did the certainty of divine vengeance and the impossibility of concealing from the eye of God the sin which we may hide from men. What preaching, for example, could be more apposite to the times than such as that in which the following paragraphs occur?

"Many men will take advantage of another's ignorance to advance their own gain, to his wrong; yea, they seem not to scruple such practices. Besides downright lying, men have many ways of blinding and deceiving one another in trade, which are by no means right in the sight of God, and will appear to be very unjust, when they shall be tried by the rule of God's word at the day of judgment. And how common a thing is oppression or extortion, in taking any advantage that men can by any means obtain, to get the utmost possible of their neighbors for what they have to dispose of, and their neighbor needs!

"Let such consider, that there is a God in heaven who beholds them, and sees how they conduct themselves, in their daily traffic with one another; and that he will try their works another day. Justice shall assuredly take place at last. The righteous Governor of the world will not suffer injustice without control; he will control and rectify it, by returning the injury upon the head of the injurer. Matt. vii.: 'With what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again.'

"To those who plead for the lawfulness of practices gen-

demned by God's people,—you who do this, consider practices must be tried at the day of judgment. whether or no they are likely to be approved by the Judge at that day. Prov. v. 21: 'The ways of man are the eyes of the Lord; and he pondereth all his go-
 ower, by your carnal reasonings, you may deceive hearts, yet you will not be able to deceive the judge; not hearken to your excuses, but will try your ways; he will know whether they be straight or crooked. you plead for these and those liberties which you t be considered, whether they be likely to be allowed judge at the last great day. Will they bear to be his eyes, which are purer than to behold evil, and ok on iniquity?'¹

the proper impression from the famous sermon on in the Hands of an Angry God," it should be read of the fact that sympathy for a righteous cause uni- d rightfully overpowers and pushes out of sight the sympathy for the misfortunes of those who have elves against it. We have not heard that the Christian s put on sackcloth because Parks is sent to prison ying his labor-unions and defrauding the general he only mourning is over the fact that many of those ived with him have escaped, and are still flourishing en bay-tree. The dying words of Christ upon the far from being an unconditional proclamation of uni- giveness. On other occasions he had said that there yree of guilt which could not be forgiven, either in d or in the world to come. Those who crucified are partly excused by ignorance. It is a startling should not be forgotten, that there is a stage of cannot be palliated by any plea of invincible ignor- d this we do not suppose that Dr. Gordon means to deed, no one can state more emphatically than he has ruth that "there is no peace for the wicked. If wick- not be expelled from the spirit and life of mankind, ation of a happy future is idle. . . . If the struggle righteousness is vain, optimism is vain" (p. 254).

¹ Edwards' Sermons, pp. 185-186.

JESUS OF NAZARETH: His Life and the Scenes of his Ministry. With a Chapter on the Christ of Art. By WILLIAM E. BARTON, D.D., author of "The Old World in the New Century," "The Psalms and their Story," "Faith as Related to Health," "Consolation," "A Hero in Homespun," etc. With Maps by General Henry B. Carrington, U. S. A. 8vo. Pp. 558. Boston and Chicago: The Pilgrim Press. \$2.50, *net*.

This elegantly printed and finely illustrated volume more nearly meets the wants of ordinary readers than any other which has been published. The one hundred new illustrations from photographs, and the two hundred and fifty reproductions of paintings, of themselves give to the volume a unique value, presenting at a glance the information concerning the land, the people, and their customs which requires a volume in itself in ordinary words. For one thing the work is not, like so many Lives of Christ, overcritical, but in the main takes the history on its face value, which is the only reasonable way. Many writers seem to forget that our Gospels are the result of a very thorough sifting of original materials at hand, though evident from the fact that nothing but pure wheat is left. Indeed the Gospels for the most part are self-evidencing, since they are in such striking contrast with the productions which are the known work of uninspired writers. But we have not space to mention the good points in Dr. Barton's work. He has not failed to face and discuss the real difficulties of the subject, and everywhere he sheds light upon them. The work needs but to be known in order to secure a very wide circulation.

THE ATONEMENT AND THE MODERN MIND. By JAMES DENNEY, D.D., Professor of New Testament Language, Literature, and Theology, United Free College, Glasgow. Crown 8vo. Pp. 159. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. \$1, *net*.

This little volume is largely a reprint of articles which had appeared in the *Expositor* in answer to criticisms made upon the author's work on "The Death of Christ: Its Place and Interpretation in the New Testament." Both this and the former

is certainly deserving of the attention of our superficial. After all the defective conceptions of the atonement have been propagated in connection with the so-called "anthropomorphism" of God, it is refreshing to find an author who presents a more comprehensive view of the subject, and yet one which is not the mere logical outgrowth of dry dogma. The author well says: "The relations of father and child are undoubtedly more adequate to the truth than those of judge and criminal; they are more adequate, but so far as our experience goes they are not equal to it. If the sinner is not a criminal in the eyes of his judge, neither is he a naughty child before a parent whose own weakness or affinity to evil introduces an incalculable element into his dealing with his child's fault It is to be apparent to every one that even the relation of father and child, if it is to be a moral relation, must be determined in a way which has universal and final validity. It is a relation in which—ethically speaking—some things are forever obligatory, and some things forever impossible; in other words, it must be a relation determined by law, and which cannot deny itself" (pp. 70-72).

THE ASCENSION; or, How Jesus Came and How He Went Up. By D. W. FAUNCE, D.D., author of "A Young Man's Difficulties with his Bible," "Prayer as a Theory and Fact," "Shall We Believe in a Divine Providence?" 12mo. Pp. 215. New York: Eaton & Mains. 75

The defense of the miraculous character of Christ's ascension is one of the best which we have ever seen. The subject is much more inclusive than it seems. It is really a presentation of the whole supernatural element which runs through the life of our Lord, involving the entire system of distinctively Christian doctrines. Christ's work depends upon the exaltation of his nature. His work was what no man could do. The blending of the supernatural with the natural is continuous from beginning to end of his life. That it is mysterious is beyond question. But mystery develops all truth; and that of the blending of the natural with the supernatural in the life of Christ is no more a barrier to believing in it than is the union of the mental and the

physical in our own constitution a bar to our believing that our personality involves the union of mind and matter. The author's statement of the relations of Christ's two natures to each other is peculiarly happy. After summarizing the impressions made upon the Virgin Mother, upon the general public, upon his own disciples, and upon successive generations of believers, and after considering the import of Christ's own statements concerning himself, the author condenses his views as follows:—

“Only four inferences are possible: If we shall say, looking on one class of facts, that he is only divine, there remain a large class of facts of which no account can be given. If we shall say, on the other hand, that he is only human, one equally large class of facts remain not included in the theory. If we shall say he was superhuman only, neither human nor divine, but in some way superior to man and inferior to God, then what becomes of both classes of facts, neither of which is accounted for in this hypothesis? These three theories of Christ's nature set aside, as not covering the facts, one more remains: that the Person whom we know as Jesus Christ was the God-man; the Son of God becoming the Son of man, ‘God manifested in the flesh.’ And this conclusion reconciles and combines both classes of texts—those which speak of him as God and those which speak of him as man. The question is not whether this is or not explicable. We bow before it as the divine mystery. But we must not so hold the revealed fact as to make the divinity absorb the humanity, or the humanity the divinity, nor yet so as to claim a double consciousness in the one Person, our Lord Jesus Christ; nor need we hold to two natures separately existing side by side, now one acting and now the other. Yet the whole mode in which this incarnation was accomplished must always baffle us. Human reason has no plummet that can sound the depths of God. There were those who felt that the impassibility of God forbade any words about the divine nature as suffering. There were those who held that there could be no self-deprivation of the divine attributes, no self-renunciation of any divine perfection; not even a voluntary self-limitation. But all this was to limit God's power to limit himself, and so it actually affirmed in one direction what it denied in another. Whether it is necessary to call in the idea of self-limitation or not, some have questioned. The

requently used about 'the limitations of humanity' as our Lord needs to be employed with great caution. limited—limited by himself in the exercise of his attributes—a widely different conception from God limited by God—God limited by man. Indeed, what has been the limitation in the case of Christ is really extensive conditions of men. He was able to extend his being to become babe, child, man. He reached out and to every variety of human experience. It may be called as an expansion rather than a contraction, an extension rather than a reduction. It is the condescension of God to care for the lowliest. Infinite greatness is the greatness of care for minutest objects. Jesus came to die, showing thereby his power; God was seen in love at the cross; and these were not limitations but extensions toward our human needs" (pp. 128-130).

CHRISTIAN. By THEODORE LEDYARD CUYLER, D.D., 12mo. Pp. 144. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath-school Work. 75 cents,

eight characteristic sermons of one of the most successful protestant pastors cannot fail to edify and interest all who are so fortunate as to read them.

OF CHRISTIAN PREACHING. By T. HARWOOD PATTERSON, Professor of Homiletics and Pastoral Theology in Chester Theological Seminary; author of "The Making of the Sermon," "Public Worship," "History of the Bible," etc. 8vo. Pp. xvi, 412. Philadelphia: Baptist Publication Society. 1903. \$1.50, *net*.

General reader, as well as the preacher, will find this a storehouse of interesting information. The volume contains well-written biographies of twenty of the most distinguished preachers of all ages, from Augustine to Moody. The subjects are well selected, and in each case a well-executed illustration accompanies the text.

EDENS. By J. R. MILLER, author of "Week-day Living," "Wedded Life," "Silent Times," etc. 12mo. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath-school Work. 75 cents, *net*.

At least valuable of the author's numerous volumes is

this collection of sermons, of which the first has given title to the book. Others treat of "The Way of God," "Prayer," "The True Glory of Life," "Grieving the Holy Spirit," and two or three other topics.

A. C. Armstrong & Son, New York.

THE EARLY CHURCH: Its History and Literature. (Christian Study Manuals.) By JAMES ORR, M.A., D.D., Professor of Apologetics and Systematic Theology, United Free Church College, Glasgow. 16mo. Pp. viii, 146. 60 cents.

Houghton, Mifflin & Company, Boston.

WITNESSES OF THE LIGHT; Being the William Belden Noble Lectures for 1903. By WASHINGTON GLADDEN. With Portraits. 12mo. Pp. 285. \$1.25, *net*.

The Macmillan Company, New York.

MIRACLES AND SUPERNATURAL RELIGION. By JAMES MORRIS WHITON, Ph.D. (Yale). 12mo. Pp. 144. 75 cents, *net*.

Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath-school Work, Philadelphia.

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THE POWER OF GOD UNTO SALVATION. By BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD, D.D., LL.D., Professor in Princeton Theological Seminary. 8vo. Pp. v, 254. 75 cents, *net*.

The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

PRINCIPLES AND IDEALS FOR THE SUNDAY-SCHOOL: An Essay in Religious Pedagogy. By ERNEST DE WITT BURTON and SHAILER MATHEWS, Professors in the University of Chicago. 8vo. Pp. viii, 208. \$1, *net*.

The Westminster Press, Philadelphia.

THE GIFT OF POWER: A Study of the Holy Spirit. By JOHN ELLERY TUTTLE, D.D. 12mo. Pp. 60. 25 cents, *net*.

STUDIES OF FAMILIAR TUNES. By LOUIS F. BENSON, D.D., Editor of "The Hymnal, published by Authority of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A.," "The Hymnal for Use in Congregational Churches," "The Chapel Hymnal," and "The School Hymnal." 8vo. Pp. xvi, 285.

THE BIBLIOTHECA SACRA

ARTICLE I.

THE ADDENDA OF PSYCHOLOGY.

BY EX-PRESIDENT JOHN BASCOM, D.D., LL.D.

PHENOMENA are our first terms of knowledge and must always remain its permanent center. The explanations we bring to the phenomena cannot be allowed to blur the phenomena themselves, or carry them off from their own basis. The facts of perception and the facts of consciousness, with which our thoughts are occupied, must, amid all theories, be allowed to retain their own independent revelation. This is essential to the coherence and accumulation of knowledge. In the midst of speculative action we are liable to overlook this dependence, and the very data of thought are surrounded by an artificial halo of words, by images that lack firmness of definition, by alleged facts which are themselves without proof. Idealism is ready to carry over mental phenomena into the physical world, and, having given less than due weight to the facts of mind, to give more than due weight to the physical facts associated with them. Having missed the mind where it is most active, we rediscover it in remote and obscure places. We displace direct perceptions by ill-established implications. Thus consciousness, the exclusive form of activity in mental activity, is allowed to wander from its own

field, and to unite itself in an unintelligible way with physical processes. Whatever explanation is secured by the substitution of one kind of phenomena for another, by mingling phenomena in a way not justified by experience, serves only to confound the primitive data of knowledge. Monism and idealism and empiricism fall constantly into this error. They are not true to the problem they attempt to explain. They add and subtract in a way to suit their immediate purpose. Numerous and bright colors that lie distinct on the palette are rubbed together, and then the painting is rendered in grays and browns, as holding the constituents of the entire spectrum. The colors with which we started cannot be regained till our explanatory work is undone, and we stand again with the clear definition in perception of simple shades. Mind and matter explain each other by both being present. Our theories fail to satisfy the problem because they do not accept the problem as they find it, but put in its place confused terms which admit of an inadequate rendering. We need constantly to go back to our first forms of knowledge, to have our task re-assigned us, and to see how far we have prospered in its accomplishment.

Mental phenomena, approached exclusively through consciousness, and the physical facts of the brain, subject to perceptive inquiry alone, together constitute the terms of intellectual life. Their interdependence is of a very subtle, obscure, and extended character, quite beyond any adequate explanation on our part. What we have to do is to study them, separately and reciprocally, in their sequences, and to preserve as best we can the true nature of each. We thus retain the facts and the order of the facts, see something of their dependence in its changeable character, and win some mastery over them. The success of the entire movement depends on our fidelity

facts, and our willingness to accept them in the relation which they establish among themselves.

A few years since, Dr. Carpenter, in aid of an explanation of the sometimes obscure and rapid development of intellectual processes, assumed that these processes were not always characterized by consciousness, but took place in a region described as subconsciousness and came thence in an advanced form of formation, as occasion offered. Thus a third term was introduced in intellectual activity which some thought explanatory, and which was certainly very pliant. This was a first step taken in merging physical and mental phenomena in each other, and lessening the apparent difficulty of their union. The intermediate activity was neither strictly mental nor simply physical, but partook of a mingled character. We had thus gotten beyond the two disparate terms, mind and matter, and found a region, neither in space nor in time, where they could be freely united. We were no longer bound down to two definite forms of activity, each with its own empirical limitations and laws, but could employ imaginary forces in a way wholly beyond any correct observation. We had reached empty air-spaces and could do what we pleased. We were bound neither by a logical sequence nor by a physical dependence, but could vault over to undefined, intermediate terms. Our problem was quite other than what it had been.

This region of reserved activities has been recently immensely enlarged, and we now have prolific automatisms which may quite submerge the plodding processes of reason. Professor James, "I cannot but think that the most important step forward that has occurred in psychology since the time when a student of the science is the discovery first made that in certain subjects at least there is not only the

consciousness of the ordinary field with its usual centre and margin, but an addition thereto in the shape of a set of memories, thoughts and feelings which are extra-marginal and outside of the primary consciousness altogether, and yet must be classified as conscious facts of some sort, able to reveal their presence by unmistakable signs.”¹

This method of reasoning, this region of novelties, this discovery in which not a phenomenon of any sort has been discovered, we must be allowed to question as quite beyond the range of knowledge. “Facts of some sort” is no sufficient description. The keel of our Columbus has not touched shore. A nebulous world, without form and void, whose misty outlines the eye cannot penetrate, is brought into the problem, and each man can expand it or contract it, or make what he will of it. There is no limit to the exposition it may offer, for there is no law to its being, to its actions or reactions. As a man thinketh so is he, and so is his philosophy. Binet, who has framed many experiments in confirmation of this region so constantly in the throes of creation, has given the theory definite expression. His earlier experiments had reference to movements of an automatic character which might be induced in a patient suffering from anesthesia. The paralyzed right arm, when hidden from the observation of the patient, would take up certain motions initiated by him, as those of writing, and repeat them several times as under a prolonged impulse. These movements were first referred by Binet to an organic interlock of nervous stimuli and muscular activity. The initiative stimuli supplied by him operated for a brief period when the occasion was removed. He saw nothing in this but an example of automatic response in the physical mechanism. His earlier experiments were directed to securing various re-

¹ *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 233.

which are ordinarily due to the will, but in which no conscious activity on the part of the patient was involved, some results impressed him as beyond those which could be referred to automatic dependencies, and to imply, in the absence of all consciousness, something like intimate connections. This conclusion he accepted with reserve, but confirmed it, sufficiently as he thought, by repeated experiments. It is worthy of remark that automatic action in a patient suffering from paralysis, and with whom the normal relations between nervous stimuli and muscular activity were interrupted, might very well take on some unusual form. The habitual and serviceable use of organs being withdrawn, they could be left to play more idly under more remote and isolated impulses.

A frequent experiment was that of placing a pen in the patient's hand, and guiding it in writing a few words. If words so written were misspelled, the hand hesitated in writing them and might correct the orthography. This was regarded as indicating a trace of overruling intelligence which must be referred to some unconscious source. If the first syllable of a word was indicated, later syllables were supplied. This result seemed to call for a similar explanation. The experiment which finally satisfied Binet was that the patient could be taught to write sentences somewhat at length which could not be referred to the immediate activity of the mind, and which showed coherent intellectual connections. Indeed, the words so written might be only partially apprehensible when the attention of the patient was directed to it. These experiments, repeated in different forms, came to be regarded as the proof of a guidance not found in the conscious activity of the writer. Thus Binet was led to accept two centres of supervision,—that of the mind proper, and that by

which certain phenomena took on a coherent form without any conscious oversight. These two centers are in interaction, the activities present in the one modifying those in the other.

While there is a certain coherence in this reasoning, it fails to attach sufficient importance to the automatic action of the nervous system, and is still more inadmissible in introducing a new center of control whose phenomena are in no way verifiable. Much, nay most, of the interaction of the several parts of the body on each other,—nerves, muscles, and organs,—passes without observation, and we can easily forget how extensive and exact this interplay is. The organic movements of the body in constant modification of each other proceed with little oversight of the mind or direction by the will. Stimuli that are able to secure such complex results are not to be hastily pronounced inadequate to explain other less familiar, but no more obscure sequences. The automatic activities of our physical mechanism are not easily exhausted, and may readily bear the appearance of direction from some overruling center. When we are dealing with dependencies which have been wrought into the system by the most protracted interaction, we cannot refer apparently intelligent activities to a second center of supervision with the same facility we would employ in ascribing thoughtful relations to persons. A certain suggestion of intelligence pervades the body everywhere. We must give these automatic movements full credit before we proceed to supplement them with hypotheses, involving unknown centers.

There are also the more variable forms of action which we refer to instinct and to habit. Here are connections, either constitutional or the result of repetition, which explain a great variety of effects as readily as does an immediately active in-

telligence. There has been a tendency, which it is not easy to justify, to make intelligent activity the basis of instinctive connections. The relation would appear to be the reverse of this. Instinctive, constitutional connections would seem to be the foundation of our voluntary action, and its constant support. While conscious effort reaches and modifies organic relations, the permanent lines of sustentation extend from below upward.

If we consider the two earlier stages of the experiment on which Binet relies, they present no special difficulty as explained by the ordinary dependence of physical and voluntary action on each other. The hand, moving automatically, hesitates as it repeats a word which has been purposely misspelled. This, in a slightly different form, is a familiar result. Spelling is peculiarly an automatic product, particularly if we spell correctly. He who hesitates in his spelling has fallen under a doubt raised by the mind. Words are spelt most correctly when they are spelt automatically, that is under connections established in the nervous system. We frequently resolve a doubt by writing a word, and seeing how it meets, to the hand and eye, familiar automatic relations. It is perfectly natural, therefore, that a form of orthography which had been just imposed should embarrass the physical mechanism when it came to repeat it in the presence of an established habit. In rapid writing, the mind, being occupied by the thought, gives little or no attention to the words. These follow each other under the stimuli of habit. If the hand cannot keep pace with the mind, words and clauses are dropped, and the fingers hasten forward. Our ideas, pen in hand, pursue the path of expression as readily and as forgetfully as do the feet the highway, when we are in animated conversation. Indeed, were not automatic movement becoming constantly

more complete, we should be but halting pilgrims in the crowded thoroughfares of thought.

Any sudden interjection of intelligence confuses the automatic processes, and is the prelude of failure. One accustomed to tie his cravat without a moment's thought, trying to do the same in a glass, in a more careful way, may find himself uncertain as to the movement which comes next in order. Or if one accustomed to work by direct vision, undertakes to guide the instrument he is using by reflected light, he may find himself quite at fault.

Neither does the completion of a word, the opening syllable being given, offer any particular difficulty. An endless number of dependencies have been established in this direction, and the one most allied to the occasion may thrust itself forward. Associations of this order are constantly being formed. When one wishes to evoke rhyming words, the automatic and thoughtful powers play into each other. The inquiry should be, How do the two tendencies sustain each other? and we are not to be guided in our conclusions by a rigid notion of the nature of the particular act. A reflective process may readily lapse into an automatic movement.

If we take the third consideration offered, the rendering without consciousness of consecutive and unfamiliar sentences, the case is somewhat more difficult and it is correspondingly rare. It is a result we should not anticipate prior to the facts, but it is not impossible of explanation. It is hardly more than an extension of the connections already recognized. An unusual verbal memory, with desultory reading, is sufficient to give a suggestion of the forces involved. The memory of words includes a ready articulation of them. The mental effort does not suffice unless it is at once sustained by the appropriate physical activity. This connection may be

flexible and rapid or it may be painful and slow. There are wide differences between persons in this regard. What seems impossible to one is readily performed by another. Words are most perfectly rendered when they are repeated by rote. In pronouncing the Lord's Prayer, if the automatic movement is broken up, the mind may become suddenly confused. Lines of poetry to which the attention has not been directed for a long period are frequently restored by running over the words still held in mind, till they link themselves again automatically with their fellows. The physical dependence outlasts the intellectual connection.

One may have changed the house in which he lives, closing a door here and replacing it by one at another point. For years an automatic tendency may occasionally return to find the familiar passage through the space now walled up. A man is flung from his horse; a shock is given to the nervous stimuli which confuses their action. Months may pass before the poise and assurance natural to him are recovered. Thought has no control over these impressions.

The surprising thing in the experiment referred to was that the words, automatically written, had escaped the recollection and even the comprehension of the patient. Yet this difficulty is not very grave when we recollect how many romancing and imaginative sentiments may become alien, in later life, to the mind that once entertained them; and how possible it is for the physical vestiges of these earlier impressions to linger long after they have ceased to play any part in the voluntary experience. Whether they ever did exist and how long they have endured are questions to be resolved by an inquiry into facts, and not questions to be readily set aside by a theory wholly of its own order.

If the case under consideration were such as to leave a

choice open between two sets of facts, each equally well established, we might incline in our opinion to the one or the other, but the problem is not of this nature. The proposed explanation is of a very unusual and unsatisfactory character. The immediate objection to the phenomena brought forward by Binet to account for the facts is their utterly unknown form. We not only assume them, we have no avenue of approach to them. Not even the imagination can assign them locality and a mode of being. The names we apply to them are inconsistent, and in no way guide us to the region of which we are in search. If we use the earlier word and term them subconscious facts, our language has no descriptive power. As consciousness has no locality, we cannot reach a locality by speaking of phenomena as above or below it. Facts are not defined as to their own nature and relations by being spoken of as not embraced in consciousness.

If we call them marginal or subliminal phenomena the confusion remains the same. The words still suggest space relations, and we have no areas which can entertain the facts proposed. Consciousness is an idea of its own order. The phenomena incident to it may be more or less rapid in movement, more or less distinct in impression, but when they disappear there is no known limbo into which they retire. They come and go in their own field, and are in no other way approachable. They cease to exist when withdrawn, as certainly as do shadows when the light is removed. Their provoking causes may be present in the brain, and through its action they may be restored, but they do not in the meantime exist. Our experiences combine the nervous and the intellectual activity in various ways, but we know nothing of any third phenomena which unite the two. Professor James speaks of

them as a discovery. Where have they been discovered? Jesus I know, and Paul I know, but who are you?

The word "automatism" gives us no aid. Automatism is a mere abstraction till we have some mechanism capable of automatic motion. We are assured that there is a nest with many vigorous fledglings, but when asked where it is, we are told that it is in the air.

What right have we to entertain phenomena of no known order? How, in fact, can we be said to entertain them, when we have no way of approach to them? When certain diseases were referred by the Jews to possession by devils, they had far more to proceed on than have we in subconscious facts. They had conceptions of devils, and pictures of devils; definite facts to refer to them, definite places to put them in. We have none of these, unless it be some not very intelligible facts which we insist on surrounding by mere words. This complete vagueness of our conception destroys its value.

Or look at automatism as an explanatory idea. There are certain phenomena we fail to understand. We create out of mere shreds of notions other phenomena which are to furnish their causes. When the healing water in our pool is to be moved, we imagine an angel who comes down out of Heaven and troubles it. Our angel is invisible, his methods are invisible, and all we really proceed on is the movement in the pool. That which we invoke is beyond all terms of knowledge. If this is explanation, we are at liberty to invoke any causes we please; no problem will prove too hard for us. Its conditions at once supply the fitting reasons. We thus leave open the cave of Æolus, and any vagrant and foolish wind that blows is at our service. Difficulties at once unravel themselves. They establish satisfactorily the needed automatisms.

But if this ready creation of causes is allowed, how can we get any explanation out of it? The perplexities are, to the mind in search of facts, as troublesome with the added reasons as without them. The imaginary phenomena do precisely what they are set to do, and no more. They begin where we begin, and leave off where we leave off. We have climbed a ladder, but we come down the same ladder with nothing more than we carried up. Our actual phenomena call out our imaginary ones, and then our imaginary ones expound our actual ones. Explanation can not proceed from the unknown to the known. All that remains to us as the fruit of our inquiry are the simple facts, physical and mental, with which we started. The waters of the pool are troubled, that is all. We may be diverted from proper forms of inquiry by these premature expositions, we can get no real instruction out of them. Our suppositions are so much rubbish, of which we can make no use. We know not when or by what law automatisms are to arise and convert themselves into thoughts. From the moment we leave the real till we return to it, we gain nothing. Naked we come into this world of nonentities and naked we go out of it. How phenomena that are neither physical nor mental can modify phenomena that are either physical or mental, we have no way of apprehending, and no experience pertinent to our want. The method is a mere simulacrum of knowledge.

There is no end to the variety of assumptions which this new freedom of psychology grants us. It has led some to assume two kinds of mind,—a subjective mind and an objective mind. All that they find difficult to explain under the daily objective mind is immediately referred, with perfect ease, to the subjective mind. The hypnotist is thought to reach these more hidden powers, by means of them to readily master fa-

miliar phenomena, and to secure unexpected lines of action. A tendency arises at once to exaggerate these hypnotic results, and to make them more alien than ever to the ordinary movements of mind.

One may impress his own thoughts strongly in reference to a future action, he may be affected in a similar way by something unusual in the address of another, or he may receive a "suggestion" from a hypnotist. The difference in these cases lies more in the circumstances under which the impression is made than it does in the impression itself. This may remain a normal intellectual fact. The hypnotist first induces an unusual condition in which the patient is withdrawn from ordinary influences and made especially subject to the operator. He then proceeds to enforce a certain line of action, and later it is found that this "suggestion" has gained a firm hold of the mind thus impressed by it. There is in this something unusual and extreme, but there is in it nothing which separates it finally from normal phenomena. The hypnotist starts in inducing a susceptible physical state, he proceeds by an enforcement of his own idea, and the patient, in obedience to this influence, receives the required action as a part of his own experience. The "suggestion" begins and ends with the normal phenomena of body and mind. What is there to call for occult causes, or what part is left for them to play? We should certainly exhaust all known interdependencies of physical sensibilities and mental states before introducing unknown data.

In the example of subconscious activity educed by Dr. Carpenter he neglects the readily forgotten, but frequent and real, activity which the mind directs toward the solution of a problem which has been presented to it; the increased insight of favorable moments; the accumulation of data as

time passes, and refers these gains to a decisive and unconscious effort. If the mind of a person entertaining a difficult question is not alert and attentive, it will not find any subconscious powers coming to its relief. Whatever is instructive to the mind must reach it in an intelligible, concurrent way. If it does not, it will make no impression, miss adoption and lie idly upon the surface. It must have a certain normal relation to the existing state of the waking faculties, or they cannot make use of it. If there were a deeper mind it would be compelled to play into and with the more superficial powers, coherent among themselves.

Binet seems to think that these subconscious phenomena offer an explanation of the rare fact of double personality. In double personality two series of experiences, diverse in kind, from time to time displace each other, with no obvious interplay or interdependence. These are very obscure facts, but they do not seem to be allied to a blind side and a perceptive side of the mind in constant interaction. The title of Binet's treatise "On Double Personality," seems to indicate that automatic mental states have for him a more detached, independent existence than is ordinarily ascribed to them; that they are not simply submerged incidents of normal mental processes, but a second form of such processes.

Subconsciousness, subliminal experiences, automatism, a subjective mind, bring no explanation to double personality. The normal man is thought to have two minds, a subjective and an objective one. The subjective mind makes itself felt through the objective mind. The subjective mind does not give us one experience in consciousness and the objective mind another. We have two minds, but not two personalities. The case of two personalities would call for four minds, and the relation of one couple to the other couple would be as obscure

Indeed cases have been affirmed of a half-dozen persons, and thus we should have a dozen minds buzzing in the hive to no intelligible purpose.

It is not wholly without suggestion as to how what has termed double personality may arise. All sudden and radical changes of character may occasion a long struggle between conflicting tendencies, the rejected line of conduct prevailing at times the mastery. A man like Gough may, under sudden temptation, find the old ways of thinking and returning on him like a flood. St. Paul affirms with emphasis that there is a law in his members warring against the law of his mind.

Even in the process of starvation, as in the Greeley polar expedition, may develop an entirely new character. In some cases a complete erasure of memory takes place, and later recollections might thus be separated from earlier ones by a complete break. If two such phases of life were to displace each other from time to time in memory, we should have the appearance of double personality. Certainly it is premature to advance any extreme theory of double personality, till we have had a more extended inquiry.

As an explanation the extension of familiar facts has great force over the introduction of unknown and unverifiable facts. It is surprising with what ease subconscious, automatic and subliminal phenomena are accepted when they are introduced in the ethical world, and make men and women more than jumping-jacks. There is no sense of the unreality of intellectual facts, allied to that of physical facts. It is as if in the presence of strange phenomena, like radium, the conclusion should at once be reached that there is no ground for the law of the conservation of

The fact that so many of the phenomena from which this supersensuous state is referred are arrived at in connection with a disturbed nervous system goes to show that, in explaining the usual process of mind, we are allowing ourselves to be perplexed by some extreme interactions between the physical and mental terms of life. Our theory should rest on the ordinary, rather than on the extraordinary, dependence of the terms involved. Exceptional phenomena are pretty sure to approach habitual phenomena far more nearly than at first sight they seem to. The suggestions of hypnotism are an extreme manifestation of the action of one mind over another, incident to an impressible nervous temperament; but they are quite in keeping with the impressions which we ourselves are constantly establishing through the processes of memory. A particular hour suggests a particular duty; we are frequently aware, in a vague way, of something which we have forgotten, a suggestion we have let slip.

Having indicated the defect in the reasoning process by which extended and complicated marginal mental phenomena are brought on the stage, we may properly speak of the mischief which attends on their presence. If they were established, we should be compelled to tolerate them, but if they simply provide an hypothesis of doubtful character, we are at liberty to point out the confusion they bring with them. They greatly add to the perplexity and obscurity of the most central and variable problem of human life,—the relation of its physical and spiritual constituents to each other. We still entertain a great variety of opinions on the nature of this dependence, and allow the initiative to pass in an arbitrary way from one to the other. A cautious study of data, a ready acceptance on either hand of the validity of the phenomena involved, a faith in the unity and integrity of our intellectual

constitution, a sense of the inexhaustible mystery of its ultimate terms, and of the safe and wholesome handling of its immediate activities which lies open to us, are the conditions of a successful management of life. We need at once a robust and resistful common sense, a ready entertainment of new phenomena, and a power to bring them into harmony with that whole of which at best they are but a small portion. To introduce between these two terms, physical and spiritual, each so potent and so changeable in expression, a third term in no well-defined relation to either, with no distinct functions, and to which so many results may be vaguely referred, is to greatly add to the confusion and obscurity of our spiritual life. It is to make a "sweet reasonableness" almost impossible. Of all forms of inquiry we need here most of all to maintain sanity of method, and one widely supported by a carefully collated experience. We need to be taught the deepest as well as the latest lessons of the world, and to reconcile all lessons in the growth of the race. Our ultimate certainty lies in a recognition and maintenance of the framework of things. A bold, speculative temper breaks down the first terms of knowledge. Forsaking beaten paths means leaving behind us the wisdom which men have learned by much wandering.

The use which Professor James is disposed to make of automatism is chiefly found in the religious world, to whose obscure experiences it so readily unites itself. Here are some of the resources of the subliminal region as he conceives them. "It contains, for example, such things as all our momentarily inactive memories, and it harbors the springs of all our obscurely motivated passions, impulses, likes, dislikes, and prejudices. Our intuitions, hypotheses, fancies, superstitions, persuasions, conventions, and in general all our non-

rational operations come from it. It is the source of our dreams and apparently they may return to it. In it arise whatever mystical experiences we may have and our automatisms, sensory or motor; our life in hypnotic and hypnoid conditions; our delusions, fixed ideas and hysterical accidents, if we are hysteric subjects; our supra-normal cognitions, if such there be and if we are telepathic subjects. It is also the fountain-head of much that feeds our religion.”¹ What a chance medley have we here of things existent and non-existent, normal and abnormal, and waiting one and all to be abolished by deeper and better-established physical currents sweeping us onward! If such a chaos exists anywhere, and is liable to become pregnant with new terms of life, what monstrous births are we exposed to! If our faith is fed from these fountains none of its aberrations need disturb us. What bars and locks sufficiently strong can be put upon this realm of blind night; and when its progeny break forth how are we to distinguish the offspring of hysteria from the sound children of a sane birth?

The conscious, half-unconscious states of mind, the experiences in which the physical and spiritual elements will not align themselves, but remain obstinately confused; visions that will not down; dreams that are perpetually re-dreamed; impressions full of painful absurdities, forever turning as in insanity on their own axes; the self-repeating progeny that swarm around a feverish pillow, are a few of these maladjustments of mind and matter. The chief inquiry we raise about them is how to escape them. It is the characteristic of sound mental activity that it can and does wipe the board clean of all its demonstrations when it has no longer any occasion for them. To enthrone hysteria amid a swarm

¹ *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 483-484.

phenomena that are escaping all rule, is to lose the very
of intelligence, is to become the victim of spirits we
not raised and cannot lay.
us has been spoken of as if it were a form of insanity.
tion is radically untrue. Genius makes any want of
y more conspicuous, but genius is preëminently self-
d. The distinction between the normal and the ab-
between that which springs with wholesome activity
s own spiritual center, and that which is a half-formed
of ill-adjusted interactions, gains strength with every
the spiritual world. What is normal, sound, and just?
ever-returning inquiry. To cluster at random such
ena as Professor James mentions and implies, and
em the freedom of the religious world, is to hand it
o endless folly and confusion. "In persons deep in
s life, as we have now abundantly seen,—and this is
clusion,—the door of this region seems unusually wide
"The B-region, then,"—the secondary marginal re-
"is obviously the large part of each of us, for it is
ode of everything that is latent and the reservoir of
ing that passes unrecorded and unobserved." "I do
believe that if the subject have no liability to such sub-
us activity, or if the conscious fields have a hard rind
argin that resents incursions from beyond it, his con-
must be gradual, if it occur, and must resemble any
growth into new habit. His possession of a developed
nal self, and of a leaky or previous margin is thus a
o *sine qua non* of the subject's being converted in the
aneous way." "Higher powers may get access to us
n the subliminal door"—that is, I apprehend, the back
The confused, mystical, and unintelligible have rarely
o installed in the high places of religion. Hard com-

mon sense, familiar ways of doing good, beliefs that have the suffrage of mankind, retire into the shadow of more visionary experiences. The hubbub of waking life closes the door which in the dreamy subliminal state remains ajar.

The fanciful, extravagant, and remote have often forced their way into faith, but here they are housed in a sumptuous manner, much to the disturbance of the homely, every-day occupants. If this properly represents the religious life, it is indeed a most evasive and erratic experience. It is not entering by the door into God's universe of wisdom and love, but climbing up "some other way," as occasion offers, over an ill-guarded margin of ever-shifting illusions. Our religious experience no longer lies in a territory of pure copious streams, bringing affluence and beauty to the landscape, but in one of subterranean streams, dropping out of sight, gliding in dark places, and leaving the surface parched and barren. What we have been wont to regard as the reproach of religion we now find to have been its native potency.

We shall escape all this confusion if, with a simpler and sounder philosophy of life, we believe that the apparent terms are the real terms of welfare, that the entanglements of matter and mind, working their way into each other and with each other, are entanglements; that the things which are to be are the things which truly are; that the failures of our mental processes vanish with the processes themselves, and that there is no rubbish of mind ready to stand in the way of its new creations. The center of what we do know is the best point from which to start our explorations of what we do not know. Our intelligence is not about to steal in upon us across a leaky margin, but is to slowly accumulate under processes of inquiry we have learned to use and trust. The familiar paths, paths the race has long traveled, trails that

crossed continents since the dawn of time, are after all
main our true thoroughfares.

These obscure ways of subconsciousness get no color from
the fact that religion is so largely the expression of emotion.
Life is life, the fullness of life in the entire man, is the
reference of his consciousness held in one central illumin-
ation; but it is all the more for that reason profoundly re-

We need comprehensive, penetrative feeling, because,
by means of it, and by means of it alone, is our life spread
over its own field of spiritual phenomena; by means of it,
by means of it alone, we come to a knowledge of what
we are, are to be, and have to do. One without abundant
activities is like one without wide-ranging perceptive or-
ganisms, both in their nature and in their scope, escape
the world. As many men are irreligious by virtue of obtuse sensi-
bilities as are irreligious because of slow, dull thoughts. All
the impressions of knowing the world in its several parts furnish the
basis of faith; but these impressions must be real, veri-
fied impressions, permeated with the light of reason. They
spring up in the day; parts of the permanent creative
processes that are in progress about us; not colorless, feckless,
ghostly, products of the night.

Religion has shown such unquenchable energy, and
has played so beneficent a part among men, because the systema-
tized processes of faith have often been so barren, and its
scope so narrow, as to be incapable of fertilizing the mind.
Yet we herein find no reason for the introduction of vis-
ions and data, which leave the thoughts searching obscure places
with much eagerness but able to bring forth nothing which
extends itself to universal, daylight experience. If relig-
ion cannot be completely worked out in terms of creed, rites,
observances, what remain to us as its proper expression

are the terms of life itself. We should not try to escape these in mystical phenomena. To submit ourselves to automatism is to lose once more the plain paths. Our plea is for clinging to the knowledge we have as a condition of gaining more knowledge. The concurrent force of knowledge spreading outward from its own centers is its great characteristic. The myths and visions and hypotheses with which we surround the solid substance of truth must all be cleared away before the processes of growth can again set in. Things remote and detached are untrue; material for the fancy rather than the thoughts, meteors rather than planets in the true solar system. If empiricism would only be empirical it might come to something.

Professor James in his work on "Human Immortality" strives to lend probability to the doctrine of immortality by the theory that consciousness "does not have to be generated, *de novo*, in a vast number of places. It exists already behind the senses coeval with the world." There is required only a lowering of the threshold to allow of a free flow into the mind from this general ocean of consciousness. Our present experiences only express the form and movement of the gate by which these waters of intellectual life find admittance.

The doctrine of immortality is the assertion of our ethical nature—is that through which it completes itself. Physical difficulties do not enter into the problem. The promise is not a physical but a spiritual one. Speculations, like those offered by Professor James, in their own obscurity and improbability weaken rather than strengthen belief. In striving to reënforce the conviction with these evasive fragments of thought we envelop the whole subject afresh in mystery. There is hardly a better example of the need of finding our safety at those centers of faith where convictions, like liv-

ing things, have been perpetual, springing up and spreading abroad—new phases in the eternal evolution of being. If we could resolve immortality into the trickle of a preëxistent ocean of consciousness, what utter confusion and hopeless loss we should suffer in our spiritual individuality! The belief in immortality is the faithfulness of the soul to itself.

ARTICLE II.

AUTHORITY AND THE PULPIT.

BY THE REVEREND CHARLES H. OLIPHANT.

"I hung my verses in the wind,—
Time and tide their faults should find!
All were winnowed through and through.
Five lines lasted sound and true!
Sunshine cannot bleach the snow,
Nor time unmake what Poets know.
Have you eyes to find the five
Which five hundred did survive?"

R. W. EMERSON, *The Test*.

"The final form of truth may come to be simply a summing-up of the experience of mankind as it has affected human destiny through the history of the world."—CARL HILTY, *Happiness*, p. 135.

THE design of this article is a plea for authoritative preaching. Lest its position be misunderstood, a few preliminary propositions may be stated.

Truth is everywhere and always sacred. Congregationalism is the denomination which can afford to make all truth its ally and to be frank about it. From its rise in Brownism, our churches have stood squarely for intellectual freedom and spiritual fellowship. "If I am bound to believe what they say who are in authority, then my conscience is subject to error."¹ Thomas Goodwin somewhere averred that "Errors maintained against knowledge are alone vital."

We of the new century are done with the ancient device of setting the sun by the dial of our creed. Denominationally it is our pride that we are "authors of liberty," and walk

¹ Henry Burton, Rejoinder to Prynne, p. 48.

not only in God's ways made known, but also to ~~be~~ made known, to us. A leader in another communion has said, "The Congregational Church is the foremost intellectual power on this continent." The denomination should aim still to deserve this reputation. Among the sects, our witness is to the perpetual reasonableness of faith, to the unfettered mind, to the enlightening office of Christ. According to Justin Martyr, "All pagans who live reasonably, or by the word of wisdom, have the Son" (Logos). Never was it more evident than it is to-day, that "truth is the daughter of time, not of authority."

By the logic of her birth and bringing-up, Congregationalism is committed to the principle of intellectual liberty. It is a dangerous denomination, and we love it. There is freedom to err in it; therefore, there is freedom to know the truth. In such a communion the errors that move for adoption have perpetual leave to withdraw; the evil humors that arise, liberty to come to a head, and cure themselves.

That the age we live in is religious, none will doubt. Yet its religiousness shows a greater diversity of operations than ever before. The church seems about to be disintegrated by the very liberty of thought for which our party has contended. Authority in the old sense has long since been denied to the pulpit. What is left is hardly more than *influence*, the specific gravity of Christian character. The pulpit is not so sure of its message; or, when it is, it strikes many false notes. The church seems "afraid to conquer." Its heralds are hesitant and apologetic. Their sermons are editorials, or, what is worse, "discourses." Every man has his own gospel. "Athens is in her ships." Men preach not as "authoritative teachers," but as "communicative learners." Of sweet reasonableness there is much, but where is the ring of authority:

Has there been a revelation or only a speculation? Because there is much to learn, is there nothing to preach? Such are the questions in answering which I trust that neither my space nor the reader's patience will be quite exhausted.

When that picturesque Philistine, Elbert Hubbard, speaks of the churches, it is in this fashion: "There is no dispassionate and unprejudiced man now but that knows and will admit that Protestant churches in America are no longer religious institutions. They are social clubs, with a ritual, often obsolete, and, as such, serve their purpose, and surely are more or less useful." Though such language is, of course, not to be taken too seriously, no Christian can read it without some degree of compunction. No danger is more subtle than that in which the church ever stands of becoming an æsthetic institution, where offenses against good taste are more eagerly shunned than the sins which, under cover of such an ecclesiasticism, become daily more respectable.

For myself, however, I should put into the impeachment of our churches different specifications. I do not find the distinctive weakness of the church to be either in its sociability or its "clubableness." It is oftener true that there is a deficiency than an excess of social coherence. What appears to be the apter and not less severe criticism is that the churches are united in little else than agreement about the minister, and, in stress upon this point, have become lectureships rather than fellowships, which condition may be charged in part to the pulpit's disuse of the method of authority. To a consideration of the legitimacy of this method of preaching, let us, then, with some misgiving, but not without a deep conviction, turn.

Three views, according to Professor Howison, have been held of the relation of reason to religion: (1) religion con-

tradicts reason; (2) religion supplements reason; (3) religion rests upon reason, and its authority is the authority of reason. He continues: "Reason, instead of paying homage to Religion, and making its submission to external authority, now legislates for the religion which is its own offspring, and becomes itself the authority from which the credentials of religion must issue."¹

To this, as a general statement, one may agree, though not to the implication suggested by the writer, that the "method of authority" and the "method of conviction" are antagonistic the one to the other. In the preacher's witness to the truth, these methods are to blend. For the very reason that all legitimate authority is not above reason, but within it, the use of authority is the reasonable service of the pulpit. By as much as religion is unmistakably rational, by so much should it be authoritative. *The reason for authority is, therefore, the authority of reason.*

"Thought in motion, it is said, is for the sake of thought at rest." The method of conviction is not less valid in religion when conviction is agelong, and represents the agreement of experts in spiritual things. Convictions having these properties become authoritative, and the denial of their authority in religion is like the anarchist's denial to society in general of those powers and liberties which he claims for himself. Without its appropriate authoritativeness, reason becomes anarchic, and socially ineffective.

Difficulty, however, lies in the definition of legitimate religious authority. "The semi-regenerate man," says Thomas H. Green, "craves for positive declarations."² But so does the *wholly* regenerate man, and the totally *depraved* man. To deny such positive declarations, it is true, is quite in the

¹ *Limits of Evolution*, p. 224.

² *Posthumous Fragments*.

mode of present-day thought. The vice of the method of authority is the want of a rational delimitation of its scope. As it affects the pulpit, however, the fact must not be ignored, that within the holy precincts of truth there is a *most* holy place reserved for *the* truth—for truth, not only “as it is in Jesus,” but as it is in the agreement of the church’s testimony. Whatever theory be adopted as to the mode or measure of revelation; whether the truth be regarded as supernaturally displayed or vitally experienced; whether the Bible be the occasion or the consequence or the concomitant of revelation; even though, out of its “verses hung in the wind” of centuries, we can find but “five which five hundred do survive,”—the case is the same. Within the orbit of thought in motion, there is somewhere a stable equilibrium of thought at rest, to which, as truly as to its supreme prophet and oracle, all authority is given, at least on earth. So that, although such authority is not an ideal or normal standard, but only a practical or working one, it is the function of preaching to assert it.

Writing in 1877, Mr. Gladstone said: “In twenty-eight more years, perhaps, those of us who may be alive will have nerve to look in the face the proposal that the doctrine of a trustworthy authority in *morals* shall be abandoned, as well as that of a trustworthy authority in religion.”¹ But “those who think lightly of the testimony of the ages, or the tradition of their race, which, at all events, keeps them in communion with it, are often found the slaves of Mr. A. or Mr. B. of their newspaper or of their club.” Twenty-five years have passed, and how nearly has this prophecy been fulfilled! “It is not,” writes President Eliot, “the authority of the Bible only which has declined. All authority has lost force;

¹Nineteenth Century, July, 1877. The present writer’s agreement with all that Mr. Gladstone wrote upon this subject is not here implied.

authority political, ecclesiastical, educational, and domestic. The world has had too much of authority, not enough of love and freedom." "There is, however," Dr. Eliot continues, "an authority which has been withal increasing in influence: it is the developing social sense, or sense of kin." Now we shall have made a beginning in answering our questions if we remind ourselves that this "sense of kin" is the essential part of the Christian revelation, upon which, rather more than upon other parts of the same revelation, the ministers of the church have dwelt with authority.

It has been said that "neither the verb 'to love' nor 'to believe' has any imperative mood." Jesus, however, used both words in the imperative: "I say unto you, Love your enemies." "Ye believe in God, believe also in me." By common consent it was allowed that Jesus taught with authority, and that he claimed authority. What did he claim? With what kind of authority did he teach?

The twofold use of the word authority admits of great confusion of ideas: (1) as signifying power to command or to act, as the authority of a king or judge, the right of coercive administration; (2) "the power derived from opinion, respect, or long-established reputation; influence conferred by character, office, station, mental superiority, or the like."

A writer of half a century ago defines authority as "the influence which determines belief without a comprehension of the proof."¹ Gladstone states the principle of authority thus: "The mass and quality of prior assent to a proposition in some minds may be, without examination of the grounds, a legitimate ground of assent for other minds in matters of knowledge and in matters of voluntary action."

According to these definitions of authority (excluding that

¹ George Lewis, quoted by Gladstone,

one denoting governmental or executive power), its recognition and use is distinctly reasonable. *It is a weight put into the balance of free judgment* without destroying either the freedom or the judgment. To deny the legitimacy of such authority in matters of religion appears to me to be superlatively irrational. Arthur James Balfour, in his "Foundations of Belief," goes further still in its defense: "If we would find the quality in which we most notably excel the brute creation, we should look for it not so much in our faculty of convincing and being convinced by the exercise of reasoning as in our capacity for influencing and being influenced by authority" (page 238).

I confess to a distaste for such antitheses. To set reason over against authority degrades both and confuses the issue. Reason is the total vibration of the chord of thought. Authority is like the nodes at which that vibration rests within itself, and whence are propagated the harmonic overtones, which may be likened to the overplus or stable residuum of the total vibration; to the common and settled convictions of thinking minds.

If we turn now to the value of evidence and precedent, we find that both are allowed, at law, to possess authority in virtue of the solidarity of our thinking as well as our acting, as social beings. In Greenleaf's treatise on Evidence are these words: "Matters of fact are proved by moral evidence alone, i. e. all evidence not obtained either from intuition or from demonstration" (page 3). "The true question, therefore, in trials of fact, is not whether it is possible that the testimony may be false, but whether there is sufficient probability of its truth" (p. 4). "All that men know is referable to perception and reflection. But, in fact, the knowledge acquired by an individual through his own perception and reflection is but

a small part of what he possesses ; much of what we are content to regard and act upon as knowledge having been acquired through the perception of others. The disposition to believe upon the evidence of extraneous testimony is a fundamental principle of our moral nature, constituting the general basis upon which all evidence may be said to rest " (p. 15).

How is it with the judiciary? Certainly it is not the individual acumen of a judge which alone makes his judgment august and effective! Such acumen is indeed indispensable, but only as it is added to the knowledge of cases, the citation of ancient and modern instances, the corroborative weight of precedent. If it is true that a recent appointee to the supreme bench of the nation remarked in public on the eve of his departure for Washington, "For no rule of action can we claim that it has the authority of the universe behind it," exception should be made of those rules of action which are accredited by the best judgment of the best men from time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary.

For the church such authority may to a large extent be claimed. Her testimony has been compared to the weight of the ax-head which makes the edge cut, without which the keenest wit, the brightest individual essay or pronouncement, will be relatively ineffective.

We are too ready, I am convinced, to look upon spiritual experience and its vital truths as we regard the doctrines of inductive science or the products of invention,—as changing from generation to generation. But the values of the soul are not variable, like the vehicles of locomotion. The spirit that once went to God in a stage-coach does not go with greater celerity in an automobile. The approaches to the Infinite are the same from generation to generation. We un-

derstand the Bible better than our fathers did, but we may not know God as well as they knew him.

To claim authority for any system of theology is no part of my intention. One may agree with Martineau, in his masterly contention for the inner light as a just objective revelation, and yet hold to a real and valid principle of ecclesiastical authority.

But it will be asked, What is added to conviction by the assertion of such a principle? I would say, The same power that came into the teaching of Jesus when the assurance grew upon him that his spiritual intuition was the fulfillment, not the destruction, of the testimony of Israel; that his commandments summed up the law and the prophets; when he could say, "It is written," and appeal from the fashionable Targum of the day, from the Scribe and Pharisee, to Moses and the Psalms; when in the synagogue of Nazareth he could find in the roll of Isaiah his own momentous commission. One will find, of course, in some pulpits to-day much assertion of authority with the statement of many "things that aren't so." Is that worse than to hear many things that are true with no accent of authority, no apparent consciousness of the historic continuity of the church's testimony to them? Is not my conviction reënforced, confirmed, by that of myriads of others, though their conviction differed not in kind from my own?

The fallacy suspected in the aversion of our age to authority in the pulpit is the inference that, because the seat of authority is not above or other than the normal Christian experience, there can be no authority other than *individual* conviction. In opposition to this view, it should be urged that, in the collateral, collective, cumulative weight of Christian experience and testimony like our own, we have a valid seat

tive authority within reason, and not differing in quality from the Inner Light itself, only vastly augmented. With recognition of such a principle, the *Te Deum* would find its meaning:—

All the earth doth worship thee;
The holy church throughout all the world doth acknowledge thee;
The goodly fellowship of the prophets,
The noble army of martyrs,
The glorious company of the apostles,
Praise thee.

Authority of Jesus: "He taught as one having authority."—The authority with which Jesus taught was not of reason: not, it is true, of reason in a purely philosophical sense; not of a rational consciousness, independent of the mystical or inspirational consciousness, but of a consciousness in which they coalesced in a soul open, free, and pure, like an instrument with all its registers quick and responsive to the touch of the Holy Spirit.

Authority as the Scribes.—Theirs was the authority of a closed mind; his was of an open mind; theirs was traditional, his was original; theirs was derivative and ministerial, his immediate and prophetic; theirs was the method of exposition, his of illustration; theirs literal, his spiritual; theirs was the authority of the letter, his of reality. Yet though the disciples he made were not converts by the sword, not conformists through fear, but disciples through love, through grace and light, no king, no lawgiver, no ruler, has commanded obedience more inexorably, nor been honored with such absolute surrender and service. Moreover, the spiritual impression made upon us by Jesus is not of one whose authority was capricious and innovating; but of a reverent and conservative soul, heeding the *spirit*, not the letter, of the past.

"Christianity," wrote Max Müller in 1892, "was really
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from the beginning a synthesis of the best thoughts of the past as they had been slowly elaborated by the two principal representatives of the human race—the Aryan and the Semitic.” “By the Vedas,” said the Swami Vivekenanda, “the Hindus do not mean the books themselves, but the accumulated treasury of spiritual laws stored by all men through all times.”

As in all Old Testament prophecy there is the note of conservatism, holding the people back from the crass experiment of new-fangled sin, reminding them of a divine voice they had already heard; so Jesus came, not to destroy, but to fulfill. He submitted to be known as a baptized disciple of John, regarded by many as a rival teacher and acknowledged generally as a prophet. “What saith the *law*?” he demanded of an inquirer who came to him for light. “They have Moses and the prophets,” let them hear them. On two recognized commandments,—love to God and to the neighbor,—he founded his teaching. In the consciousness of such love he dared all opposition and moved upon the works of the devil. Mindful of the rights of such love, he asserted eminent domain for his kingdom and its claims. He doomed the ass for his use, offering no apology but his need of him. He cleared the Temple of commercialism; he accepted the hurrahs of the boys, and did not protest against those who strewed palm-branches in his way. The triumphal entry and spontaneous enthusiasm of the people were audaciously appropriated as befitting a self-consciousness which was rooted in so divine an altruism.

One who loves may always command.

“A mother never is afraid

Of speaking angrily to any child,

Since love, she knows, is justified of love.”—MRS. BROWNING.¹

¹Quoted by President Hyde, art. “The New Ethics,” in the *Atlantic*, November, 1902.

"Ignorant, short-sighted, inexperienced as he is," says President Hyde, "the child who walks in implicit trust in the wisdom and goodness of his parents cannot go far astray. He is guided by a vicarious intelligence in which the wisdom and experience of the race are reproduced and interpreted for him in each new crisis by the insight of love." Is this true only of children in *years*?

"How," a correspondent asked a certain editor, "can a Christian go to a Buddhist and preach Christianity as a duly accredited message from God to men, if authority is neither in church nor book, but only an inner light?" The history of mysticism proves how slight a difficulty there would be in that. Yet here again is the antithesis between authority and reason, between church or book and inner light. Why not allow that authority is in church and book because it and they alike belong to the insight of love, because church and book are voices of the soul? If one's intuition is final for himself, as it is and ever must be, are the concurrent intuition and experience of myriads of no greater authority? Shall not a preacher who finds himself supported by the historic testimony of the ages stake something upon his "Thus saith the Lord"?

"For human use it is evident that criticism was intended by Providence as a purgative, not as a food. There is nothing of which we are more weakly proud, especially we men, than our logic. And yet it is our logic that too often makes fools of us. In fact, plain logic is usually too simple an apparatus for the need. The data for the construction of a perfect syllogism can only be obtained from an artificially prepared cross-section of life,—which never does it justice. To operate with plane geometry, and neglect the third dimension on the axis of historic order is to do offense unto the

constitutive principle of human social life. To be human is to be social, to be social is to be historical, and human judgments to be sound, must be historical judgments.¹

Is there no historic consensus on which our little testimony is borne—as chips are borne by the tide—compared with which our little theologic systems—*ours*, as well as our *father's*, “have their day and cease to be”; no Christian momentum which by our partaking of it enables us to pull more than our poor weight, and “to speak and exhort and reprove with all authority”; so that, in some true sense, we may feel that whatsoever we “bind on earth shall be bound in heaven”?

The time appears to me to be ripe for the reassertion of some principle of authority within the free churches called Protestant. With humiliation we must confess that Protestantism has been outgeneraled by the more experienced and far-sighted Roman Catholic polemic. Not the book, but the church, is the source of authority. A keener insight into human nature, a more deliberate prognosis of the advancement of learning, should have saved Protestantism from risking the principle of authority upon human writings, however inspired. Neither Catholic nor Protestant is, to be sure, quite right; but the Catholic is nearer right in resting for authority upon the living church than we in seeking it in the prophecies that fail, the tongues that cease, or the letter that kills.

With no fear that the Bible will ever lose its power as the word of God and Book of Life, it may be asked if just now we are not plagued with sects which have carried out to the letter post-Reformation insistence upon literal infallibility for Scripture. “An amiable old lady in Concord with a gift for in consequence asks us to believe that we are ensphered in a gigantic swindle, and that the best way to get at the truth of

¹ President B. I. Wheeler, in *Atlantic*, November, 1902, p. 638.

things is to assume that they are all lies.”¹ In support of her claims she offers a “Key to the *Scriptures*”! A false prophet from Chicago comes to us clad in the same “limp-leather, silk-sewed, divinity circuit.” Both brandish Bibles as they preach their new crusades.

What, now, shall be our attitude toward such extraordinary pretensions and often strangely beneficent delusions? Stress should be laid on the fact that they are as yet *untried*; that no single generation can determine the worth of notions such as these. They are “without father, without mother, without genealogy,” without traditions, without a literature. No family has yet been brought up in them. No one, therefore, knows their secondary or ultimate effects upon character. In other words, they have no authority.

Nor is it a sufficient answer to this to say, that *all* our denominational systems are eccentric. The eccentricity of the historic though variant bodies of Christendom is such that, while the axis of rotation is not perhaps in any case a true center, it lies within the circumference of the historic faith. One denomination accentuates mystical piety, another the rational understanding, another ecclesiastical order and continuity, another divine sovereignty, another evangelical fervor; but each of these centers of denominational zeal lies within the circumference of the historic faith of Christendom, each is but the relative accentuation of a truth of the historic order.

Not so Dr. Dowie. Not so Mrs. Eddy. Where is the authority for Dowie’s Elijahhood, for Mrs. Eddy’s “concatenation of nonentical identities”? Challenge her to take her Bible, and you will, I fear, be worsted in the arbitrament of literal Scripture. How changed the situation if we require her to show *a century’s persistent faith in and practice of her creed!*

¹ Rev. M. L. Williston.

To object to this principle of authority, on account of the obvious limitation of its applicability, is a mere quiddity. Authority is not the same as infallibility. Of the latter we have indeed had too much. It had been better for the world if the doctrine of infallibility had never been born. But the church represents the deposit of the Spirit's witness in human experience. It is like the nautical chart in which are written down the day-marks and beacons, the buoys and signals, the sailing directions and soundings in the ocean's danger-belt. Because the chart is amendable, it is not less authoritative. Because it grew out of the successive adventures of ill-starred or successful navigators, has it no authority for the sailor beyond his own conviction or ability to verify its conclusions? The government which invites each purchaser of such a chart to report its errors or insufficiencies at Washington, stamps it, nevertheless, with its seal, approves and authorizes it, despite inevitable errors. In like manner the preacher may without fear utter the corporate subconsciousness of the church.

Is there not, at the present time, a dearth of such authoritative preaching? Can real preaching be anything but authoritative? Important as is the literary form and the Christlike temper; needful as are the grace of charity and the virtue of candor,—are these the distinctive traits of the sermon? The sermon is a message; the preacher a herald. Let the matter of it be however simple, the mode can be no other than imperative.

The church, then, that abdicates the seat of authority, forfeits the homage of the people. If it can be made out that the Congregational minister is a highly enlightened type of man, even in that fact may lurk a subtle temptation. His sermon may be cast in such a mold that, should there chance to be in

the audience a professor of psychology, he should hear no positive affirmations. Moral laws should be alluded to for their "symbolical validity" only. Prohibitions should become inhibitions; rewards, a poetic El Dorado; punishment, a hope deferred. The whole scheme of inexorable retributive love too often dissolves in euphemisms, and the historic Christian experience in amiable maxims like those of Franklin's autobiography or an editorial in a Sunday newspaper.

The question is raised whether there are not more truths than we suspect which can be *preached* as well as discoursed upon; and I would humbly affirm that, narrow as we may the scope of the message, curtail as we must the over-faiths and irrelevant dogmas of outworn creeds, insisting, above all, that authority lies never *beyond*, but always *within* rational conviction, being the weight freely assigned by Reason to historic testimony, there still remains to us the Faith once for all delivered to the saints: the God declared by Jesus; his sovereign Fatherhood; the reality of his presence and of his providence; the guilt and retribution of sin; the validity of prayer; the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount; the communion of the Holy Spirit; and for those who will accept it, the life everlasting.

For the disputer of the world there is ample room outside the church and, as there should be, hospitable treatment everywhere. As for the man in the pulpit, it is his kingly office "to bear witness to the Truth."

ARTICLE III.

THE LATEST TRANSLATION OF THE BIBLE.

BY HENRY M. WHITNEY.

VI. ADDITIONAL POINTS,—CHIEFLY AS TO RHETORICAL METHOD.

WE have spoken of the relation of the figures and the literary methods of the Bible to the task of making a good translation. We have discussed hyperbole, ellipsis, paronomasia, metaphor, the remarkable class of metaphorical "sons," the substitution of a genitive noun for an adjective, hendiadys, personification, and the attribution to the volition or the activity of God of everything, good or bad, that God permits to take place. These unfamiliar terms apply to very real and very important matters in the rhetorical or literary form.¹ It requires something more than acquaintance with Hebrew and Greek to enable a man to catch the real idea lying in the use of any one of these figures or methods, and to bring it over in the best possible form into our mother-tongue.

1. For instance, if Huxley grew hot over Paul's assertion, "If the dead rise not, let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die," one is tempted to speculate upon the question what he thought of Ps. li. 4: David has ruined a home, and has murdered the man whom he has unspeakably wronged; then he turns his eyes away from the scene of his wrong-doing, to look up to God and exclaim, "Against thee, thee only, have

¹ We might have spoken of even less familiar methods, such as apostrophe, anacoluthon, and onomatopœia, but for the purpose of these papers their content is relatively small.

" From Huxley's standpoint these words are simply ; as Hebrew *hyperbole* they are, in their own way,

se days of revived interest in Emerson and his work, e well to note that his power of arresting attention ly, if not largely, due to his use of hyperbole that n beyond all biblical examples,—hyperbole that was s in the extreme. He said that the young man of ent day "should be taught all skepticisms, all unbe- nd again: "Adhere to your own act, and congratu- self if you have done something strange and extrav- nd broken the monotony of a decorous age." What Huxley have thought of such utterances as those? they seem to us to go beyond the limits of r taste: is it remarkable that such expressions led distrust the influence of Emerson over the unreflect-

e may add some notable examples in which the *ellip-* large or so daring that multitudes of people fail to get : 2 Sam. vi. 23: "Michal the daughter of Saul had [after that] unto the day of her death"; Ps. x. 4: [is] no God: [such are] all his thoughts"; Matt. vi. s not the life more than the food [that sustains it], body than the raiment [that covers it]?"—without eted words the use of *the* before the nouns, as by the s, is awkward and puzzling; Mark ix. 37: "Whoso- iveth me receiveth not [only] me, but him that sent is is rarely explained; Luke xi. 13: "If ye then il, know how to give good gifts unto your children, h more shall your heavenly Father give [the chief of ts,] the Holy Spirit to them that ask him?"—in this sudden but unemphasized turn from what the reader

expects is peculiarly Oriental; xv. 29: "Thou never gavest me [even] a kid"; John v. 31: "If [only] I testify concerning myself, my testimony [unsupported] is [according to the law] not [necessarily to be accepted as] true"; vi. 32: "It was not Moses that gave you the bread out of heaven; but my Father [not only gave you that bread, but also] giveth you the true bread out of heaven"; Rom. vii. 24, 25: "Who shall deliver me out of this dead body? I thank God, [it shall be], through Jesus Christ our Lord"; 1 Cor. viii. 3: "If, however, a man loves God, he [not only has known as a man ought to know, including the knowledge of God, but he] has been known by him." In Acts i. 1 how many readers think to supply the omission?—"The former treatise I made . . . concerning all that *Jesus began* . . . [; the present treatise I make concerning all that *the Holy Spirit continued*]" : the "Twentieth Century" people and Weymouth show by their versions that they did not see this point.

Some of the cases are euphemisms, as in John xii. 32: "I, if I be lifted up from the earth [on a cross], shall draw all men to myself"; and in Acts xii. 19: Herod commanded that the guards "should be led away [to be put to death]." All these cases, and those that we gave before, illustrate the terseness, many of them illustrate the extreme terseness, that is a chief mark and difficulty of Hebrew style,

"Where more is meant than meets the ear."

In Mark ix. 28, the American Revisers, evidently on account of the verb "asked," treated the matter as a case of bold ellipsis: "His disciples asked him privately, [How is it] that we could not cast it out?" The English Revisers seem to have thought this too marked a departure from the text, and made the utterance only an exclamation, crestfallen or admir-

could not cast it out!" In Mark xvi. 4 there may be a large ellipsis; the "for" can hardly be made right in any other way: "They behold that the stone rolled away, [and that is at once a marvel and a grief to them,] *for* the stone is exceeding great." The ellipsis was too hard even for the Twelve, and Jesus expanded it for them himself: "With what difficulty will I have riches [,—they that trust in their riches,—] the Kingdom of God!" (Mark x. 23, 24.)

There are many more such cases, but we have given enough to emphasize the lesson that the translator and the commentator, the simple reader alike must be constantly on the watch for the ellipsis, and especially must study the dark places of the Bible with reference to a possible clearing of them up by the facts. These are important facts in the case: (1) The ellipsis is much more marked, bold, frequent, and conspicuous in its ellipsis, but it must never be forgotten that the Bible is at heart, in spite of its language, not a Greek or Latin book, and that therefore it has its own examples of literary or linguistic method that was used by those who wrote in the mother-tongue; (2) no peculiarity of the Bible carries to a higher degree than does ellipsis the combination of frequency with unexpectedness and with unmodern casts of thought; (3) ellipsis is most likely to be found in emotional or rhetorical passages, but it may occur suddenly at any point.

We have said that *hendiadys* is common in the Bible, but we have given no idea of its frequency or of the variety of its uses. Perhaps, also, we have failed to suggest that it is not always recognized, or understood, even by one who is familiar with its figure in the classics. To emphasize these points we give a few additional examples. It is agreed by all stu-

dents that in Gen. i. 14 "for signs and for seasons" means "for signs of the seasons," and that in iii. 16 "thy pain and thy conception" means "the pain of thy conception [and later, to the birth]." Job v. 18 ("For he maketh sore, and bindeth up; he woundeth, and his hands make whole") makes sense only when understood as meaning, "Although he maketh sore, he bindeth up; although he woundeth, yet his hands make whole." In Mark i. 7 "the latchet of whose sandals I am not worthy to stoop down and unloose" would be, of course, more exactly, "worthy, stooping, to unloose"; in xi. 24 "pray and ask for" means "ask for when praying." In Acts vii. 36 at least the spirit of "wonders and signs" is "wonderful signs"; in xi. 1 "threatening and slaughter" probably means "threats of slaughter"; in xxiii. 6 "hope and resurrection of the dead" apparently means "hope of the resurrection of the dead." In Rom. i. 5 "grace and apostleship" is, almost certainly, "the grace [gracious gift] of apostleship"; in viii. 22 "groaneth and travaileth" evidently means "groaneth in its [unavailing] birth-pangs." In 1 Cor. ii. 4 "in demonstration of the Spirit and of power" makes the best sense when interpreted as "in demonstration of the power of the Spirit." In 1 Thess. i. 5 "in power and in the Holy Spirit" means "in the power of the Holy Spirit"; in ii. 12 "into his own kingdom and glory" means "into his own glorious kingdom." In each of these cases the sense suggested is entirely in keeping with the methods of the original tongue, but extraordinarily far from the methods of English expression, in any mood, or in any age.

It is curious that the makers of the various versions have not flinched from the Hibernicism of the literal rendering of Luke xi. 49: "Some of them they shall kill *and* persecute";

can a man be persecuted after he is killed? Neither is the real sense “kill *or* persecute,” but, by hendiadys, “persecute to the death.”

We have already noted Rom. viii. 10 as containing an hendiadys that would be detected by few: this is resolved by the “Twentieth Century,” but not by any of its predecessors. In this connection we may say that one of the best things about the “Twentieth Century” is its treatment of hendiadys, a figure so unfamiliar and so baffling to the Occidental mind. For example, in Acts xvi. 6, etc., “Phrygia and Galatia” is considered by the “Twentieth Century” as “the Phrygian district of Galatia,”—a view that happily meets the difficulties of those who think that Phrygia and Galatia overlapped.

It is a satisfaction to note that the Revisions and the “Twentieth Century” are agreed in clearing up one of the most important of these cases,—that in Rom. vi. 17. We give, in parallel columns, the rendering of 1611, which is literal to the Greek, and that of 1885 and 1901, which is literal to the English tongue:—

God be thanked, that ye were the servants of sin, but ye have obeyed from the heart	Thanks be to God, that, <i>whereas</i> ye were servants of sin, ye became obedient from the heart
--	--

The second would be still more literal as English, if, as in the “Twentieth Century,” “whereas” should give place to “though.” But, even with “whereas,” we may rejoice that one more stumbling-block is removed from the path of the non-erudite student of the Word.

We give two cases that illustrate how hendiadys may be found, unsuspected, in the most familiar parts of the Bible:—

John ii. 13. (Revs.) And the pass-over of the Jews was at hand, and Jesus went up to Jerusalem.

iii. 19. This is the judgment, that the light is come into the world, and men loved the darkness.

(T. C.) Then, as the Jewish Pass-over was near, Jesus went up to Jerusalem.

Their condemnation lies in this, that, *though* the Light has come into the world, men liked the darkness.

The practical character of the matter may be illustrated by the following cases: In any other language than Hebrew or Hebraized Greek "cursing and bitterness" (Rom. iii. 14) would have to stand as it is, but in the Bible it may mean "bitter cursing." In xiii. 13 the presumption has to be in favor of a similar treatment of "reveling *and* drunkenness, chambering *and* wantonness, strife *and* jealousy,"—drunken reveling, wanton chambering, and strife produced by jealousy being the real thought. In Matt. iii. 11 "He shall baptize you in the Holy Spirit and in fire" would thus be turned into—what?

From all these cases the inference is immediate and urgent, that almost every verse in the Bible should be tested, by translator and by ordinary reader alike, to see whether it contains an hendiadys that is hopelessly dark to the unskilled, and that therefore, if it is to be really translated, needs to be adjusted to modern powers of comprehension through adjustment to modern methods of expression.

4. We have not mentioned *paradox* as a biblical figure, yet no account of the figures of the Bible would be adequate if it failed at least to mention that special aspect of paradox by which it is a contradiction in terms.¹ It is only lately that this name has come to be recognized as having any place in rhetoric at all: a turning-over of the text-books in rhetoric and of all but the latest dictionaries would emphasize this fact.

¹In technical rhetoric it is known as "oxymoron"; as in Milton's "L'Allegro": "Wanton heed and giddy cunning."

Yet every one feels the pungency, and therefore, more keenly, the truth, of such contradictions as these: "Nothing is constant in nature except change"; "The more we know of ancient literature, the more we are struck with its modernness"; "He is never thoroughly happy, except when he is a little miserable"; Swift was "a generous miser, a skeptical believer, a devout scoffer, a tender-hearted misanthrope."¹ And only the superficial reader can have failed to feel the power of Acts v. 41: "They therefore departed from the presence of the council, rejoicing that they were [had been] counted *worthy* to suffer *dishonor* for the Name." There is humor in the exhortation (1 Thess. iv. 11) that we "be *ambitious* to be *quiet*." There is cumulation and a towering climax of contradiction in 2 Cor. vi. 8-10: "As deceivers, and yet true; as unknown, and yet well known; as dying, and behold we live; . . . as sorrowful, yet always rejoicing; as poor, yet making many rich; as having nothing, and yet possessing all things."²

The matter may be passed with four obvious remarks: (1) that this figure, also, is a marked characteristic of the Bible, and, when met, should be recognized as such; (2) that it is thoroughly and especially Oriental, and yet appeals to men in every part of the world; (3) that it is perfectly translatable, so that it cannot possibly give trouble to any discerning translator; and (4) that, nevertheless, it should be watched for and carefully brought out in translation, instead of being, as in 1 Thess. iv. 11, misapprehended and buried out of sight.

5. We emphasized the extreme distance of some of the

¹This last is the beginning of a long and remarkable series of entirely true contradictions concerning Swift, given in the *Nation* for April 13, 1876, pp. 248-249.

²Mark ix. 37, already quoted as a case of ellipsis, is by ellipsis also a case of paradox.

Bible-metaphors. A curious and really a very extraordinary group of this kind may be found in Eccl. xii.,—if it is many assert, that “the strong men” are the legs of a man, “the grinders” (grinding women?) are his teeth, and “the windows that look out of the windows” are his eyes, and “the doors that are shut” are his lips, and the blossoming “almond tree” represents his whitening hair;—and so on. It is impossible to make sense of the details of the passage unless this is what they mean. Yet how extraordinarily far-fetched it is. Shakespeare, with the far leaps of his imagination, never equaled this.

In Ps. xxii. 3 we read: “Thou that *inhabitest* the p[er]son of Israel,” that is, the temple, the center of the national worship, and in xx. 20: “Deliver, . . . my darling [perhaps, my life] from the power of the dog [the prowling foe].”

As we have said, by Hebraism this far-away kind of metaphor crept into the New Testament Greek. In 2 Cor. v. 21 Paul said of Christ that he was “made *sin* [a sin-offering?] for our behalf.” In 1 Cor. iv. 3, Paul refuses to be judged by [any other] man’s *day*,”—an expression that is given literally in the Bible Union, but in the Revisions appears as “man’s judgment.” It is likely that there will always be an unsolvable remainder of biblical riddles, due simply to the fact that it is late for us to find their clues: there was a far-off analogy which the writer was impressed with it, and used its terms in preference to those of his original idea. But every worthy translator and commentator will feel himself challenged, will respond to the challenge, to help to reduce the number of these riddles to the lowest possible terms. The ordinary student or reader can get no help here quite as much as at any other point in the Word.

¹ This may, however, be regarded as a case of marked ellipsis. *inhabitest* the [place where are especially given the] praises of Israel.

We have spoken of the fact that there are many places where there is likely always to be uncertainty as to the rendering which is right or, even, is to be preferred. This also it is worth while to illustrate more fully, with emphasis on the fact that it is in the Old Testament that we are much more liable than in the New to uncertainty as to the exact field of the meaning of words.

A good example is the case of the "virtuous" or "worthy" in Prov. xxxi. 10. She is *'esheth hhayil*,—that is, by the old lexicon, a woman of strength, might, valor; forces, power; ability, wealth, riches; good quality, integrity, virtual force, fruit. And worth and capability might just as well have been added. On the whole, is the moral element implied? or is she only "smart"? This is only one of many instances of the difficulty, in translating the Old Testament, arising from the great variety of meanings that has resulted, from the parts of speech, from the boldness with which the translators of that language threw themselves upon the figurative possibilities of words.

So in zoölogy,—which is a matter of less consequence,—a scholarly account of "the animals of the Bible" gives the following as part of the changes that translators have deemed it wise to make in the rendering of animal-names:—

Porcupine, } now bittern.
Hedgehog, }

Osseifrage, now bearded vulture.

Eagle which stirreth up her nest," now griffon-vulture.

Chameleon, now monitor-lizard.

Skink, now gecko.

Adder in the path," now horned snake.

Doleful creature," } now hyena.
Speckled bird, }

Fowls that creep," now bats.

Grygarg, now addax-antelope.

Maney, now hyrax or dyman.

Red-bellied, now red buzzard.

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Gier-eagle, now Egyptian vulture.
 Osprey, now short-toed eagle.
 Mole, now chameleon.
 Cockatrice, now yellow-streaked snake.
 Leviathan, } now crocodile.
 Dragon, }
 Deaf adder, now Egyptian cobra.
 Badger, now dugong or seal.
 Unicorn, now European bison.
 Behemoth, now hippopotamus.

As to petrography: in the "breastplate of judgment" (Ex. xxviii. 17-28) six of the twelve stones are noted by the American Revision as uncertain.

In such cases as Ex. xxxii. 1 when shall we call the plural a "plural of majesty," meaning "god," and when a real plural, meaning "gods"? In such cases as Ex. xxii. 9, shall we read "god," "gods," "God," or "judges"? How much of the globe was included in the "earth" or "land" (Gen. vii.) that was covered by Noah's flood? Is *na'ar* in Eccl. x. 16 (like *παῖς* in the New Testament) a "child," or a "servant"?—or is he a "soldier"?

In the New Testament: there is, for instance, the remarkable freedom with which, by Hebraism, the passive is doubtless used for the reflexive verb.¹ In some places translators have recognized the fact; in some they have not; and in some they evidently have hardly known what to do. They recognized the fact in Mark vi. 53, where "they *were brought* to the land" is rendered by the Revisions "They *moored* to the shore"; and in John xii. 36: where "Jesus . . . *was hidden*" is rendered "Jesus . . . *hid himself*." In other places the fact has been at least left unexpressed; in Matt. i. 18, we can hardly escape from reading, as Dr. Weston suggests: "Mary *found herself* with child of [by] the Holy Spirit"; in Luke xv. 16 it is bet-

¹ Winer, *Grammar of the New Testament* (Edinburgh, 1870), § 39, 2; see also Buttmann, Jelf, etc.

ter to read: "He would fain have *filled himself* with the husks [pods]"; in Rev. xxii. 11 the most truthful and powerful conception of the matter is that he who is "made filthy" or "holy" is made filthy or holy primarily by himself. But there are other cases that are not so clear. It is an almost startling experience to go through the passives of the New Testament, proving with how many of them the substitution of a reflexive verb would furnish a more penetrating sense, and with how many the sense must be left uncertain between the two.¹

But, more specifically: in Matt. xiii. 35, did Jesus go "home," "into his house," or only "into the house"? Did Herod (xiv. 6) celebrate his "birthday," or only the anniversary of his accession to the throne? Is the blessing (v. 5) pronounced upon the "meek," or the "gentle," or both? In Mark x. 14 does Jesus mean "to such belongs" (B. U.), or "of such is composed" (apparently the sense in most versions) "the Kingdom of heaven"? In xiii. 9, why should we not read, "Ye shall be beaten *into* the synagogues"? In John xii. 3 was Mary's nard "genuine," or "liquid," or what? Was Apollos (Acts xviii. 24) "eloquent," or "learned," or both? In xviii. 18 most versions make Paul the one who had just completed the rites of a vow by shaving his head, but

¹ These facts will not seem quite so strange if we remember a parallel fact in our own language, namely, that "Shakespeare often uses the active and [the] passive participles indiscriminately" (Steevens),—that is, the one for the other. Examples are:—

M. of V. i. 3. 106: "Well, Shylock, shall we be *beholding* to you?"

Cor. iii. 1. 292: "Gratitude towards her *deserved* children."

Cf. Lear i. 1. 231: "Dishonour'd *step*"; Cor. iii. 1. 72: "Honour'd *number*"; Oth. i. 3. 290: "Delighted *beauty*"; R. and J. iv. 2. 26: "*Becomed* love." Similar cases may be found in other Elizabethan writers.

There are curious things to be found in the history of every language, and some of them are strange enough to make this biblical peculiarity seem alight.

many high authorities, as Conybeare and Howson, hold that Aquila was the man.¹ In xxii. 25 was Paul stretched out "with" or "for" the thongs? In Rom. xvi. 21 were Lucius and the rest real "kinsmen" (*συγγενεῖς*) or only "countrymen" (T. C.) of Paul's? How long are the "ages" (*αἰών*), and the "eternal" (*αἰώνιος*) periods, of which the New Testament tells? In 1 Tim. iv 8 does bodily exercise profit "little" (A. V.), or "a little" (A. R.)?—these are two very different things. When does *πιστός* mean "faithful," and when "believing"? Where, in the long range between mere "sir" and "Jehovah," does each use of *κύριος* come in? When is *χριστός* a proper name, "Christ," and when an adjective, "anointed"? When do *πειράζω*, *πειρασμός*, refer to trial, when to temptation, when to both?—in Jas. i. 2-14 the reference seems to be to trial at first and to temptation at last. When do *ἐρημος*, *ἐρημία*, stand for a desert, and when for a wilderness?—in Mark vi. 35 "desert" (Revisions) is presumably wrong, as villages were near; the uniform use of "desert" by the "Twentieth Century" is certainly wrong; in fact, we have no word that describes the region where the Baptist taught. Similarly, we have no word that describes the slavery of New Testament times; the use of "bond-servant" in the margin of the Revisions is only a suggestion of the difficulty; it gives no help.

¹ This case is due to a participle appended loosely at the end of a sentence, with "Aquila" as the nearest noun. It is the dictionary-makers that at the present day seem to have most conspicuously the infirmity of hanging at the end of a sentence a doubtfully related word or clause,—thus producing a puzzling or a ludicrous effect. Examples might be quoted from living dictionaries; we quote the following from one that is recent but is virtually dead: "*Varvels*. Rings, usually of silver, placed on the legs of a hunting[-] hawk, on which the owner's name is engraved." "*Water-yam* . . . It has a root-stock about 6 or 9 inches long and about the thickness of a man's thumb, which is farinaceous and used for food."

ould have saved much wretched and divisive contro-
three points as to baptism had been cleared,—whether
tizer and the baptized went (*eis*) *to* or *into* the
whether they came (*ek*) *from* or *out of* the water,
ther βαπτίζω means *immerse* or only *baptize-in-any-*
There are in the Bible many puzzles like these. The
especially in the Old Testament, shows how uncertain
lators often were. They were uncertain, and they had
age and the frankness to show it.

bly as curious a case of uncertainty as can be found
hole Bible is in Mark xi. 3: "If any one say unto you,
ye this? say ye, The Lord hath need of him; and
way he will send him back hither." Who will send
k? and whither? It used to be thought that it was the
ending, but there is no denying that it may be Jesus
y returning, the beast.

one point we would not be misunderstood: the uncer-
of meaning, the difficulties of translation, do not in-
y of the great vital points, or the main outlines, of the
e. But they do involve ten thousand minor points, as
n the translator needs to be profoundly wise and yet
er hope to be wise enough. The great company of the
t are waiting for his work.

We have spoken of the importance of having the words
translation match the original not only in content but
ee of intensity and in grade of dignity.

r intensity we gave only the painful case in John
Woman, what have I to do with thee?"—for which
"What is that to you and me, Mother?" is vastly
But a plenty of other cases might be given.

" is a word that became over-intense with the lapse of
King James's version, in forty-three of the fifty-four

places where "hell" was used, it stood merely for "sheol" or "hades," that is, the unseen world: "It was the almost universal belief that Adam and all his descendants (with the exception of Enoch, Elijah, and the penitent thief) descended into hell, and there remained till Christ fetched them thence after his crucifixion."¹ The word "hell" has very properly been given up in these forty-three places; it is less unfit where it stands for "Gehenna," or "Tartarus," but it has become so intense a word, and it has been so much a storm-center for the theological world, that it had better be given up altogether and a fresh start taken with other words. The facts of human destiny will remain.

Like things may be said of "damnation" and "damned," as in 1 Cor. xi. 29: "He that eateth and drinketh unworthily eateth and drinketh damnation to himself." How much needless pain and how much needless repulsion from the Bible have been caused by that text! The two words were always far too strong; they grew more intense and terrible with the intensity of the effort to make them a means to repentance. Happily, they went out of the Bible with the English Revision. The facts of the divine judgment upon man will remain.

Under dignity we gave no examples at all. The "Twentieth Century" and the "American Bible" are monumental object-lessons of the effect of using words that are below the level of the thought. But, we might have said of the more dignified versions that, for instance, the official in Acts xix. 35 was far too important a man to be called a "townclerk"; he was the executive of the great city of Ephesus. The "Twentieth Century" and the "American Bible" call him "the Mayor," and that is better, except for being inexact. We should call him "the recorder."

¹ W. W. Skeat: note on "Vision of William," C. xxi. 147.

other hand, "communed" (Acts xxiv. 26) is far too intimate a word, it is a ludicrously stilted word, for views in which Felix hinted to Paul that some of the that the Apostle had brought from the west might help shake off his chains. Similarly (1 Sam. x. 2, A. V., the Queen of Sheba did not "commune" with Solomon all that was in her heart"; the original word is the best one in the Old Testament for merely *saying*: she told Solomon whatever came into her *mind*, including the answers to his questions. In each of these cases there has never been any excuse for "commune."

In the Gospels a great many small places are called *πόλις*: in the old versions and the Revisions have uniformly rendered "city," as in Luke vii. 11: "a city called Nain." It is a misnomer, and the "Twentieth Century" does not call them "towns."

We have spoken of the importance of bringing the rendering into conformity to English idiom, instead of transferring the idiom of the original tongues.

This applies pointedly to disagreeable expressions: it is a good instance, to keep up the locution by which a man's sins are said (2 Sam. vii. 12, etc.) to "proceed out of his bowels."

This applies to using "of" for "by," as in Acts xxiii. 27: "I am of them."

This applies to the epistolary standpoint: it is well known that letters were written as though spoken to the receiver at the moment of receipt, as throughout the letter of Claudius to Felix in Acts xxiii.; for example in verse 30: "When I was shown to me that there would be¹ a plot against the emperor, I would be" is also unidiomatic in English. The "plot" exactly. The "would be" reaches forward to the endeavor to carry out by murdering Paul.

man, I sent him to thee forthwith." Modern idiom requires that the standpoint be that of the writer as he writes: "Since I *have been* informed . . . I *send* him to thee at once." Few readers, even among those who once studied the classics, know why it is that this letter to Felix seems somehow out of joint.

In Rom. xvi. 22 this epistolary principle is recognized by the Revisions; it used to read: "I Tertius who wrote," but now it reads: "I Tertius who write." The Epistle to Philemon has been partially but not sufficiently reconstructed with the epistolary standpoint in mind. For example: 12f. "Onesimus, . . . whom I have sent back,"—"whom I send"; "whom I would fain have kept,"—"whom I would fain keep"; without thy mind [consent] I would do nothing"—"am unwilling to do anything," "that thy goodness should [may] not be as of necessity."

There are two striking cases in 1 Cor. v. 3-5, 9. If *κέρπικα* and *ἐγγραψα* are treated as being, by the ancient epistolary manner, equivalent to the modern present, the sense in 3-5 would be something like this: "For I myself, though absent in body, yet being present with you in spirit, *do now*, in the name of our Lord Jesus, pass judgment, just as if I were present, upon the man who has done this thing: being present in spirit when you are gathered together, the power of the Lord being with us, I *decide* to deliver such a man [the man who has done such a thing] to Satan, that what in him is carnal may be destroyed, and so his soul be saved on the day of the Lord." Conybeare and Howson have a curious half-way-adoption of this view of the matter. Similarly, verse 9, which is commonly referred to a message in a previous letter, would then be: "I *write* to you in *this* letter not to have to do . . .". These are worth remembering as alternate forms. Can it be said that they are certainly wrong?

We group a number of cases, and more might be given, in which the "Twentieth Century" shows greater sensitiveness to modern idiom as determining whether the singular or the plural shall be used:—

Mark vii. 6: Their <i>heart</i> is far from me.	Their hearts are far removed from me.
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viii 17: Have ye your <i>heart</i> hardened?	Are your minds so slow of comprehension [deadened?]??
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Luke xxiv. 32, 38: Was not our <i>heart</i> burning within us?.... Wherefore do questionings arise in your <i>heart</i> ?	How our hearts glowed!.... Why do doubts arise in your minds?
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It is rather amusing to think of one heart as having to function for so many different people.

Conversely:—

Gal. ii. 9: James and Cephas and John.... gave to me and Barnabas the right hands of fellowship.	James, Peter, and John.... gave Barnabas and me their hands in acknowledgement of us as fellow-workers.
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It is "the right *hand* of fellowship" that is given, whether by one or by many.

As to the idiom that requires "Barnabas and me" instead of "me and Barnabas," and "my Father and I" instead of "I and my Father," we would add Genesis xxxi. 49: "Jehovah watch between me and thee [thee and me]," and Joshua xiv. 6: "Concerning me and concerning thee." Shall we make these speakers seem ill-mannered?

Of idiom as affecting structure we may give a single example:—

2 Peter iii. 4: Where is the promise of his coming?	What has become of his promised Coming?
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The second, though marred in euphony by the nearness of "become" to "coming," is at least clear, by being in idiom,

and that is the primary thing. The first is not good idiom, and therefore is not readily understood.

It was a frequent remark in regard to the English Revision that it seemed to have been "made by men who were devoid of the literary sense." We wish that both they and the American Revisers had realized how much more their two versions would be worth to people of these later days if they should utilize every resource of idiom, and every other resource, to give not only beauty to the form, but clearness to the thought, of the Scripture.

9. Not least important is the question of the form of the Old Testament poetry in the various versions. In this the two Revisions seem substantially alike. A change that came in with the English Revision was the casting of the poetry in poetic lines; the change was greatly needed, and was joyfully received. There was also a grouping of the verses into sections, separated by the space of a line; some of these are for topics, as in Ps. xlii.; they answer to the paragraphs of prose, and, as with the paragraphs, some of the sections seem to us too long. In Ps. xxiv. there is an excellent separation of the first speaker, who is didactic, from the second, who is emotional and hortatory;—of course, in saying "speaker" we know that, even when "I" is used, it may be the voice of a chorus, perhaps representing the nation. There should be a break whenever there is a change of speaker, but we doubt whether all such places have been noted: in Ps. xxxii. 1-7 the Psalmist has been addressing God; at verse 8 another, apparently God, begins, but there is no break.

In Proverbs the topics are much more evident, and they are carefully broken apart.

In the Song of Songs the running analysis placed at the top of the pages in the American Revision recognizes only

two speakers, the royal lover and the Shulamite, with no hint of a shepherd-lover, whom we suppose the great body of critics now believe in as appearing in the background and as being steadily preferred to the king. In the English Revision there is no such analysis, to guide or to mislead. In both Revisions the successive utterances are separated. In the Bible, when printed as a mere rendering of the original, we suppose there should be no furnishing of helpful clues; but there is no part of the Bible in which the reader more needs a guide; in this case it would be an account of the best theories as to the action and the participants. It was only by learning of these theories that we were able to overcome our repugnance to what had seemed merely a sensuous love-song and to find in it instead a beautiful union of the lyric, the dramatic, and the pastoral in celebration of the mutual love of one man and one maid. The Song of Songs is in this respect an exact antithesis to the book of Job; in Job each speaker is emphatically announced, and the action is perfectly clear.

For ourselves, we think highly of the views of Richard G. Moulton as to the desirability of making more of the possibilities of indention and "centering" of lines for bringing out the relations among clauses or parts; the Hebrew parallelism is sometimes peculiarly intricate, and often very carefully wrought.

10. Another point that we may name is in the field of rhetorical form. It is a question of the way in which one shall bring before his readers or hearers proposals or beliefs that he knows they do not or will not like. There is as to this a fundamental difference between Oriental and Occidental usage. The ancient, the Oriental, way is that of suavity, of extreme complaisance of manner, and hence of holding back the announcement of anything disagreeable, of coming at it induct-

ively, of giving it the softest possible introduction and a softened statement throughout. The modern, the Occidental, way is that of vivacity, pungency, of frank and courageous emphasis upon the main heads and upon the details of that which one wishes to press upon unbelieving or unconsenting hearers: it is deductive, stating the point frankly, and then proceeding to expound or to prove it. The Oriental way was used, of course, in the Bible, and thus far it has always gone over into English translations, and has not been exchanged for the Occidental way.

To illustrate by two cases that do not conform to the rule: any one who has read the "Panegyricus" of Isocrates will remember that it was constructed in the modern way; so was Cicero's oration "For the Manilian Law"; but both these orators prepared their words for audiences who were already on the orator's side. Our present question is as to the method that is actual or is wisest in saying unacceptable things.

We may illustrate the difference in the two methods by comparing Milton's "Areopagitica" with Paul's so-called first (really his second) letter to the Corinthian church.

Milton wished to persuade Parliament to give up the system of requiring authors to submit their writings to the public censor before sending them to press. This system was fully entrenched in the habits, the fears, and the prejudices of Parliament, and Milton had need of his utmost tact and skill if he was to make even a beginning toward a change. Yet he told them frankly at the outset what he wanted and the points that he meant to make: "I . . . shall lay before ye, *first* the inventors of [the licensing-system] to bee those whom ye will be loath to own; *next* what is to be thought in generall of reading, what ever sort the Books be; *and that* this Order avails nothing to the suppressing of scandalous, seditious, and libel-

lous Books, which were mainly intended to be suppress; *last*, that it will be primely to the discouragement of all learning and the stop of Truth . . ." That Milton entirely failed to move Parliament to do as he wished we attribute not to his frankness, nor to his emphasis, but to the fact that he attempted something that no one could have accomplished then; the system had to be left to break down, half a century later, under its own weight.

In First Corinthians we find exactly the opposite course. Only the student can find any plan in the letter, because the plan, although carefully wrought out, is as carefully concealed. It is substantially this: (1) He attacks certain evils, in the church at Corinth, of which he has learned through the "household" of Chloe; namely, (*a*) faction; (*b*) sensuality,—in one case incest; (*c*) litigiousness,—especially before heathen courts; (*d*) disorder in worship,—especially in connection with the Lord's Supper. (2) He answers questions received from them: (*a*) as to eating food that has been offered to idols; (*b*) as to whether celibacy is a holier state than marriage; (*c*) as to the relative value and excellence of the various spiritual gifts. All these delicate points are touched, with an unmistakable judgment upon each, but of abrupt announcement there is none; only the rebuke to the offender against social decency is pungently expressed. Every point is led up to with the utmost care. If we think that our way is better, we must remember that it is better only for us. If the Apostle had used our method, he would in those times have seemed rude and blunt, and thus, by giving offense, would have hindered the acceptance of his words.

We may mention a few other illustrations of the Oriental-Biblical way. Of course, Nathan, speaking, though a prophet, at the risk of his life, when he condemned the taking of Bath-

sheba, had to come darkly to his final outburst, "Thou art the man." Stephen, addressing the Sanhedrin, gave a long review of the national history, but, when he was stopped, he had not yet said, what he really meant, "You see that I am loyal to our national history and faith." Paul, on Mars Hill, in an address of which we doubtless have only a synopsis, works up by cautious and disguised approaches to the assertion that the risen Christ ought to be the object of faith to the Greek. Paul, writing to Philemon, makes a long but exquisitely skillful preface to his request that Onesimus be forgiven and freed; the request itself, when it comes, is hardly more than a hint. There is more of this sort in the Bible; so that we are obliged to infer that such was the established way; current notions and expectations would have made any other method seem an actual affront to the persons addressed. Yet it is exactly opposite to the frankness and pungency of Milton; it is exactly opposite to the course of Burke when, in the face of an almost omnipotent ministry, backed by a subservient Parliament and a nation furiously hostile to America, he made,¹ with the utmost frankness and vigor and with free use of ridicule, his great exposition of the reasons why the insurgent Americans could never be brought into subjection by British arms.

Now, in the translation of such Bible-passages as we have named, what shall be done? To transfer the cautious inductive method seems flat, if not cowardly, to one who is familiar with the spirited way. In some cases, as in First Corinthians, and perhaps in Philemon, if the reader does not understand the method, he fails to get the sense,—and so far forth the Bible is a sealed book to him. To bring out for him the sense that is in the text would require a paraphrase of the

¹Speech on moving resolutions for conciliation with America, March 22, 1775.

most liberal kind, but paraphrases are not the Bible, and that fact closes the case.

We doubt if much can be done to help the reader by means of the text itself. We cannot turn the Bible-methods wrong-side-out; we must not reconstruct the material on modern lines. The intaglio cannot be changed to a relieve, and still be the veritable thing. To our thinking, although paragraphing, italicizing, capitalizing, may help a little, the margin and the commentary must in this matter be the chief resource. In this respect the Bible-authors must be left, without anachronism, speaking in the way that was required by their times; it is the commentator who must tell how their message would sound in the manner of to-day.

Thus we have one more class of cases excellently illustrating the fact of the impossibility of making a really adequate translation of the Bible. It reminds us also of the greatness of the task of so getting the Bible-standpoint that one constantly feels the sense, even when the form is diametrically opposite to his own.

ARTICLE IV.

PROFESSOR PARK'S THEOLOGICAL SYSTEM.

BY THE REVEREND FRANK HUGH FOSTER, PH.D., D.D.

THE most impressive part of Park's theological lectures, and the scene of his greatest service to theology, was in the discussions to which the progress of our review now brings us, viz. those upon

THE ATONEMENT.

The theory of the atonement had already undergone a complete change in the New England Theology in consequence of the controversies which resulted from the introduction of Universalism into America. Twelve years after Edwards' death, there had appeared in New York a certain James Murray, who soon transferred his principal activity to New England. He derived the doctrine of universal salvation from the premises of a strict Calvinism.¹ He argued: Christ's death procures salvation for all for whom he died, in strict justice, because he paid the exact equivalent of their punishment. But Christ died for all men. Therefore all men are already saved; and all they need is to be brought to the knowledge of this fact. The conclusion of this argument the New England theologians could not accept because it was unbiblical. The minor premise they could not deny, because it was the plain teaching of the Scriptures. Hence they were driven to the revision of the major proposition, which had been generally

¹For a full view of this connection of Universalism with the history of New England theology, cf. *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. xlv. (1888) p. 670 ff.; and vol. xlvi. (1889) p. 85 ff.

accepted among them as among all other Calvinists. In making this revision, they did not go back to the beginning of the topic and start from a new principle, although they had such a principle in the theory of virtue which Edwards had left them, but were led by the particular circumstances of the controversy to redefine the old terms and preserve, in general, the tone and method of the older theology. At many a point the influence of the new theory appeared, as when general justice was explicitly defined by some of them as benevolence. But they still employed chiefly the analogies of earthly governments in the formulation and defense of their positions. And their new theory received the name of "the governmental theory."

By the time that Park appeared upon the scene the theory of virtue was much better understood. Its application to the character of God, and the development of the system of Christian duties in accordance with it, had given it a new scope and importance. Professor Park had a larger comprehension of its meaning and of the range of its application than any of his predecessors had had. It might have been a question of great interest, when he first began the presentation of his views upon the atonement, what he would do; whether he would reject all idea of atonement in deference to the supposed requirements of the love of God which should need no propitiation; whether he would develop it afresh from the theory of virtue as a starting-point, exhibiting its ideal side and setting it free from a certain bondage to mechanical relations in which it had hitherto been confined; or whether he would let it stand substantially where his predecessors had left it. His historical sense, and his intense admiration of his predecessors and loyalty to them, finally cast the scale in the last direction. He continued to use the governmental

analogies, which were rapidly becoming offensive to his times; and this fact, more than anything else perhaps, prevented him from coming to an understanding with the greatest thinker upon the atonement among his contemporaries, Horace Bushnell, or from doing much to prepare for the new epoch that was coming. There is something sad, if not tragic, about this, for Park studied every new writer upon this theme diligently, and has left incorporated in his lectures what he considered best and truest among their contributions to the theory.

As always, Park began with definition. The atonement is "that sacrifice of the God-man which is substituted for the punishment of men, and which therefore forms the sole ground on which God is justified and satisfied, and the chief motive by which he is influenced and by which he exerts an influence, in directly blessing men."

The definition is highly technical. By "directly blessing men" is meant converting and saving them. The "sole ground" is the last cause on which God directly depends for blessing men. The term "propitiation" is later defined in exactly the same words as atonement except that the words "and by which he exerts an influence" are omitted. He hastens in this connection to guard against the idea that God antecedently to atonement was "too angry to favor sinners." "God is made propitious by the sacrifice of Christ in the sense that it is made consistent and justifiable for him now to bestow blessings which it was not antecedently consistent for him to do. Therefore it is figuratively that God is propitiated. He is propitiated in the sense that the atonement is a new motive for him to bestow blessings upon men. Also in the sense that he changes his outward conduct just as if he had changed his moral purpose."

The definitions also introduce a number of weighty modifi-

cations of old conceptions of the atonement. Park employed the word "satisfied" in his principal definition. But satisfaction was not the rendering of the strict equivalent in distributive justice. On the contrary, he defines "satisfaction" as "that sacrifice of Christ by which it is made consistent with God's blessedness that he waive the exercise of distributive justice." What he meant by distributive justice has been fully explained in a former article.¹ He was thus gradually stripping off the artificial distinctions which had formerly encumbered the theory. He completed this process by his rejection of the application of the idea of imputation to the atonement. Christ's righteousness could no more be imputed to us than Adam's sin. In both cases the law holds that character is not transferable, since it is always produced by the individual choice. Something is done for us by the obedience of Christ, so that we receive the benefits of his death. But neither that obedience nor any other is imputed to us, for it is forever his obedience and not ours.

One other element which needs to be noted before we proceed to the more systematic development of Park's argument is the largeness of outlook given by his conception of the atonement as having relations to the entire universe. The suffering of Calvary was not an event done upon a small planet in one corner of the stellar universe, without relation to other worlds and beyond the knowledge of other intelligent beings. Neither did it provide for the salvation of men alone nor, much less, for the salvation of some limited portion of the human race who might happen to hear of it. But it was the display, once for all, of the divine character, and it formed the ground of all forgiveness which should anywhere take place throughout all space and time. When God has

¹ Vol. 1x. (1903) p. 689 f.

once made himself fully known, then it is forever and everywhere consistent with his "justice" that he should be the "justifier of him that believeth."

The next step in the development of the atonement is its analysis, which was conducted under three heads: 1. The facts which are involved in it; 2. The facts which constitute it what it is; 3. The essential relations of it.

1. We have seen how Park guarded against the idea that God was an angry and implacable God without the atonement. He now again emphasizes the truth by placing at the very head of facts involved in the atonement the fact (1) that the atonement has its origin in the grace of the Father. "God sent his Son," "God so loved the world," "I come to do thy will, O God," are the texts he cites. Christ is not more amiable than the Father, and it is infelicitous and injurious to give any such impression.

(2) The second of these involved facts is the divinity of Christ. In making the atonement he needs perfectly to represent the will of God; which is possible to God only. And then, all those expressions which represent the sacrifice of God in making the atonement, require the Godhead of him who was thus sacrificed. The reverse of this idea was also in Park's thought; for if the one great work of atonement which required the divinity of Christ were denied, there would remain no necessity for any such divinity. Like Henry B. Smith, he adopted the thought expressed by the phrase "incarnation unto redemption." Remove the redemption, and you have removed the occasion for the incarnation. In this view of the essential connection of ideas, both these men showed their greatness. It is not a chance phenomenon of earlier times that the denial of an objective atonement has led to the denial of the divinity of Christ: the two doctrines are

so connected by the internal necessities of thought that they stand in any system or fall together.

(3) The third involved fact is the humanity of Christ. He must be a man fully and genuinely to represent man. We see here the influence of Macleod Campbell upon Park's course of thought. His views were carefully and not unsympathetically reviewed in the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA by Professor Park himself; but, long before, his great idea, that the atonement was the confession of humanity, had been fully incorporated in the theory. But while Campbell had rejected other elements in favor of his own newer light, Park, with his characteristic breadth, did not reject one truth because he had found another. The atonement makes forgiveness "consistent," and a profound confession of humanity's sin by the God-man adds another element to that consistency, but does not take away every other.

2. Passing, now, to the facts *constituting* the atonement, Park mentions (1) the sacrifice of the God-man. Sacrifice is so often conceived mechanically that Park's understanding of its meaning will have a permanent interest. "A sacrifice," he says, "is a confession of the guilt of the person for whom it is offered. It is an expressive gesture, a symbol. It is thus an acknowledgment of the rectitude of the being to whom it is offered. It is an acknowledgment that the sin may be deservedly punished by the being to whom it is offered. It is an acknowledgment that the sin must be followed by some pain of the person by whom the sacrifice is offered. Thus the sacrifice of the lamb without blemish by the ancient Hebrews was not merely the loss of so much property, but was a crossing of the affections. It is also a prayer for the person in whose behalf the sacrifice is offered. It is a public avowal of the offerer's intent to honor the being to whom the sacri-

fice is offered. And, finally, it is an avowal that the sufferings of one being are substituted for the punishment of another. The sufferings of the lamb are substituted for the punishment of the Jew: the sufferings of the Lamb of God are substituted for the punishment of the world."

(2) The second fact constituting the atonement was the death of Christ. Park conceived this in a large way. It was not the mere physical sufferings of the moment of death which constituted the atonement, but all Christ's sufferings, both physical and mental, culminating in Calvary. Park emphasized also the "public and judicial character of his sufferings"; and here he introduced, to the confusion of the argument, as it will seem to most, the attempt to connect the human government, cruel as it was upon the side of the Jews, weak and subservient upon the side of the Romans, with the divine government, so that the act of the one should be the act of the other. "He suffered at the hands of the rulers who are in this respect symbolical of the power of God." This element, it is true, plays no essential part in Park's theory, but it was introduced, apparently under the influence of the word "government" itself. It would much better have been omitted.

(3) "The atonement consisted in the sacrifice of the God-man substituted for the punishment of sinners." The proof of the substitution is derived from the use of the word *ἀντί* in Matt. xx. 28 and parallel, from the word *ὑπέρ*, which, while not so distinct, "in its connections denotes substitution," and from the other great cardinal passages of the New Testament, especially those which dwell upon the voluntary character of Christ's death. It is noticeable that Isaiah liii. is not employed in this argument.

3. Park now passes to another grand division of the theme,

to the essential relations of the atonement. These are relations to the created universe, to the sinner, and to God. He embraces them under the general word "appeal." The atonement is an appeal to the universe for God the Father. It expresses his love to his Son, to the universe, to the race of men; and it expresses his justice. It is an appeal for the God-man, who is an object of regard to angels, principalities, and powers. It is an appeal for the perfected race, since "the perfect representative man acknowledges by his sacrifice that God is right and man is wrong."

"Appeal" has therefore the meaning in this connection of a solemn setting forth of the elements of the case and the demand for a proper attitude in reference to it. Park accordingly goes on to say that this appeal to the created universe exhibits and honors the justice and holiness of God as much as these attributes could have been exhibited and honored by the punishment of sinners; it exposes also the vileness of sin as much as this would or could have been exposed by the unconditional punishment of sinners. We begin, therefore, already to see what Park has not yet stated, that the atonement is intended to accomplish in one way exactly what the punishment of the sinner would accomplish in another way.

But the atonement has relation to the sinner. It is an appeal to the sinner to repent and be saved. God appeals: "Behold, how I love thee"; the God-man appeals: "I have come to suffer for thee"; and the perfected race appeals, because that race will universally desire the conversion of every sinner. And then there is the relation of the atonement to God. It takes away the motive for punishing the sinner, since the end of punishment has been perfectly gained; and it presents a positive motive for forgiveness. Park is aware that this last

statement will meet with objection. God saves men to promote his own glory; but his greatest glory is the glory of his grace, and the atonement is the fundamental act of his grace. And then, the atonement is God in Christ; and to glorify the God-man expressing the desire of salvation is to glorify God himself.

With these many definitions and qualifications, suggesting repeatedly very broad conceptions of the atonement, Professor Park has now come to the "principle upon which the atonement operates." By this he means, of course, the theory of the atonement. We shall give the statement of this principle in his own words, but it is our purpose, in the further explanation of the theory, to depart now from the exact reproduction of the form in which he expresses his thought and to strip it of the governmental analogies by which it was enveloped and possibly obscured. It is possible that thereby the suspicion may be aroused that a departure is being made from Park's real theology. But in fact an explicit reference might be given for every statement that is to be made. If there is any difference from Park's own statements, it is one merely of form, and scarcely of that.

1. First, then, for the formal statement of the principle. It is this: "The atonement exhibits and honors the holiness, distributive justice, and law of God, and it promotes the holiness and happiness of the universe, so as to make the conduct of God in forgiving men consistent with the honor of his holiness, distributive justice, and law, and so as to satisfy his general justice in rescuing sinners from unconditional punishment, in adopting measures for inducing them to repent, and in eternally rewarding them if they do repent."

2. Second, for a running account of this theory:—

The theory of the atonement begins in the theory of man.

Park has given to men the attribute of freedom, and whether successfully or not, has labored to establish the principle that all influence over their action, whether on the part of their fellow-men or of God, must be exerted by means of motives. We may speak of the divine "government"; or we may call God "Father," and seek to find the principles upon which he exercises his fatherly office in seeking and saving men; but, however we put it, men are controlled or led through motives.

As to these motives, Park has a further idea which exercises a large influence at various points, the idea of "system," law, general methods,—the same idea, in fact, which appears in the scientific emphasis of "natural law." God is not restricted to these methods so that he cannot follow anything else, but he proceeds upon great general principles from which he does not depart (as, for example, to perform a miracle) except for grave reasons.

God has, therefore, established a system of moral influences designed to lead men to salvation. One element of this system is the law, involving threat of punishment, and summarily comprehended in the verse, "The soul that sinneth, it shall die." This whole system, including the law, originates in the love of God. He is seeking the holiness of man, and he surrounds him with all appropriate influences which will tend to promote his holiness, exhibiting the attractiveness of holiness and the repulsiveness and danger of sin. All this is alike the outworking of the same love.

But if love originates such a system, then while love prevails in the councils of God, the system must be maintained. This is true of the law. It was fully understood, its meaning carefully weighed, the possible results which might flow from its promulgation clearly foreseen, before it was ever

proclaimed. When man has sinned, if he is to be saved, the penalty of the law must be waived, for to execute it would be to destroy the race; but, if it is waived, it must be so waived that the system of moral influences designed for man's good shall remain unimpaired. If man is not punished, then all that punishment would effect in the way of moral influence upon man must still be effected. His forgiveness must be made *consistent* with the maintenance of the moral system, with the undiminished total of moral influences tending to promote holiness and deter from vice, or else he cannot be forgiven: love forbids it.

It will be noted that this view of the case exalts the positive character of the law. God might have written his moral law in the nature of men as he has natural law upon the phenomena of nature, and left man to find it out in the same way. But that would have meant the destruction of men. He therefore adopted the method of revelation, of the communication of his law through chosen agents to men. He has declared his law and announced the penalty; and now he comes, and with equally distinct objective declaration, he sets forth his Son as the sacrifice for sin, saying explicitly that his sufferings are substituted for the punishment of all who will accept of his salvation by believing on him. Park did not suppose this declaration a matter of necessity in the nature of things. If his Son had come and quietly endured the sufferings which actually came to him without any explanation, the mere fact that God so hated sin, and had so involved all beings in its consequences that not even his own Son could come into the world, sinless though he was, without suffering, would declare his righteousness and the seriousness of the threat of the law, and thus maintain its honor. But this is not God's method, because we are under a system of

grace. God has declared what Christ does by his death. He takes the place of sinners before the law.

What, when thus viewed, does the suffering of Christ effect? Precisely that, all that, and even more than, the punishment of guilty but repentant men could effect.

To understand this reply, we need to ask what, in Park's thought, the punishment of men was designed to effect. It must be designed to effect something good, for else it could not be inflicted. Punishment, like every other act of God, must be performed under the influence of love, or else his act in this case is not holy. To ask what punishment effects is therefore to ask what good it effects. Does it do any good to the sinner? Park's answer is, No. He thus rejects the idea of the reformatory design of punishment. When man is finally adjudged guilty before the bar of God, the time for benefiting him through painful discipline is past. Such discipline is properly called chastisement, not punishment. Punishment, when it is inflicted, is to the sinner nothing but an unmitigated evil. Still it must do some good somewhere; and this must be among the innumerable intelligent spirits, men and angels, who may hear of this punishment. With them it will effect two principal things; it will vindicate the character of God as having no pleasure in sin, but as eternally opposed to it; and it will powerfully deter them from sin, since it exhibits sin's true nature in the awful consequences which ultimately follow upon its commission.

All this, and more, the sufferings of Christ upon Calvary effect. They (1) vindicate the holy character of God. Did he really express his holy attitude and the profound truth of things when he promulgated the terrible threat of the Law? Does he unspeakably hate sin? When he forgives it, is there no trace of carelessness in him, no complicity of heart with

it, no relaxation of his moral earnestness, no giving of the lie to the solemn implications of the threat of death to the sinner? All these questions might be raised, if God forgave sin without an atonement.

What would it be to have such questions raised? Take the repentant sinner himself, what would it be to him? It would destroy his repentance, for why should he repent of that about which God cared so little? It would destroy his God, for he would find himself upon a higher level in repenting than that occupied by God in forgiving and thus reversing his law without a given reason, since he would exhibit a greater sense of the meaning of sin. What would it be to angels but to teach them that they might indulge in the pleasures of sin, if they seemed attractive, without much hesitation, since God thought far less of it than his law seemed to indicate, and the danger of transgression was small.

But the atonement forever shuts off such questions. God waives the punishment of the repentent sinner, but he does it for a great reason. His own dearly beloved Son comes and takes upon himself the suffering of the cross. This is the suffering of God. Man was to suffer to express the infinite ill-desert of sin, but now God suffers to bear testimony to the same thing. If man suffered, the suspicion might possibly arise in some mind that the suffering was inflicted in a mechanical manner or a routine spirit, and did not mean so much after all. But when God suffers, no such suspicion can arise. God is intensely opposed to sin, his law expresses the ultimate relations of things and his own most unchangeable attitude towards all sin, if, in order to waive the punishment of the law and relieve man from eternal suffering, God himself must first suffer. Such is the unavoidable impression of the beholder, be he angel or man.

But (2) the sufferings of Christ deter all intelligent beholders from the commission of sin as effectually as, and even more effectually than, the punishment of guilty men could. One might suspect that God had grown indifferent to men, and punished them without deep feeling; but no one can suspect this when he "sends his only-begotten Son." The threat of the law remains in all its terror. If God makes exception to its execution in the case of those who repent, what will he do to those who rush forward consciously into sin, are thus from the beginning unrepentant, and have no sort of warrant in themselves that they ever will repent? And to those souls to whom the thought of the vileness of sin is a greater deterrent than the thought of the danger involved, how much clearer is its essential odiousness in the sight of God, and of all holy beings like the Son, when God will not pass it over without so great a reason as the sacrifice of his Son, and that Son voluntarily takes the cross that sin may be condemned in the act of its forgiveness!

Thus, when Christ has suffered, the object of punishment in the case of the repentant man has been secured, and it is now consistent with God's honor and the honor of his law, and with the interests of all holy beings everywhere, that he should be forgiven. And, since he is now, by repentance and faith, brought into harmony with God, the love of God positively prompts him to receive into his fellowship one who is now fit for it. Thus love in all its aspects is fulfilled by the forgiveness of the sinner.

This is the form of the theory resulting from the introduction of positive law into the universe. Dropping this fact now from view, the atonement may be considered, in conformity to that ultimate principle already enunciated, as the means by which, when sin has once entered the world, man

may be saved and still the "system of moral influences" originally inaugurated be preserved. Those moral influences are exerted substantially through the combined faculties of the intellect and the conscience. In the voice of conscience and in the teachings of history as interpreted by the faculty of the reason lie the great natural influences which are designed to restrain men from sin and lead them to holiness. If man repents of his sin, however blindly he may grope for the truth, and however little he may know of himself or of God, he is received by the forgiving act of God into the divine fellowship. It might be that, in a limited sense and for a time, a man ignorant of the atonement might find holy influences impaired by the very freeness of the divine approach to his soul. But the ultimate revelation of the atoning death which Heaven will make, the fact of the cost of sin, and hence the cost of forgiveness, to God, as shown in the sufferings of the Son of God, would so reënforce the voice of conscience and the lessons of history that the soul would ultimately rest in the eternal meaning and validity of its earliest impressions of righteousness. And thus God's intent in surrounding it and filling it with such moral influences in favor of righteousness would be both justified and maintained.

Into the remaining portions of Park's treatment of the atonement it is not necessary for us to enter. Enough to say that he thoroughly discussed, along lines which will be easily surmised by the trained reader, the old theories which the New England speculations were intended to replace. He then passed to the "fact" of the atonement, which he elaborately proved from the Scriptures. He derived its "relative necessity" from the principles we have already passed in review. And he taught that it was "general," that is, made the salvation of all men possible. It is easy to see that if the

atonement makes it "consistent" for God to forgive one sinner, it makes it equally consistent for him to forgive all. In these discussions Park displays all his characteristic acuteness and profundity.

For a time the theory of the New England theologians which Park presented received a very large acceptance among Congregationalists. It became the working theory of the great majority of practical ministers. But the original minds which were pressing on to new views of truth and felt most fully the influences of the new forms of thought which from time to time appeared, did not accept it. They did not even become acquainted with it. This was undoubtedly the effect of Park's error in following too loyally the modes of presentation of his great predecessors, as has already been suggested. It is to be expected that more attention will be paid to him in the near future, and that the main results of his studies will, under the interpretation of some appreciative student who possesses the necessary familiarity and sympathy with later speculations, supply the necessary corrective to the too exclusively subjective theories of the present hour. Almost all those who have gained the ear of the theological public have, more or less clearly, explicitly acknowledged the necessity of just that element which Park placed at the center of his theory, that men "must be made to feel, in the very article of forgiveness, when it is offered, the essential and eternal sanctity of God's law." These are the words not of Park, but of Bushnell, who was prevented from giving his adhesion to the New England theory by confounding it with the older Calvinism, as I have elsewhere shown.¹ William N. Clarke, who has removed most of the objective elements from Christian theology in favor of the subjective, lays great stress upon the manifesta-

¹ *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. lix. (1902) p. 617 ff.

tion of God's righteousness in connection with forgiveness. He says that Christ does not satisfy law or punitive justice, but he has in mind here the elder ideas of satisfaction which Park also rejects. He speaks of the "gladly endured pain of saving love," and adds that it "is a substitute for punishment which God is offering." Again: "Whatever exhibits God's righteousness, or rightness of character and conduct respecting sin, has the character of a propitiation." Clarke thus approaches very near to Park. Like him, he has emphasized the ethical, and has laid the greatest stress upon the holy character of God. But he is conspicuously defective in his exegesis of the Scriptures, giving them, when he considers them at all, little chance to express their true mind, and generally neglecting to refer to them either as the source or the proof of his theories. He thus denies what ever has been and ever must remain the received interpretation of the Bible, that the sufferings of Christ are accepted by God in place of the punishment of sinners. To complete his theory, to gain the full benefit of his most powerful setting forth of the truth which he does present, he needs objective faithfulness to the Scriptures. He needs, therefore, correcter ideas of the office of punishment. He needs just those considerations which abound so richly in the discussions of Professor Park.

In a sense, all the defects of the purely subjective theories of the atonement may be traced to a defective understanding of the principle of the divine love. Love conceived as an emotion, and directed to the conferment of happiness as the supreme good, can never serve as the principle of a theology, because it is but a half truth. Love is an emotion, but not fundamentally. Fundamentally it is a choice. Happiness is an end of God's efforts for men, and it is even the ultimate end; but it is never the supreme end. The highest thing

which God seeks is man's holiness, from which happiness is to result. This conception of love is the Edwardean, and needs to be better understood by those who wish to make love the principle of their theology. And when it is understood, it will be seen not only to admit of, but to require, that objective view of atonement upon which both Edwards and Park insisted, and which alone will ever be thought by the mass of readers to agree with the plain utterances of the New Testament.

We think that these elements of the case are yet to receive a more full and hospitable treatment than they have in recent times. Let some theologian arise to go deeper into the idea of love than even Edwards did, and let him deduce his theory directly from the facts of the Scriptures gained by an objective exegesis, and formulate it in the light of his correcter and deeper analysis of the fundamental ethical principle, and he will be hailed as the restorer of theology to objective truth.

An indication of this may be found, perhaps, in the fact that Kaftan, who represents the outcome of Ritschlianism in the more orthodox direction, insists upon such an ethical view of the atonement as shall not evacuate the juridical of all its meaning. He says, in closing his discussion upon this theme in his "Dogmatik":—

"If the juridical conception of the doctrine of the atonement is to be replaced by an ethical conception, it is necessary to found the understanding of the death of Christ upon the moral order of education instead of the legal order of the state. The death of Christ was not necessary as punishment [considered merely as punishment] but as a means of education, this word being taken in its widest meaning as it is unfolded in the historical conduct of the race through the world by God. We must only add that the death of the Saviour was

the only sufficient means for the purpose of education, and that this purpose is founded in the nature of God himself; for then the suggestion of the arbitrary and of something like a selection among various means, which seems at first to attach to the notion of a means of education, disappears, and it becomes evident that we have here to do with a necessity for God. Every effort at amending the old theory which is less thoroughgoing runs the danger, so far as it holds to the legal presuppositions, instead of effecting an ethical deepening of the doctrine, of failing to maintain the moral earnestness of the old theory. For this is the end of the matter, that the thought of propitiation ethically understood is that of punishment through which satisfaction is rendered to the broken law."

I have said that the lectures upon the atonement were the most impressive part of Park's work and the scene of his greatest service to theology. Whether this statement be accepted as correct with reference to the theological world outside or not, there can be no doubt that it was correct so far as those of his pupils were concerned who followed him with intelligent comprehension and were naturally led to the acceptance of his positions. For them he satisfied all those difficulties which arbitrary and forensic theologies had accumulated about the theme. He rendered the ultimate conception of the atonement ethical. He liberated the enjoyment of all its benefits from any arbitrary conditions of such a nature that some (like Socrates) never could meet them. He preserved, at the same time, the real relation of the transaction upon Calvary to the divine law. There was an objective substitution, a propitiation. The old hymns of the church could still be sung, the results of the universal experience of the Christian heart still be accepted. And he made real that without which no the-

ology can be biblical or (in the historic sense) Christian, viz., the essential relation of the person of Christ to our salvation. It is not Christ's doctrine that saves, it is himself. We are not called upon to *believe him*, but to *believe in him*. Thus the heart's loyalty could still go out to the divine Redeemer, and with even augmented intensity. And the preaching could still remain what it had been to Paul, the "preaching of the cross."

But these services were not completed with the topic of the atonement; and in the next and concluding article it will be necessary to review the discussions of regeneration, sanctification, and eschatology, in which the further outworkings of Park's thought will be seen.

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]

ARTICLE V.

BIBLICAL EPIDEMICS OF BUBONIC PLAGUE.

BY EDWARD M. MERRINS, M.D.

THE recent outbreak of bubonic plague in different parts of the world, after a long period of quiescence, and its brief, unwelcome visitation to our own land, create an interest in this disease which it would not possess if it were extinct, and all we knew of it had to be gathered from records stretching away into the remote past. For plague is certainly one of the most ancient of all diseases: to quote a Shakespearean phrase, it is "blasted with antiquity." The earliest notice of it in secular literature is contained in the writings of Rufus of Ephesus (*circ.* 100 A.D.), who refers to records concerning an epidemic in the third century before Christ, which ravaged Egypt, Syria, and Libya,—an epidemic which was undoubtedly plague, for the contemporary physicians described it "as accompanied by an acute fever, by terrible pain, by a trouble of the whole body by delirium, and by the appearance of large buboes, hard and without suppuration, not only in the usual positions, but also behind the knee and at the elbow." A careful study, however, of the events recorded in the early chapters of the book of Samuel,¹ has led several writers² to the opinion that here is the most ancient of all records of an epidemic of bubonic plague (*circ.* B.C. 1100).

The biblical story, supplemented by Josephus,³ is as follows:

¹ 1 Samuel iv.-vi.

² George A. Smith, *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*; Clemow, *Geography of Disease*.

³ *Antiquities of the Jews*, vi. 1.

In one of the battles which occurred during the long and incessant struggle for religious and political supremacy between the Philistines and the Jews, the latter were defeated with great slaughter. The contest was renewed after a short time, and to insure success the Jews carried their sacred ark with them into battle. The Philistines fought desperately, inflicting such a severe defeat upon their enemies that thirty thousand were left dead on the battle-field. The ark was captured, and taken by the Philistines to the city of Ashdod, where it was placed in the temple of their own god Dagon. Ashdod was a city of great commercial importance about three miles from the sea-coast, on the high road of traffic between Egypt and Syria. Almost immediately after the ark's arrival, there was an outbreak of disease in the city and surrounding parts. The biblical writer regards it as an exhibition of Divine wrath upon the Philistines for their sacrilegious detention of the ark. "The hand of the Lord was heavy upon them of Ashdod, and he destroyed them, and smote them with tumors [or plague boils], . . . and there was a great and deadly destruction in the city."

According to Josephus, many of the Philistines did not see it in this light, but considered the epidemic as simply due to natural causes. They exhorted their fellow-citizens "to be quiet, and to take patiently what had befallen them, and to suppose there was no other cause of it but nature, which at certain revolutions of time produces such mutations in the bodies of men, in the earth, in plants, and in all things that grow out of the earth." But the fears of those who were unable to bear their misfortunes with stoical fortitude, could not be allayed by these philosophical speculations as to their remote cause. "Perceiving that they suffered thus because of the ark, and that the victory they had gotten was not

for their good," with a painful absence of unselfish patriotism, they sent the ark to their neighbors of Gath, about ten miles away. The disease soon appeared among the latter, and evidently with increased virulence. "The hand of the Lord was against the city with a very great discomfiture; and he smote the men of the city both small and great, and tumors brake out upon them." Accordingly, arrangements were made in all haste to send the ark away. The inhabitants of Ekron were the next to receive the ark, and their fate was still worse. "There was a deadly discomfiture throughout all the city: the hand of God was very heavy there. And the men that died not were smitten with the tumors, and the cry of the city went up to heaven." The ark was then taken to the remaining cities of the Philistines, in every place, as Josephus says, exacting similar disasters, as a tribute to be paid it for coming among them.

At the end of seven months, the Philistines, considering they had suffered enough, and afraid of further calamities, determined to return the ark to the Israelites. Taking the advice of their priests and diviners, they sent with it, as a trespass-offering to appease the wrath of the offended Deity, "five golden tumors and five golden mice," corresponding with the number of their principal cities, "for one plague was on them all and on their lords." The ark was sent therefore into the country of the Israelites, and was received with great joy by the inhabitants of Bethshemesh, a village near the frontier. But misfortune continued to follow in the track of the sacred procession; the plague still clung to the ark. The joy of the villagers was soon turned into sorrow and consternation, for "the Lord smote many of the people with a great slaughter."

The text here is very uncertain. Whether those who died

were punished for irreverence, or because they did not rejoice with the others when they saw the ark,—which is hardly to be wondered at under the circumstances,—we do not precisely know; nor do we know the exact number of those who died, though it is given as 50,070. Probably this means that seventy died in Bethshemesh, and fifty thousand during the whole course of the epidemic. At any rate, many died in the village, and as the physical cause of death is not given, no doubt they died from the same disease as the Philistines. But the prevalence of the epidemic was now to cease. The inhabitants of Bethshemesh sent a message to the people of Kirjath-Jearim, a town high up on the hills, begging them to come and take charge of the ark. The request was willingly assented to, and so, for the first time since the outbreak of the disease, the ark passed into the charge of people who had not been, and were not likely to be, in constant communication with those among whom it was prevalent. There was a complete break. Moreover, in Kirjath-Jearim, the ark was placed in the house of a priest, who, necessarily from his calling, would scrupulously observe for himself and his household all the admirable regulations of the Mosaic sanitary code. There the ark remained for twenty years, and we read nothing further of the epidemic.

Almost every feature of this narrative fits in with the opinion that it is an account of an epidemic of bubonic plague.

1. *The symptoms of the disease correspond with those of plague.*—The sacred historian, not writing a medical treatise on the subject, mentions only the most characteristic symptom,—the tumors or plague boils. But this of itself is enough to identify the disease. “No other idiopathic fever attacking a multitude of persons at the same time is characterised by glandular swellings, by carbuncles, and by those severe

manifestations of the nervous, sanguineous, and biliary systems which declare themselves in an attack of plague."¹ A very severe form is chiefly marked by vomiting of blood, as in the outbreak on the Lower Euphrates in 1873; and of the Justinian epidemic Gibbon writes: "In the constitutions too feeble to produce an eruption, the vomiting of blood was followed by a mortification of the bowels."² It is very interesting to observe that, according to Josephus, death came upon the Philistines very suddenly: "For before the soul could, as usual in easy deaths, be well loosed from the body, they brought up their entrails, and vomited up what they had eaten, which was entirely corrupted by the disease."³ In the most terrible form called the "fulminant," people are struck down very suddenly, and die before the tumors have time to develop. The inhabitants of the city of Ekron were visited by this type. "And the men of the city that died not [immediately] were smitten with the tumors."

Apart altogether from philological grounds, the "emerods," or hemorrhoids of the old version, must be an incorrect translation, for hemorrhoids, although extremely common in Oriental countries, never attack multitudes of people in this sudden manner, and are never the sole cause of death.

2. *The predisposing causes were the same as in other epidemics of plague.*—The misery and destitution which inevitably follow in the track of war, and the enormous number of dead, many of them doubtless left unburied on the battle-field, are precisely the conditions which have often preceded an outbreak of plague. When it appeared in Persian Kurdistan in 1863, it was observed that the infected district was per-

¹ Art. "Plague" in Quain's Dictionary of Medicine.

² Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.

³ *Op. cit.*, x. 1.

vaded with the putrid emanations from the unburied bodies of cattle which had died from the murrain. Creighton, in his "History of Epidemics," also lays stress upon cadaveric putrefaction as a factor in producing the disease.

Further, the cities of the Philistines were only a few days' march from a region "which has been stigmatized in every age as the original home and seminary of the plague." The great highway of commerce and war between Asia and Africa, after leaving Gaza, the most southern Philistian city, passed near various salt marshes along the coast, the largest of which was known as the Serbonian Bog; from there the road passed to Pelusium and the delta of the Nile. The natural conditions of a hot, humid climate, and great stretches of mingled salt and fresh water, were such as to favor the development of any epidemic, and so also was the miserable condition of the people. "The Serbonian Bog was surrounded by communities of salt-makers and fish-curers: filthy villages of undersized and imbecile people who always had disease among them." "It is not surprising, therefore, to find that armies passing through this region were nearly always decimated by pestilence." "It was here that Sennacherib's army was smitten with pestilence, and melted northwards like a cloud; here, in Justinian's time, the plague started more than once a course right across the world; here a Crusading expedition showed symptoms of the plague; here in 1799 Napoleon's army was infected with the very fatal *fièvre à bubons*, and carried the disease into Syria, while the Turkish force that marched south in 1801, found the plague about Jaffa and in the delta."¹ Ashdod, the city where the biblical epidemic first appeared, was on this direct line of communication, and thither came the Philistian soldiers after their campaign, so

¹Smith, *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*, chap. viii.

that none of the predisposing and exciting conditions, including filth and overcrowding, appear to have been wanting.

3. *The mention of swarms of mice in connection with the disease is an indication that it was plague.*—In the biblical narrative it is stated, that, “in the midst of the land thereof, mice were brought forth”; “the land swarmed with mice”; they “marred the land.” In fact, the connection between mice and this particular disease had been so impressed upon the minds of the people by past experience, that the golden image of a mouse had been adopted as its special symbol.

It is now well known that many of the lower animals, especially rats, and mice, and other rodents, and the parasites that infest them, are important agents in the propagation of plague, and die themselves in large numbers from it. Even before the plague attacks human beings, it destroys these animals. In one of the most important and ancient of Hindoo writings,¹ the people are instructed to quit their homes, and go to the plains, as soon as they observe that rats fall from the roof above, jump about, or die. In the recent Chinese epidemic, masses of dead rats were seen in the streets of Hong-kong, and at one gate alone, in the city of Canton, the keeper collected and buried no less than twenty-four thousand of these animals. Where the plague was in every city and all over the country side, as among the Philistines, it is easily credible that rats and mice died in such numbers as literally to “mar the land.”

Reference may here conveniently be made to a later biblical epidemic which occurred about B.C. 701. It has already been mentioned that it was in the region of the Serbonian Bog, where the main division of Sennacherib's Assyrian army, sent

¹ Bhāgavata Purana.

against Egypt, was partially destroyed and totally dispersed. In this event, also, it is almost certain that when

“the angel of death spread his wings on the blast,
And breathed on the face of the foe as he passed,”

the mundane cause of death was bubonic plague. Josephus, quoting from the Chaldean author Berosus, states that when Sennacherib was returning from his Egyptian war, he found his army under the Rab-shakeh, in danger by a plague, for God had sent a pestilential distemper upon his army. In the narrative of the same event by Herodotus,¹ rats and mice again play a singular part. According to this author, the reigning Egyptian king had alienated the military caste, and it refused to go with him to fight against the Assyrians. In his extremity he prayed for help from his god Vulcan, and this in a vision was promised to him. “Confiding in this vision, he took with him such of the Egyptians as were willing to follow him, and encamped in Pelusium, which commands the entrance into Egypt; but none of the military caste followed him, only tradesmen, mechanics, and sutlers. When arrived there, a number of field mice, pouring in upon their enemies, devoured their quivers and their bows, and the thongs of their shields; so that on the next day, when they fled bereft of their arms, many of them fell. And to this day a stone statue of this king stands in the temple of Vulcan, with an inscription to the following effect: “Whoever looks on me, let him revere the gods.’”

It is obvious that the plague had driven from their usual haunts multitudinous swarms of rats and mice. It does not necessarily follow that all were diseased. In the epidemics in the Himalayas of 1864, we are told that rats quitted the various villages in anticipation of the disease, and the people,

¹ History, ii. 141.

taught by experience, recognized the exodus as a warning.¹ It is quite conceivable, therefore, for rats and mice, in their hunger and desperation, to have devoured the leather parts of the weapons and accoutrements of the Assyrian soldiers. In the ignorance of those far-off times, this comparatively minor incident is given prominence, to the exclusion of the far more important part which these animals contributed towards the destruction of the army by acting as the carriers of contagion.

As the plague is a disease which attacks both rich and poor, every rank and profession, indiscriminately, it was not confined to the Assyrian army, but reached their opponents as well. About this time we read that the Jewish king, Hezekiah, was seized with a dangerous illness.² No particulars are given beyond the statement that he had a "boil," or carbuncle, as some propose to translate it. Now to a man "in the noontide of his days" as was Hezekiah, apart from some constitutional disease an affection of this kind is seldom a serious affair. The case is very different, however, if the "boil" or carbuncle is an expression of the plague, and it is not always easy to discern this. During the course of the present epidemic in India, the diagnosis of plague made in a

¹ Pringle, *British Medical Journal*, Aug. 8, 1895. Cf., also, the following curious incident recorded in the *Lancet*, May 31, 1902, p. 1565: "The province of Gujerat has lately been overrun with rats in enormous numbers. The young crops have been eaten up and great damage has been done. The excess has been amongst field rats, and the extraordinary fact is that they have disappeared almost as rapidly as they came. Although plague is existent to a small extent in certain places, this disease has not been the cause of their diminution. They have in reality been starved. There have been no crops in the fields except tobacco, castor, and aniseed, for none of which do they seem to care. . . . There is no evidence that the rats have died from plague or from any other form of septicæmia."

² 2 Kings xx.; Isa. xxxviii.

particular case by the native medical officer being questioned, the patient was examined by a number of English physicians. At least one of them declared the man to be suffering from a simple boil, and all came to the conclusion that it was not the plague. Nevertheless, the man died within twenty-four hours, and they were then convinced that it was the plague, of the carbuncular type.¹

If this was the type of Hezekiah's disease, as seems very probable, considering all the circumstances and the prevalence of plague at the time, his exalted rank no more protecting him than it did the Emperor Justinian, we can understand the prophet's abrupt announcement as soon as he saw the king's condition: "Set thine house in order, for thou shalt surely die." Impressed with the sense of his great danger, the king prayed to God for longer life, and his request was granted. The prophet returned and gave him the assurance that he would live. Natural means of cure, however, were not disregarded; the simple remedies of those days were directed to be used. When plague tumors remain hard and dry and the skin above them unbroken, "mortification quickly ensues, and the fifth day is commonly the term of life; but if they come to a just swelling and suppuration, the patient is saved by this kind and natural discharge of the morbid humor." One of the measures employed even to-day to hasten suppuration is poulticing, and in ancient times figs were commonly used for this purpose. "Figs are applied topically," writes Pliny,² "in all cases where sores require to be brought to a head or dispersed." Accordingly, Isaiah directs a poultice or plaster of figs to be laid on the boil, and the king recovers. But so narrow had been his escape, that

¹ Hoesack, art. "Diagnosis of Plague," *Lancet*, Nov. 24, 1900, p. 1487.

² Book xxiii. c. 63.

for the remainder of his days the king declared he would walk as in a solemn procession. It may be objected that no mention is made of any epidemic prevailing among the Jews at this particular time; but this need not occasion any difficulty. As a rule, national disasters are only narrated when they are clearly seen to be the result of national sin. Moreover, with the departure of the Assyrian soldiers to their own country, the disease had probably spent its greatest force; the remaining cases would then appear to be sporadic. In any event, the illness of the king would attract the attention of the animalist far more than would sickness among the people.

As to the appalling mortality of over fifty thousand in the Philistian epidemic, and the death of one hundred and eighty-five thousand soldiers of Sennacherib's army, there need be little cavil. In the Justinian epidemic, a "myriad of myriads" are said to have perished. In the European epidemic of the fourteenth century, twenty-five millions died. In the Great Plague of London of 1665, about seventy thousand died. Six hundred thousand have died during the course of the present epidemic in India, and it is still pursuing its dreadful course.

With somber detail the different historians dwell on the homes made desolate by this terrible scourge. In the Justinian epidemic, "the order of funerals and the rights of sepulchers were confounded: those who were left without friends or servants, lay unburied in the streets or in their desolate houses, and a magistrate was authorized to collect the promiscuous heaps of dead bodies, to transport them by land or water, and to inter them in deep pits beyond the precincts of the city." When the plague was in London, Defoe tells of a family ten in number, counting the servants, who were all seemingly well on the Monday; "that evening one maid and

one apprentice were taken ill, and died the next morning; then the other apprentice and two children were touched, whereof one died the same evening and the other two on Wednesday. In a word, by Saturday at noon, the master, mistress, four children, and four servants, were all gone, and the house left entirely empty, except an ancient woman, who came to take charge of the goods for the master of the family's brother, who lived not far off."¹ It was a saddening event of this kind to which the prophet Amos alludes in the words: "And it shall come to pass, if there remain ten men in one house, that they shall die. And when a man's kinsman and the man to burn him, shall lift him to bring the body out of the house, they shall say unto him that is in the innermost part of the house, Is there any yet with thee? and he shall say, No. Then shall they say: Hold thy peace, for we may not make mention of the name of the Lord."²

The text again is somewhat obscure, but, as the commentator well says, the uncertainty "does not weaken the impression of its ghastly realism: the unclean and haunted house; the kinsman and the body burner afraid to search through the infected rooms, and calling in muffled voice to the single survivor crouching in some far corner of them, 'Are there any more with thee?' and his reply, 'None:—himself the next.'"³ And then, in the terror of superstition, the injunction to silence, lest mention of the name of Deity should loosen some fresh avalanche of his wrath.

Although scenes such as these are still common in India and other Oriental countries, we are happily so unfamiliar with such visitations, that when we hear of them our imagination and interest are but faintly stirred. Yet it is well to

¹ History of the Plague.

² Amos vi. 9-11.

³ G. A. Smith, *Book of the Twelve Prophets*, Vol. i. p. 178.

remember that our deliverance from such epidemics is due to sanitary laws wisely made and faithfully administered by authorities ever on the alert to guard the public health; and the frightful suffering and loss of life in the epidemics here alluded to or described, have been part of the heavy price which the human race has had to pay to learn unforgettably the laws of physiological as well as of moral righteousness.

ARTICLE VI.

JAMES MARSH AND COLERIDGE.

BY PROFESSOR JOHN WRIGHT BUCKHAM.

SOMEWHAT apart from the centers of education, in the beautiful Champlain Valley, where for a hundred years Vermont University has been performing earnest and efficient service to the cause of learning, President James Marsh accomplished a work for which American philosophy will always be his debtor. The man was as modest as the institution of which he was head. The impulses and aims under which he worked were singularly pure and disinterested. He was a student of philosophy by divine appointment, and he felt it. This was his high calling, and he resolutely adhered to it.

Born at Hartford, Vt., in 1794, the son of a farmer, James Marsh entered Dartmouth College at nineteen and graduated in 1817. His chief characteristic as a student, as of many another man of mark, was his ambition to acquire a broad and systematic conception of human knowledge rather than proficiency in any one department. He read widely and thoughtfully. Two-years' connection with the college as tutor gave him further opportunity to explore and acquire, and he carried to Andover Seminary an exceptionally broad and thorough collegiate education. Here, also, his thirst for comprehensiveness would not permit him to confine his mind to the studies of the course, and he indefatigably pursued studies in literature and history, science and philosophy.

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In addition to the study of Kant's "Critique," he undertook to read through the works of Plato and to make a copious analysis of each dialogue, while carrying on his regular studies. In a letter written at this time he shows how extended were his excursions into the subtleties of theology, by vividly portraying the difficulties and dangers of the "ill-starred adventurer who plunges into the metaphysical depths of controversial theology!" He must not only "unravel the mysteries of fate, free-will, foreknowledge absolute, etc., without getting lost in their mazes, but, while floundering in an everlasting 'hubbub wild' of ancient learning, crazed and made to dance, like Epicurus's atoms, to the 'harmonious discord' of some German metaphysical bagpipe, he must be careful to keep his balances nicely adjusted, and weigh with statistical accuracy the 'hot, cold, moist, and dry' of these 'embryo atoms. . . . Truly a man in such a course—if, like Dante, he has his Beatrice, or divine love, for a guide—may arrive at heaven at last; but, like Dante, he must do it by first going through hell and purgatory." Nevertheless he deliberately chose this course as his own; nor was his faith lost in the labyrinth.

At the close of his course Mr. Marsh formed the quixotic plan of returning to his father's farm to carry on "in independence and leisure" the studies which he felt constrained to follow; but the intellectual atmosphere of the farm was not, as might be expected, stimulating, and he soon resigned his bucolic ambition to seek some position, educational or literary, in which he could work to better advantage.

After a long and trying period of suspense, in which he exhibited admirable patience and self-control, he was at length, through the influence of his friend, Rev. Dr. Rice, of Virginia, appointed Professor of Languages in Hampden

Sidney College. Here he remained about three years, doing excellent work and carrying forward his studies—especially in Hebrew—vigorously. It was here that he began the translation of Herder's "Spirit of Hebrew Poetry." On October 14, 1824, he married Miss L. Wheelock, of Hanover, New Hampshire.

In 1826 came his appointment as president of the University of his native State. This was an honor—such was the feeble condition of the University—accompanied with serious responsibilities and uncertainties, but he accepted the position. For, to quote the words of his Memoir, written by Dr. Joseph Torrey, "to reëstablish in the public confidence and favor an institution which seemed on the very verge of extinction, appeared to him an object worthy of his highest efforts; and he saw, moreover, an opportunity—the most favorable that could be desired—for introducing such improvements in the system of discipline and instruction as were called for by the wants of the age." The improvements which he advocated and, to a degree at least, introduced, were mainly in the direction of greater liberty in the choice of studies, and of a more parental college government in which social and moral influence should have greater prominence. Thus early do we find this broad and far-seeing mind anticipating the salutary advancements in collegiate study and discipline of which we are now beginning to enjoy the advantage. These ideas and others cherished by President Marsh were embodied in a pamphlet entitled "An Exposition of the Course of Instruction and Discipline in the University of Vermont," which was sent to many prominent educators, and undoubtedly influenced other institutions in the same direction. We know that President Porter had a profound regard for Dr. Marsh, and the paternal, or, if we may call it so, fraternal, attitude toward

students, of which Yale's president was so prominent an exemplar, may have been, to some degree at least, owing to the influence of President Marsh. At all events, the youthful president of Vermont's then miniature University cherished ideas of education which have proved to be full of utility and power.

But now philosophy, doubtless in connection with the instruction in its principles which he was called upon to give, began to assume greater and greater sway over the attention and love of this indefatigable student and enthusiastic scholar. He wrote for the *Christian Spectator* a discriminating and able review of Professor Stuart's "Commentary on Hebrews," in which the philosophical principles underlying the interpretation of Scripture are uppermost in the treatment.

On an eventful day in this period of his life there came into his possession (in a sense more real than is often attached to that word) a copy of Coleridge's "Aids to Reflection." It produced an impression upon him that no book save the Bible had paralleled. Not that its principles were new to him. He had already found them in Plato and Kant, although he acknowledged that he was largely indebted to Coleridge for his understanding of the latter. His study of philosophy and theology had been already extensive and thoughtful, and the axioms of Coleridge came to him, not so much as revelations, as the enflowered and perfect statements of truths which had been struggling for expression in his own mind. Lonely as he was in his dissatisfaction with the formal and uninspiring theology of the time, this book came to him as the message of a kindred and greater soul speaking from the housetops truths which had been but whisperings to himself. To get these truths before his fellow-countrymen in such a way as to impress them upon contem-

porary thought now became the ambition of President Marsh. He felt that his task was difficult and hazardous. The philosophy of Locke and the Scotch school reigned supreme. Hobbes and Hume, and the school of which they were leaders, gave philosophy a materialistic and sensuous character which was reflected in the labored and artificial theology of Paley and Brown. In advocating a *spiritual* philosophy Dr. Marsh felt that he was giving a challenge to the dominant philosophy which would bring the *odium theologicum* upon his head. He confesses as much in the "Preliminary Essay" which he wrote as an introduction to his famous edition of the "Aids to Reflection," published by him in order to disseminate the tenets of his master. The "Preliminary Essay" is the writing of Dr. Marsh by which he is chiefly known. It was afterward prefixed to the London edition, and also to the American edition of Coleridge.

A brief outline of this "Essay" will give some idea of its contents, though not of the admirable spirit and movement which animate it. It opens with a tribute to the value of *reflection*, which it is the primary object of Coleridge's work to promote. Then follows an allusion to the influence which the book is likely to have upon prevailing theological topics, an influence which the writer thinks may be disturbing, but cannot fail to be beneficial. The subject of the treatise is defined to be a *philosophical statement and vindication of the distinctively spiritual and peculiar doctrines of the Christian system*, the aim being to show that *Christian faith is the perfection of human reason*.

In order to vindicate this idea as a rational one, and this purpose as wise, the essayist enters upon an admirable treatment of the relation of philosophy to religion, in the course of which he states with great emphasis that "it is not the

method of the genuine philosopher to separate his philosophy and religion, and, adopting his principles independently in each, leave them to be reconciled or not as the case may be; he has and can have rationally but one system, in which his philosophy becomes religious and his religion philosophical." He pertinently adds: "If any dispute the necessity of thus combining the study of philosophy with that of religion, I would beg them to point out the age, since that of the apostles, in which the prevailing metaphysical opinions have not distinctly manifested themselves in the prevailing views of religion." While insisting thus strongly upon the vital connection between philosophy and religion, Dr. Marsh does not fail to admit "that a man may be truly religious and essentially a believer at heart while his understanding is sadly bewildered with the attempt to express philosophically what yet he feels and knows spiritually," and offers the following profound and suggestive observation: "It is indeed impossible for us to tell how far the understanding may impose upon itself by partial views and false disguises without perverting the will or estranging it from the laws and authority of reason and the Divine Word." While thus admitting the possible coexistence of a genuine faith with an imperfect philosophy, he still insists that errors of the understanding are obstacles to the truth and ought to be corrected.

The special defects in the prevailing system of metaphysics, as they appear to him, he proceeds to point out as (1) a theory of the will which denies its freedom, and (2) the too close identification of the natural with the spiritual. The "Essay" at this point assumes a somewhat controversial tone, but the cause is a good one, and the sincerity and ability of the argument awaken sympathy. The famous distinction between the Reason and Understanding receives attention. Dr. Marsh

closes this excellent introduction with a defense of the style and thought of Coleridge against the charge of being obscure and unintelligible, and with a warm eulogy of the worth and greatness of the man whose work he thus presents to the American public.

The book, thus sent forth, met with a reception which testified to its value and timeliness, and, while some opposition was excited, there is every reason to believe that what Noah Porter once said, writing for the *BIBLIOTHECA SACRA*, is true: "The influence of Coleridge on the philosophy and theology of New England has been, in some respects, what President Marsh desired it should be. It has opened new fields of inquiry and put us in possession of other modes of viewing religious truth. It has made our theology tolerant and free, and abated the harsh spirit of controversies. Above all, it has contended for a wakeful, thorough, and scientific theology."

In common with Coleridge, Dr. Marsh had an ardent admiration for Leighton, Jeremy Taylor, Howe, and others of the old English divines, and in the year following the appearance of his first edition of the "Aids to Reflection" he published the first volume of "Selections from the Old English Writers on Practical Theology." But the public did not receive this initial volume with sufficient favor to warrant him in continuing the undertaking.

A step was now taken by this devoted student, who had won for himself an enviable reputation for thorough scholarship in the world of letters, which discloses anew both his unselfish humility and his devotion to the pursuit of philosophy. Feeling that he did not possess the executive abilities to conduct successfully the affairs of the university in the financial embarrassment in which it was placed, in 1833 he

resigned the presidency and accepted the chair of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy.

From this time until his early death in 1842 he gave himself, with the true scholarly instinct which never left him, to the winning and imparting of truth concerning the human mind and spirit. He outlined a work on Logic and another upon Psychology, neither of which, however, was completed. Of the latter as it might have been, we have enough to form some conception in the "Remarks on Psychology," written for class-room use and published in the volume containing his Memoir. There is evident in the work of these mature years the same thirst after a principle of *unity* in knowledge which characterized the young scholar. That principle he found, in one aspect of it at least, where Kant and Coleridge found it, in the *Practical Reason* or the *Will*, where knowledge is transmitted into being.

In another aspect, this unity was sought by him in the harmonization and adjustment to one another of the sciences. He attempted this harmonization in a cursory way in the fragment, "Outlines of a Systematic Arrangement of the Departments of Knowledge, with a View to their Organic Relation to each other in a General System." But it was not for him, or for any one in his day, to form more than a superficial theory of this unity, for those deep and hidden affiliations of the sciences which have since come to the light give to us revelations of the true nature of their unity quite impossible for those of a previous generation to discern. It is often true, however, that he gives best service to the progress of knowledge who helps to establish an ideal for those to work out who have better opportunities for doing so than he possesses. This Dr. Marsh did.

After this brief sketch of the man and his writings, some

estimate may now be offered of his work and of the philosophy of which he was an exponent. His chief service, of course, was as interpreter, defender, and promulgator of the philosophy of Coleridge, and our conception of the value of what he accomplished for American philosophy will accordingly depend upon our estimate of Coleridge. One thing is beyond question, and that is, that Dr. Marsh was able, wise, and successful in his advocacy of the views of the great sage of Highgate. He showed that warm and disinterested enthusiasm in the defense of his philosophical hero which is so much more effective than the studied air of superiority with which the ideas of another are so often coldly and thanklessly appropriated and used. He was sincere, ardent, loyal in this philosophical attachment to a man whom he never knew. And yet he was no Boswell. His admiration was intelligent and discriminative. He found that ideas which had been lying dormant in his own mind had been strongly, eloquently, wisely set forth by another, and, like a true John the Baptist, he lent all his energy to preparing the way for their reception. How much better thus to elevate another than to fly one's own name from the pinnacle of appropriated ideas!

What, then, is the real and abiding value of the Coleridgean philosophy? It would not be correct to identify Coleridge's philosophy with Kantianism. It is less than the philosophy of Kant, and other than it, although based upon and derived from Kantianism. The one great philosophical principle upon which Coleridge concentrated his emphasis was that *there is a spiritual knowledge possible to man* by which alone he arrives at the highest reality. The key to this spiritual knowledge is the Will. To repeat his oft-quoted words: "If there be aught spiritual in man, the Will must be such. If there be a Will, there must be spirituality in man." The

Practical Reason, "comprehending the Will, the Conscience, the Moral Being, with its inseparable Interests and Affections," is the source of living and actual truths. The *Speculative Reason*, as distinguished from the Practical Reason, furnishes certain necessary and universal principles (e. g., cause and effect) to which all knowledge must be referred. The *Understanding*, or faculty judging according to sense, "applies its preconceptions of Quantity and Relation to the objects of sense, and thus refers them to Class and Name." The distinction between the Understanding and Reason Coleridge calls the *Gradus ad Philosophiam*, and to this distinction he gives great and constant emphasis. Reason is a "direct aspect of truth, an inward Beholding: it is fixed"; while Understanding is "discursive, and in all its judgments refers to some other faculty as its ultimate authority." Beasts have *Understanding*—that is, they can adapt means to ends, and that in some cases "even in *varying circumstances*." Reason is the distinguishing possession of man. It is supernatural, and upon it is based the *Spiritual Philosophy*, in which God, the soul, freedom, immortality, are the great realities. "All Christian truth"—this is Professor Tulloch's summary of Coleridge's teaching—"must have vital touch with our spiritual being . . . and be conformable to reason." "There was nothing," Tulloch continues, "absolutely new in this luminous conception, but it marked a revolution in the earlier part of the century."

Above all, and this is his greatest service, Coleridge defines the relation of Philosophy to the Christian Revelation. Indeed, he connects Philosophy and Theology as no other—at least no other Englishman—has ever done. His Theology is as philosophical as his Philosophy is theological. His understanding of the Bible was both rational and spirit-

ual, and he gave the church an interpretation of the true nature of its authority, which has become recognized as the great harbinger of the present increasingly intelligent conception of the Scriptures.

In the judgment of the most thoughtful the influence of Coleridge has been in the main both great and salutary, establishing sound philosophical principles and methods, quickening thought, and strengthening the position and influence of Christianity. If this judgment is correct, then the question as to the worth and usefulness of the work of James Marsh is determined. For, as has been shown, it was his chief aim and work to disseminate and illumine the philosophy of one for whose magnificent intellectual powers he had such profound regard. And he fulfilled his task well. He quotes with approval, in his "Preliminary Essay," the remark of a friend: "If you can once get the attention of thinking men fixed on the distinction between the reason and the understanding, you will have done enough to reward the labor of a life." That distinction and the real scope and significance of the Coleridgean philosophy President Marsh did succeed in large measure in getting before the thinking men of the country, and won a large degree of allegiance to it.

Professor William G. T. Shedd wrote in his introduction to the complete American edition of Coleridge, published by the Harpers in 1853: "With the exception of the clear and masterly essay prefixed to his edition of the 'Aids to Reflection,' by the late Dr. Marsh, whose premature decease in the full vigor of his powers and the full maturity of his discipline and scholarship is the greatest loss American philosophy has yet been called to meet, we call to mind no thoroughly elaborated and truly profound estimate of the philosophical opinions of Coleridge."

There are few finer instances of loyal and intelligent discipleship in literature than that of James Marsh. The honor which such an attachment brings is not less to the pupil than to the master. Yet independently of Coleridge, Dr. Marsh would have done good service to the cause of philosophy, for his convictions were his own. It is fruitless to speculate what direction his work would have taken if he had not had Coleridge as his philosopher and guide, but we may be quite sure that in some way he would have uttered his protest against the regnant philosophy and theology of his time and country. With his earnest belief in the freedom of the Will he could not but have controverted the prevailing Edwardean theory. With his antipathy to the sensation school of philosophy he must needs have told others of the sweet reasonableness of Idealism. With his conception of the conformity of reason and revelation he could not have remained silent concerning their underlying unity. As it was, he spoke through another, but he spoke *himself*.

We have purposely confined ourselves to the philosophical work of President Marsh, but his influence on theology was also not inconsiderable. The nature and origin of Sin were interpreted to him by his theory of the Will, and he drew attention away from the fall of Adam to fasten it upon the sinful individual. With respect to the Atonement he was regarded by many as heterodox, but, following Coleridge, he wisely insisted upon its manward influence, leaving the mystery of its Godward effect for more presuming and confident minds to fathom. The narrow theology held by many of his contemporaries found in him an expansion conformable to his broad philosophical principles, and he broadened others by his breadth.

Neither his philosophy nor his theology, it is true, is flaw-

less. It is not even what it would have been had he lived in our day. Viewed, however, in the light of his time and his advantages, this isolated, hard-pressed, earnest student merits high honor and lasting esteem as a worthy pioneer in American philosophy.

Said President Porter of him: "His modest demeanor, his amiable disposition, his freedom from craft and cunning, his obvious and ardent love of truth wherever it was to be found, the thoroughness of his scholarship, his iron diligence, his warm susceptibility to the good and the noble, and his disposition to master every subject in its principles—were such as to merit for him a reputation and an earthly reward far higher than he received." This is high praise, but it is confirmed by those who knew him as a man. As a philosopher his work proves him to be one of those who, in his own words, "escaping from the thralldom of the sensuous and the present, with large discourse of reason looking before and after, form their minds to the discovery and apprehensions of ultimate principles."

ARTICLE VII.

AUGUSTINE AS AN EXEGETE.

BY THE REVEREND J. RITCHIE SMITH.

THE place of Augustine is with the foremost creative minds of history. No other man has exercised such imperial sway in any realm of thought as the great Latin father in the realm of theology. Even Aristotle must yield to him the palm. As he strove to grasp and reduce to order the whole range of Christian truth, his theology is broad enough to embrace the difficulties, the apparent contradictions, which the Word of God presents, while it partakes of the errors and imperfections which belong to all things human. To his authority, therefore, appeal the most diverse schools of theology and philosophy,—Roman Catholic and Protestant, scholastic and mystic, Thomas Aquinas and Anselm and Pascal and Luther and Calvin; while Christians of every name do him honor as the most potent champion of the faith which they hold in common. He is the greatest man of the Christian church since the days of the apostles, the successor of Paul in logical acumen, of John in spiritual fervor. It is a profoundly interesting study to trace the principles and methods by which he wrought out of the Scripture the massive system that bears his name.

HIS EQUIPMENT.

Of his education he has given us a sketch in his "Confessions." He was trained for oratory, and studied grammar, rhetoric, and books of eloquence. In the school of rhetoric in Carthage he won the first place; became a teacher of the art,

and practiced his profession in Rome and Milan. All the books of the so-called liberal arts—rhetoric, logic, geometry, music, arithmetic—that came within his reach, he read and understood. Of astronomy he had some knowledge. With pagan literature he was familiar from childhood. When scarcely twenty years of age he read and comprehended without a teacher the Ten Predicaments of Aristotle. He read both Greek and Latin biographies (Jerome, Letter LXXV. 3). Certain books of the Platonists he read in a Latin translation. His knowledge of Greek and Roman history appears in his "City of God," and his acquaintance with Greek philosophy is often shown (Letter CXVIII.; City of God, viii.). Plato he preferred to all other philosophers, because he came nearest to Christian truth. At one time, pleading the authority of Ambrose (Christ. Doct. ii. 28. 43), he held the opinion that Plato was a disciple of Jeremiah. Afterward he acknowledged his mistake, yet admits that Plato may have been acquainted with the *prophecy* of Jeremiah (Retract. ii. 4; City of God, viii. 11).¹

In early life Augustine composed poems in various kinds of meter, and wrote two or three books on "The Fair and the Fit." He wrote six books on rhythm, and purposed to write as many more on music, but was prevented (Letter CI. 3). In the summer of his conversion he suffered from weakness of the lungs induced by excessive study. Quotations from Greek and Latin literature are frequent. His favorite authors were Virgil, Cicero, whose "Hortensius" inflamed him with the love of wisdom, Varro, Sallust, and Plato. He cites, moreover, Horace, Lucan, Terence, Persius, Ovid, Livy, Juvenal,

¹ For convenience the translation of the fathers published by the Christian Literature Company of New York is used, with occasional reference to writings which it does not include.

Ennius, Homer, Plutarch, Apuleius, Justinus, Scaevola, Seneca, Claudian, Terentian, Euhemerus, Labeo, Aulus Gellius, Plotinus, Pliny, Lucretius.

The weak point in his exegetical equipment was his imperfect acquaintance with the original tongues of Scripture, though his deficiencies have often been exaggerated. Gibbon remarks, "According to the judgment of the most impartial critics, the superficial learning of Augustine was confined to the Latin language." The great historian usually followed safer guides. Augustine had some knowledge of the Punic, a language spoken within recent times (Letter XVII.), which he pronounced akin to the Hebrew and the Syriac (N. T. Homil. lxiii. 2; Tract. on John, xv. 27). Several times he interprets Punic words—*Namphanio* (Letter XVII.), *Mammon*, which is both Punic and Hebrew (N. T. Hom. lxiii. 2; Serm. on Mt. ii. 14. 47), *iar* (Ps. cxxiv. 5). He observes that *Edom* in Punic signifies "blood" (Ps. cxxxvi. 7), and *Bal* is equivalent to "lord" (Qu. on Judg. xvi.; see also Serm. clxvii. 3; Rom. xiii.; De Magistro xlv.).

Of Hebrew, which he believed to be the original language of the race (City of God, xvi. 11), he confessed himself wholly ignorant (Conf. xi. 3; Letter CI. 3); as were the fathers generally, except Origen and Jerome. His dependence upon others led him into curious errors. He preferred to derive "Hebrews" from *Heber*, but thought that the derivation from *Abraham*—"Abrahews"—might possibly be correct (City of God, xvi. 3). *Racha* and *Hosanna* he supposed to be interjections, incapable of translation (Christ. Doct. ii. 11; John li. 2); *David* signifies "strong in hand" or "desirable" (Ps. xxxv. 1; cxxxii. 2);¹ *Galilee*, "transmigration" or "revela-

¹ Origen says it means "skillful with the hand" (Matt ii.).

tion" (Harm. Gos. iii. 25. 86); *Joab*, "enemy (Ps. lx. 2); *Philistine*, "falling from drink" (Ps. lxxxiii. 5); *Hermon*, "his curse" (Ps. lxxxix. 13). In correcting the mistake of those who derived *pascha* ("passover") from the Greek *πάσχειν* ("to suffer"), he remarks that "in Hebrew *pascha* means passover; because the *pascha* was then celebrated for the first time by God's people, when, in their flight from Egypt, they *passed over the Red Sea*" (John iv. 1).¹

He spoke modestly of his knowledge of Greek, "scarcely to be called knowledge at all" (Agt. Letters of Petil. ii. 38. 91), and confessed that he was not familiar with the technical terms of theology (Trin. iii. 1); not even understanding the distinction between *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις* (Trin. v. 8, 10). Yet he studied Greek literature from boyhood, though he always disliked it (Conf. i. 13. 20). Ordinarily he used the Latin translation of the New Testament, and was thus often misled. He comments on Gal. vi. 2-5 without observing that "burden" represents two Greek words, though he remarks that the word is used in different senses (Harm. Gos. ii. 30. 72); finds in the phrase "evening of the Sabbath" (Matt. xxviii. 1) a difficulty which is not in the Greek (Harm. Gos. iii. 24. 65); remarks on John xix. 34 that the evangelist uses a suggestive word, not "pierced," but "opened," while the Greek has "pierced" (Vulg. *aperuit*); several times in his exposition of First John he reads "love is God"; and discusses the difficulty raised by the reading "to" Caiaphas in John xviii. 28, where the original has "from" Caiaphas (Harm. Gos. iii. 7. 27; John cxiv. 1). *Κενοφώντας* he renders as if it were *καινοφονίας* (John xcvi. 4), which is indeed the reading of some Greek MSS. of inferior authority. The Vulgate has *vaniloquia*. *Εἰς*

¹ On Hebrew terms, comp. Irenæus, Ad Haer. ii. 35; Ambrose, Letter LXIII.

in Phil ii. 11 he translates as *ἐν* (John civ. 3), an error in which he was anticipated by Origen, and is followed by Bengel (so Cassian, On the Incarnation, iv. 13). The Vulgate has *in gloria*. These prepositions are often confounded, as in our Authorized Version (Winer, N. T. Gram. i. 4). In Heb. xi. 1 he translates *ἐλπίζοντων* by *sperantium*, the confidence "of those that hope" (N. T. Hom. lxxvi. 3; John lxxix., xc.). The Vulgate has *sperandarum rerum*. In his controversy with Pelagius he laid great stress on *ἐφ' ᾧ* in Rom. v. 12, which he rendered "in him"—Vulgate, *in quo* (Trin. iv. 12; Agt. Two Letters Pelag. iv. 7, 8; On Marr. and Concup. ii. 47). In John iv. 3 he has the singular reading, "*Qui solvit Christum*"—so the Vulgate; yet he quotes the common reading in Serm. clxxxii., clxxxiii. (See Westcott, Eps. of John, addtnl. note on I. iv. 3, and to the authorities there given add Cassian, On the Incarnation, v. 10.)

But the fact that he often neglects to refer to the Greek, and sometimes errs with the Greek before him, does not prove that he was wholly incompetent to use it. The statement that "in his exegetical and other works he very rarely consults the Septuagint or Greek Testament" (Schaff, Church History, iii. 1001, note 1) requires serious modification. The single volume devoted to the Psalms in this edition, abridged from the six volumes of the Oxford translation, contains over one hundred references to the Septuagint, which Jerome rebuked him for reading in the edition of Origen, the one in common use (Letter LXXV. 19). The Greek is frequently quoted in his notes on the Heptateuch, and, in general, references to it are as numerous as we should expect in view of the character of his writings. This followed naturally from his extravagant estimate of the Septuagint. He says that the Latin versions of the Old Testament must be corrected by the Greek

versions, especially the Septuagint, and of the New Testament by the original text (Chris. Doct. ii. 15. 22; Ps. cxix. 47). References to the Greek of the New Testament seem to be less numerous in proportion, though by no means wanting. Jerome's version of the Gospels he compared with the original text (Letter LXXI. 6). He often refers to various Greek copies of both Testaments; occasionally to the versions of Aquila and Symmachus (City of God, xv. 23; Qu. on Numb. lii.); and to many Latin codices. "The translations of the Scriptures from Hebrew into Greek can be counted, but the Latin translators are out of all number" (Christ. Doct. ii. 11). Of the Latin translations he preferred the Itala, "for it keeps closer to the words without prejudice to clearness of expression" (Christ. Doct. ii. 15). He was familiar with the use of Greek letters as numerals (John x. 12; Ps. lxxviii. 29). Apart from Scripture quotations, a considerable list of Greek words may be culled from his writings. In a cursory examination of a portion of his works, nearly one hundred have been found. Trench gives a list of words of similar meaning which Augustine compares, including twenty-eight examples (Aug. on Serm. on Mt. ii. 20, 21); to which may be added *λόγος* and *λόγιον* (Ps. cxix. 51), *σοφία* and *φρονήσις* (Ps. cv. 13), *χρηστός* and *αγαθός* (Ps. cxxxvi. 1). And in his study of the Scripture he was not unmindful of the labors of his predecessors (Ps. lxxxviii. 1).

From this review it appears that the learning of Augustine, while by no means contemptible, was rather varied than profound, and that his equipment for the work of the expositor was decidedly imperfect. But if he fell behind some of the fathers in this regard, in amplitude and originality of genius he surpassed them all. His mind was singularly acute, subtle, penetrating, profound. For his meta-

physical acumen it is enough to refer to his discussion of time (Conf. xi.), and of memory (Conf. x.). In his proposition, "*Si enim fallor, sum*" (City of God, xi. 26), he anticipated the famous dictum of Descartes, "*Cogito, ergo sum.*" As an instance of subtle and striking exposition may be named the contrast, suggested by Origen (on John ii. 26), between John the Baptist the voice and Christ the Word (Serm. ccxcii. 3, cited by Trench, Syn. N. T., p. 89). If it be true that the heart makes the theologian, no man was ever more thoroughly qualified to expound the mysteries of God. He combined in eminent degree intellectual vigor, moral earnestness, and spiritual intuition. So retentive was his memory that he seemed to have all Scripture at command, and he had the power of stating truth in those terse, strong phrases that turn to proverbs. A list of them is given in Schaff's "Church History" (iii. 999), to which may be added: "*Crede ut intelligas,*" "*Intellectus enim merces est fidei,*" "*[Christ] quo itur Deus, qua itur homo,*" "*Fuga animi timor est,*" "*In templo vis orare, in te ora*"; on Simon Magus, "*Voluit talia facere, non talis esse*"; on "My Kingdom is not of this world," "*Non negat hic esse, sed hinc.*" If deficient in attainment, by nature and by grace he was prodigally endowed, and in rare measure, to use his own words, he saw "with the eyes of the heart into the heart of Scripture."

HIS EXEGETICAL PRINCIPLES.

The first point to be noted is his view of the Scriptures.

1. *Canon.*—He often insists upon the distinction between the canonical and apocryphal books. In the canon of the Old Testament he included Tobias, Judith, the two books of the Maccabees, Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus (Christ. Doct. ii. 8); and his judgment was ratified by the Third Council of

Carthage and the Council of Hippo, and was generally accepted until the Reformation. In practice he was singularly wavering and inconsistent, a position by no means peculiar among the fathers. He was aware that Ecclesiasticus (On Care for the Dead, xviii.), Wisdom (City of God, xvii. 20; Re-tract. ii. 20), and Maccabees (City of God, xviii. 36) are not contained in the Hebrew canon; but he accepted them on the authority of the church, and frequently appealed to them as Scripture (On Predest. of Saints, xxvii.). Occasionally he cites as of scriptural authority other apocryphal writings, as the additions to the book of Daniel, the History of Susanna (On Virginity, xix. 20), which Julius Africanus had rejected more than a century before (Routh, Rel. Sac. ii. 225), and the Song of the Three Children (City of God, xi. 9); Baruch, which some attributed to the scribe of that name, but more with better reason to Jeremiah (City of God, xviii. 33; Agt. Faust. xii. 43); and First (Third) Esdras (Agt. Two Letters of Pelag. iv. (vi.) 14; City of God, xviii. 36).¹

He held that both Hebrew and Greek are needful to the expositor (Christ. Doct. ii. 11), yet with Justin Martyr (Hort. Addr. to Greeks, xiii.; the genuineness of this address is questioned), Irenæus (Ad. Haer. iii. 21), Clement of Alexandria (Strom. i. 22), and Cyril of Jerusalem (Catechet. Lect. iv. 34) he accepted the current fable of the inspired origin of the Septuagint, drawn apparently from Philo, and rejected by Jerome (Pref. to Gen.), and held the Greek to be of equal authority with the Hebrew original (City of God, xviii. 42-44; Christ. Doct. ii. 15).² The discrepancies between them he

¹For the opinion of the fathers regarding these books, see lists in Smith's Bib. Dict., art. "Canon," pp. 364, 366.

²On the divergent chronologies of the Hebrew and the Greek, see City of God, xv.

compared to the differences between the Gospels: "And if an explanation is asked for this discrepancy I am of opinion that no more probable account of the matter will suggest itself, than the supposition that the Seventy composed their version under the influence of the very Spirit by whose inspiration the things which they were engaged in translating had been originally spoken" (Harm. of Gos. ii. 66. 128). "Where the difference is not a mere copyist's error, and where the sense is agreeable to truth and illustrative of truth, we must believe that the Divine Spirit prompted them to give a varying version, not in their function of translators, but in the liberty of prophesying, and therefore we find that the apostles justly sanction the Septuagint by quoting it as well as the Hebrew when they adduce proofs from the Scriptures" (City of God, xv. 14. See also xv. 23 and xviii. 43).

He advised Jerome to translate the Old Testament from the Septuagint, because few were familiar with the Hebrew, and the Greek text was more accessible (Letter LXXI. 4); but afterward owned that Jerome had chosen the better way, "in order that you may bring to light those things which have been either omitted or perverted by the Jews" (Letter LXXXII. 34).

He declared, "I should not believe the gospel except as moved by the authority of the Catholic Church" (Agt. Ep. of Manich. v.); but he traced the witness of the church in unbroken tradition to the days of our Lord and his apostles (Agt. Faust. xi. 5; xxviii.), so that faith in the Scripture rests ultimately upon the authority of the *apostolic* church. And he furnishes abundant proof that he was not unmindful of the evidence of divine origin which the Scriptures themselves furnish.¹

¹ With this saying of Augustine, comp. Iren., Ad. Haer. iii. 3. 4; Ter-

2. *Inspiration.*—With the fathers generally he held the most rigid theory of inspiration. The Scriptures are holy, sacred, divine, infallible, inspired, “the venerable pen of thy Spirit” (Conf. vii. 21). “He [Christ] stands to all his disciples in the relation of the head to the members of his body. Therefore, when those disciples have written matters which he declared and spake to them, it ought not by any means to be said that he has written nothing himself; since the truth is that his members have accomplished only what they became acquainted with by the repeated statements of the Head. For all that he was minded to give for our perusal on the subject of his own doings and sayings, he commanded to be written by those disciples, whom he thus used as if they were his own hands” (Harm. of Gos. i. 35. 54). But in thus emphasizing the divine he does not fail to recognize the human element. “I venture to say, my brethren, perhaps not John himself spoke of the matter as it is, but even he only as he was able; for it was man that spoke of God, inspired indeed by God, but still man. Because he was inspired he said something; if he had not been inspired, he would have said nothing; but because a man inspired, he spoke not the whole, but what a man could, he spoke” (John i. 1. Comp. Harm. of Gos. ii. 12).

It is interesting to note here Augustine’s conception of the relation of God to the world: “For he did not make it as a carpenter makes a chest. The chest which he makes is outside the carpenter and although the workman is nigh, he sits in another place and is external to that which he fashions. But God, infused into the world, fashions it; being everywhere present he fashions, and withdraweth not himself elsewhere, nor doth he, as it were, handle from without the till, *De Praescr. Haer.* xix.-xxi., xxxvi. In Milman’s *Latin Chrt’y.* xii. 7, p. 93, note 1, the true interpretation of Augustine’s words by Marsilio of Padua is noted.

matter which he fashions. . . . Therefore was he in the world as the maker of the world" (Tract. on John, ii. 10, delivered in the year 416, fourteen years before his death, or even later). Yet Professor Allen (Contin. of Chr. Tht., p. 149) and Mr. Heard (Alex. and Cath. Theol. Contrasted, p. 204) charge him with abandoning the truth of the divine immanence in his later writings. Professor Erdman observes that Augustine was much nearer to pantheism than to dualism (Hist. of Phil. i. 275).

The Scripture is without error of any kind. "For it seems to me that most disastrous consequences must follow upon our believing that anything false is found in the sacred books" (Letter XXVIII. 3). "Of these alone [the canonical books of Scripture] do I most firmly believe that the authors were completely free from error. And if in these writings I am perplexed by anything which appears to me opposed to truth, I do not hesitate to suppose that either the MS. is faulty, or the translator has not caught the meaning of what was said, or I myself have failed to understand it" (Letter LXXXII. 3). "We are bound to receive as true whatever the canon shows to have been said by even one prophet, or apostle, or evangelist. Otherwise not a single page will be left for the guidance of human fallibility, if contempt for the wholesome authority of the canonical books either puts an end to that authority altogether, or involves it in hopeless confusion" (Agt. Faust. xi. 5. See the whole paragraph). "Your design clearly is to deprive Scripture of all authority, and to make every man's mind the judge what passage of Scripture he is to approve of, and what to disapprove of. This is not to be subject to Scripture in matters of faith, but to make Scripture subject to you. Instead of making the high authority of Scripture the reason of approval, every man makes his

approval the reason for thinking a passage correct" (Ag. Faust. xxxii. 19; comp. Letter XL.; Jerome, Letter LVII.).

Sound reason and Scripture are never at variance (Letter CXLIII. 7). All the prophecies must be fulfilled (Letter CCXXXII. 4). The Old and New Testaments are in perfect accord (On the Profit of Believing, ix.). "*Novum Testamentum in vetere latet, Vetus in novo patet.*" "*Distingue tempora, et concordabit Scriptura.*" The Gospels are in harmony (Harm. Gos. ii. 17, 27, 28, 29, 41, 66, 67). An interesting example of the treatment of a difficult passage is afforded by his discussion of the quotation ascribed to Jeremiah in Matt. xxvii. 9 (Harm. Gos. iii. 7). He notes that there are codices in which the name *Jeremiah* does not occur, but insists that it must be retained because it is found in the oldest codices, and because it is easier to suppose that it was erased to avoid the difficulty than that it was added without warrant. Thus he recognized the critical canon that the more difficult reading is to be preferred. His explanation is that *Jeremiah* was substituted for *Zechariah* under the inspiration of the Spirit to signify the unity of the prophetic order, whence we may look upon "their individual communications as also those of the whole body, and on their collective communications as also those of each separately." It is true, moreover, that the quotation, so far as it relates to the purchase of the field, is drawn from Jeremiah xxxiii., mystically interpreted. The apparent discrepancy between Mark and John regarding the hour of the crucifixion is removed by the reflection that Jesus was virtually crucified when the Jews cried out against him, though not actually nailed to the cross until the sixth hour. "For he [Mark] judged most truly that the Lord's murderer was rather the tongue of the Jews than the hand of the sold-

iers" (Harm. Gos. iii. 13. 42; John cxvii. 1; Ps. lxiv. 5). Another solution is suggested, that the sixth hour of the *preparation* coincided with the third hour of the day.

Though Scripture has to some extent been corrupted by copyists (City of God, xv. 13), yet these errors are not serious enough to affect its authority (Letter LXXXII. 6; On the Profit of Believing, vii.; On Morals of Cath. Ch. xxix.; Agt. Faust. xvi. 11; xxxii. 16; xxxiii. 6). "Should there be a question about the text of some passage, . . . we should first consult the manuscripts of the country where the religion was first taught; and if these still varied, we should take the text of the greater number, or of the more ancient. And if any uncertainty remained, we should consult the original text" (Agt. Faust. xi. 2).

In his treatise on "Christian Doctrine," of which three books were written in 397, about ten years after his conversion, and the fourth in 426, near the close of his life, he lays down the principles that should guide the expositor. The end of Scripture is love. No interpretation can be correct which does not tend to build up love to God and man. "A man who is resting upon faith, hope, and love, and who keeps a firm hold upon these, does not need the Scriptures except for the purpose of instructing others" (i. 39; comp. Trin. viii. 4. 6). The plainer passages must be used to throw light upon the more obscure. "The Holy Spirit has, with admirable wisdom and care for our welfare, so arranged the Holy Scriptures as by the plainer passages to satisfy our hunger, and by the more obscure to stimulate our appetite" (ii. 6. 8). "The very obscurity . . . was a necessary element . . . to profit our understandings, not only by the discovery of truth, but also by the exercise of their powers" (iv. 6. 9). The words of Scripture should be committed to memory. Hebrew and Greek

are needful, and the correct text must first be ascertained. All truth found in heathen learning belongs to Christ, and should be appropriated by the Christian, as the Jews spoiled the Egyptians (comp. Justin Martyr, Apol. ii. 13; Origen, Letter to Gregory). Yet it is poor in comparison with Holy Scripture. "For whatever man may have learned from other sources, if it is hurtful, it is there condemned; if it is useful, it is therein contained" (ii. 42. 63)—which reminds us of the judgment that Omar is said to have pronounced upon the library of Alexandria. The importance of punctuation,¹ pronunciation, numbers, natural history, history, and logic is noted, and the *Bible Dictionary* is suggested (ii. 39. 59). Astronomy is of little service. The literal and the figurative must not be confounded. "Whatever there is in the word of God that cannot, when taken literally, be referred either to purity of life or soundness of doctrine, you may set down as figurative" (iii. 10. 14). Prayer is essential. Scripture should be interpreted by Scripture. The "Book of Rules" of Tichonius is of great assistance, but should be used with caution. "Of these rules, the first relates to the Lord and his body, the second to the twofold division of the Lord's body, the third to the promises and the law, the fourth to species and genus, the fifth to times, the sixth to recapitulation, the seventh to the devil and his body" (iii. 30. 42). He refers to these Rules several times, but they exercised little influence upon his exposition.

EXEGETICAL METHODS.

Augustine was happier in the statement than in the application of exegetical principles. "*Video meliora proboque,*

¹ This must be determined by the rule of faith and the context. He gives an example in his treatment of John i. 3, which, with the Ante-Nicene fathers generally, he renders, "That which was made in him was life."

deteriora sequor," is the confession of the race. His principal exegetical works are his Commentaries upon Genesis, the Psalms, the Sermon on the Mount, the Gospel and Epistles of John, Romans (unfinished), and Galatians, and the Harmony of the Gospels; and his writings generally abound in exposition. His commentaries are not of the modern type, with elaborate introduction, minute textual criticism, and detailed verbal exposition. They are largely, as he terms his work on the Psalms, homilies, expository discourses delivered to the people. This accounts in great measure for their prolixity and repetitions. Often he preached every day, sometimes twice a day. There was neither occasion nor opportunity for the niceties of scholarship. This must be borne in mind if we would form a fair estimate of his exegetical ability. "For I have not now, and I can never hope to have, such knowledge of the Divine Scriptures as I see you possess. Whatever abilities I may have for such a study, I devote entirely to the instruction of the people whom God has entrusted to me" (Letter LXXIII. 2. 5, to Jerome). Often he used words not Latin in his preaching (Ps. cxxiv. 5), and did not disdain the rude phrases of the vulgar idiom. "I would rather have the barbarism . . . than have the passage in better Latin, but the sense less clear" (Christ. Doct. iii. 3. 7). "Better is it that scholars find fault with us, than that the people understand us not" (Ps. cxxxix. 15). His expositions were sometimes prepared with great care (Ps. civ. 46), and sometimes extempore (Ps. xxxv. 16; cxxxix.).

In the sphere of textual criticism he is a witness, not a judge. He seldom discusses or attempts to correct the received text. Passages rejected by modern criticism he retains—as Mark xvi. 9–20; John v. 4. John viii. 1–11 he not only retains but defends, alleging that it was rejected lest it should

encourage immorality (On Conj. Adult. ii. 7). He does not notice the reading *οὕτω* in John vii. 8, though he treats the passage at length. Here the Vulgate has *non*, and many critics retain *οὐκ* though the weight of MSS. authority is in favor of *οὕτω*. *Πρὸ ἐμοῦ* in John x. 8 he omits, and in John viii. 19 inserts and discusses the word "perhaps." In both cases he is in accord with the Vulgate. In Ps. xcvi. 11 he accepts the singular reading, "The Lord reigneth (hath reigned) from the wood," which Justin Martyr (Dial. lxxiii.) charged the Jews with expunging (comp. Apol. i. 41; Tertull., Ans. to Jews, x.). Justin Martyr (Dial. lxxii.) asserted that the Jews had erased several passages relating to Christ from the Old Testament, and the Koran alleges that they have erased prophecies relating to Mohammed. For singular readings and consequent singular interpretation his exposition of Ps. lxviii. is an interesting study.

Questions of *introduction* hold a subordinate place. The current traditional views are commonly accepted. All the Psalms he ascribed to David, who prefixed to some of them the names of other men (City of God, xvii. 14). Undoubtedly this judgment betrays a gross lack of the historical sense, yet it may be questioned whether it is more uncritical to assign all the Psalms to David or to allow him none. Canon Driver, in his able "Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament," maintains that David was not the author of Psalm li., mainly for the reason that he could not have said, "Against thee, thee only have I sinned" (p. 367, note 3). Yet the *bloodguiltiness* of verse 14 points directly to his crime. Canon Driver holds that the subject of the Psalm is Israel in exile, but Prof. W. R. Smith, who holds the same view, has truly observed of "collective Israel in the captivity," that, "according to the prophets, it was the guilt of blood equally with the

guilt of idolatry that removed God's favor from his land" (O. T. in Jew. Ch., p. 417). It was the sin of man against man that the prophets charged upon Israel as well as the sin of man against God. If the literal sense of the words be pressed, no man, whether speaking for himself or for his people, could say, "Against thee only have I sinned." Augustine's conduct toward his mistress after his conversion may serve to illustrate the thought of David, the sin against man lost in the greater sin against God. In view of this episode in his life, the comparison of Augustine to Paul in point of moral character before his conversion is singularly unfortunate (Schaff, Ch. Hist. iii. 991, note 1).

The Gospels were written in their present order (Harm. Gos. i. 2). Matthew wrote in Hebrew (*Ibid.*). This is attested by Papias (Eus., Eccl. Hist. iii. 39), Irenæus (Haer. iii. 1), Origen (Eus., Eccl. Hist. vi. 25), Epiphanius (Hær. xxx. 3), Chrysostom (Hom. on Matt. i. 7), Jerome (Praef. in Matt. De Vir. Ill. iii.), Cyril of Jerusalem (Catechet. Lect. xiv. 15), and others; an array of evidence that cannot be set aside, however difficult may be the problem of the relation of this Hebrew Gospel to the Greek. He is at variance with the sounder tendency of modern criticism in regarding Mark as a mere attendant and epitomizer of Matthew (Harm. Gos. i. 2). He observes that Matthew has an attendant because he represents Christ in his royal character, while Luke has none because he represents him as the high priest who must enter the holy place alone (Harm. Gos. i. 3. 6). The Epistle to the Hebrews, he remarks, was commonly, though not universally, ascribed to Paul (City of God, xvi. 22). Some doubted its authority, but the eastern churches gave it a place in the canon (On Merits and Remission of Sins, i. 50). In his list of the canonical books he assigns it to Paul (Christ. Doct. ii. 8), though in

quotation, while he sometimes refers it to the Apostle (N. T. Hom. v. 5; xxxii. 11), he usually cites it by name (Westcott, Canon N. T., p. 455, note 1). It may fairly be said that he recognized the doubts regarding its authorship, but himself believed it to be the work of Paul, who is said to have omitted the customary salutation lest his name should give offense to the Jews (Rom. xi.). To the title of First John he adds, *ad Parthos*—words which he nowhere explains. He alludes to the doubts regarding the Revelation (N. T. Hom. ccxcix.), but has no hesitation in ascribing it to John (City of God, xx. 7; N. T. Hom. xlv. 2).

The great vice of Augustine's system was his abuse of allegory. This is not peculiar to him, nor to Christian theology. It was employed among the Greeks upon ethical grounds from an early period (comp. City of God, vi. 5 ff.; Grote's Greece, xvi.), and was used to defend the popular mythology against the attacks of Christians (Athenag., Apol.; Arnobius, Adv. Gent. v. 32 ff.). It was in common use among the Jews, and found an able exponent in Philo. The practice of putting the Word upon the rack, and "straining the breast of Scripture," in the language of Saint Ulric, "until it yields blood instead of milk," is confined to no age of the church. But Augustine does not set aside the literal sense. He founds the allegory upon it. "Thus Paradise is the church . . . the four rivers . . . are the four gospels, the fruit-trees the saints, and the fruit their works; the tree of life is the holy of holies, Christ; the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, the will's free choice. . . . These and similar allegorical interpretations may be suitably put upon Paradise without giving offense to any one, while yet we believe the strict truth of the history" (City of God, xiii. 21. Comp. Cyprian, Letter (to Jubaianus) LXXII. 10). The allegorical interpretation must accord with the rule

of faith. All Scripture treats of Christ, and beneath the letter of the Word Christ and his church may everywhere be found. That allegory has a place in Old Testament interpretation Paul has shown (Gal. iv. 24). How readily it may be perverted, Augustine is one of innumerable examples to prove. The superiority of the New Testament writers to the greatest of the fathers appears nowhere more clearly than in the sobriety and self-restraint with which they employ a method so tempting and so easily abused. In the whole range of Christian literature it would be difficult to find conceits more fantastic and puerile than those which may be gathered from the pages of Augustine. Often indeed he has only repeated or amplified explanations already given by others, as the references appended, to which many more might be added, will show. References to his master Ambrose may be specially noted. These allegories, it should be observed, are not mere passing allusions, or homiletic adaptations; often they are drawn out in detail, form the burden of the exposition, are adduced as doctrinal proofs. Though the literal sense is maintained, it is often obscured and reduced to a subordinate place, and a spiritual significance is imposed upon every detail.

The Trinity may be indicated by the three loaves of Luke xi. 5 (Letter CXXX. 15), and by the two or three firkins of John ii. 6, the six water pots representing the six ages of the church. (For other interpretations see Tract. on John, *ad loc.*)¹

Christ was prefigured by Isaac sporting with his wife (Agt. Faust. xxii. 46); by David in his sin, though the sin of course is condemned, Uriah representing the devil, and Bathsheba

¹ Reuchlin is said to have discovered in בְּרֵה of Gen. i. 1 the initial letters of Father, Son, and Spirit. On the typical significance of the wives of Jacob, see Agt. Faust. xxii. 51 ff.

the church, "when washing herself on the roof, that is, when cleansing herself from the pollution of the world, and in spiritual contemplation mounting above her house of clay, and trampling upon it" (Agt. Faust. xxii. 87); by Jacob's stone and ladder (*Ibid.* xii. 26. Comp. Justin Martyr, Dial. lxxxvi.); by the rod of Moses (*Ibid.* xii. 28); by the axe that fell into the water (2 Kings vi.), his body the wood, his spirit the iron, separated at his death, united again in his resurrection (*Ibid.* xii. 35. Comp. Justin Martyr, Dial. lxxxvi.; Irenæus, Frag. xxviii.; Tertullian, Ans. to Jews, xiii.); by the worm that destroyed Jonah's gourd, which signified the promises and privileges of the Old Testament, "a shadow of things to come" (Letter CII. 35-37); by Elisha healing the son of the Shunamite, the staff that failed to restore life symbolizing the law (Ps. lxxi. 17; N. T. Hom. lxxxvi. 6); by the stone knives of circumcision (John xxx. 5); by the pelican, the owl, and the sparrow of Ps. cii. 7, 8; by the fish with the tribute-money, the four drachmas being the four Gospels (Ps. cxxxviii. 12); by David hiding in a cavern, which signifies at once the flesh and the tomb of Christ (Ps. lvii. 4); by the psaltery and harp, which denote his miracles and sufferings (Ps. lvii. 14), or the Spirit and the flesh (Ps. lxxi. 28), or again the ten strings of the psaltery may signify the ten commandments (Ps. xcii. 5). "But we must sing upon that psaltery, and not carry it only. For even the Jews have the Law; but they carry it; they sing not."

The cross is prefigured by the timbrel and psaltery:—"On the timbrel leather is stretched, on the psaltery gut is stretched; on either instrument the flesh is crucified" (Ps. cxlix. 4); by the drum, a skin stretched on wood (Ps. xxxiv. 1); by the spittle of David flowing upon his beard, strength covered by weakness (Ps. xxxiv. 3), though the reference is rather to

his whole estate of humiliation, culminating in the cross; by the double smiting of the rock in the wilderness, indicating two beams of the cross (John xxvi. 12); by the two sticks of the widow woman in 1 Kings xvii. 12 (Agt. Faust. xii. 34); by the three hundred of Gideon, a number represented in Greek by the letter T (Ps. lxxviii. 29. See Ambrose, *On the Christian Faith*—*prol.* For symbols of the Cross, see also Barnabas, Ep. viii., xi., xii.; Justin Martyr, *Dial.* lxxxvi. ff.; *Apol.* i. 55, 60).

The passion of Christ is symbolized by the drunkenness and nakedness of Noah—"The mortality of Christ's flesh was uncovered"—Shem and Japhet representing believers, Jews and Greeks, and Ham the heretics, or the Jewish people, while the garment with which he was covered was the sacrament, and the backs of his sons the memory of things past—"for the church celebrates the passion of Christ as already accomplished" (*City of God*, xvi. 2; Agt. Faust. xii. 23. *Comp.* Cyprian, Ep. lxii. 3); his blood by the scarlet thread of Rahab (Ps. lxxxvii. 5. *Comp.* Justin Martyr, *Dial.* cxi.; Irenæus, *Haer.* iv. 20. 12; Clemens Rom. xii.; Ambrose, *On the Christian Faith*, v. 10. 127); his baptism by the Red Sea, since it is consecrated by his blood (John xi. 4; Ps. cvi. 8). Origen taught that the shoes of Christ are his incarnation and his descent to hades. To interpret these is to loose the latchet of his shoes (*Com. on John* vi. 18).

The church is represented by the ark, though in the application the figure wavers between Christ and the church, his body. The proportions of the ark are those of the human body which he assumed (so Philo); the door is the wound made by the spear; the three stories may denote the sons of Noah, the Christian graces, or the states of marriage, widowhood, and virginity (*City of God*, xv. 26. On degrees of

Chastity see Ambrose, *On Widows*, iv.). Other interpretations may also be given. (For further details see *Agt. Faust.* xii. 14 ff.; comp. Justin Martyr, *Dial.* cxxxviii.) The church is signified again by Eve issuing from the side of Adam in his sleep—"since from Christ, sleeping on the cross, was the church to come" (John xv. 8; Ps. xli. 9); by the snow-like wool of Ps. cxlvii. 16, now cold, presently to become a garment for Christ; by the moon (Ps. xi. 3; civ. 26), though this may signify also the synagogue (Ps. xi. 12), the resurrection (Ps. ciii. 8), or the mortality of the flesh (Ps. lxxxix. 32).

The facts and fables of natural history are often adduced, though he advises, "If any comparisons shall have been made for thee, if thou hast found them in the Scriptures, believe; if thou shalt not have found them spoken of except by report, do not very much believe them" (Ps. lxvii. 10). To be wise as serpents is to sacrifice the body for Christ the head, and to put off the old man as the serpent sheds its skin (*Christ. Doct.* ii. 16. 24; comp. Ambrose, *On the Faith*, iii. 16. 131; Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catechet. Lect.* iii. 7). To renew the youth like the eagle's is to break off the beak, that which hinders the Christian life, against the rock, Christ (Ps. ciii. 8). The believer is compared to the hart (Ps. xlii.), which destroys serpents, and then, inflamed with these, seeks the water-brooks (comp. Origen on Matt. xi. 18). Moreover the harts in wandering or swimming support one another, as Christians should bear one another's burdens. The sinner is like the hare, because he is weak and timid; like the hedgehog, because covered with sins as prickles (Ps. civ. 25; comp. Cassian, *Conf. of Abbot Isaac*, ii. 11). The only reference that I have noted to the phoenix, employed as a symbol of the resurrection by Clemens Romanus, Tertullian, and others, is in the treatise "*On the Soul and its Origin*" (iv. 33).

The numbers of Scripture afford an inexhaustible field for ingenuity.¹ The twelve apostles signify the twelve hours of the day, or the four quarters of the earth multiplied by the number of the Trinity (John xxvii. 10; xlix. 8). The twenty years of Num. xiv. 29 represent the five books of the law multiplied by the four Gospels (On Merits and Rem. of Sins, ii. 57). The letters of *Adam* are the initials of the Greek words for east, west, north, and south. The numerical value of the letters is 46. Thus the forty-six years of the building of the temple (John ii. 20) indicate that Christ in the flesh was born of Adam, representing the race (John ix. 14; x. 12). (Comp. Origen on John, *in loc.*) This interpretation he received from the elders. He suggests again that $46 \times 6 = 276$, the number of days between Christ's conception on March 25 and his birth on December 25 (On the Trin. iv. 5). The seventy and eighty years of Ps. xc. 10 represent the Old and New Testaments, which hallow the seventh and eighth days (comp. Ps. cl. 1).

The bread, the fish, and the egg of Matt. vii. 9-11 denote faith, hope, and charity (Letter CXXX. 8. 16). The vinegar put to the lips of Christ represents the Jews degenerated from the wine of the patriarchs and prophets; the sponge their hearts; the hyssop the humility of Christ, and the reed the Scripture (John cxix.). The Samaritan woman (John iv.) signifies the Church, her husband the understanding, and the five husbands, like the five yoke of oxen in Luke xiv. 19, the five senses (John xv. 10 ff.; N. T. Hom. lxxii. 3). The fig-tree under which Jesus saw Nathanael is sin, because our first parents covered the shame of their transgression with fig leaves (John vii. 21; N. T. Hom. lxxii. 1). The words of John the

¹ See, in general, On the Trin. iv. 4-6; Letter LV. 28-31; John cxxii; 8 Ps. 1. 9; City of God, xi. 80-81.

Baptist, "He must increase, but I must decrease," point to the birth of the one when the days begin to lengthen, of the other when they begin to shorten; and to the fact that John was beheaded while Jesus was lifted up. (John xiv. 5). The five thousand of John vi. signify the people under the five books of the law; the twelve baskets the apostles, filled with the fragments of the law; the five loaves the Pentateuch, which was only as barley compared with the wheat of the gospel; the lad perhaps Israel, bearing but not eating; the two fishes the two great Commandments, or the Jews and the Gentiles, or the king and the priest of the old economy, typical of Christ (John xxiv.; N. T. Hom. lxxx. 1. Comp. Origen on Matt. xi.). By the pool of Bethesda is symbolized the Jewish people, enclosed within five porches, the books of Moses, which contained but did not heal them. The angel that troubled the water represented Christ; that only one was healed denoted unity; the thirty-eight years of infirmity are forty, the number of righteousness, less two, the great commandments of the law. "Take up thy bed and walk" meant, Obey these commandments. For *bed* signifies *neighbor*. "When thou wast weak, thy neighbor bore thee; thou art made whole, bear thy neighbor." *To walk* is to go unto God (John xvii.; N. T. Hom. lxxv.; Ps. lxxi. 17). For the application to baptism, see Ambrose, On the Mysts. iv.; Chrysostom, John xxxvi.; Tertullian, On Baptism, v. On Old Testament figures of baptism, see Ambrose, On the Mysts. iii.

The eyelids of God (Ps. xi. 4) are the Scriptures, the opening and closing indicating the clear and obscure passages of the Word. Or the death and resurrection of Christ may be signified. The law was written on stone, intimating the hardness of Jewish hearts; our Lord wrote upon the earth (John viii. 8), signifying the productiveness of Christians (John

xxxiii. 5; Ps. ciii. 9). In the three instances of the raising of the dead in the Gospels, the three degrees of sin are set forth, in thought, in act, in habit. The discussion is interesting and suggestive (N. T. Hom. xlviii. 5; John xlix. 3). The good Samaritan is Christ, the beast his flesh, the oil and wine baptism, the inn the church, the host the apostle Paul, the twopence the great commandments (N. T. Hom. lxxxi. 6; Ps. cxxvi. 11. Comp. Clement of Alexandria, *Salvation of the Rich Man*, xxviii., xxix.).

To these illustrations, which might be multiplied indefinitely, may be added a few examples of his treatment of passages upon which expositors are divided. Difficulties are often passed over without remark, as *ἐπιούσιος* (Matt. vi. 11), the feast of John v. 1, the date of the Last Supper. On the preaching to the spirits in prison (1 Peter iii. 19) see the long discussion in Letter CLXIV. The change of Saul's name to Paul (little) is ascribed to humility (Hom. 1 John viii. 2; On Spirit and Letter, xii.; N. T. Hom. xxvii. 3); in another place to the conversion of Sergius Paulus (Conf. viii. 4). The imprecatory Psalms are not the expressions of desire, but prophecies (Ps. lxxix. 14). The ignorance of the Son (Mark xiii. 32) he understands, with Hilary (Letter CLXXX. 3), to mean only that he would not reveal to his disciples. "He is ignorant of this, as making others ignorant" (On the Trin. i. 12. 23. Comp. Ambrose, *On the Faith*, v. 16 ff.; Gregory the Great, x.; Letter XXXIX.; Basil, Letter CCXXXVI.). Upon the vexed question of the genealogies of our Lord, he held that Matthew gives the line of Joseph's father, Luke the line of the stepfather by whom, or rather unto whom, he was adopted (Harm. of Gos. ii. 3; N. T. Hom. i. 27-29). On the significance of the number of the generations recorded, see Harm. of Gos. ii. 4; N. T. Hom. xxxiii. 5, 6. Comp. Julius

Africanus; Eus., Hist. i. 7). That both genealogies were Joseph's was the unanimous opinion of the early church, though the differences were variously explained. With the Latin fathers generally he identified Mary of Bethany with the woman that was a sinner of Luke vii., though he recognized two anointings (Harm. of Gos. ii. 79. 154; John xlix. 3, where he intimates a doubt), an error which modern exegesis has not wholly outgrown (Hengstenberg). See Ambrose, Letter XLI., where a mystical interpretation is put upon the passage.)

Beyond any other teacher Augustine has profoundly and permanently affected the whole course of Scripture exposition. A few examples may suffice to illustrate the extent of his influence. He was one of the first (City of God, xv. 23) to apply the phrase "sons of God," in Gen. vi. 2, to the children of Seth, the line of godly men, in opposition to the common opinion that it signified the angels, held by Justin Martyr, Apol. ii. 5; Athenagoras, Apol. xxiv.; Josephus, Antiq. i. 3. 1; Philo, De Gig. ii.; Book of Enoch, ii. 6; Tertullian, On Veiling of Virgins, vii.; Test. xii. Patrs. i. 5; Methodius, Disc. on Resurrection, iii. 7; Clement of Alexandria, Paed. iii. 2; Lactantius, Div. Instt. ii. 15; Sulpitius Severus, Sacr. Hist. i. 2. Ambrose seems to waver (Expos. Ps. cxviii.; Serm. iv. 8 and viii. 58; Apol. David, i. 4; On Noah and the Ark, iv. 8). In face of these witnesses it is difficult to understand the statement of Prof. W. H. Green in the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review* for October, 1894, p. 655, that "this purely mythological conceit was repelled by the great body of Jewish and Christian interpreters from the earliest periods." Compare the Commentaries of Delitzsch and Dillmann. In this interpretation, Augustine was anticipated by Julius Africanus (Routh, Rel. Sac. ii. 421. See Cassian, Conf. of Abbot Serenus, ii. 21). In strong reaction from the

absurdities of chiliasm, to which in its more spiritual form he was at one time inclined, he taught that the millennium is the period between the coming of Christ in the flesh and the end of the world (City of God, xx. 7-9); and against his judgment, reinforced as it appeared to be by the course of history, hardly a dissenting voice was raised for a thousand years. His doctrine of the Trinity has been profoundly influential in shaping the thought of the church. He taught the procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son (On the Trin. iv. 20-29; John xcix. 6-9), though principally from the Father (On the Trin. xv. 26. 47); and to him beyond any other man is due the addition of *filioque* to the Latin creed, which remains to this day the doctrinal stumbling-block in the way of the reunion of Eastern and Western Christendom as represented by the Greek and Roman Catholic churches.

It would be highly interesting to examine the teaching of Augustine upon such themes as the celibacy of the clergy, purgatory, prayers for the dead, church polity, and baptism, and trace his influence in the development of government and doctrine: but this belongs rather to history.

It is apparent that Augustine was not a master in the sphere of critical exegesis; but what man can be named in the history of the church who stands in the front rank at once of exegetes and of theologians, except John Calvin? Yet though inferior in learning to many of earlier and of later times, he is surpassed by none in the firmness with which he grasped, and the clearness and force with which he expounded, the essential truth of Scripture. So vigorous was his understanding, so keen his insight, so rich his experience, that with all their defects his expositions are mines of intellectual and spiritual treasure, still indispensable after the lapse of fifteen centuries to the thorough student of the Word.

ARTICLE VIII.

LABOR PROBLEMS OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY.

BY PRESIDENT CHARLES WILLIAM ELIOT, LL.D.

[An address given before the Boston Labor-Union to define the author's attitude on the labor question. This address and his previous one on "The True Mission of Labor-Unions" (published in the *BIBLIOTHECA SACRA*, for January, 1903, pp. 129-147) furnish two of the most important contributions to the subject that have been made, and are worthy of the permanent preservation which they will receive by being published in our pages.—ED.]

THE opening of the twentieth century has witnessed a remarkable change in the conflict between labor and capital—a change due to the rapid increase in the effective power of large combinations of men. Democracy has made legal these combinations, whether of laborers or of employers; and applied science has made them possible on an immense scale and over great areas. The telegraph, telephone, and quick mail have made it possible to unite thousands of men who live and work in groups scattered all over our broad land, in prompt common action under a few leaders whose headquarters are kept in instant connection with hundreds of thousands of different centers of industrial activity. This secure legal status, which is hardly thirty years old (in England 1871-75), and these means of instant communication, so recent as still to be developing, belong both to workingmen and to employers. The workingmen were the first to utilize them; for till the opening of the twentieth century the organization of employers was very inferior, both in extent and in firmness, to the organization of the employes.

RISE OF EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATIONS.

In most of the trades and manufactures in this country the employers were so imperfectly organized that, by attacking

one employer, or a few isolated employers, in a trade or manufacturing in which many employers were competing with each other, the labor-union could gradually overcome the whole group by forcing a few at a time to raise wages or shorten hours in fear lest their competitors should capture their business during a strike. It is the frequent sight of this conquest in detail and the mounting demands of organized labor which have finally produced firm associations of employers. The spirit of the numerous employers' associations, which with characteristic American quickness have been organized within three years, is not always the same. In some of them the prime object seems to be to resist labor-unions; but in most of them the main intention is to discuss with organized labor new demands from either side, to prevent the interruption of production, and, respecting each other's rights, to keep the peace and cooperate for mutual benefit.

An employer, or an association of employers, may be expected to resist at first new demands of his employes, if these demands threaten to diminish the employer's habitual profit; but if the employes stop working, the employer will not long forego all income from his investments in buildings, machinery, and stock. If his market is secure, he will raise the price of his product enough to cover his new expenditures for labor and to keep his own habitual profit—that is, he will, after a time, compromise with his employes, resume operations, and recoup himself from the community. Naturally, an employer who has a practical monopoly in his business will act in this way sooner than one who has not, for he is surer of his market. Now, the final outcome of the successful organization of a solid and complete employers' association in any trade or industry is the securing of a monopoly of the whole product of that trade or industry; and the final outcome of the successful organization and maintenance of labor-union is a monopoly of all the labor in the trade or industry which the union represents. Work out to perfection in practice the theory of the complete national employers' association in any trade, and federated labor-unions all over

the country in the same trade, and we arrive at the successful establishment of two monopolies—one in the labor necessary for making the goods, and the other in the goods themselves.

The fundamental motive and spirit of these two monopolies are precisely the same. Both propose to prevent competition, so that each may regulate prices within its own field. The workmen propose to get into the union all the laborers in their trade, so that they can control the daily wages, the number of hours or of pieces of work which shall be called a day, and the general conditions under which the work is done, the definition of a day's work being the basis of the demand for extra pay for overtime. The employers propose to fix the conditions under which the whole product of the industry shall be sold to the public. The strong employers' association, which at the first may have been an organization chiefly for defense, inevitably tends to become a means of establishing a monopoly, or, at least, to become a price-raising or price-maintaining agency, and every national or international labor-union is trying to determine all the conditions of labor, pecuniary and other, for every laborer in the industry it represents, or, in other words, is trying to establish a successful monopoly of the sale of a certain kind of labor.

THE JOINT AGREEMENT.

The new feature in the industrial conflict since the twentieth century began is this—one monopolistic combination, the union, nowadays finds itself in face of another, the employers' association. This kind of encounter, which was rare, is now common. Out of it has promptly come the joint agreement. This joint agreement between a labor-union, or group of unions, and an employers' association is a very important step in the development of the conflict over industrial conditions, and it is of the utmost consequence that the general public should understand its significance. The firm labor-union, or group of firm unions, makes an agreement with a firm employers'

association—an agreement which ordinarily covers a period of from one to three years; in this agreement are included wages, hours, and elaborate provisions for the discussion of differences and the settlement of disputes in conferences between the two parties and for arbitration when conflicts fail to reach a satisfactory settlement by direct conference. The employers agree to employ only union men and the union agrees that its members shall work only for members of the association, and thus the employers accept and give effect to all the restrictive regulations which the union imposes on its own members.

The plain tendency of the joint agreement is to bring about a junction of the forces of labor and capital in the combined effort to raise prices and so increase both wages and profits. This ultimate result has been reached in several trades or industries in the United States within the last three years. It is not an original or novel idea. Just such results were aimed at in the combination called the Birmingham alliances in England, which date from 1890. These alliances included a pledge on the part of the manufacturers not to employ any but members of the operatives' association, and on the part of the operatives not to work for any but those manufacturers who sell their goods at prices decided on from time to time by a "wages board, to be formed of an equal number of employers and employed." The two parties united their forces in order to exact better terms from the community for their trade as a whole, and incidentally to protect themselves against what they considered unfair competition. It is this idea which has been rapidly carried into practice on a great scale among our own people since the twentieth century opened. The dual combination of laborers with employers is sometimes strengthened by including an association of manufacturers of the supplies which the employers in the trade concerned make use of. The three bodies acting together are capable of exercising a complete command over the trade so organized; but they have great difficulty in acting together except in very prosperous times.

Whither does this practice tend, and what are the natural limits of its power, if any there be? Under democratic law and custom, and with the facilities which modern society possesses for quick intercourse and free exchange of views, these two monopolistic combinations, the union and the employers' association, have come into existence, and are capable of uniting in a common interest. What is the limit to the successful exercise of the tremendous power such a combination of two monopolies possesses? The limit, I believe, is only to be found at the limit of the consuming power of the population. That consuming power is limited. It fluctuates from year to year, but it rises in civilized countries from generation to generation, and has risen prodigiously during the past one hundred years. Nevertheless, its limits are much narrower than the modern monopolists appear to suppose.

MODERN TENDENCIES ILLUSTRATED.

Let me illustrate, as briefly as possible, what I mean by these limits of consuming power. Ninety years ago Harvard College, which was then an institution of far less wealth and influence than it is to-day, built in the middle of the college yard, from plans made by Charles Bulfinch, the earliest of American architects, a handsome building of white hammered granite, from Chelmsford. It stands there to-day, one of the most valued of the university buildings, a great credit to the architect who designed it and the stonecutters who shaped the material. A few years ago, hoping that it would be possible to use the same material in a new stone building which had been designed for the university, I inquired into the cost of that same stone, cut in the same way, and found that cost to be absolutely beyond the resources of the present university. It was out of question to use again the hammered granite which three generations ago it was possible for the poorer college to employ to such advantage. Any one who examines the office buildings and other commercial structures lately erected in Boston will see that the stone used in them is a soft limestone, or a sandstone, which can be sawed.

Instead of the hammered granite fronts which used to stand on Pearl Street and many of the other older streets of Boston we have nowadays brick fronts, trimmed with soft stone, and steel frame buildings veneered with thin layers of the same easily worked material. The rock hills of New England could well supply granites of immense endurance and many pleasing shades of color; but the labor conditions in the granite industry prohibit the use of those materials.

To take another illustration from the building trades— heavy buildings used to be placed on solid foundations of block granite; but, because of the great cost of such foundations, concrete structures, which can be erected with little except the crudest sorts of labor, will be hereafter largely substituted for brick and stone. At this moment, building all over the United States has been checked, because the cost of building has so increased that men thinking to invest in buildings are doubtful if they can get, at the present prices of construction, an adequate return on their investment. The method of abstinence on the part of the consumer will stop the rise of prices, even in an industry which two absolute monopolies control. I believe that there is no other real limit to the power of such combinations.

SOME GAIN TO THE COMMUNITY.

There is, however, some clear gain to the whole community from the progressive rise in the price of labor and of materials since labor-unions began to put up wages. Invention has been strongly stimulated thereby—the invention of labor-saving machinery and of new materials or new combinations of materials. Every such invention adds to the power of man over Nature, and some of this added power ought to be credited to the unions. At this point some enthusiastic unionist may say, Organize every trade and calling, so that there shall be no non-union public to suffer from the price-raising which twentieth-century unionism effects. But if we try to imagine the entire community divided into trade-union groups, each group containing the union and the employers' association of its trade, we immediately perceive that the attitude of

each single trade group toward its consumers will remain precisely what it is now. Society will be divided into monopolistic trade groups; but each group will be trying to get higher wages and profits by raising prices on its own goods. The union label will be on all goods, and therefore of no advantage to any; and the only market will be a higgling between intrenched monopolies. A demand consisting of many unionized monopolies will encounter a supply proceeding from a single unionized monopoly. This situation is almost unimaginable.

Recent experience and the ordinary working of universal human motives assure us that these combined efforts of two monopolies may be directed, and will be directed, to raising the prices of necessities of life, such as coal, wheat, and water. From real necessities of life the people at large cannot long abstain, though in some measure they can find substitutes for things they have considered necessities. People can wait for cigars or cash registers, or even for houses and shops; but they cannot wait long for food, or domestic fuel, or, in cities, for the water which must be pumped by coal, or for the street lights produced from coal. Already in the United States the supplies of these necessities of life in modern society have been seriously threatened, and indeed, for brief periods, partly cut off. From such dangers society must find a sure way to defend itself. The total interruption of the post-office, telegraph or telephone service, or municipal water supplies is not to be contemplated by modern society. Other modes than strikes or lockouts must be used for adjusting wages and hours of labor in such services as these. All possible alleviations and defenses being taken into account, it must be confessed that the prospect of encountering a combination of a perfect labor-union and a perfect employers' association, both engaged in providing a necessary of life, and both bent on raising its price, is a formidable one for society at large. Democratic society has by its legislation and by its public opinion made such a combination possible, and democratic society must guard against dangers which, in its pursuit of liberty, it has engendered.

It is, of course, conceivable that the legislatures which created the right of association should hereafter limit that right, or restrict the purposes for which the right should be exercised. It is also conceivable that the courts should find ways of preventing that close restraint of trade which results from firm monopolistic organization, whether that of a labor-union or of an employers' association, or indeed of a very comprehensive trust among owners of railroads, steamships or factories. Much of the old doctrine about conspiracy and restraint of trade seems to be in an uncertain and latent condition; but it is possible that this doctrine may be revived and developed by democratic courts and accepted by democratic society. The world has already seen the disappearance of monopolistic industrial organizations which once had great power.

THE GUILDS OF THE MIDDLE AGES.

The old guild organizations of medieval Europe, once very powerful in the regulation of wages and prices, broke down before the end of the eighteenth century, under the action of new economic forces. It was in part the extension, first, of home industries, and then of the factory system, and the introduction of mechanical power, which gradually destroyed these ancient industrial authorities; but, chiefly, it was the incompatibility of the guild system with nineteenth-century ideas of individual liberty and free competition. The medieval guilds bore more resemblance to labor-unions than to the modern associations of employers; for they not only regulated wages, hours of labor, and apprenticeship in a given craft, but they had certain benevolent and social features such as enter into the purposes of modern labor-unions. The story of the decline of the guilds suggests that democratic forces may again put limits to the power of association laborers and associated capitalists alike. When such associations of either kind become monopolistic, they interfere with ideas which are precious to modern society and especially to democratic society—the ideas of individual liberty and free competition.

The same democratic government which gave the right of

association and the right of incorporation with limited liability has already exercised some powers of supervision over the strong combinations thus created, especially when the industrial combinations created began to exert a monopolistic power. Thus railroads, steamship companies, gas companies, and electrical companies of all sorts, with banks, savings banks and insurance companies, have been made subject to various degrees of public supervision, and this public supervision commands, in most respects, public approval, and has produced, where wisely exercised, admirable results in the protection of the public against monopolistic oppression.

GOVERNMENT INSPECTION AND CONTROL.

The present tendencies of labor-unions and employers' associations suggest strongly the expediency of establishing over them governmental inspection and control, and this for two reasons—first, that both kinds of association soon become monopolistic, and secondly, that they are secret societies. Democratic government, like despotic government, dislikes secret societies, particularly if they are apt to resort to violence for the enforcement of their demands. Americans seem to take kindly to private or secret clubs or associations for social and benevolent purposes, and now and then for political purposes, but they are inclined to distrust the organization of thousands or millions of men into secret societies having industrial or commercial objects. One would say that, on the whole, there has been a visible tendency during the last four years to an increased regulation of industrial combinations of all sorts through the courts.

Picketing is sometimes prohibited by police orders, on the ground that, like assembling in crowds on the streets, it causes public disorder in times of excitement. The growing strength of industrial combinations having been partly expressed in the accumulation of invested funds and cash resources, the tax gatherer is looking at these accumulations with increasing interest. Moreover, these accumulations invite actions for damages against either labor-unions or employers' associa-

tions—actions which may be brought by an injured workman, or an injured employer, or by the public prosecuting attorney.

The action of legislative or judicial remedies must, however, necessarily be slow and superficial. The real remedies for destructive strife, whether the strife between workmen and capitalists, or the strife between firm monopolies and society at large, must be found through the deep workings of the same democratic spirit which created the conditions that made such strife possible. Now, the effective democratic powers for good are the increase of intelligence and skill through education, and the increase of efficiency through the promotion of individual liberty and coöperative good-will. How to develop these powers is democratic society's great problem.

Real social improvement or progress is very seldom brought about in this world by violence, although violence seems to be sometimes necessary in order to procure public attention to existing wrongs, and to win opportunity for the play of reason and good feeling. There is no more misleading phrase in history than the phrase "decisive battle." Waterloo has been called a "decisive battle," and did restore the Bourbons for the moment; but somehow there has now been a republic in France for a whole generation, and the president of it is of peasant birth. How many things my generation thought were decided at Appomattox; but during the subsequent forty years it has gradually appeared that hardly anything was there settled except the preservation of the unity of the national territory. It remained for long years of civil endeavor to determine the uplifting of the negro race, the relations of the whites to the negroes, the new industrial resources of the South, and the slow development of a better social order. That frightful civil war did but procure the opportunity for the legitimate play on a great social wrong of the universal principles of good feeling and good sense.

SUGGESTED MODIFICATIONS IN LABOR CONDITIONS.

In all social and industrial strife it is immeasurably better to use the great forces of publicity, discussion, and fellow-

feeling before physical conflicts take place, rather than after they have occurred. It is, therefore, an intensely interesting inquiry what modifications of existing labor conditions will tend toward permanent industrial peace, and be absolutely consistent with the democratic ideal of liberty. To that inquiry I turn.

1. Steadiness of employment is reasonably desired by both the workmen and the employer. Labor is a commodity which should be salable for future delivery, and not be merely delivered at a price for the passing day. On the other hand, the enormous investments of capital which many manufacturers now require make it of great consequence to the employer that he should be able to count for at least one year on the cost of his labor. In this respect the joint agreement works a great improvement, but there are other possible improvements which look toward this same steadiness of employment. Thus, the instant dismissal of the laborer by the employer, except for the clearest reasons, is brutal, and inconsistent with considerate relations between labor and capital; and even sudden reductions in the working force of a large establishment without notice of previous concert are lamentable, although sometimes unavoidable when bad judgment or misfortune has changed a successful establishment into an unsuccessful one. American legislation on the tariff brings about in many trades alternations of exaltation and depression; and so long as it is persevered in, these alternations will occur. They militate against steadiness of employment; but the joint agreement will mitigate the situation, if it proves to work as well when prices are declining as it does when prices are rising. The automatic sliding scale of wages also offers advantages in promoting steadiness of employment and prevents the contests which the inevitable fluctuations of wages are apt to provoke.

2. Another common need for workmen and employers is that condition of labor which permits the laborer to have a settled place of abode. A nomad population can hardly be a civilized one. Only a firmly settled laboring population, which desires and expects to pass its life in one spot can be really

happy and contented and produce good citizens. The family which lives without love of its home, or pride in its local surroundings, is not the kind of family a free state needs. It cannot produce some of the most solid advantages of life. It cannot develop in its children the sentiments on which patriotism is founded. Hence, durable improvement in the condition of any body of laborers must contemplate a localized industry and terms of employment which make possible the creation and preservation of permanent homes. It follows that employers or associations of employers that import, or bring from afar, wandering work-people having no local attachments, impair the prospect of establishing just and satisfactory relations between capital and labor. From this same point of view it is undesirable that the managers of a business conducted by a large corporation should be non-resident. The managers of a factory ought to live in the same place with the work-people, in order that they may all have common local interests and daily friendly relations. On the other hand, so far as labor-unions encourage or compel the migration of laborers from one place to another, abandoning employment here, enlisting there, and forming one connection after another without any intention of settling anywhere, they postpone the only satisfactory solution of the laboring-man's problem, a secure, steady employment at wages which will make a settled family comfortable.

3. In manufactures which require large and costly plants and numerous operatives the strife between labor and capital—so wearing and wasteful for both parties—would be pacified in the most substantial and durable manner if means could be found of giving the workmen two things which they now obtain but rarely in a highly organized industry—first, a voice in the discipline of the works, including that very important part of discipline, the dealing with complaints; and secondly, a direct pecuniary interest besides wages in the proceeds of the combined application of the capital and the labor to the steady production of salable goods. A voice in the management of the works the workmen may reasonably aspire

to. The successful management of any large industry involves two quite distinct processes—first, the maintenance of good discipline of the works, and, secondly, the maintenance of a shrewd and alert trading policy. The workmen themselves generally recognize that the trading policy must be determined from month to month, or even from day to day, by a small number of skillful persons, or oftener by one extremely skillful man.

RELATIONS OF EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYED.

It is not in deciding on this policy that the workmen think they have a right to take part; but they almost unanimously believe that it is both right and expedient that they should have a voice in regard to the discipline of the establishment. They also believe, almost unanimously, that the faithful and industrious workman who works for years in the same industrial establishment has earned something more than the wages paid him. They believe that he has contributed to the reputation of the product and therefore to the good-will of the establishment, and that he should have some pecuniary share in the value of that reputation and that good-will. They recognize the fact that only the settled or reasonably permanent workman has any claim on this intangible and yet real something. The transitory workman who shifts from one factory to another is evidently entitled to his wages only.

The share in the profits or the good-will which should go to the permanent workman is a difficult thing to determine wisely and justly. It would doubtless be different in establishments having different products, and indeed in the same establishments at different periods. The satisfactory determination of it would involve knowledge by the permanent workmen of the annual results of the business, and this knowledge would have to be given with exactness and completeness to chosen representatives of the body of workmen.

To secure the confidence of the workmen in the statement of the year's business, expert auditors or accountants selected by them would examine the accounts and certify to the annual statement. Although public accounting in intelligible and

uniform methods is as yet in its infancy among us, there are numerous successful financial and transportation companies, the accounts of which are already published under the supervision of the state without prejudicing the business in any manner. Thus, savings banks, insurance companies, trust companies, and railroads are obliged to publish at stated intervals figures which enable the public to form some useful judgment as to their condition and as to the results of their business during the period covered.

The necessity and value of an extreme privacy in a manufacturing or building business have been much exaggerated. Doubtless, if intelligible accounts of the results of a business were to be annually submitted to the permanent workmen employed, the chance of occasional high profits kept secret would have to be abandoned by the employer. The capitalists of the enterprise would have to be content with a regular moderate return on the capital and with sound safeguards against depreciation or degeneration in stock and plant. In maintaining any degree of privacy which contributed to the success of the business, the permanent workmen would be as much interested as the owners.

The establishment of mutual confidence between capital and labor, based on acquaintance with the methods and results of the business they combined to conduct, would be so precious an achievement that large sacrifices might reasonably be incurred to secure it. One of the results of this mutual confidence and coöperation would be that every workman would see it to be to his own individual interest to improve in every imaginable way the methods of the industry, and to impart to the management any idea of improvement which came into his head. Questions about working hours, as well as questions about wages, would be more easily adjusted than they are now; for the operative who had an interest in the annual profits would soon learn, that in large, staple industries profits are much affected by the number of hours of the twenty-four during which the costly plant can be utilized.

These two provisions—a voice in the discipline of the works

and a share in the pecuniary value of the good-will—would give the workingman something indispensable to a satisfactory working life, namely, the opportunity and purpose to serve generously and proudly the establishment or institution with which the workman is connected. This is one of the deep, permanent satisfactions of human life, and I cannot call any conditions of employment humane which make that satisfaction unattainable. Looking back on my own working life, spent in the service of a single institution, I see clearly what a happy privilege it is to give unstinted service to an undying institution in whose permanent and enlarging serviceableness one ardently believes.

RISING WAGES AND PENSIONS.

Two other humane conditions of labor, if generally introduced, would render industrial conflicts less frequent and greatly mitigate their severity. These are the rising wage—rising, that is, with years and experience—and the pension or retiring allowance at disability. I see with great satisfaction that these two provisions, both of which prevail in my business, are spreading widely among industrial, financial, and transportation companies in the United States. Wisely applied and taken together, they are capable of doing much to prevent strikes and other disastrous interruptions of manufacturing and trading operations. They give security and dignity to the laborer, and are as applicable in the humblest careers as in the highest.

These processes of improving the conditions of labor by giving free play among laborers to the ordinary hopes and motives which govern the conduct of all intelligent and conscientious people are in the main within the power of any single employer, and should be examined, not as philanthropic performances, but strictly as business measures. It has been abundantly proved that what are called “welfare” arrangements in factories—good air, strong light, cleanliness, tidiness, ornamented grounds, washing facilities, lunch-rooms, and so forth—emphatically pay. They are not favors or charities,

but business. Just as the single employer or owner, whether an individual or a corporation, can introduce these welfare arrangements of his own motion, so he can adopt all the humane conditions of employment I have described, with the single purpose of making his business steadier, more agreeable, and, all things considered, more satisfactorily profitable. These humane conditions, wisely adjusted, will pay, because they will make all hands more alert, zealous, and efficient, more contented and happier, and therefore more productive workers.

NEW OBJECTS OF ASSOCIATION.

You have doubtless perceived that an organization of industries under the humane conditions which I have been describing involves the continued existence of both kinds of industrial association—the employers' association and the labor-unions—but the motives and objects of both these associations would be much changed. In industries which support thousands of workmen and hundreds of employers, both workmen and employers often need to take action through representatives, and must maintain organizations capable of choosing representatives. Apart from benevolent and social objects, those two forms of association would be maintained for the principal object of determining prices—the prices which each industry would bear. A secondary object would be to improve steadily those sanitary and educational conditions of labor which make labor more efficient and both capital and labor more productive. Those two objects are perfectly harmonious, for since wages can in the long run only be paid out of product, the economic justification of higher wages is greater skill and efficiency in the individual workman, and their social justification is the increased total efficiency and happiness of the community. The process of determining what prices a given industry will bear is now a process of combat. The weapons have been chiefly strikes, boycotts, and lock-outs, all of which ordinarily involve bitter strife and violence, and not infrequently the disastrous interruption of a productive industry. This is certainly a very stupid way of arriving

at a determination of the best price to be got in any year or at any moment for a given product. Conference and discussion between the workman, the capitalist, and the trading agent, whatever he may be called, are the rational modes of arriving at a practical answer to the question of price; and this would be the mode adopted if the right relations existed between capitalist and workman, each believing that the other had a genuine interest in the real success of the business they unite to conduct.

Democratic society believes fundamentally in seeking the greatest good of the greatest number, and in seeking this greatest good through freedom, order, justice, and good-will. During the first half of the nineteenth century it believed that the greatest good of the greatest number was consistent with the greatest good and largest freedom of the individual. During the last half of the century it seemed to have experienced some reversion of feeling with regard to personal liberty. It has seemed willing to sacrifice the welfare of the individual to the supposed welfare of the mass, to abridge the liberty of the individual for the supposed collective benefit of his class.

The labor-unions and the employers' associations both illustrate this tendency. They are both fighting organizations, and all fighting abridges individual liberty—indeed, puts an end to it for the time being. Armies and navies are not concerned with personal liberty, but with implicit obedience and the complete subordination of the individual to the efficiency of the organization to which he belongs. In the same way labor-unions and employers' associations, so far as they are fighting bodies, abridge personal liberty; and so far forth they are in conflict with the democratic ideal. They are also in conflict with the democratic ideal when they destroy free competition. In this respect one kind of association is just as bad as the other. A monopoly has always been an object of detestation in democracies, and such it ought always to remain, for competition is the native air of human progress and improvement.

DEMOCRACY AND THE LABOR QUESTION.

How else can the new and better thing get a chance to demonstrate its superiority to the established but inferior thing? How else can rising genius win its way against entrenched dullness? How else can new inventions in industry or trade demonstrate their superiority? The rising generation should be free to compete with the generation in possession. The young journeyman should be free to compete with the old one, and surpass him if he can. The department store should be free to prove that it serves the community better than a large number of separate stores. A young department store should be free to prove itself better than the older ones. Competition in industries, trades, and professions provides the indispensable opportunity for progress. It is the friend and servant of liberty; and this is the reason why democracy has always feared and protested against monopoly.

Again, democracy believes to its very core in the modern mobility of industrial and commercial society, that mobility or fluidity which permits the capable and promising individual to rise through its various layers. It believes with all its might that every young American of remarkable capacity should find it easy to rise through all the grades of his trade till he becomes himself an employer and leader. It believes with all its soul that every child should be able to get the best education it is capable of receiving, and that society suffers a grave injury if the upward progress of a promising child is checked or prevented.

Democratic society, therefore, sees with great concern that in the joint agreements now made between labor-unions and employers' associations there are many provisions which tend to make rigid and high the barriers between the common laborer, the helper, the journeyman, the employer, and the capitalist, and the fences between one trade and another. It sees with alarm these great combinations of men acting on principles which tend strongly to divide American society into classes, and to perpetuate those classes. Whoever gets a monopoly—be it one man or one hundred thousand men

—invariably tries to keep other people from sharing his exclusive privilege. Any monopolistic classification must cause great abridgments of personal liberty among all sorts and conditions of men. Moreover, since the fundamental object of the labor-union or the employers' association is always the pecuniary benefit of its class, these two organizations are providing democratic society with exhibitions of class selfishness, which, in other centuries, society, and government have seen manifested by classes quite different from those that now manifest it, as, for example, by nobilities, priesthoods, and soldieries. The world has had bitter experience of the evils resulting from the class selfishness of these aristocratic, ecclesiastical, and military combinations; and democracy does well to distrust the new developments of class selfishness, different though the classes be that now manifest this dangerous quality.

Again, a bold, alert, and vigorous democracy will always believe in every man's doing his best, and being free to do his best whatever his station or function in society. Real democracy thinks of an operative or a mechanic who does not do his best at his trade with the same contempt it would feel toward a fireman who did not work his hardest at a fire, or a nurse who took care of a patient nearly as well as she could, or a surgeon who cut out a tumor with a slow, languid, inexact hand, or a teacher who regulated his own work for his pupils by the accomplishment of the slow and dull teacher in the next room, or the dairyman who kept his milk and cream only as clean as his dirty neighbor's, or the steersman who kept his vessel somewhere near her course when the only safety lay in keeping her exactly on her course. Democracy knows that the main object of being free is precisely the freedom to do one's best and win one's best, to-day, to-morrow, at home, abroad, at work, at play, alone, in society, in labor, and in love. Democracy knows that the only way to do better to-morrow is to do one's best to-day, and the doing better and being better should be the fundamental object of every free man's life. That way lies increasing usefulness and hap-

piness as life goes on. That way lies public prosperity and happiness.

Therefore democracy must profoundly distrust the labor-union's too frequent effort to restrict the efficiency and the output of the individual workman; but its objection is not economic, but moral. It objects to this method of rotting the individual man's moral fiber. But how about the feeble or slow brother who cannot keep up with the strong, alert brother in the craft? Shall not the strong man help the weak? Yes, by doing the work or bearing the burden of the weak in addition to his own, but never by voluntarily impairing his own force of body and will. We are told to bear one another's burdens, not to make every man's burden no heavier than the weakest can bear. The brothers in one family are seldom equal in bodily strength or force of character; but a wise and loving parent never wishes to average the brothers. To increase the superiority of the superior is more important to the family than to diminish the inferiority of the inferior. It is also more expedient for society at large. It is a false and degrading view of brotherhood which proposes to sacrifice the efficiency of the strong to the inefficiency of the weak.

A WORLD-WIDE CONFLICT.

How, then, shall democratic society contemplate these new and formidable industrial and social commotions? Calmly and courageously, as witnessing a world-wide conflict in which certain democratic qualities of ancient date are greatly needed, and are to be ultimately manifested. These qualities are an abiding confidence in freedom, publicity, discussion, and fair play, a love of vigor and efficiency, and a firm faith that free institutions will prove to be also fundamentally righteous, and consequently conducive in the highest degree to public welfare and happiness. Amid all these combinations and masses, what can the individual do, the man of free spirit, who is willing to pay a to-day's price for freedom? You and I and everybody must, in the first place, believe, and must teach our children to believe, that brave men are not mere

creatures of circumstances, slaves of blind forces, or tools of destiny, but are capable of molding circumstances, directing forces, and changing destiny. And then each one of us must fight evil and promote good by his own personal endeavors and sacrifices. The forces of society, which seem so strong, often turn out to be weak when confronted by men who believe with all their hearts in pure ideals of freedom and righteousness.

ARTICLE IX.

THE LAW OF VERACITY: A STUDY IN
PRACTICAL ETHICS.¹

BY PROFESSOR GABRIEL CAMPBELL.

IN the interpretation of the development of the race a fact at once remarkable and anomalous comes to view, namely, the varying recognition and valuation of Truth. At all times and everywhere the acclaim is so unanimous, the commendation of truth so imperative, it may well be designated a racial impulsion. When, however, we pass definitely from theory to practice the divergence in valuing is as marked as was the unanimity.

This has been interpreted as an outcome of our partial, our progressive evolution. Spinoza's account of Evil in the world as resultant of man's limitations, is admirable for its simplicity. But clearly it is too simple. In the ethical opinion of sundry barbaric civilizations we find truthfulness holding its maximum rank; while in our own most enlightened communities it encounters difficulties seemingly for the moment insurmountable. One of the most subtly perplexing problems of our modern applied ethics is this, Does there exist for us a Law of Veracity, or only a convenient, conventional maxim? In other words, Is Kant's pronouncement "To speak the truth is my bounden duty" a result of genuine vision, or is this merely Kantian mysticism, as some of his followers claim? Here then is our question.

Let us summarize a few prominent ethnic peculiarities in the appreciation of a Law of Veracity. Among the ancient Egyptians there was a singularly unsophisticated blending of

¹A paper read before the American Philosophical Association, in Princeton, New Jersey, December 30, 1903.

speech and life: no distinction between what a man says and what he is. For admission to a future happy world it is only requisite that the soul before the judges repeat moral maxims, declare I have not falsified. The word stood for the deed and the life.

In China a distinguishing between speech and deed becomes apparent. Who can compute the effect upon Chinese life of the confession by their great moralist Confucius that he himself failed upon occasion to conform his conduct veraciously to his words?

There develops in India a remarkable antithesis. The oldest codes condemn falsehood in strongest terms. A hero who will not lie is immortalized. And yet, it is in evidence that there were likewise evolved methods of deception as deftly systematic as a cancerous disease.

So far as we can ascertain, the Scandinavians appear to have been worshippers of veracity. No place in their Valhalla for a liar.

Among the Greeks and Romans, while Socrates is willing to die rather than live a life not according to truth, and Cicero denounces mendacity unqualifiedly, while Plato rises to the declaration that the Divine nature is incapable of falsehood, still, the gods themselves of those civilizations were, as a rule, deceivers, fabricators of words which were not according to the hidden desire; and the gods were idealized humanity. It should be added that the Greeks at the zenith of their enlightenment surpassed the ethical development of their own Pantheon, which represented the ideation of an earlier era.

Among our modern nationalities Christianity has of course dominated Ethics, but the advance in veracity is still dubious. Although Christ was recognized as the Truth—a mouth without deceit, in this, his transcending characteristic, his followers do not immediately follow. Even the saintly Jerome must be chastened in the valuing of truth by the more saintly Augustine. A society of professed representatives of the life of Jesus give the term Jesuit an ambiguous import.

In Germany, Kant who maintains the unmeasurable value

of truthful speech is but the rational evolving of his predecessor Leibnitz. Leibnitz embraces intrinsically the apology for Kant. Recently in the University of Berlin, Dorner, my old instructor, doubtless also teacher of some of my readers, —Dorner has stood with his characteristic four-square irresistible sincerity, to advocate the priceless valuation of truthfulness. And some who may be also members of the Philosophical Society of the German Capital, the most able and cosmopolitan of philosophical societies, will agree that what has made Germany the Fatherland of philosophic thinking, is the unsurpassed candor of the search of her sons for truth's treasures.

Of course the Fatherland has her divided house. Rothe and Lotze limit the sovereignty of truthfulness, and have their following. But the Critical thinking beyond the Rhine surpasses the more politic régime in empirical England, where a utilitarian morality has tended to price and compromise even Truth itself. While we must grant Macaulay's contention that English veracity has held England's power in India, and that Dymond may stand with Kant and Dorner, while Scott commands admiration by raising a monument in Scotland to one who would not lie to save a life, nevertheless it is likewise to be told that English Philosophy in its peculiar way has influenced English development.

In America, Trumbull, who on no account would justify a lie, refuses to be delivered from a rebel prison at the price of a falsehood—his life available but not his conscience. But has the morale of our public life in the twentieth century risen greatly above the politic level, the conventional standards, of the era of Confucius? From this ethnic survey let us pass to observe the development of veracity in professional fields. And first in Jurisprudence.

The civil law has been and is a most decisive harbinger of truthful speech. It demands "Truth, nothing but the truth." Perjury is a crime, a heinous crime. The courts frequently rectify even a failure of conscience. A professedly Christian man refuses to pay a stipulated sum because the promise

was spoken, not written. His word was worth less than his ink. A civil process requires him to validate his agreement. An attorney's oath of admission to the bar includes the avowal to shape his conduct in honest conformity to law and evidence. Indeed our National Constitution forbids any State to enact a law impairing the obligation of contracts. Recognizing the fact, as Chancellor Kent asserts, that "human laws are not so perfect as the dictates of conscience," and that equity is more extensive than civil jurisdiction, it is equally certain that the administration of courts of justice is more exacting than the ordinary private administration of men's moral motives. Even in the religious field the exactions of truthfulness are less rigorous than in Jurisprudence.

Religion has developed, still develops, without full vision of its ethical implications. Judaism with its command, "Thou shalt not bear false witness," is, notwithstanding, a historical medley of inconsistencies. While in apostolic days there were those who incurred a capital penalty for false witness, even the theologians of later time have been prone to regard truth-speaking as having its price, greater or less. Sidgwick bewails the lack of veracity among ministers. His charges, I believe, are exaggerated, certainly as applied to this country. But alas, that it should at all be true that religion's teachers cannot be trusted. This tirade, however, against "clerical veracity" reveals a humorous aspect when we consider Sidgwick's own laxity of valuations, and that too in the role of professor of Ethics. He would justify falsehood to forestall social annoyance—"Not at home" replacing not wanted. It would be excusable in diplomacy when the good of the country demands. Of course in case of detective police continual deception becomes indispensable. Under guise of warfare every form of falsification has been justified. Finally the physician is to be commended who can conserve the mental balance by necessary specious assurances. These dicta of Professor Sidgwick have been only too popular, representative as they are of the antipodes of the strictly Kantian regimen.

From this survey of the objective world, historic and professional, we come to the subjective and practical inquiry. What are the internal facts? What of man's equipment and environment? Man is a creator. He may fancy, imagine, construct an entire world, an unreal cosmos. His freedom, says Hegel, permits him to disport, to develop, to handle this creation at will. He may make it his refuge. The fictitious, the false, may proffer unlimited possibilities. He is deceived—he deceives. How can civilization bring man, thus creative and free, to recognize the sovereignty of Truth? The problem before the world. Let us note sundry conditions of a requirement of truthfulness.

A man's business is his own. Here we may speak in terms of the civil law. In normal cases he is not obliged to divulge. Proper concealment is his right. Farther, he will be misunderstood. Of course he should not aim to be. He must accept the inevitable. It is not man's primal duty to explain. But, it is claimed, Necessities may meet and over-match a regimen of veracity. For instance, it cannot prevail in war. But warfare exhibits the ethics of the savage. Might makes right. Its evolution, however, is suggestive. Deception, we find, is resource proportionately as no real art of war has developed. Let warfare become science and its success appears in meeting facts—hard facts. Truthfulness, "the word of honor" among soldiers, more and more commands devout respect. To violate a flag of truce is unpardonable. Neither soldier nor civilian takes special pride in the capture of Aguinaldo so far as it was mendacious. Evidently warfare fully, properly developed becomes exacting, a mastery of verities.

But, says a spirit of chivalry, We may lie to defend a woman's honor. If a woman's reputation has no securer foundation than falsehood it is dubiously worthy of the sacrifice. Indeed it is further claimed that in courtship lovers are not expected to speak truthfully. Unfortunate evolution of affection verily. Must then the "true love" be relegated to the realm of poets and the era of the troubadour? Heaven forbid!

How lamentably does wedded life suffer from lack of conscience. The marriage vow of fidelity for better or for worse too often becomes a veritable figment. Notwithstanding the solemn pledges, how numerous the newly-wedded begin to speculate as to incompatibilities. Divorce follows divorce. There is forsooth an open question as to incompatibility. Is such speculation compatible with the most sacred vows to love, honor, and cherish? The untruthfulness of matrimonial compacts is the bane, a most alarming menace of our would-be Christian civilization.

Still, it is added, we are justified in false assurances to the sick. Nay, nay. There are truths that are healing. Can we prescribe? Or are we mere imbeciles? And shall we add mendacity to our imbecility? Shall our sick friend be tempest-tossed as to what to believe? Or perfectly trustful and confident? Shall our friend be prepared for the real, for the worst, or cajoled by specious fictions to the gates of the unseen? There is an increasing demand that physicians, so far as they speak, speak veraciously. Recently an able practitioner lost his field because his patients lost their faith.

Finally comes the test case. May we lie to save a life? In any event the evidence would, at the best, be merely probable—not to say doubtful,—that truth would be fatal. Shall we presumptuously falsify? Moreover, whatever impairs health endangers life. Shall we discount truth accordingly? But, what risk? Any risk? To me, to you, to some one? Is it not every time more or less an open question? And we become a prey under a theory of discount. Eternal quandary—unlimited travesty—confusion worse confounded. The rule is unworkable.

Doubtless veracity calls for brain power and courage. Man is rational because and before he is moral. The spherical cerebrum that enables complete inhibition is the equipment of his freedom. "God cannot lie." He knows. Intelligence cannot lie. A writer in the first century said, "They that be drunken are drunken in the night." May we not write in the twentieth century, They that make lies make lies in the night?

All deception reacts, impairs the vision. The vision impaired, the choice enslaves. The deceiver is deceived. There can be complete vision, full freedom, only in a perfect moral system. Trendelenburg declares, "It is conscience that preserves the might of the will."

Man's refuge indeed is in an ideal world. The True is in perfect affiliation with the Beautiful, the Right, and the Good. With all its shams the age is inheriting and developing the truth,—Truth in its all-pervading, all-commanding reality. Our country is safe when the soldier is ready to offer his life in its defense. Can Ethics stand with a lesser loyalty? The civil law conserves society saying "Nothing but the truth." Can religion accept a lower standard? Already the genuine expositor is heralded as a high critic, not because of his scholarship expressly, but of his sincerity. Let other critics, loving truth equally, with higher vision and broader scholarship, follow him, and he descends to the common level.

Our business life must develop in terms of the real, the genuine, the true. The goods that hold the market are to be equal to the sample. Wundt says we have reached one stage of progress toward Kant's prediction of a perfect kingdom. When the yea of a promise becomes valid, as binding as an adjuration; when our religious faith in God becomes as well, faith social, political, faith in man, we shall have reached another stage of development. It was the Nazarene who said "The Truth shall make you free."

ARTICLE X.

NOTES ON BRITISH THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

ONE of the most interesting of recent works in theology is an "Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine"¹ by J. F. Bethune-Baker, B.D., Fellow and Dean of Pembroke College, Cambridge. The book is one of a series of Handbooks on Theology, edited by Principal A. Robertson, D.D., London, and is carried up "to the time of the Council of Chalcedon." Mr. Bethune-Baker has kept the text-book purpose steadily before him, giving a continuous narrative in free and untechnical fashion, with footnotes for authorities and details. His design is to show theology in the making, and this he succeeds in doing most admirably, for the student's purpose. The work is performed, not only with wide and painstaking scholarship, but also with discrimination and independence, its prevailing orthodoxy notwithstanding. It would, of course, not be fair to judge particular parts or aspects of a student's handbook from the standpoints of experts, for it could not but be wanting from such viewpoints. Remembering, however, the purpose of the book, Mr. Bethune-Baker's work is altogether admirable, and deserves to be very extensively used, for teaching purposes, on both sides of the Atlantic. The author in his modest preface says, "I believe that this point of view, from which Christian doctrines are seen as human attempts to interpret human experiences—the unique personality of Jesus of Nazareth supreme among those human experiences, is a more satisfying one than some standpoints from which the origin of Christian doctrines may appear to be invested with more commanding power of appeal." It cannot be expected that

¹ London: Methuen & Co. Pp. xxii, 436. 10s. 6d.

different readers will account all parts of such a work equally well done, even for students' use. Occasionally, one feels tempted to wish the author had practised a less "strict economy" in works referred to, and at stray points one judges philosophical matters readily susceptible of stronger treatment. But, withal, so great learning and labor have been expended on the work that one cares not to indulge in ungracious reflections. To many of us, indeed, such teaching would, in student days, have been a veritable godsend, and they are to be heartily congratulated into whose hands Mr. Bethune-Baker's extremely able and serviceable book may be placed, for instruction in things theological. It need hardly be said that the publishers have done their part, in all respects, with their usual excellence.

Another work of much theological interest is "Studies in Theology" by J. Estlin Carpenter and P. H. Wicksteed.¹ These studies are thirteen in number, and of varying merit. Two of them—Mr. Wicksteed's "Religion of Time and the Religion of Eternity," and Mr. Carpenter's "Place of Immortality in Religious Belief"—are alone worth the price of the book. Not for a long time have we read a more timely and able pronouncement than this paper by Mr. Wicksteed, enhanced by some scholarly notes as an appendix. It deserves the warmest praise, as a valuable corrective to some current tendencies of thought. We are entirely at one with the writer's insistence—for it has been our own—that progress is related to end or goal, and that the true life of the soul is a progress *in*—and not merely *to*—the life that is in God. Mr. Carpenter's paper on Immortality is also excellent, and puts the case in varied, temperate, yet telling fashion. The writers seem to be at their best in these two pieces, and the themes were worthy of it. All the other papers may be read with pleasure (which does not mean always agreement) and profit, such subjects ranking amongst them as "The Education of the Religious Imagination," "The Place of the History of Religion in Theological Study," "Sociology

¹ London: J. M. Dent and Co. Pp. 543. 5s., *net*.

and Theology," and "Religion and Society." The chapter on "Unitarianism as a Theology" is of too sectarian a character to be of general interest, and indeed one almost regrets its accompanying themes of much larger and more inspiring interest. Our occasional vigorous and emphatic dissent from a phrase or a position does not in the least interfere with our most grateful welcome of these theological studies, which may be most heartily recommended to all robust-minded persons interested in problems of modern theology.

A noteworthy work in philosophy is the newly-issued volume, "*Principia Ethica*," by George Edward Moore, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge.¹ In his preface Mr. Moore says, "I have endeavored to write 'Prolegomena to any future ethics that can possibly pretend to be scientific.'" If there is boldness in Mr. Moore's aim, we do not on that account object to it, in days when so many works are sent forth without any sufficiently definite or justifying aim. Mr. Moore is already known to philosophical readers as an acute thinker, with masterly powers of analysis and dialectical fence. His treatment will certainly provoke criticism and dissent, possibly even antagonism, but it is to be welcomed all the same, and he deserves all credit for his intellectual courage, candor, and independence.

After a chapter on "The Subject-matter of Ethics" comes one on "Naturalistic Ethics," which deals with the question of "good in itself," and examines Spencer's positions in particular. Mr. Moore's criticism is clear, excellent, and timely. An interesting and able refutation of Hedonism follows in the next chapter, which contains a criticism on Utilitarianism that is deserving of attention. One cannot help being surprised that ethicists are so slow to perceive what we account the vicious—or say, fallacious only—identification of ethical character with mere constitutional motive or natural impulse, in theories of Hedonism. Also, that they so often fall short of realizing what a resolution of ethical right into

¹ Cambridge: At the University Press. Pp. xxvii, 232. 7s. 6d., *net*.

a mere amiable desire to please or make happy is involved in Utilitarianism.

The succeeding chapter on "Metaphysical Ethics" is one with which we are in less agreement than any other part, perhaps, of the book. Mr. Moore's discussion is too abstract and verbal, and he is too absorbed in his ethical aspects to be able to realize how deeply related these are, and must be, to the much-reviled metaphysical phases. Mr. Moore too readily assumes his "good"—even with the addition "in itself"—to be something really ultimate and unanalyzable. Ethics would be in danger of becoming a science of the visionary, imaginary, and unreal, if Mr. Moore's "confusion"—the "confusions" of metaphysicians seem dear to him—of the distinctive character of a truth as ethical ("unique in kind," as no one denies) with its absolute unrelatedness to truth or reality, were ever to have the slightest chance of currency. Be it plainly spoken, therefore, the true or the real has much more significance for the good than Mr. Moore's ethical philosophy has discovered or admitted. Metaphysics and ethics have to do with a universe that is real and rational, and we wish Mr. Moore had come into closer grips with reality here. For surely philosophy is, in our time, and none too quickly, awakening to the fact that its business is to transcend all one-sided procedures, and see to it that metaphysics shall be ethical, and that ethics shall do justice to metaphysical presuppositions. It should be thoroughly understood in this connection that the ideal is indeed the fundamental reality, so that metaphysical presuppositions cannot be got away from. When Mr. Moore comes, in the fifth and sixth chapters, to treat of the good and the ideal, he does not set forth the good sufficiently as something determined by us under the truths, laws, and ideals of reason. He makes insistences like "good is good and nothing else whatever," telling us he has "established" this, and urging almost in the same breath that such fundamental truths of ethics are "self-evident" in the sense that no reason can be given for them. This sort of thing gives an irrational cast to ethics which is

hardly to be commended. There is nothing more inspiring about Mr. Moore's book than his own fine, unfailing interest in ethical method as such, but the subject itself is left concerned too little with ethical beings—their characters, choices, volitions, self-determinations—and too largely with abstract ethical objects, to reach the level of interest of which it is capable. The good and its recognition is much too axiomatic an affair for our ethical philosopher, in the rarefied atmosphere in which his thought moves, to care one jot or tittle whether the whole matter has any vital interest for us or not. Not so have we learned ethics, but with "that severe, that earnest air" which marks the strenuous moods of the moral life. It is to be said, however, that Mr. Moore has given us a book which may be cordially recommended to the notice of ethical students on both sides of the Atlantic, as one which, by its fundamental questionings and its acute, ingenious, and brilliant discussions, will prove a valuable contribution to the scientific study of ethics.

A small book from the pen of the veteran philosopher, Dr. J. Hutchison Stirling, is on "The Categories."¹

Though small, the book is extremely able. As Dr. Stirling's, it could not be anything else. Not even its occasional jerkiness of style avails in the least to take away from the fascinating interest of the work. Dr. Stirling lays down in his preface that the net result of modern philosophy is just the ego. That, of course, is no new word, but Dr. Stirling has his own way of amply illustrating its truth.

In his first chapter he deals with the "Categories Generally," remarking at its close that "it is not meant to talk of Categories, as formally the business in hand. What comes into speech here is, for the most part, a general theme, and really in continuance of philosophy as I have of late written on it, say, in my immediately previous book, 'What is Thought?'" The second chapter, on "The Double Statement," is supremely interesting, dealing with the contradiction of reason and faith, the reflection-philosophy, and the re-

¹ Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd. Pp. 158. 4s.

lations of Hegel and Schelling. Now, it may very well be that Michelet and others have overdone Hegel's indebtedness to Schelling, but we are by no means clear that Dr. Stirling is free from overdoing Hegel's independence of Schelling. No doubt, Hegel—as Dr. Stirling insists—owed enormously to Kant, but it does not seem easy to doubt that he owed much also to Fichte and to Schelling—more than Dr. Stirling is willing to admit. Kant and the Illumination taught Hegel the worth of formal scientific strictness, on which he improved by making it no more abstract; but Hegel learned depth and richness of content from the despised and unsystematic Schelling, and the same Hegel put a quite new logical consecutiveness into Fichte's principle of development, with whose philosophy of spirit as a leading interest or dominant feature Hegel could not but have a certain sympathy. And, in truth, he improved on it by making his emphasis on spirit such as to be untinged with Fichtean contempt of nature. Nor, it may be added, are the faults of Schelling easier found than those of Hegel. Also Schelling is, in any case, a much more considerable philosopher than Dr. Stirling's "beginner" would naturally infer from these pages. Hero-worship of Hegel is so perfectly innocent a thing that we have not the slightest objection to it; still, we cannot all agree to be too unmindful of the great precursors of the Hegelian Agamemnon. Hegel is Hegel still, consonantly with all that has now been said, both by reason of originality of conception and massive grandeur of achievement. Let a concession so liberal, richly deserved, and freely given, satisfy the most vehement of his disciples or devotees. Sharing, however largely, their rapturous admiration, we have never forgotten—cannot forget—there is criticism as well as exposition of Hegel. *Verb. sap.*

The third chapter takes up the "Categories and Physics," and passes on into a lively and somewhat entertaining vein at the expense of certain modern physicist and evolutionist theories. Chapter the fourth deals with "Religion and the Categories." It would, let us only remark, have given Dr. Stirling's "beginner" more cause for gratitude, had the author

not merely set down a few pious phrases to show the religion of Hegel, but actually dealt with the standing difficulty said "beginner" is sure to encounter, in that, while Hegel is made to stand for the truth of a personality that is Absolute, the same Hegel is set forth roundly declaring it absurd to predicate personality of the Infinite. If Dr. Stirling would do so much for the "beginner"—and no one could do more—why, though Hegel has been glorified, leave the "beginner" long time perplexed?

Let it be said, however, the veritable *multum in parvo* which Dr. Stirling—*clarum et venerabile nomen* to all philosophical students—has here given us, will be found of entrancing interest to readers of philosophy, and must prove highly serviceable to very many. As such, we most cordially commend it to readers of the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

Kilmarnock, Scotland.

JAMES LINDSAY.

ARTICLE XI.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

AN UNPUBLISHED ESSAY OF EDWARDS ON THE TRINITY, with Remarks on Edwards and his Theology. By GEORGE P. FISHER, D.D., LL.D. Pp. xv, 142. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1903.

We are greatly indebted to Professor Fisher for his valuable and timely monograph on Jonathan Edwards, set forth in connection with the publication for the first time of the notes on the Trinity to be found among the rich collection of manuscripts of the great New England theologian in the Yale library. An air of mystery has for several generations clung to this fragment, throwing around it, indeed, a glamor of romance, and giving it, probably, a disproportionate emphasis. As we see it, at last, in all its rugged plainness in the light of the twentieth century, we may well wonder whether or no a keen sense of humor has followed Oliver Wendell Holmes into the spirit life, enabling him to see in its true farcical light, his rather hysterical call for the immediate publication of this "heretical" document. Perhaps Horace Bushnell, also, in spiritual communion with the literary heirs of Jonathan Edwards, has, ere this, made saintly apology for doubting their honesty in "withholding" from publication the Essay now given us in Professor Fisher's booklet. But here it is at last; and with a sigh we consign the romance clinging to it to the limbo of sectarian controversy.

Dr. Fisher's dedication gives his purpose in setting forth the Essay, and makes evident that he does not overestimate the importance of the Edwards treatise on the Trinity. It reads: "I venture to dedicate this book to the large number of cultivated readers, who, from disinclination or the want of leisure for the task, have not acquainted themselves with

the character and writings of Edwards." This end he accomplishes most admirably. Among all the literature called forth by the bicentennial of Edwards' birth, this book will probably be counted of the most abiding significance. Besides nine pages of luminous preface, and four valuable notes in the Appendix,¹ Professor Fisher gives us, in seventy-five pages, a charming study of Edwards and his influence in shaping theological thought at New Haven, and through Yale throughout New England. To this we shall return after a brief study of the Essay proper.

This takes up fifty-six pages of the book, or about 14,000 words. It is given to us with a painful fidelity to the crude manuscript, reproducing minutely all the eccentricities of hurried notes which were never intended by the author for publication in this form. There is a certain unfairness in thus catching the venerable father of New England theology in literary undress, and one does not quite get over the infelicity and the shock of such abbreviations as G., F., X., H. G., L. J. X. (appropriate enough possibly in a hurriedly written note-book). It would seem to have been more in taste to have reproduced in facsimile a page or two of the manuscript, and given the Essay in a dignified form, without abbreviations, possibly with occasional exact reproductions in footnotes, where the manuscript presented exceptional difficulties.

Edwards sums up in a paragraph on page 110 (quoted by Dr. Fisher on page 55) the main theses of the Essay, as follows: "This I suppose to be that blessed Trinity that we read of in the holy Scriptures. The Father is the Deity subsisting in the prime, unoriginated and most absolute manner, or the Deity in its direct existence. The Son is the Deity generated by God's understanding, or having an Idea of Himself and subsisting in that Idea. The Holy Ghost is the Deity subsisting in act, or the divine Essence flowing out and

¹(1) "The dismissal of Edwards from the church in Northampton"; (2) The account given by Edwards of his method of study"; (3) "Augustine on the Trinity as imaged forth in the human mind"; (4) "President T. D. Woolsey on the personal traits and the influence of Edwards."

breathed forth in God's infinite love to and delight in Himself. And I believe the whole divine Essence does truly and distinctly subsist both in the divine Idea and divine Love, and that each of them are properly distinct Persons."

The first half of the Essay is given over to a plain, straightforward attempt to substantiate these points from reason and Scripture. The analogy of the human mind appeals to him, "though the divine Nature be different from that of created spirits." God is love, and he was love before the creation of the universe. But love always must have an object upon which to bestow its affections. Hence that object had to be found under those conditions in God himself, who alone existed. That self-communicativeness can only be explained to limited mental processes by the symbol of Personalities. God's Idea of himself toward which the divine affection ever went forth is apprehensible to Edwards under the terminology of Sonship. He says: "If a man could have an absolutely perfect idea of all that passed in his mind, all the series of ideas and exercises in every respect perfect as to order, degree, circumstance, etc., for any particular space of time past (suppose the last hour) he would really to all intents and purposes be over again what he was that last hour, . . . he would be indeed double, he would be twice at once. The idea he has of himself would be himself again" (page 83).

We note in all his argument the peculiar idealistic philosophy which dominates all Edwards' thinking. He says (page 87): "Seeing the perfect idea of a thing is to all intents and purposes the same as seeing the thing; it is not only equivalent to the seeing of it, but it is the seeing it; for there is no other seeing but having the idea."

Proceeding with his argument, he says: "The Godhead being thus begotten by God's loving an idea of Himself and shewing forth in a distinct Subsistence or Person in that Idea, there proceeds a most pure act, and an infinitely holy and sacred energy arises between the Father and Son in mutually loving and delighting in each other. . . . This is the eternal and most perfect and essential act of the divine Nature, wherein

the Godhead acts to an infinite degree and in the most perfect manner possible. The Deity becomes all act, the divine Essence itself flows out and is, as it were, breathed forth in love and joy. So that the Godhead therein stands forth in yet another manner of subsistence and there proceeds the third Person in the Trinity, the Holy Spirit, viz. the Deity in act, for there is no other act but the act of the will" (pp. 93-94). Again, he says: "Reason is sufficient to tell us that there must be these distinctions in the Deity, viz., of God (absolutely considered) and the Idea of God, and Love and Delight, and there can be no other real distinctions in God that can be thought. There are but these three distinct real things in God. Whatsoever else can be mentioned in God are nothing but mere modes or relations of existence" (page 111).

He takes particular and elaborate pains to guard against objections to the personality of the Holy Spirit on the ground that you cannot have personality without understanding and will. He goes on with a minuteness characteristic of the so-called "Athanasian" creed (preferably to be counted "Augustinian"), saying, "Let it be considered that the whole divine office is supposed truly and properly to subsist in each of these Three, viz., God, and His Understanding and Love, and that there is a wonderful union between them, that They are, after an ineffable and inconceivable manner, one in another, so that one hath another and They have communion in one another and are, as it were, predicable one of another" (page 114).

On page 117 we find a breadth of view most modern, where he says: "But I don't pretend fully to explain how these things are, and I am sensible a hundred other objections may be made and puzzling doubts and questions raised that I can't solve. I am far from pretending to explaining the Trinity so as to render it no longer a mystery. I think it to be the highest and deepest of all divine mysteries still, notwithstanding anything that I have said or conceived about it. I don't intend to explain the Trinity. But Scripture with reason may lead to say something further of it than has been wont to be

said, though there are still left many things pertaining to it incomprehensible." The same thought is strongly reinforced on page 127.

A suggestion of a positive, as distinguished from a negative, doctrine of the atonement appears on page 121, which has significance for our own day. "What Christ purchased for us was that we have communion with God, . . . and enjoy his Love . . . which is nothing but the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the heart."

Professor Fisher's more extended "Remarks" review the life and teachings of this strong man of God in as lucid and satisfactory a way as the space would allow. He makes clear the formative place he takes in the development of New England theology. He might have called Edwards the "Origen" of American theology, so profoundly has he influenced all schools of thought. But he is greater than an Origen, combining in himself three mighty qualities that not more than a half dozen times have been found in one life. As Professor Fisher points out, Edwards was a logician and scientist by nature and training, with powers of scientific observation already eminent in the boy entomologist. But above all he was a mystic, and as you read on from treatise to treatise, as Professor Fisher says, it is "like passing from the pages of Scotus or Aquinas to Thomas à Kempis or St. Francis of Assisi." But he is still more emphatically a practical man, facing mighty religious and ethical problems with a largeness of vision, a noble self-sacrifice, a keenness of ethical distinction, a wisdom of ecclesiastical method, take them all in all, without a parallel in the life of the church since the Reformation. He knew how to pick out and win one of the most beautiful and noble women America has produced, who entered most profoundly into his whole life. With her he stood by his own convictions at Northampton, calmly preaching a great farewell sermon to a hostile audience with a magnanimity of heroic dimensions. At Stockbridge he routed the notorious jobbers who were fattening at the expense of the Indians, and set an example for humanity and mission-

ary zeal worthy of imitation in any age. He fought almost single-handed the universal New England ecclesiastical habit of admitting to church-membership those who need not give clear evidence of conversion, and won out in time. Whatever else he was, he was all on fire in the defense and spread of truth as he saw it, the father of a warm revival spirit, the eccentricities of which as displayed in others he attempted to regulate. Like Socrates, he took for his base-line, in judging of the Divine, the human mind, with which he was intimately familiar, in spite of philosophical vagaries. He felt that he was building on reality. HENRY W. HULBERT.

DIE SICHERSTELLUNG DES MONOTHEISMUS DURCH DIE GESETZGEBUNG IM VOREXILISCHEN JUDA. VON WILHELM ERBT. Beigegeben ist der Untersuchung Umschrift und Uebersetzung der metrisch abgefassten Gesetze. Pp. 120. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. M. 3.60.

The title is somewhat misleading, for by monotheism Erbt means the religion of Jehovah, which was given to Israel by Moses in the Decalogue. Erbt looks upon the various stages of legislation in preëxilic Israel as being the result of a struggle. The "Yahwistic" legislation is the protest of the priests vs. the Syrian influence in Judah under Athaliah. The priestly party is the champion of Yahwism and fights as such against the throne (Athaliah). The "Elohistic" legislation, on the contrary, is antihierarchic, the result of the reaction against priestly supremacy. The opponents of the priests are the social (prophetic) parties, who gain their point under Ahaz against the priests. But under *Hezekiah* the two parties compromise. The social party gives up the Elohistic laws concerning the cult, and accepts the one sanctuary at Jerusalem, as the only legitimate one (Erbt believes that the law of the centralization of worship was already in existence under *Hezekiah*); the priests accept the Elohistic civil and criminal law, and permit an elaboration on the basis of the fixed family law. This law of *Hezekiah* is one of the main sources of the book of Deuteronomy. The reaction sets in under *Manasse*. He is again

antihierarchic. He removes the new reform law of Hezekiah and turns back to the older laws, the Yahwistic and Elohist; these two he combines (Jehovist), and with this the old sanctuaries on the high places are reinstated. The reformation under *Josiah* is also due to a compromise between the social and priestly parties. Both want to restore that which had been lost under Manasse and to fashion it according to the changed conditions. Their program is the other main source of Deuteronomy. The law resulting from the working together of the two reform-legislations under Hezekiah and Josiah is our book of Deuteronomy. In the Exile the two great works of the Jehovist and Deuteronomy were combined and became the program for the restoration of the *status quo*. The result of all these struggles has been to make secure the religion of Jehovah, i. e., monotheism. "The history of preëxilic legislation in Judah is the history of the securing of monotheism." Through these struggles it had become so firmly rooted in Judah, that it could never be lost any more in spite of the later attacks.

Erbt investigates in the following chapter the history of the Social party, and in an appendix he gives a transcription and translation of those laws which are, according to him, liturgical pieces and therefore in metrical form, suited for the reading in the services. They are composed in verses of 6 resp. 3+3 beats. It is interesting and valuable to have here Sievers' metrical principles applied to the different laws. But I confess that their application to these laws appears to me, so far at least, unwarranted. Still the metrical question is yet a vexed one, and we may be grateful to Dr. Erbt for his metrical contribution.

The main question in connection with Erbt's book is this. Is Dr. Erbt right when he regards these different codices as the result of many struggles, between kings and priests and social reformers? I remark only, in passing, that the premises that the religion of Moses was monotheism, and that Steuernagel's results as to Deuteronomy are correct, are not unchallenged. The first point has little influence on the dis-

cussion. He might as well have said Yahwism instead of monotheism without changing the discussion in the least.

That the whole legal development has for once been brought under the point of view of the result of a continual struggle must be reckoned as a credit to Erbt, but he seems to believe that he has now the master-key which will unlock all locks. Certainly we must look much more carefully at the forces at work behind the scene and we shall agree that there was more or less struggle among the different parties, but I question in every single instance, that Erbt has made his case, that the various legal codices are the *direct* result of these struggles, that they were the party programs or the documents of a compromise of the different parties. We should expect much more evidences of this. There is not much argumentation in the book. Erbt is intent on stating his own point of view. One important point, with which he starts, that the reformation of Josiah can only be regarded as a compromise between the priestly and social parties, he has proved in a former book, "Jeremia und seine Zeit," which I have not seen; so that I suppose this former treatise must be taken together with this one.

Erbt's acute scholarship, so well displayed in his little book "Die Purimsage in der Bibel," is apparent on every page of this essay; and, though I do not think that he has made his case, I am sure his book possesses real merit and will be found very stimulating. The second half, containing the metrical transcription and translation of the various laws, has its independent value.

JULIUS A. BEWER.

DOGMATIQUE CHRÉTIENNE. Par AUGUSTE BOUVIER. Publiée d'après le cours manuscrit et les notes de l'auteur par EDOUARD MONTET, doyen de la Faculté de Theologie de Genève. 2 vols. 8vo. Pp. xvi, 320 and 326. 1903. Paris: Librairie Fischbacher.

This work suffers inevitably from the fact that it is a posthumous work. During his professorship at Geneva, Switzerland, Dr. Bouvier drifted from a medial ground between or-

thodoxy and liberalism to a position which was quite radical. Until 1870 he allied himself by voice and pen with the evangelical party of French Protestantism, but since that date has been counted among the liberals. In reading this work the troublesome doubt is always present as to whether the statements in every case represent the latest thought of the writer. One cannot but feel that Dr. Bouvier, in preparing the matter for publication, perhaps might have altered the one or the other statement. But Dr. Montet could do nothing else than publish the manuscript as he found it.

Taken singly, the statements seem to reflect all the various theological positions ever held by Dr. Bouvier. On page 98 (vol. ii.), he states his belief that no other than the traditional view of the resurrection will ever be successful. This statement follows a rebuttal of other views which is as orthodox as Calvin. And on page 314 (vol. ii.), he declares himself strongly in support of the doctrine of eternal punishment, quoting Matt. xxv. 46. But on page 155 (vol. i.), he declares that the account of the creation is only a tradition, and on page 72 (vol. ii.), he thinks that the account of the miraculous birth of Jesus is not sufficiently attested. He further states: "It seems to us this traditional doctrine compromises one of the evident conditions of the holiness of Jesus, i. e. the possibility of being tempted and the conscious and purposed victory over evil, at the same time tending to suppress one of the evident conditions of the redemption, i. e. the perfect humanity of the Redeemer." Speaking of the redemption, he says on page 214 (vol. ii.): "It is not a sort of agreement between the Father and the Son concerning the salvation of mankind, of which the blood of the Son, made man, is the price." Further on he says that the substitution was the "substitution by sympathy." Regarding the doctrine of miracles and that of the Trinity, his position is neither strictly orthodox nor ultra-liberal, but rather that represented by the New Theology of our day. Thus one finds in this work different types of theological thought represented side by side, which leaves a rather odd impression.

The method of Dr. Bouvier is singular from the fact that he makes the divine life in man the center of his system. All else—God, creation, the Christ, redemption, the Spirit, salvation and judgment,—is described only as it has reference to this. This divine life is described on page 95 (vol. i.) as “the living spiritual principle, working for the perfect realization of universal harmony.” This treatment gives life to the style, and the book leaves the impression of being a religious work, and not merely a learned exposition. One is reminded of Newman or Harnack. The book well merits the appreciation of the editor in his preface; viz. “I know nothing more edifying than the reading of these pages, all aglow with enthusiasm for God, for Christ and for divine things.” It is a splendid addition to a preacher’s library, abounding in excellent sermon material.

The editor has done his work well. We feel that he has not set himself forth in Dr. Bouvier’s name, but has presented the latter exactly as he found him to have expressed himself in the manuscript.

FREDERICK W. HASS.

THEISM. By BORDEN P. BOWNE, Professor of Philosophy in Boston University. Comprising the Deems Lectures for 1902. 8vo. Pp. xii, 323. New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: American Book Company. \$1.75.

This volume is an enlargement of a previous work entitled “Philosophy of Theism,” published nearly twenty years ago. But the whole has been largely rewritten, and the volume nearly doubled in size with new material. Altogether the work is now one of the best in existence in meeting the perplexities of the time respecting the theistic argument. The author gives due weight to the old-time argument, maintaining that theism is the only explanation for the order and evidences of design which appear in the universe. All the plausibility of atheism is taken away when the argument for it is stripped of its assumptions and made to appear in its naked reality. Evolution is presented by the author in its true light, as being simply the order of divine operations.

But that evolution "according to which something, which was not much of anything, began to evolve through differentiation and integration, etc., is sheer confusion and illiteracy" (p. 110). As a result of all the old-time arguments, the author holds that the design argument "proves far more conclusively the existence of mind in nature than it does the existence of mind in man" (p. 118).

CHRISTIAN FAITH IN AN AGE OF SCIENCE. By WILLIAM NORTH RICE, PH.D., LL.D., Professor of Geology in Wesleyan University. Crown 8vo. Pp. xi, 425. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. \$1.50, *net*.

Professor Rice's eminence as a geologist is well known. The present volume reveals him as a devout believer in the Christian religion, and is of great interest and value not only as a personal "apologia," but as a general defense of the faith peculiarly adapted to the times. When examined, however, as a whole, it does not differ so much from the old defenses as might at first appear from the opening chapters. In the course of the volume the author considers that he has made it clear "that certainty in natural science is absolutely unattainable. We cannot know that the external universe has any objective existence. Our whole system of natural law may be but a castle in the air. The postulate of the uniformity of nature, upon which all our reasoning is founded, is in itself utterly undemonstrable. . . . The laws of nature which we consider most thoroughly verified may be true only approximately and within limits. Nowhere in the whole system of natural and physical science can we find certainty. From this point of view we recognize the utter vanity of the talk which is so frequently heard in which the solid facts of science are contrasted with the iridescent dreams of religion, and religious men are reproached for their folly in making undemonstrable beliefs the basis of their plans of life. . . . Alike in the common affairs of daily life, in our scientific speculations, and in the sphere of morals and religion we base

upon postulates which are undemonstrable, conclusions which more or less probably are more or less close approximations to the truth. And in all these spheres we act upon such beliefs as if they were certainly true. . . . As Locke has well said, 'He that will not stir until he infallibly knows that the business he goes about will succeed, will have but little else to do but to be still and perish' " (pp. 406-408).

The author well maintains that the real evidence for Christianity is not found in any one line of argument, but in convergence of all lines. The argument is cumulative. Thus considered, the proof of the resurrection of Christ is as satisfactory as could be well desired. From the acceptance of this central miracle, he correctly reasons that it is probably "not an isolated instance, but that other miracles more or less numerous have attended the critical epochs in the history of revelation. This suggestion finds confirmation in the peculiar chronological distribution of miracles in sacred history. With very few exceptions the miraculous narratives of the Bible are included in three great groups," namely, about the Exodus, about Elijah and Elisha, and about the ministry of Jesus. "If stories of miraculous events are simply the product of the imaginative tendencies of the Hebrew mind, it is difficult to see any adequate reason for this limitation of miracles to three well-defined groups."

Having said so much, it seems rather unfortunate that he should have devoted so large a portion of the earlier chapters in discrediting Old Testament history and its statements concerning the relation of God to natural law and to the ordinary affairs of mankind; for the author believes not only in Providence, but in the extreme form of the doctrine which goes under the name of the "Divine Immanence." "God is everywhere or nowhere in the universe. He does everything or nothing" (p. 337). Yet he holds with great strenuousness to the freedom of the human will, which he looks upon as "one tremendous exception to the scope of Providence. . . . Providence enters not into the sacred sphere of human per-

sonality" (p. 340). In the earlier portions of the work the author, therefore, in disregard of the philosophy of the later portion, assumes a degree of certainty respecting scientific conclusions which is often unwarranted, and proceeds to exclude divine agency in striking disregard to his general belief upon the subject. Throughout those portions of the work he has given unwarranted credence to the prevailing critical views of Old Testament history; for those views are so far from being demonstrable that they violate many of the fundamental principles of inductive reasoning. The author, for example, spends much strength in dwelling upon the contradictions between the first chapter of Genesis and the second, which are probably and almost demonstrably a figment of the critical imagination which disregards rather plain literary evidence. If the author had properly considered the well-known principles under which an extremely condensed historical statement has to be interpreted, most of his objection to considering the early chapters of Genesis as "historical" would have been obviated. The readiness with which he sets aside Professor Green's interpretation of the genealogical tables in Genesis would hardly have been possible if he had carefully considered the subject; and so, in general, a considerable portion of the author's conclusions in this part of the work betray a superficial and hasty knowledge of the variety of subjects concerning which he is compelled to express an opinion. For example, in his treatment of the date of the glacial period and of the instability of conditions connected with it, both his direct statements and his literary references betray a very incomplete knowledge of the subject. In view of the deliberate statements of geologists like Prof. N. H. Winchell, and Professor Salisbury, as well in view of the facts themselves, it is hardly fair to say, as the author does, in speaking of the age of the Niagara gorge, that "it is probable that the time occupied in the excavation was a considerable multiple of seven thousand years" (p. 75). But these defects in the work only slightly mar what is otherwise one of the most valuable and important of recent contributions to apologetical literature.

THE STUDY OF ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY. (Handbooks for the Clergy.) By W. E. COLLINS, B.D. 8vo. Pp. xv, 166. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co. 1903. 90 cents, *net*.

There are none too many good Introductions to the Study of History in English, or, in fact, in any language. It was therefore welcome news when Messrs. Longmans, Green, and Company announced, in the prospectus of their series of Handbooks for the Clergy, a book on "The Study of Ecclesiastical History, by W. E. Collins, B.D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History at King's College, London. Professor Collins is one of the recognized scholars of Great Britain, being a contributor to the Cambridge Modern History. He can therefore speak with authority.

The book is written for two classes of readers: firstly, for students in colleges; and, secondly, for those "who, being already at work in their parishes, desire to continue their historical studies."

The first chapter, on "The Meaning and Scope of Ecclesiastical History," contains nothing particularly new.

Chapter II., on "The Science of History," contends that the student of Ecclesiastical History, even if he is concerned rather with modern works than with original documents, should nevertheless know something of the methods of historical research.

In support of this contention, Chapters III. and IV. give a short sketch of "Historical Method," Chapter III. being devoted to "The Work of Analysis," and Chapter IV. to "The Work of Synthesis." These chapters, as well as the preceding one, quote largely from Langlois and Seignobos' "Introduction to the Study of History"; but the treatment is excellent, and the author supplies many additional illustrations of the principles of historical methodology. These chapters are the best in the book.

Chapter V., on "How to Study Ecclesiastical History," advises students to work from the particular to the general

(p. 75). The author "assumes such a general knowledge as will enable the student to understand the main bearing of his facts." Alas, this assumption of "a general knowledge" is often only an assumption. Just at this stage the reading of a short outline manual, such as, Cowan's "Landmarks of Church History," Zenos's "Manual of Church History," or Sohm's "Outlines of Church History," should have been specifically recommended. Then the student would have been in a position profitably to "take to himself a hobby and treat it seriously," as the author advises him (p. 75). As the book under review was prepared, in the second place, "for those already at work in their parishes," it would have been well, we think, to have insisted quite at length on the homiletic value of Church History. The mere remark (p. 80) that "the student who has found such an interest [his "hobby"] ought never to be at a loss for a subject for an occasional lecture to his people," is not enough, we think, to induce any large number of clergymen in the active ministry to keep up their historical studies. It might have been pointed out that a series of sermons on topics in Ecclesiastical History,—as, for example, "The Great Reformers,"—would often solve the problem of the Sunday-evening service.

Chapter VI., on "The Choice of Books," and Chapter VIII., which is a Bibliography, are those from which other teachers of history will be most tempted to dissent. Each professor, of course, has his favorite books, for at least some of which he will search Professor Collins's lists in vain. The recommendation (p. 95) that "the best books are those which are most honestly written and which are based on the largest and most discriminating study of the original authorities" is one that will commend itself to every historian. The teacher of history will also heartily approve of the statement (p. 107) that "the student of ecclesiastical history cannot be said to have done anything at all until he has begun to read the original authorities." A list of "sources" that have been translated (pp. 113-114) adds to the value of this chapter.

Chapter VII. is on "Some Special Aspects of Study in Ecclesiastical History." The first few paragraphs, on "The Preparation for Christianity," might have been wisely omitted, as this subject is treated in the introductions of most Church Histories. The space thus saved would have been wisely used to expand the all-too-short reference to Canon Law—a subject much neglected in the average Church History. The author's views on the place of marvels in Ecclesiastical History might very profitably have been expanded. He says (p. 136), "They [marvels] may or may not have had an objective reality." Surely this is a position that needs a treatment of more than four pages,—all the author gives it,—especially when he differs *toto caelo* from Langlois and Seignobos, who say (p. xxiii), *à propos* of miracles: "When science and history conflict, history should give way."

The author of this review takes pleasure in calling the attention of his fellow-teachers of Church History to Professor Collins's book. They can place it as a *vade mecum* in the hands of their students, even if they do not themselves agree with every statement in it. For their own uses they will probably be most thankful to Professor Collins for the lists of "Books for Further Study" which he has appended to the various chapters. The preacher in the pastorate will be well repaid for the purchase of this excellent handbook. The lists of books refer to works in English, French, German, and Italian, and are brought down to 1903. As the author has frequently quoted from Langlois and Seignobos, it is a little surprising that he has not referred his readers to Langlois's "Bibliographie Historique."

The proof-reading is well done. On page 109 the author refers to "The useful series of Translations and Reprints of the Columbia University." This is probably a slip of the pen, the "Translations and Reprints" being published by the University of Pennsylvania.

It is a temptation to quote a few of the wise and epigrammatic sayings of Professor Collins; but it must be resisted.

The book is well worth the small price asked for it, and should have a wide circulation.

ALLEN DUDLEY SEVERANCE.

LIFE AND LETTERS IN THE FOURTH CENTURY. By TERROT REAVELEY GLOVER, M.A., Classical Lecturer and formerly Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge; late Professor of Latin in Queen's University, Canada. 8vo. Pp. xvi, 398. Cambridge: At the University Press. \$2.50, *net*.

The purpose of this book is to introduce to a wider circle of readers the Roman literature and life of the period of the Gothic invasions and of the fall of Paganism. The author calls attention to the fact, only too true, that this age of Roman letters, which could boast of an Augustine and a Prudentius, is but little known by the average student. Professor Glover is therefore rendering a valuable service to the literary world in presenting a series of studies of the life and literature of this important period. The subject-matter of the book is not given in dry, chronological form, but in a group of vivid portraits of the men of the times. These include Ammianus Marcellinus, Julian, Quintus of Smyrna, Ausonius, Symmachus, Macrobius, St. Augustine, Claudian, Prudentius, Sulpicius Severus, Palladas, and Synesius. An introduction sums up the characteristics, social and religious, of the fourth century. One of the most striking facts about the period is its sterility in both art and literature, and this, no doubt, is the true explanation of the indifference with which the study of these times is generally viewed. But little originality is seen, and the models followed by writers and artists were, as a rule, not classical, but were derived from classical sources through several stages of transmission. The arch of Constantine well illustrates this. On the other hand, in the realm of literature there were many forces which tended to arouse enthusiasm in the art of composition. One of these forces was the charm which the classical masterpieces exercised over the minds of intelligent men, another was the victory of the church. These subjects inspired respectively a Claudian and a Prudentius.

The greatest developing influence in society of this century was undoubtedly the church, which was in contact with the whole life of the empire. "The church had absorbed all that was then vital in the civilized world. It had not assimilated all the beauty and wisdom of the great classical period, for much of them was lost to that age, and was not to be recovered for centuries. The church of the day had her weaknesses, she made grave mistakes, and she was not without sins that bore bitter fruit, but she rose superior to all the world around her, and to whatever sphere of work and thought we turn, literature, philosophy, administration, we find her marked off from all her environment by one characteristic it had not and she had—life and the promise of life."

WALTER DENNISON.

ROMAN AFRICA: An Outline of the History of the Roman Occupation of North Africa, based chiefly upon Inscriptions and Monumental Remains in that Country. By ALEXANDER GRAHAM. With thirty Reproductions of original Drawings by the Author, and two maps. 8vo. Pp. xiii, 325. New York and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co. 16s., *net*.

Much has been done in recent years, chiefly by French scholars, in excavating important sites in the Roman province of Africa, with a view to determining the extent of Roman occupation and the degree of civilization reached in Northern Africa during the early centuries of our era. The results of these excavations, the description of the finds, and the discussion of their importance artistically and historically, have heretofore been practically inaccessible to most people, since they are found scattered here and there in French archaeological journals, or in the formal reports of government representatives. A real service, therefore, has been rendered by the scholarly author of this book in gathering together what is of interest to all, and presenting it in a clear, readable form. The most interesting and at the same time the most valuable remains in reconstructing ancient life—the inscriptions—are freely used and quoted. The city, which, because

of its remains, has attracted more attention perhaps than any other is Thamugas (Timgad), the Pompeii of North Africa. It was only a fortified outpost on the frontier of the Roman Empire, but it had a forum, a basilica, a theater, a *curia* or city-hall, temple, and baths and other public buildings, numerous private houses, shops, and paved streets. Many statues and inscriptions have been found here.

Thousands of Christian inscriptions also have been brought to light by the spade of the excavation, thus testifying to the importance of Africa in the history of the church. One recalls the names of Tertullian and Cyprian, of Arnobius and Lactantius and Augustine. Hippo Regius has been identified as the scene of the life-long labors of the last-named scholar, the chief father of the Christian church in Africa. The book is illustrated with views and plans, and forms a distinct contribution to the subject with which it deals. W. D.

ROUSSEAU and Naturalism in Life and Thought. (The World's Epoch-Makers.) By WILLIAM HENRY HUDSON, Lecturer to the London University Extension Board; late Professor of English Literature, Stanford University, California, and Professorial Lecturer, The University of Chicago; author of "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Herbert Spencer," "The Life of Sir Walter Scott," etc. 12mo. Pp. x, 260. New York: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons.

In this volume the reader will find an exposition and critique of Rousseau sufficiently full for all practical purposes. The history of his early life is given with sufficient fullness, and with a delicacy, in reference to his violations both of decency and moral law, described in such detail in his "Confessions," that must commend itself to all readers. Rousseau's philosophy and religion were in many respects like those of Tolstoi, as was his estimate of art. No one can understand the development of modern society without becoming acquainted with his strange but fascinating influence, as shown in politics as well as in art, literature, and religion. The present work deserves wide reading.

PROFESSOR JACOB COOPER, D.C.L., LL.D.

JACOB COOPER, son of Jacob and Elizabeth Walls Cooper, was born on a farm in Butler County, Ohio, December 7, 1830. He was of Quaker ancestry, and the youngest of a large family of children. His parents had emigrated from South Carolina to Ohio in the early years of the nineteenth century.

As is well known to students of colonial history, the Southern colonies furnished a home to various religious sects; e.g. Huguenots, Salzburghers, Moravians, German Lutherans, Scotch Presbyterians, and others—among them a considerable number of Quakers. Most of the Northern colonies, either by the nationality or the religious creed of their inhabitants, were more or less exclusive as to their populations. New England was controlled by the Puritans, New York and New Jersey by the Dutch, Pennsylvania by the Quakers, and Maryland by the Catholics. But the settlements to the South were little dominated by this religious exclusiveness; while as to nationality their colonists were chiefly of English blood. They offered peculiar inducements for immigration to small, isolated communities of various creeds. Along the Catawba, Ashley, Cooper, Savannah, and Altamaha, and elsewhere these little communities of particular faiths were found.

Negro slavery was an institution of all the colonies; Georgia, for sixteen years, being an isolated exception. But in the more southerly colonies the slaves were found chiefly on the rice plantations near the coast, and there was much sentiment in those days against the system. But Eli Whitney's invention of the cotton-gin, in 1792, sealed the negro's doom. Up to 1800 less cotton was grown in the whole South than is now produced in any average county of the Cotton Belt. But with the general introduction of the gin the fleecy plant became the great staple of Southern fields. Although a few years later the African slave-trade was outlawed, yet the price of an able-bodied "field-hand" steadily rose from an average of about \$150 at the close of the eighteenth century to ten times as much at the outbreak of the Civil War. All hope of a gradual emancipation of slaves faded away; and the "up-country," as well as the coast, began to swarm with slaves. Many of the religious colonists who were conscientiously opposed to slavery began to turn their faces Northward. The

Northwest Territory was constituted, free of slavery, in 1787, and Ohio, first of the free States of the West, was admitted into the Union in 1803.

A steady stream of immigration into the new State set in; and among the early comers were the parents—then unmarried—of the Cooper family. The family home was finally pitched in the Miami country not many miles from the *village* of Cincinnati.

In this family the religious element dominated as thoroughly as in any Puritan household. Religion was the atmosphere they breathed; their faith molded their family, their social, their individual life. Industry, honesty, thrift, a high morality—modeled after the Bible standard—guided their lives. It was natural for children thus reared to succeed, and they did succeed. Of the personal history of each this writer cannot now speak with absolute certainty. But one brother became a distinguished physician and the founder of a large infirmary, or sanitarium, in San Francisco, which still bears the family name. One sister became a preacher of the Friends; while another, Miss Ruth Cooper,—far advanced in her “eighties,”—still makes her home at her brother Jacob’s in New Brunswick.

Jacob Cooper was reared at the family homestead and bred to work upon the farm. Yet he was a hard student, and toiled at his books, as well as with the plough, hoping, waiting, for the opportunity for a college course. It came at last; though, as he told the writer last summer, it might never have come but for the death of his father, and the household changes thereby brought about. Much as he longed for the broader culture, he had felt that his first duty was to his aged parents and their remaining family.

After his father’s death, and some time spent in Western colleges,—Hanover and Miami, if the writer is not mistaken,—he entered the Junior class at Yale in 1850, and graduated in 1852. Among his college mates was Chauncey M. Depew, ever afterward his warm personal friend.

Of his financial efforts to get through college, he has often spoken to the writer. In his forceful way he described himself as “poor as a church-mouse” all through these toilsome days. But he was not to be repressed by such an adventitious circumstance as poverty. No American boy with intellect, health, and freedom from obligation of support, or service, to others, need despair of an education.

In 1852 Jacob entered the University of Berlin, where, in

1854, he received the Doctorate of Philosophy. He also attended for a short time on special lecture courses at the Universities of Halle and Edinburgh. His Doctor's thesis at Berlin was "*De Mysteriis Eleusiniis*,"—during the preparation of which, as he says, he hardly ate, or slept, for two months.

Returning to America, Dr. Cooper was married, May 31, 1855, to Miss Charlotte McDill, of Oxford, Ohio, who died December 18, 1857, leaving him an infant daughter, who still lives in Ohio.

Just after his marriage he was elected Professor of Greek in Centre College, Danville, Ky., at that time probably the leading educational institution of the West. Its prosperity continued until the outbreak of the Civil War, when, alas, both college and church (Presbyterian) were rocked to their foundations.

Danville, popularly known as "little Britain," had long been a storm-center of ideas, both ecclesiastical and political. Many of the great names, both of church and nation, belonged to Danville. In the "thirties," "Old School," and "New School" made a divisive issue in almost every Presbyterian church in the land, and Danville was the vortex of the whirlpool. Only in 1871 were "O. S." and "N. S." erased from the factional banners, after a union had at last been effected.

But nearly ten years before this reunion the church had been riven transversely along political lines; for in December, 1861, the Southern Presbyterian Church was formed, out of those churches chiefly which were located in the seceding States—the very territory from which Centre College drew much of her patronage. The Kentucky churches, being within the Federal lines during most of the war period, still adhered to the Old Assembly; but both the college and the theological seminary had received mortal hurt.

Danville, for a generation before the war began, had been the Kentucky center of the slavery agitation. She was the native place of James G. Birney, abolition's first Presidential candidate. She was a kind of nucleus of the old Emancipation Society of which Henry Clay, the town's political idol, was President and one of the chief promoters. Clay lived at Lexington, not far away; and there also his relative, Cassius M. Clay, the very genius of abolition, edited his anti-slavery organ until his office was mobbed, and the paper had to be transferred to the other side of the Ohio.

In 1849–50 Kentucky was in the throes of a "New Consti-

tution" campaign in which "Emancipation" was the all-absorbing issue. Danville was as usual in the maelstrom. Dr. Young, President of the College, Dr. Beatty, and many others of Danville's leading men, took the stump in favor of the Emancipation amendment. The excitement was most intense. A large vote was polled for the measure. Possibly it might have carried, had not some of the Cotton State legislatures taken the alarm, and enacted that no Kentucky negroes should be brought, for sale, into their territory, in case the amendment should carry. The prospect of losing their slave property *in toto* was used to frighten Kentucky slaveholders; and the Amendment was lost. Thus it will be seen that Danville was a storm-center for ideas, ecclesiastical and political, when Dr. Cooper came thither in 1855. In the terrible quadrennium the State remained true to the Union, though her loyalty was sorely tried. Centre's brilliant son, John C. Breckenridge, was the Presidential candidate in 1860 of the secession element. In the chaos produced by the secession of her neighboring slave States, and the kindred sympathies aroused in Kentucky, the great question facing her Union men was, how to hold the State to her moorings and gain time. The Governor, also a Centre alumnus, was in open sympathy with secession, as were probably a majority of the slaveholders, naturally the most influential class. Should Kentucky be left alone in a Union with the North? That surely meant the destruction of her slave property as well as the alienation of her sister States of the South, the territory with which her trade was chiefly concerned. Should the National border run with the Ohio, or with the Tennessee line? This was the alternative; or failing, then the last arbitrament—the sword, and Kentucky was in the very center of the prospective war arena. It was the gravest issue ever presented to the State—an issue, too, not of her own choosing. Between the upper and the nether millstone she must be crushed. With all their power her ablest Union men plead for peace; too late. Then the "Neutrality" sedative was administered for a few months, to gain time for calm reflection, and save from precipitate and fatal action. Yet no Union leader really believed it possible to preserve the State's neutrality in such a conflict. "Home-Guard" companies were everywhere organized to "defend" the State: then three months of "Cockade" war. The "Reds," for "Southern Rights," with fife and drum drilling on one hill, while perhaps a few hundred yards away, the "Blues," for the "Union," were stepping to the music of "Columbia" and

the "Red, White, and Blue." The volcano must burst, but time was gained: the State was saved to the Union, and more than 100,000 of her whites and negroes were enlisted during the four years under the Stars and Stripes. But what had Danville, the college, and the seminary, to do with all this?

Danville was the center of the "Blue Grass" loyalty. The mountains were loyal; they had very few negroes. Kentucky's 225,000 slaves were, for the most part, in Central Kentucky, the political "hub" of the State, whence the keynote was always given. It meant much to hold this vantage-ground. From Danville radiated the chief political ideas.

In 1861 the college and seminary faculties projected the *Danville Review*, a quarterly which, like the war itself, was destined to a quadrennial lease of life. The leading spirit in its editorial corps was Dr. Robert J. Breckenridge, a leader in his church and potent in national politics. Dr. Cooper was accustomed to pronounce him the "greatest man born of woman."

Although Dr. Breckenridge always claimed for his father, John Breckenridge, Jefferson's Attorney-General, the authorship of the "Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions" of 1798, on which the doctrine of States' Rights," *ergo*, the right of secession, was based, yet he himself became the staunchest champion of the Union. His great ability and fierce combative temper made him a rallying-point for Kentucky Unionists, as well as a target for the secessionists. That the Review was a hot blast from the Federal side goes without saying. That it, along with Danville the college, and the seminary, became a stench in Southern nostrils, may be readily inferred. The South was lost as the college's recruiting ground. Indeed, this field has been but in small measure regained in the generation since Appomattox. Dr. Cooper was an associate editor of the Review, contributing various articles, chiefly from the Union standpoint, to its pages, and of course sharing in the odium incurred by the Review's policy. By July, 1861, the "Neutrality" veil was dropped, and the Federal troops entered Kentucky, and established headquarters and a recruiting station at "Camp Dick Robinson," a few miles from Danville. There was not a railroad near by, nor a line of telegraph. A war correspondent of the *Cincinnati Commercial* gave, as a reason for choosing this camp site, its nearness to Danville, home of Dr. "Bob" Breckenridge. From this center radiated the army movements of Central and Eastern Kentucky. "Camp Dick" troops fought the battles of Wild-

cat, Mill Spring, Richmond, and in October, 1862, in the same county with Danville, was fought Kentucky's bloodiest battle—Perryville.

For a time college exercises were practically suspended, and the buildings were used for hospital purposes. Dr. Cooper, under leave of absence, went into the Union army as chaplain of the Third Kentucky Infantry, Col. Thos. E. Bramlette, afterward Governor of the State. This regiment was made up of mountain men; and its survivors still cherish the memory of their chaplain's loving sympathy.

Chaplaincy then meant more than mere Sunday preaching. That was often impossible in the exigencies of camp life, or of forced marches. But there was constant work in the hospitals; nursing, counseling, prayer, Bible-readings, letter-writing for some poor, illiterate, or disabled, soldier; it was a *ministry* indeed, no sinecure. The mountain boys loved Dr. Cooper for his tireless care of them and for his loving sympathy.

In the autumn of 1863 he returned to his college work. In September of that year the writer matriculated as a student of "Centre," and then first met Dr. Cooper. The intimate friendship then begun continued till Dr. Cooper's death. It may be inferred that those were stormy days for student life. Singular was the day which had not its own sensation of war, or of war rumors; we lived on excitement. There was no lack of news. Every flying horseman might be a Cushi with tidings. Every whirling, fast-nearing, dust-cloud concealed, perhaps, some peril. A whisper—"Morgan is coming,"—and the country boys, whose horses were stabled behind the college, mounted and rode as for life, perhaps to be met on another road by a Magruder, or "Sue Munday," guerrilla band, or a Federal cavalry troop, unhorsed and set afoot, glad perchance to get off thus easily. Sometimes a guerrilla band would swoop down upon a town, seize horses, rob banks and stores, "line up" the civilians in the streets, and make them "stand and deliver." Scenes of violence were of daily occurrence, and this state of affairs continued after the great struggle ended, and was only suppressed at last by the iron hand of "Judge Lynch."

As if the college and seminary had not enough already to contend with, the General Assemblies of 1864 and 1865 adopted a kind of loyal test for Presbyterian membership, somewhat analogous to the iron-clad oath imposed for citizenship.

Led by Stuart Robinson, a former professor in the seminary,

a majority of the Kentucky Presbyterians withdrew from the General Assembly's jurisdiction, and organized the "Declaration and Testimony" party. Suits at law were instituted for the ownership of college, seminary, publishing, and individual church properties throughout the Commonwealth. The line of cleavage ran through churches and families. Rival churches were built. Central University at Richmond and a theological seminary in Louisville arose as rivals to Danville. A small wing of about 8,000 members still adhered to the Assembly and its college and seminary; and formed their source of patronage. Under such fiery leaders as Stuart Robinson and Robert J. Breckenridge, Kentucky Presbyterianism was in for a truceless war. Indeed, Breckenridge being asked, on his deathbed, if the two factions could ever be united, replied, that they might be, "provided, the Lord would first take me to heaven, and take Stuart Robinson back to Ireland, and keep him there." With this small constituency, "Centre" and the seminary kept up a nominal existence, though their "War" faculties—except a single professor of each—retired and new men came in.

Dr. Cooper's position in the college could not be pleasant. His sensitive nature was deeply wounded by the bitter shafts aimed at him—the outcome of this political and ecclesiastical warfare. He determined to resign, and in 1866 he was elected to the chair of Greek in Rutgers College, New Brunswick, New Jersey, with which institution he was connected until his death, January 31, 1904.

At Rutgers the "Storm and Stress" period of his Kentucky life had passed; and his great learning, his power as a teacher and writer, had abundant opportunity for manifestation. He became the idol of his pupils and the "Grand Old Man" of his city. Yet, to the last, he was as determined a foe as ever to political and personal corruption. He was a Republican of Republicans, and from conviction, not from any hope of office, or other political pelf for himself, or for his near friends. Such base considerations never entered his mind. If a Republican convention or public meeting were called in his city, the most faithful, non-office-seeking respondent to the call would be Dr. Cooper. He was there because he felt it the duty of good citizenship to cast voice and vote into the scale for what he regarded as a sound administration of law and equity. If a Republican procession was to parade the streets, Dr. Cooper was found in the ranks, be the column long or short, and regardless of weather, or other extraneous conditions. With

him it was a political duty. Had he been a citizen of Old Athens during the Peloponnesian War, every morning, when his term of service came around, the sun would have found him on the Pynx, actively opposing Cleon, Alcibiades, and the other demagogue crew. But, no; not "every morning" sun; for the demagogues would have resorted to the shells; he would have been ostracised, and would have spent most of those years in exile.

In Demosthenes' time he would have been unsparing in denouncing Philip and in stirring up the Athenians against Macedonian encroachments. At Rome he would have attended every great election, or popular assembly, in the Campus Martius despite the threats and daggers of Catiline and his band of traitors. Jacob Cooper's religion, politics, social, moral, and domestic standards of duty were "fixed ideas"—years ago determined, stereotyped, and no longer subject to revision, alteration, or amendment. From the duty side his temperament was militant; but it was only the outcome of deep conviction. From the other side, his deep sympathies, highly-tensioned, nervous temperament made him the tenderest of men. Never were two seemingly antagonistic natures more thoroughly combined in one human organism. He would have been a model soldier of Cromwell's Ironsides, ready first to fervently pray; then, with psalm and *pike*, to go through the ranks of the Cavaliers with the breath of the tornado for God and the Parliament.

On the other hand such was his reverence for all God's creation that he could not bear to see even the lower animals suffer willful injury. Of this sentiment the writer recalls an instance from one of his visits to Dr. Cooper's home in New Brunswick. Dr. C. and he were passing through a little copse, or thicket, near the former's house. Dr. C. had purchased this little waste some years before and for a good, round sum,—when he called attention to a rabbit squatting beside our path. The little animal hopped a few feet out of our way, then stopped, evidently with no apprehension of harm to itself. Then Dr. Cooper pointed out several other hares near by in the thicket, ruminating much at their ease and with a sense of security. He said he never suffered the little creatures to be disturbed in this retreat, and so well had they learned of the safety assured them there that often when chased by hunters near the city they would fly into this copse—their city of refuge—near their protector. Verily we have hope that lion and lamb will feed one day together in peace.

Before leaving Kentucky, Dr. Cooper was married, July 20, 1865, to Miss Mary Lane, of Cincinnati, who survives him. Three sons of this second marriage are still living: the eldest is a civil engineer; the second, a lawyer; and the third, in the faculty of Cornell University. The early death of his little son, Theodore Woolsey, plunged him into the deepest grief. Long afterward he wrote sadly to the writer that he could not yet understand God's sore dealing with him. He became reconciled at last; but the torn heartstrings were never attuned again. No heart could suffer more acutely from the loss of those it loved. His loves and his antipathies were poles apart; there was no debatable ground between. Dr. Cooper's learning was of the highest. In his specialties he had no superior on our continent; while in general, "all-round," scholarship he had few equals.

His scholarship was recognized by high authority, as evidenced by his degrees: S.T.D. was conferred in 1874 by Columbia; D.C.L. by Jena in 1873; and LL.D. by Tulane in 1895.

His writings treated chiefly of patriotic, philosophic, or theological subjects—themes broad enough to touch upon the thought, feeling, and motive forces of our race. He doubtless felt that along these lines the springs of action of intelligent conscience were to be directed. He never indulged in that cheap line of authorship, the compilation of college textbooks; for which he might *force* a small market at least in his own class-room. He did not add another to the thousands of grammars forever set afloat upon, or *sinking in*, the literary gulf. He published no editions of Greek plays; nor a new issue of Homer, or Xenophon, collated and compiled from a few German authorities, plus no original investigation of his own, and with nothing new save the name on the title-page. He knew that such authorship is ephemeral, and he never "felt impelled by the lack of a text suitable for students as the sole reason for undertaking such a task." He did not care to winnow straw that had already been threshed a thousand times. But in the old days when the nation's life was the wager; or when Renan's skepticism was shaking the faith of many Christians; when the supernatural of the Christian system was at stake,—then Dr. Cooper was forward in defense of the faith once given to the saints. This scribe has no catalog of Dr. Cooper's manifold writings; but readers of the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA who have studied his articles delving into the deep problems of thought, faith, and life, can bear wit-

ness to his learning, and patient search after the things of the spirit.

His warm personal relations with Mr. Gladstone are well known. He had persuaded the great Englishman to undertake the edition of Butler's "Analogy"; for he believed none other so competent to make lucid Butler's great thought, though somewhat turgid style. Last summer the writer read in Dr. Cooper's library a number of Mr. Gladstone's manuscript letters to him. Through these was indicated the high esteem in which he was held by the great Premier. Indeed, Dr. Cooper was fondly known among his pupils as Rutgers' "Grand Old Man."

In 1883 he was elected Professor of Ethics and Metaphysics in the University of Michigan, and this chair long remained open for his acceptance. Some time after finally declining it, he wrote to the writer that he felt he had made a mistake in declining the place, as thereby he might have been saved from some losses from which he had since suffered.

In 1893 he was transferred, at his own request, to the Chair of Metaphysics in Rutgers, and retained this position till his death. His pupils, his family, his fellow-citizens, will testify to the fidelity with which he discharged all the duties devolved upon him. All bear witness to his truth, loyalty, tender—almost feminine—sympathy, purity of life, his learning, his ability as a teacher, preacher, and writer. Over all his many things he was faithful, and in his death the world has lost one of its noblest characters.

H. A. SCOMP.

Harriman, Tenn.

THE BIBLIOTHECA SACRA

ARTICLE I.

THE BIBLICAL CRITICISM OF THE PRESENT DAY.¹

BY THE REVEREND ABRAHAM KUYPER, D.D., LL.D.

IN keeping with an ancient custom, it will be a rule at our University that the exchange of the rectorate shall be accompanied by an oration; and it is preferred that each rector shall take a theme from his own department. I also desire to observe this rule, and therefore the *Annale Academici* and the inaugural of the new rector are preceded by this address on Present-day Biblical Criticism, viewed from the point of its dangerous tendency to the church of the living God. I am deeply sensible of the importance of the task imposed on me by this choice of subject; I feel what modesty is demanded of me when I undertake to differ from celebrated and talented colleagues, who are for the most part my superiors; I know my need of greater courage than my own heart prompts, when I raise my hand and voice boldly against current opinions;—but may I refrain when the dangers that threaten the church compel me to speak? And, I add, do you expect anything else, when for several months past a reply has been invited from our side about this cardinal point in the conflict of spirits? It is indeed our conviction which, with an appeal to your

¹ Translated from the Dutch by J. Hendrik de Vries, D. D., Princeton, New Jersey.

considerate judgment but without the least uncertainty, we express,—that the biblical criticism of the present day is destructive of the best interests of the church of the living God, for the reason that it revokes her theology, robs her of the Bible, and destroys her liberty in Christ. Give me your attention as, in the development of these three propositions, I shall show that biblical criticism as it is prosecuted in our times at almost every Protestant university on the continent of Europe, must result in the utter destruction of theology; that it cannot continue without robbing the church of the Holy Scriptures; and that it must end in surrendering her, utterly defenseless, into the arms of the most unbearable, because intellectual, clericalism. And may He, before whose glory I reverently bow and for the welfare of whose church I plead, be in this the inspirer of my word and the judge of my thoughts; while in this sacred task, also, our help is in the name of the Lord Jehovah, the Rock of our strength, and the Strength of our life.

I.

Biblical criticism of the present day *tears the parts of theology out of their relation, violates its character, and substitutes for it something which is no theology*. Such is the three-fold complaint in which I treat the first part of the subject in hand, as I undertake to prove the proposition that present-day biblical criticism must end in the destruction of theology.

Theology is a science which, if it is analogous to philosophy and psychology, is distinguished from all other sciences by this fundamental point, that it does not occupy itself with the knowledge of the creature, but of the Creator; hence of a God who, as creator, cannot be included in the range of the creaturely. The object of theology, therefore, is God. Not God and something besides which is coördinated with him;

but God alone, and under him the creature is considered only in so far as it either instrumentally reveals the knowledge of God or for his glory takes this knowledge up into itself. In anthropology, man is the centrum, and the Almighty is considered only as the interpretation of the religious sense; but in theology God himself is the centrum, and no mention of man is justified, except in so far as God uses him for his own sake.

Again, in all other sciences man observes and thoughtfully investigates the object, and subjects it to himself, but in theology the object itself is active; it does not stand open, but gives itself to be seen; does not allow itself to be investigated, but reveals itself; and employs thinking man as instrument only to cause the knowledge of his Being to radiate. Hence the confession of God, the Holy Spirit, speaks of him also as 'Ο θεολογος, *Ecclesiæ Doctor*; "the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God," "for the Spirit searcheth all things. Yea, the deep things of God" (1 Cor. ii. 10); and all real theology is essentially one beautiful building which, in all ages and among all nations, has been reared, according to a fixed plan, by that *Spiritus Architectonicus* whom we, who are called theologians, merely assist as upper servants.

And, finally, theology is not born, like other sciences, from the motive of need or from the impulse after knowledge, but from the impulsion of the Holy Spirit. In giving us a theology, God has a purpose to fulfill. He wills that the knowledge of his Being shall be received by us; and that, having been cast into the furrows of our minds and hearts, it shall germinate; and, having germinated, that it shall bear fruit to the honor of his name. It is therefore a positive science in which object as well as end are not first to be found, but are posited in advance; and in its origin, power of development, and direction it is determined by one and the self-same principle,—the *Self-*

revealing God. As Thomas puts it, "*Deo docetur Deum docet, ad Deum ducet*"; or, better still, in the words of one of our own divines: "A theologian is ὁ τὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐκ Θεοῦ ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰς δοξάν Θεοῦ λέγων."¹

If, therefore, distinction is made between the departments of theology which touch its heart and those which occupy a subordinate place, the division into principal and subordinate departments is determined by the shorter or farther distance of these departments from this theological centrum. Hence the heart of theology is dogmatics, and those lying farthest off are the critical-literary studies, and, in fixed constellation with these, exegesis, pastoral theology, and church history round about the centrum. A just proportion demands that the strength of the best theologians and the best powers of most theologians be devoted to this central, spiritual labor, and that only a part of the strength and a proportionally small part of time be devoted to the purely literary. Thus lies the normal relation of the parts as it is determined encyclopedically, in virtue of her principle, by the nature of theology itself. And this relation is wholly torn apart by the present-day biblical criticism; in the economy of theology it upturns all order; makes that which is subordinate principal; devotes the finest energies to that which lies nearer the circumference; withdraws its best heads and best hours from the central study of theology, and thus occasions the birth of a monstrous hydrocephal. Or, to express the same in a nobler figure, it is like a regal banquet at which all the threads of the table linens have been numbered, and every spot and scratch on the golden goblets have most carefully been recorded; while, to the mortification of the guests, the sparkling wine is wanting.

¹[This line of thought is worked out more fully by the author in his *Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. —Tr.]

May this be tolerated? As the advocates of this vivisection of the Scripture repeatedly assure us, the knowledge of God rises also from the rich life of nature and man. Consequently theology also deals with the creation. But what would we think of the theologian, who, upon arriving at the point of the creation, began at once, without any self-restraint, to spend his best energy in the construction of a geology? Theology posits an Incarnation of the Word; will our theologians, for this reason, preface Christology with broad physiological and gynæcological studies of man's conception and embryonic existence? Human personality also charms and attracts by its diorama; does this make the man who spends his time and strength in anatomical, pathological, and physiological studies a theologian? Must we work through the whole conflict about materialism, chemically and geologically, microcosmically and dialectically, before as theologians we are allowed to count with the soul as existing? Theology makes confession of the resurrection of the body; is she bound, before rejoicing in her hope, to trace chemically the boundary which in our body separates the nutritive from the organic substratum? And, not to mention other points, theology also teaches a coming catastrophe which shall bring about the end of things; must she analyze by spectral analysis the component parts of all the planets, in order that she may speak authoritatively of a burning of the elements at the Lord's return? Would such a conception of study ever form a theologian? Would he who makes these things almost exclusively his studies be permitted to style himself a professional theologian? Could it be said that such studies were governed by the principle of theology? Will it do still to speak of theology, when the interests that should claim the attention subsequent to this elementary analysis are neglected from sheer lack of time?

And, if not, can we still speak of theology when not the Scripture,—which were excellent,—but the introduction to the Scripture, occupies the whole heart and head; when much is said about the Scripture, but ever so little from or upon the authority of the Scripture; yes, when ministers, though they bear the title of theologian, are wholly unacquainted with the spiritual life of their congregations, and, while almost opposing their people's holiest efforts, undertake to satisfy their own sense of honor by covering up these defects in elaborate presentations of what has been argued over and for this Bible as *literary substratum*?

Moreover, this one-sided study of this microscopic analysis disables the eye to see the holy synthesis. A chemist is not commonly a poet. In this way the powers for real theological studies remain undeveloped. They lose their sacred character; they remain barren; and, what is worse, they foster pride rather than humility. Even now nothing is more common than to hear youthful theologians, whose studies have scarcely begun, whose knowledge of language and of antiquity barely suffices to carry them along, and who still owe the world the first proof of their higher ability, deprecate the Scriptures in a way which but betrays that their superficiality echoes what their limited powers fail to grasp.

As results of this, by far the greater part of the theological domain is still untilled ground; the real theological sense is dulled; and most of those who call themselves theologians declare their study already ended when the portal which leads from the outer courts to the *sanctuary* of the *sancta theologia* still waits their steps.

Though I readily grant, indeed, that there must also be an outer court, by virtue of which these studies may and must assert their relative rights, I enter my protest against

the delusion that these studies render one a theologian; I insist that these elementary studies be relegated back again to their proper spheres; and that no one of us be longer permitted to ignore the atrophy of the higher theology which, of direful necessity, has originated from the hypertrophy of these lower studies.

For, and this was my second complaint, such a disproportionate excrescence is apt to become a constitutional defect, and present-day biblical criticism has, consequently, not only torn theology out of its relation, but has also falsified its character. This could not be otherwise. When we do not regulate with a clear consciousness the course of our studies according to the principle of our science, that course of studies governs us, and subjects us unconsciously to the power of that other principle, from which the impulse to this divergence in the course of studies was born. No accident put upon the study of the Scripture its present-day stamp. It was rather a general disposition of the spirits which, in all the countries of Europe, almost simultaneously raised very similar presumptions against the Scripture. The Schleiermachers and Robertson Smiths, the Kuenens and Colensos, are but the most accurate interpreters, on Scripture grounds, of the spirit which, as a reformer of the once current conceptions, has transposed the entire human consciousness in every department of life; even the revolution in theology, such as we have already witnessed in politics and in social and domestic relations. Encyclopedically this was most sharply declared in the claim that the *locus de S. Scriptura* should be removed from the gable of dogmatics, and be given a place in the transept of the *media gratiæ*. It will not do to say that this merely implied a change of place. Because, in the first place, in dogmatics the *media gratiæ* are

taken officially, hence it is not a doctrine of the Scripture, but a treatise of the *praedicatio Verbi*, which, alongside of the ministrations of the sacraments, appears under this rubric; as foolish, therefore, as it would be to include the whole Christology and soteriology under the *locus de sacramento*, just so untenable is the proposition to fuse the *locus de S. Scriptura* with what dogmatics teaches concerning the preaching of the Word. And, secondly, a still more serious objection presents itself. By taking away the *locus de S. Scriptura* from the entrance (introduction) to dogmatics, the ethical tendency has changed the very nature of the *principium* of theology. Our fathers have ever maintained that the Scripture was not one of many fountains, but the *principium* of our knowledge of God. The fountain of the knowledge of God, they said and very correctly, is God's own self-consciousness alone; is only present with the Creator, and cannot hide in something creaturely; and exists, therefore, exclusively in the *theologia archetypa*; while the *principium* of our knowledge of God, i. e., the principle, the organic beginning, the germ, from which springs all knowledge of God in the order of its parts, and in which of necessity the entire wealth of theology is potentially included, is neither tradition, nor the Christian consciousness, nor yet our higher implanted life, but solely and alone *the Holy Scripture*. Contradictory to this view, the ethical tendency in the present-day study of the Scriptures has made the twofold mistake: first, to locate the real source of the knowledge of God in the implanted life; and, secondly, as a simple consequence, to have that knowledge of God, as far as it is to become conscious, spring from the unconscious mystery of the soul; both these being philosophical ideas, one from Fichte, and the other from Schelling, and in a peculiar setting imported by the giant mind of Schleiermacher into the

theological domain. This attacks radically the work of the Holy Spirit, whose very office it is to reveal to, in, and by the church *conscious* knowledge of God in a form which is adapted to our human consciousness. "The way, the truth, and the life," are in Christ, but the Holy Spirit takes these from that Christ "to show them unto you"; not by impressions on the conscience, or impulses of feeling, neither by the inoculation of a lymph of life; but by the Word, i. e. by the utterance of the self-consciousness of God, interpreted in the form of our human consciousness. Again, this error is a radical subversion of the Divine ordinances, which are as analogous to the realm of nature as of grace. For, as we have the series of a "perception," from this perception a "thought," and from that thought the "word"; so we have, also, the series of a "blade," an "ear" and a "grain of wheat," or, if you like, the series of "inflammable material," "smoke," and "flame." What do you sow? And how do you ignite fire? Can you sow blades of corn, or can you make fire with smoke? Indeed in order that you may quicken the life of the blade, you must needs have the perfectly ripe grain of wheat; and, to ignite fire, you need a glowing spark or flame. In the same way it is the ordinance of God in spiritual things, not to begin with an unconscious perception, but to have the clearly *conscious Word* addressed to you, from which Word the perception shall be the first to germinate, and from which perception the thought shall ripen until at last from the Word a word of your own shall be born within you. In spite of its praiseworthy efforts to maintain the confession of the church, the ethical tendency, under the pressure of the same philosophical revolution-principle from which the present-day biblical criticism borrows its impulse, has altogether changed the face of theology. With us they confess a God who is conscious of himself, and consequently

they hold to a *Cognitio Dei Archetypa*, but the knowledge which we derive from the living God is in their system so little like the *Ectypic*, i. e. which has originated by the impress of God's self-consciousness, as to be reached by a slow process from the emotional life of the organs of revelation. Consequently this tendency was forced to take God the Holy Ghost and "the family-spirit of the congregation" to be synonymous, and, by the identification of the otherwise distinguished conceptions of *life*, *power*, and *word*, to introduce a Babylonian confusion of speech, which strangely mixes up all conceptions, and lends a floating character to every term, and, after the Romish style, allowed a continuous life-revelation to become apparent in the church, which at first took a place by the side of the Scripture, but which even now, with such men as Rothe, has usurped the authority of the Scripture.

The smooth transition, therefore, from *believing* to *modern* ethicals is found with Rothe, von der Goetz, Frank, and Rübiger. Thus far the ethicals still revered the rule "to make a separation between the sacred and the profane (Ezek. xlii. 20); and, even in spite of their starting-point, they still confessed faith in an absolute chasm between the holy and the unholy. But, and this is my third complaint, from this same principle, present-day Bible-study has produced a still more bitter fruit with the moderns, and in the place of the disconnected and grievously degenerated theology has given us an entirely other and new science. If there is no *theologia ectypa*, i. e. no communication of truth in a form appropriate to our consciousness, then, it was said, you have no right to value your perceptions as being essentially higher than ours: they do not differ specifically, but at most only in degree of development; in the religious life also there is a

Darwinistic process. And thus the wall of separation between the holy and the profane fell away; the chasm between the sacred and the common was filled in; idolatries were now taken as the religions of the nations; and, together with the sacred writings of other people, the sacred books of Israel were tested by the touchstone of all profane literature. Our theologians then dispersed into four different tents of science: There was a science of philology, and henceforth its priests would take notice of Semitic literature; there was an ethnical science, and the science of religions should henceforth be known as its subdivision; there was a science of psychology, and under its auspices religious feeling would be investigated; and, finally, there was a science of philosophy, whose task it now became to furnish a philosophy of religion. Thus alongside of, and over against, sacred theology, there arose an entirely other and separate science, no longer of God, but of *religion*. And the grievance of the church of Christ is, that this brand-new "science of religion" committed the lamentable act of dishonestly announcing itself by the old name of "theology," and, while expelling sacred theology, which it had at first ignored, altogether from the domain of the state-faculty, now carries itself as though it were the only lawful tenant, yea, owner, of the ancient sacred house. Hence our complaint against you, who, as our brethren making confession of the name of Jesus, have coöperated to effect this change, is not merely that you have mutilated theology and have allowed it to be falsified; but much more that, by the abandonment of dogmatics and practical theology, you have allowed the heart and the brain of the *sancta theologia* to be removed, in order, as a soulless mummy embalmed with spices, to have it laid away in the modern sarcophagus.

See, my brethren, in the name of the Lord, this pains us;

it grieves us that, with your leave, the profane "science of religion" has been allowed to ascend the throne of the *sancta theologia*, and that as willing priests you offer it the services of your splendid talents, and as willing choir-boys bring to it the incense of your homage. For this makes the churches of the living God to suffer loss. If, indeed, you cannot destroy them as churches, you can injure their well-being. And this is being done. According to the Lord's ordinance, a theology belongs to the church in the earth. She cannot live without it. Where she is deprived of it she must languish. She needs a theology that she might grasp the more hidden sense of God's Word; that she might discover the deflection of the line of error; to protect the medical art of the soul from passing into a spiritual quackery; to exhibit the reasonableness of her faith and as apologete to plead for it. The church needs a theology that she might be inwardly edified, and kept from error, and be able to command moral confidence from the learned and unlearned alike. In brief, she needs a theology which, while it differs not specifically, but only gradually, from the knowledge of sacred things on the part of the laity, does not stand outside of it, but in the service of the Holy Spirit, blooms and flourishes with it upon one root; which, joined to her past, directs the course of former thought into the channels of our days; and which, by virtue of that origin, trains ministers who do not move as exalted creatures in an atmosphere above the people, but dwell among them as their spiritual noblemen, who in but purer and finer forms cause to shine forth what is her life and that of her children. And this you withhold from the churches, you vivisectors. By your present-day studies of the Scriptures, you cause the church to be deprived of it. You offer her a science which has no connection with her confession, and you send her pastors who, how-

ever learned and reverend, if in other ways they are serious, must confess shamefacedly their ignorance of the things of the Spirit, and, instead of feeding the church, must needs be fed and warmed by her. And so it is no wonder, that diseases in the church are on the increase hand over hand, that sects are multiplying, that practice does not follow the teaching, and that "shepherd and flock," distrustful of each other, stand mutually opposed, instead of unitedly enjoying the glory of Jesus' name. Even society at large, yes the country, suffers by it. For a spiritual circle which finds its image in a marsh, instead of in a clear lake, throws out of necessity poisonous vapors, which spoil the national spirit. By robbing the church of her theology, she is robbed also of that wonderful power of thought which made us Calvinists for ages together an invincible stronghold in the midst of the land; and, by presenting wandering ethical ideas in the stead of the nourishing bread of practical theology, discipline and order are undermined, and the moral sense of justice is weakened.

And therefore, in behalf of that misappreciated and theology-robbed church, we have planted in this new University a slip of the old plant, with the prayer that God may give it increase. Our aim was not to place a better theology by the side of one less good, but, where there was none, to plant one anew, however imperfectly its form. For consider it well, at the state universities there is no longer any theology. It is lost. A science of religion has taken its place, a science of an altogether other caliber, but which the state, less honestly, at the price of misleading the church of God, carries under the name of the old firm. Hence our faith in our future, whatever storms may be gathering over our heads; but hence also the bitter opposition we meet with from our brethren. For nothing disturbs peace of mind so much as want of courage

to break off from what has become a temptation. And the state-faculties are a temptation; a temptation to all Christian brethren who are not wholly weaned from homage to this officially scientific world; a temptation to Christian parents who, however warm and earnest in their prayers for their sons, are anxious to choose for them the way that is socially safest; and a temptation no less to our young men who desire to become ministers of God's word. For you know that from that "faculty without theology" there runs a path to the church that has been made entirely smooth and straight. While with us, who have reinstated the *sancta theologia* in its former honor, one is to all appearances surrounded by a *wall* without any means of escape.

II.

After the encyclopedic there follows the *dogmatic* side of the question. For the biblical criticism of the present day, according to my second point, does not merely withhold theology from the congregations, but, what is worse, it robs them of their Bible.

When do the congregations have a Bible and when not? Allow me to speak of this holy matter plainly as a day-laborer, because the Holy Scripture is a divine jewel common to the day-laborer and professor. And then, I say it frankly and unhesitatingly, to us Christians of the Reformed faith, the Bible is the Word and the Scripture of our God. When in private or at the family-altar I read the Holy Scripture, neither Moses nor John addresses me, but the Lord my God. He it is who then narrates to me the origin of all things and the calamitous fall of man. God tells me with silent majesty how he has appointed salvation to our fallen race. I hear him himself relate the wonders which he wrought for our deliverance and that of the people of his choice, and how, when that people

rebelled against him, he afflicted them in his wrath, and when chastened restored them again to his favor, the whilst they sought the day of the coming of the Son of his love. In the midst of that sacred history I hear the Holy Spirit singing to my spiritual ear in the Psalms, which discloses the depths of my own soul; in the prophets I hear him repeat what he whispered in the soul of Israel's seers; and in which my own soul is refreshed by a perspective which is most inspiring and beautiful. Till at length, in the pages of the New Testament, God himself brings out to me the Expected One, the Desire of the fathers; shows me the place where the manger stood; points out to me the tracks of his footsteps; and on Golgotha lets me see, how the Son of his unique love, for me poor doomed one, died the death of the cross. And, finally, it is the same God, the Holy Spirit, who, as it were, reads off to me what he caused to be preached by Jesus' disciples concerning the riches of that cross, and closes the record of this drama in the Apocalypse with the enchanting Hosanna from the heaven of heavens. Call this, if you will, an almost childish faith, outgrown by your larger wisdom, but I cannot better it. Such is my Bible to me, and such it was in the bygone ages, and such it is still, the Scripture of the church of the living God. The human authors must fall away; in the Bible God himself must tell the narrative, sing, prophesy, correct, comfort, and jubilate in the ear of the soul. The majesty of the Lord God is the point in question, and that only. If then the Scripture has spoken, all controversy is ended; when it affirms, the latest doubt departs; even the habit of turning to the Scriptures, in times of need or despair, for help and direction from God, seems to me by no means unlawful, but a precious usage. Thus I stand with Augustine, and with Comrie, who entirely along his lines exclaimed: "When I read the Scripture, I

listen to what God speaks to me; and, when I pray, God listens to what I stammer."

This does not mean that the church looks for something extraordinary in that Book as such. A "*vis supernaturalis sacrae scripturae inhærens*," such as the Lutheran faculties taught over against Rathman, and such as, alas! among ourselves is maintained by some, is inconceivable for the Calvinist. To him the holy book is as the deep water in the diamond. As long as that precious stone lies on the table in its dark state, the most beautiful diamond can scarcely be distinguished from a worthless piece of glass. Value is imparted to it only by the inshining of the light. In this way the Scripture becomes the Holy Scripture only when the Holy Spirit sends forth his reflections, which causes God, the omnipresent God, to address my soul in and through that book. If the figure of speech were not profane, I would say, that, even as the telephone is a speaking from the distance, such is that book of the Testaments to me. If now I enter into relations with that book, and the Holy Spirit works his illumination, then is my soul joined to my God, and my God to my soul, and the speech of the Eternal One begins. Every idea of a something accidental in the Scripture is thus excluded. It did not originate of itself, but it was brought about after a fixed plan. The eternal counsel of God contained the original, the faint copy of which is given us in the Scripture. "I have known of old," sings the Psalmist, "concerning thy testimonies" "that thou hast established them forever." The soil in which it was to develop itself was expressly prepared; in the germ from which it was to grow lay the protoplasm of its full glory. It is the living stone, firm, solid as stone, and yet seething with life. They who wrote it did not write it for their own sakes, but for the church of God, for which it

was intended. "That not unto themselves, but unto us, they did minister the things" i.e. for the church of God of all ages; so that at the end of the dispensation of miracles, Almighty God would be able to speak to and through his church with indeclinable certainty in the highest form, viz. in that of the *Conscious Word*. I grant you, this is not a definition: at most it is but a refection out of my own soul for the sake of communicating the impression of the Scripture-mystery. For the Scripture-secret is a mystery, equally wonderful and impenetrable as the creation in the beginning, the incarnation in the midst of the ages, and the final catastrophe which still tarries. Wonderful, not for the sake of the book itself, but because here also it is: God touching the finite, and the wave-beat of the eternal broken upon what is devoid of all power that insures continuance of being.

If now the question is raised by what name the church of the living God has been accustomed to designate this mode of origination of the Scripture, we reply: "*Inspiration, theopneusty*, by the Holy Spirit." From the nature of the case this Scripture-theopneusty concerns a somewhat different question from that other inspiration, which was merely the vehicle of revelation. This is not said to evade a difficulty. Candidly spoken, I also belong to those backward ones who stand immovably convinced that God wrote the law himself upon the tables of stone, spake himself with audible voice from Sinai, appeared in the theophanies, sent angels to comfort sinners, and, as the wonderful worker for, to, and in Israel, of wonderful things, surely also foretold to man in prophecy what he, the Almighty One, thought of man, and purposed with the children of men. That all that relates to revelation is passed over in this paper, is therefore done least of all from fear;

but only for the sake of clearness. For revelation could have been given, and could still have been continued, without there ever having been prepared a theopneustic Scripture. Imagine that revelation worked out in its course, without anything more, and there is nothing of the Scripture itself yet existent; then that Scripture is still to come; it is still to come about after a fixed purpose; by a plan which includes also the means by which that Scripture should be wrought and formed, and this wondrous means the church calls "the theopneusty." It is possible, though I do not affirm it, that in olden times still other mighty miracles took place which have not been recorded; it is certain that important, effective prophetic addresses were made, of which the Scripture makes no mention; we know that Jesus spoke and did many things of which we have no report; also that the Apostles spoke and wrote what has not been handed down to us; but all this, however precious it must have been to Israel and the early Christian churches, does not touch the Scripture as *the Scripture of the Church of God*. For the Scripture brings us from that revelation only that much and just so much as was determined by God to be kept in the permanent organism of *the Conscious Word* for the *church of all ages*. No accident regulated what was admitted into it and excluded from it. It was the fixed choice of God which directed itself after the need of the souls of God's elect and the wants of the church of Christ, known from eternity, and therefore satisfying for all ages. It is a mystery of love and comfort which can be explained only when each and every writer, whose inestimable grace and honor it was to record a larger or smaller part of that Scripture, was not his own master in the writing, but only rendered service as an instrument of the Holy Ghost, and was so wrought upon and directed by the Holy Ghost, that the page of Scrip-

ture, which, after pencil and pen had been laid aside, lay before him, contained and was possessed of equal fixedness, as though it had originated by an immediate, divine creation.

How are we to interpret this? Does this mean to say that the Holy Spirit could have used Abiram for this wondrous task as well as Moses, Saul with equal safety as David, Judas Iscariot equally well as John? This is the way in which it has been presented, and, if compelled to do so, I myself would not, even in this, determine a limitation to the almightiness of God. God can raise children unto Abraham also from the stones of the street; and the prophecy of Balaam, the numbering of Saul with the prophets, and the redemption-idea on the lips of Caiaphas, amply show, that, if needs be, the Holy Spirit has this power also at his disposal. But it is quite another question whether the Holy Spirit has willed to work the theopneusty in such a magical way. And this we answer in the negative. On the contrary, theopneusty appears to consist in this, that the Holy Spirit temporarily took away from the human spirit the immediate disposal of the operation of his "spirit, soul, and body"; which he then from within out assumed himself; and in such a way that, in the measure in which man was spiritually disposed, the Holy Spirit operated in and by the human spirit, or even repressed the human spirit wholly. If for a moment I may speak of the human sensorium as the wheels, and the human spirit the axle, then the mystery consists in this, that in theopneusty the Holy Spirit either turned the axle at his pleasure, or lifted that axle out and acted himself in the place of it. Compare Daniel at the Hiddekel with the man of Tarsus, and the distinction I refer to will be clear. No idle speculations on the different styles of the writers or the characters peculiar to their circle of

thought need detain us. By the constant usage of another instrument, the result must be different. And that not by accident, for the Holy Spirit did not choose his instrument for this glorious work only at the given moment, but created and prepared such an instrument already in the succession of the generations, by the forming of heart and brains, in the manner of education, the leading of the daily life, and mostly also by inward grace.

To narrate history, the Holy Spirit used an instrument in which the memory of facts was present, and in whose spiritual periphery, if I may say so, were found the scrolls and documents and all necessary data. To sing psalms for the church of the living God, the Holy Spirit did not employ a prosaic cavalier, but a poetic spirit, which itself was deeply shaken, moved, down-trodden, and which heroically lifted itself up in the Spirit. In like manner, for the apostolic gnosis, the Holy Spirit did not choose a Thomas but a Paul; not a Thaddeus, but a Simon Bar-jonas; not an Andrew who stood afar off, but a John whose head reclined on Jesus' bosom. Hence the only point in question, therefore, is that of psychical analysis; whether, indeed, the human person was framed *to serve*, such as he is, with all the knowledge which he himself possesses, *as the organ of another spirit*. And this is possible; people can be possessed of other spirits. A strange spirit can speak through one so possessed. The Gospels tell us this definitely, and I myself have heard this double speaking in one possessed of frenzy. If now our spirits are susceptible to possession by evil spirits, why not also by good; and if by good, why not then by the Holy Spirit? The "*est Deus in nobis, agitante calescimus illo*"; all the gifts of genius; all real powers of poetry and art; also the several forms of divination, show that another spirit can achieve something

in ours. Even among us there are sometimes spirits who capture and hold other spirits so entirely in their powers that they use them literally as their own doubles, or who, stronger still, multiply their own spirit a thousand fold in whole companies of men. Think of a Napoleon at Austerlitz. Is it not the spirit of that one man of short stature which there causes the whole phalanx of his generals, and the many thousands of horsemen, to turn as one mighty wheel about the pivot of his will? And if in these several domains, by analogy, it appears possible to render a human psychical and physical being, by the entering in of another spirit in his spirit, serviceable to the will of that other spirit, why then should the possibility be disputed that God the Holy Spirit does this same thing in a divine, i. e. *absolute* sense. "The Holy Spirit," says Jesus, will bring to mind"; is not that an intellectual capacity to employ the memory in one's immediate service? And would not that same Holy Spirit be able equally easily and surely to introduce new and conscious thoughts into the human spirit? You yourself are able to transmit conscious thoughts into the mind of another. To accomplish this you *speak*. But what is "speaking" other than a passing on of the thought from your heart in the vibration of air-waves? and what the voice, and those vibrations of air-waves, other than conductors along which your thought is carried to the auditory nerve of the person addressed? and what is this auditory nerve in turn but a conductor or wire along which your thought is introduced into the spirit of that other man? Your motor-nerves which set in motion the muscle of your organ of speech, the air-waves which were set to vibrate by these muscles, the sensorial auditory-nerves of the ether which were affected by these vibrations and passed them on to his spirit, are altogether nothing else

than leaders which you employ to repeat the impression of your spirit in the spirit of the other, so that the same clear, conscious, and full-orbed thought arises in him which at first was only in you, and which only now has come to him. And why then should not the Holy Spirit, who, after all, is not bound to these intermediate links of nerves, air-waves, and muscles,—why should not the Holy Spirit not be able to do immediately what we are able to do mediately, and, entering in within us, transplant entirely conscious, new, and full-orbed thoughts from himself into our spirit? Hence I take the writers as entirely instrumentally in the service of the Holy Spirit, including everything they knew, together with the entire result of their previous training, even to their surroundings and credentials, and maintain that the Holy Spirit has used this whole person, with everything belonging to him, to remind in and through him, to sift, to purge, to think, to write; but also, alongside of this, that without any intermediaries of motor or sensor nerves, and hence also without inflection of the muscles of speech, or the vibration of the air-wave, the Holy Spirit communicated new, conscious, clear thoughts to them. That God also spoke with audible voice is sufficiently shown by Sinai and Tabor. But this is not the question with the inspiration of the Scripture; this was inspiration by the entering in of the Spirit into the centrum of the personality of the writers, and an absolute subjection of what was in and belonged to them to the sovereignty of the Holy Spirit.

By this the rationalistic pretext which separates between "Scripture" and "Word of God" even as the present-day protest against the inspiration of the *words*, is judged of itself. The Scripture is God's word both as a whole and in its parts. *Synthetically*, because the extent and the content of

the Holy Scripture in its organic resumption has God for their author and is given to the church as type of the incarnation. The Scripture, however, is also God's word *analytically*, i. e. in each of its parts; not because each of these parts brings us a new thought of God in a divine form, but because the actual thoughts of God as well as the thoughts of men, and even those of Satan in so far as the Scripture writes them down for us, yea, every song and every narrative of the Bible, even of what the godless have dared to undertake against God Almighty, is here placed before us, not with the uncertainty of the human, but under the infallible credential of the divine, i. e. of the word of the Holy Spirit. The latest dogmatists in Germany abandon more and more the idea of an inspiration which concerns the *thoughts*, but not the *words*. Rothe declares: "On the whole, words and thoughts are inseparable." There are no thoughts without words; they cannot be expressed and held fast otherwise than in words and by means of words." Even the moderns do not deny this any longer. It was indeed pure "thoughtlessness," as Rothe called it, to advocate an inspiration of the thoughts and to deny the inspiration of the words. He who does this is not a thinker, let alone a psychologist. No, as often as the Holy Spirit entered a human personality, in order to use him as instrument for the writing of a page of Scripture, the end could not be reached save as either the thoughts that were already in him or those that were newly inspired first entered into his human consciousness. No thought can enter into our consciousness but of itself it puts on the garment of representations and conceptions. And again they cannot come forth out of this consciousness upon paper save in the form of words and syntax. If the Holy Spirit gave the thoughts only, and left the task of expression to man, all certainty

would be lost. But, no, the working of the Holy Spirit was not by halves, it went on; and as he was able to enter the spirit of man, he equally governed the human consciousness, and effected the transition from thoughts into conceptions, and from these conceptions into words; and only when his thoughts stood written down on the parchment did the Holy Spirit rest from this his glorious work, and saw that it was good. Hence it was also a verbal inspiration,—not mechanically by whispering into the fleshly ear, but organically by calling forth the words from man's own consciousness, i. e. by employing all those words which were on hand in the spiritual sensorium of the writer. Even as the child of God confesses: "God works absolutely in my personality every good thing (deed, word, and intention), and at the same time I work all things myself, walking in the works which God has prepared for me"; the author of Scripture may confess: "The Holy Spirit inspires absolutely every thought and every word in me, and yet I write every word myself, studying the meaning of the words which God has prepared for his church." It also applies therefore to the form of the Scripture: οὐκ ἐν διδακτοῖς ἀνθρωπινῆς σοφίας λόγοις ἀλλ' εἰ διδακτοῖς ἁγίου πνεύματος, πνευματικοῖς πνευμτικὰ συγκρίνοντες, i. e. a content inspired within me by the Spirit, and given back in the words which the Spirit pressed out of me. Hence the result is, that, apart from the question whether the writers realize it or not, by them as instruments a book or song or epistle was written, which in its original form, i. e. as autographon, bare in itself the infallible authority of having been wrought by the Holy Ghost.

And this is the point in question which concerns the church of the living God. There may be some incoherence

in the theory of inspiration, the words employed in describing it may be ill-chosen; all this is nothing as long as the fact of inspiration remains untouched and its result immovable. The divine *fixedness* over against the *uncertainty* of all human ponderings, is chiefly that which makes the Holy Scripture "holy," i. e. a bible for the church of God. Hence the question which, in view of the Scripture-study of the present day, presents itself is not, whether it gathers about itself other hypotheses concerning the mystery of the inspiration of the Scripture, nor whether it modifies the judgment about the Scriptures from the literary view-point, but only and exclusively, whether it leaves us in the possession of such an inspiration of the Scripture, whose result offers us for its entire content the unweakened guarantee of divine certainty.

From the view-point of the modern tendency this is scarcely any longer a question as such. The moderns without distinction antagonize with one accord such a view of the Scripture as a fruit of superstition, and make it a point of honor to impress it deeply upon the congregations that such a Holy Scripture never existed, save in the imagination of the credulous. No further word of them is therefore necessary. But we cannot pass those by who have erected their tent midway between the moderns and ourselves, and whose banner carries the ethical symbol. For with these learned men the strange phenomenon appears that, according to the impression of the church, no less decisively than the moderns, they abolish the Holy Scripture as a book of divine authority, and at the same time personally, in strongest terms and most affectionate assurances, declare to you that the violation of a tittle or jot of God's word is held by them to be a sin before God. Hence the presentation of their ideas demands more than ordinary care. It will be less easy to reach any conclu-

sions from the declaration of their self-consciousness, which renders the test of their declaration concerning the parts of Scripture in particular the more necessary. What they unjustly demand concerning the Scripture, viz, that we should not commit ourselves to what the Scripture says of itself, but to what we observe in it as a whole, will be the only safe guide to help us make our way through the labyrinth of their studies. I call it a labyrinth; for, in sooth, with however much indulgence and brotherly kindness we may judge their labors, the complaint cannot be repressed, that by the indefiniteness which characterizes the definitions of their conceptions, the writers of this tendency both mutually and from themselves, even at times in their self-same books, so differ from each other, and so confuse the representation, that to be ethical of tendency and clear seem never capable of going hand in hand.

To hold myself strenuously to the point in question, I pass the consideration by, whether, in their general starting-point, the ethicals still stand upon the basis of the faith, and confine myself exclusively to the assertion, that, so far as it concerns the particular point of the Scripture-inspiration, they altogether walk the line of the moderns. For though, in the matter of revelation, the ethicals still acknowledge much of what the moderns deny, and even radically depart from the moderns who deny every intervention of the living God in that which has once entered upon being; and while, for the most part, the ethicals accept such a personal role on the part of God in history by manifestation and revelation, by regeneration and illumination, still all this does not touch the Scripture inspiration. Whether, for instance, in his prophecies which he proclaimed on the squares of Jerusalem, Isaiah was operated by the Holy Spirit does not affect the Scripture-question in the

least. With the Scripture the only question concerned is, whether the person who wrote the book that is named Isaiah, was so inspired in the writing of it by the Holy Spirit that he produced a sure and infallible product. For these are two entirely different question, whether in their official activity Moses and the prophets, or the evangelists and apostles, were led by the Spirit and quickened as organs of revelation, or whether the persons who wrote our Bible-books were in the writing itself inspired in the absolute sense. The first may be granted and at the same time the second pertinently denied;—and this is what the ethicals have actually done. They still believe with us in a revelation wrought by God through immediate intervention. Among the elements of that revelation they too accept a certain working of God upon the spirit of prophets and apostles, and are willing to confess with us that in all their official work an Isaiah or a John were men “filled with the Holy Ghost,” in their whole personality. But when from this sphere of revelation I pass on to the question of the completion of the Scripture as Scripture, and of the putting-together in a book not only of what Paul and John themselves wrote, but of all the books, including the historic books, which lie before us, and then ask, whether a specifically peculiar and an absolutely sure inspiration governs this act of writing, they definitely deny it, and so deny the real inspiration of the Scripture entirely.

Do we hereby lay anything unlawfully at their charge? Let this be decided by Rothe, who is the brightest, relatively clearest, and most celebrated among the soberer writers of this tendency, and to whose processes of thought no single new element has been added by the later dogmatists of their class,—a man to whom I appeal more gladly because he himself declares: “The opinion which I here write down is none other

than what openly or tacitly is thought and confessed among all believing theologians"; because he valiantly opposes the effort of the ethicals longer to hide their real meaning from the people, and no less because Rothe has likewise dominated and quickened the ideas of the Scriptures current especially among the younger ethicals in the Netherlands.

And Rothe candidly declares, that there is no objection to call our newer representation of the matter "the inspiration of the Holy Scripture, which is the same name given it by the ancient church, and it is deemed lawful to launch it out as such upon the world. This, however, is not well done, and must lead to a confusion of ideas. In truth, our aspect of the matter is of a totally different sort from the church's doctrine of Inspiration." Thus you hear it from his own lips that it is "something of an entirely different sort," and at the end he does not hesitate to reach this serious conclusion: that the Bible which presents its image to the exegete for exegesis is readily different from that which the orthodox theologian and the ordinary believing Christian takes it to be when reverently he takes the Holy Book in hand.

And what is that better and ethical representation according to Rothe? It originates from Schleiermacher, the scholarly philosopher and more than theologian who, half a century ago, at an unhappy hour, posited the fatal principle against whose pricks the whole army of the meditating theologians have kicked their heels, and by which throughout its fatal process of development the ethical tendency was and is governed; from Schleiermacher, according to whom we are to understand by inspiration nothing other than "the activity of the universal mind in the will of the individual for the sake of producing a definite special work." "So that act of composing one of the holy books and the preceding and

fundamental creation of thought in the soul of the Scripture-writer cannot be looked upon as an act of divine revelation." Corresponding to this, Rothe's representation is that there is a church of Christ. From this church a higher life operates outward. She owes this higher life to the Holy Spirit, who pitched his tent in the midst of her, and elevates the sinful life up to a "divine-human" life. This church exists organically. Hence her nobler organs, the apostles, possessed this *Gemüthegeist* in a special measure, and under this constellation their enlightenment became higher graded than that of the ordinary laity. And that which in the most pregnant sense caused this illumination to become inspiration, was the fact that for a single time God lifted up the life in their soul by a new touch, which made their consciousness of God more clear, and from this brightened consciousness of God they were able to produce rich and new thoughts. As a result of this, Rothe held that there can be no mention of an infallibility of Scripture; that most of the writers, but never the Scripture itself, can be called inspired; that inspiration differs greatly in degree among the writers severally; and that therefore the explanation given by the apostles of the Scripture of the Old Covenant often seems to him incorrect; that their representation of Christian truth cannot be taken to be normative for us *per se*; and that, which is especially noteworthy, even the image, the picture, given us of the Christ is not of itself possessed of a guarantee of being a faithful reproduction. Rothe therefore abandons altogether the narratives of creation and the fall; views the historical books as collections of records and documents which teem with mistakes; and when the sum-total is reached, there is little more left of his Bible than what, if it be in an imperfect way, has come to us as the result of preceding spiritual reve-

lation in those books, and what we can obtain from it by the criticism of faith. Hence, according to the ethical, for the church of our day there is alongside of and above the written Word, the living divine revelation, which continues to operate just as it did in earlier days.

Concerning this ethical representation allow me to present three observations: The radical mistake in this representation is, in my opinion, the assertion that "the truth ever bears an ethical character." This certainly applies to its central origin in God, and equally to its effect upon persons; but can by no means hold true of its historical process of manifestation nor of its organs. He who first takes away from the truth everything that is not ethical; makes "truth" to mean a "seeing of the kingdom of God," and then quotes the text "Whosoever is not born again cannot see the Kingdom of God,"—such an one can very easily maintain so incorrect a representation. But since the sensorium of "truth" is not the Will, but the consciousness, we object most strenuously to this maiming of the truth, and this obliteration of the boundary-lines between conceptions which are so specifically different. The *thelamatic* and the *noetic* life form indeed two separate spheres, whose mingling together beclouds our whole representation, and confuses all our thoughts.

The representation derived from the foregoing, that "inspiration" is bound to "regeneration," is equally faulty. This also is an effort to render an altogether different conception ethical, by which that which is beautiful, ordered, and distinguished is melted down chaotically. That which follows from and after regeneration is *illumination*, the enlightenment, which falls to the portion of every child of God, but which, as the case of Balaam clearly shows, differs specifically from inspiration.

No less faulty is their representation that the new elements of revelation which the Scriptures of the prophets and apostles offer us had risen from the depths of their inner lives, whose ethical character has been eminently elevated by the divine touch. Even though it were possible to imagine that they were free from sin, even then life would be quickened by the Word; since, indeed, Jesus does not say: "This is to know thee, that they have eternal life"; but, on the contrary, "This is life eternal, that they know thee";—by the Word is the creation, by the seed of the Word the recreation of our soul. But since, moreover, sin continued to break the harmony in them, the distinction must be the stronger maintained between the ethical and the non-ethical in the revelation-organs. Or is it not so? Souls that are greatly endued with grace are frequently greatly deficient in understanding; while in others who are of large understanding the measure of grace is sometimes almost shamefully unnoticeable. What overtook Rome when, for the sake of having an infallible Christ, they demanded a Mary of an immaculate conception, is the same that has overtaken the ethical; for, in a similar way, they deny the infallible thought of the Scripture, because ethically the sinless mother of such infallible thought remained wanting in the soul of its writers. In fact, therefore, their "theanthropic," i. e. divine-human life, is nothing but a confusion of conceptions sprung from the same fundamental error. For a "divine-human" life, which communicates itself to the redeemed by tincture, as the theosophists dream, or, if you like, by way of atoms, is a teaching which is altogether unreformed, even rather than, for the sake of the *communicatio idiomatum*, pseudo-Lutheran, founded upon nothing less than a *confusio naturarum*, i. e., a pantheistic mingling of the divine and the human.

And finally an equally great fault is the falsification which is thus introduced into the confession of the Holy Spirit: partly because they continually take the personal Holy Spirit as identical with his quickening reflex in the church, naming him her family-spirit; and partly because, thus limiting the Holy Spirit to the ethical domain (the domain of law and norm, will and judgment), they dispute his right to the honorable title of being the Herald of the deep things of God, i. e. the Communicator and the Inspirer of conscious thoughts.

My second observation concerns equally a confusion, not this time in two different spheres, but in distinguishable periods of development in the same sphere.

The first church, it is said, received the life without the written word, *atqui ergo* it also exists for us independently of the Scripture. This is a conclusion which should be rejected, because the embryonic state differs from the exuterinal specifically in this, that the embryo absorbs within itself the mother-blood immediately, while the adult must prepare the food himself:—a specific difference which can be formulated as follows: that inspiration *produced* something while illumination can only *reproduce*,—the reason why the church cannot get on without a Scripture in which it finds the image to be reproduced delineated in pure outlines. Though we do not deny that with an adult person the ozone from the atmosphere may enter into him through the mouth, nostrils, and ear, and through the pores of the skin, and that in like manner the church of the Lord may drink from the spiritual atmosphere through her spiritual pores, we refuse to stamp this spiritual ozone with the name of *the Word of God*, just as surely as the famishing man would scorn you when, as he called after you for bread, you would undertake to satisfy his hunger with atmospheric ozone.

My third observation is, that in this way the ethical tendency exhibits a theory which glitters indeed very temptingly, but fails of the explanation which it is bound to give.

Rothe himself acknowledges that the apostles of the Lord, and we add the Lord himself, have subscribed, not to the inspiration of the ethicals, but to that one which we defend. He acknowledges that the church of all ages, under the Old and New Covenant, have taught not a looming up of the truth from out the unconscious ethical life, but very truly *a communication of conscious truth*; also, that what the believing Christian feels in this pious reading of the Scripture, is not covered by his, but only by the orthodox theory. He grants, indeed, that the Scripture does not come with this theory to the ethicals, but that the ethicals introduce this theory into the vestibules of the Scripture. And every one perceives that this explains nothing, and simply posits a new imaginary something by the side of the object to be explained. When, for instance, and this is one out of a hundred, Isaiah foretells that Hezekiah is to have another fifteen years added to his life, it is plain that this number fifteen could not have loomed up from the depths of ethical life; so that already, by this single fact, the ethicals are brought to face the painful choice, either to declare that their theory is insufficient, or, worse yet, to minimize Israel, one of the noblest organs of revelation, to a very unethical fortune-teller or an imposter of a low spiritual level.

My last observation is, that to draw a usable conclusion from such imperfect premises, the ethicals themselves appear at length as the judges of their own theory.

What does Rothe assert? This, that the prophets and apostles could not have possessed an "errorless" knowledge of the truth, since they were ethically imperfect; nevertheless, he himself dares to maintain that (*risum teneatis amici*) he,

Rothe, and his ethical friends (who ethically may stand beneath the apostles), are perfectly well capable, with these imperfect pieces in hand, to attain unto "an errorless knowledge of the truth." Thus Rothe readily turns his back upon the theory which rendered it necessary to abandon the infallibility of the apostles, as soon as it touched himself and his congenial allies. In this way thelematic imperfection and noetic accuracy are taken to be compatible with each other, and the common methods of speech of the less "unconscious" people resumes with the ethical scholars again its original right.

Hence, however much we appreciate in the ethical theologians that struggling with both hands to oppose the irresistible impulsive force of the principle, which, as a serpent fostered in their bosom, attacks their faith at the very heart; yet with reference to this question of the theopneusty, their system may not be characterized less harshly than as a cloudy mingling of philosophical theories with gnostic aspirations, covered by the content of a faith-consciousness which belongs to Rome, and not to us; and that complaint must be entered against it, that by this threefold motive it leads to the absolute destruction of the inspiration of the Holy Scripture. Of the Scripture-inspiration, Rothe himself has said: "*Sit ut sit aut non sit*," and the modern Lipsius expressed it still more clearly, that all effort to save inspiration by the abandonment of the old dogma could result in nothing but self-deception and misguidance of others. And therefore, however much they may classify us in the *corpus virorum obscurorum*, and try to make the church dogma ridiculous by the "*automaten-parodie*," we hold fast inexorably to the ancient and unweakened theopneusty; in our historical simplicity, or, if you will, in our educational backwardness, still believing that, even though he remain ethically imperfect, an ambassador is capable of transmitting without error what his sovereign inspires him with.

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]

ARTICLE II.

THE MODERN JEW: HIS WHENCE AND WHITHER.

BY PROFESSOR HUGH MACDONALD SCOTT, D.D.

THIS is a subject of perennial interest. The Jew, like the poor, is always with us, and we cannot leave him alone. He does not dwell in heathen lands, in China, India, Japan, Africa. Half of Israel live in Russia, and most of the other half in Austria, Germany, America. His lot is cast with the Christian, and his future is inseparable from ours. "What advantage then hath the Jew?" Paul inquired, and answered, "Much every way." He so spoke in view of the revelation given unto Israel, while the Gentiles sat in the region and shadow of death. He also spoke as a prophet, for the way of the weary-footed Jew finally leads to the glory of Israel. The Hebrew, more than any other, must

"so forecast the years,
And first in loss a gain to match,
And reach a hand through time to catch
The far-off interest of tears."

But, for the present, the advantage of the Jew is hard to find and difficult to determine. Heine called it a "misfortune" to belong to Israel; and the anti-Semitic movement is as old as Abraham and Darius, and the Maccabees and Vespasian, and Richard the Lion-hearted of England. Every student of history or politics, of commerce, society, race, and religion, must consider the Jewish factor in his theme; and the consideration of it he finds to be like a two-edged sword.

The Israelite is everywhere present with the inexorableness

of law and destiny. The Talmud says that one of the horns of the ram offered by Abram in place of Isaac, was blown at the giving of the law on Sinai, and that the other will be sounded at the Day of Judgment. Between these blasts of Jewish horns, horns of law and judgment, moves the history of Israel as part of the history of mankind. For weal or woe they go together. The heredity of the Hebrew and the environment of the Gentile are in some way, under God, to shape the humanity that is to be. Until the last Jew is dead or converted to his Messiah, the Lord Jesus Christ, there will never be perfect peace on earth; for the Jewish question is at heart a Messianic question, and this, like all religious problems, can be solved only at the foot of the cross. Past and future of Israel and the Gentiles circle about Calvary. Here, and here alone, can Hebrew and Greek and Roman and American alike seek first the Kingdom of God and his righteousness, and here alone can all other things—the good things of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness—be added thereto.

We are to consider the past and the present of Israel, not in the expectation of solving a problem,—for the question concerning Israel will be answered only in the revelation of the Lord in the latter days,—but with a desire to set some elements of the subject before us, that we may pray more intelligently for the peace of Jerusalem, and labor more earnestly for the ingathering of the lost sheep of the House of Israel.

The origin and history of the Jew cannot be understood without an investigation into the tenacity of his *social* peculiarities, as well as a study of the continuity of his *religious* beliefs.

1. In the chaos of the Græco-Roman world which pre-

ceded and followed the birth of Christ, the Jews rose alone as a *race*. Civil wars, the fall of the Greek republics, the collapse of the Empire of Alexander, the fall of Carthage before Rome, the end of the Roman Republic and the coming of the Cæsars, destroyed the aristocracy of the ancient world. The racial types of Greece and Rome—kings, oligarchs, patricians—disappeared. The men of birth and culture, of ancient family and inherited genius, passed away, and the barbarous, undeveloped peoples flooded the Empire with confusion, ignorance, and loss of race bearers of culture and religion. The thoroughbred, highly civilized man, like the delicate, thoroughbred animal, quickly disappears when his race leaders fall, and he must share the lot of merely animal existence. It was not till the Germanic peoples reached maturity, in the twelfth century, that Christendom appeared, and European unity and culture were once more borne by a fully developed race.

Through the chaos of racial overthrow which marked the Middle Ages, the Jews remained, a thread of continuity, a link uniting with the past, the one small people that kept its racial type pure, and preserved through the centuries its physiognomy and character unchanged. The Jew was narrow; but, by his law, his synagogue, his guarded family, his Ghetto even, he saved himself, when all other civilized nations crumbled into ruin. He stood as no other for pure blood, for the sanctity of the race, for the unmixed household; and, as a result of such a stand, his position in the whole history of Western Europe has been most important.

2. This race unity, covering thousands of years, is closely connected with the Jew's devotion to the history of his people. It is true his conception of history is very narrow and materialistic. Nevertheless, it is true that he, as no other man on

earth, looks back upon a long, continuous, and sacred history. Every fiber of his being responds to the touch of a religious past, and of an unbroken tradition. His history is a part of himself; and because of this past, so full of promise and prophecy, the Jew, more than all others, has lived for a future, which ever casts shadows of coming rest and blessing upon his pathway. He is a living monument of protest against the corruption of race. The bastard, the mixed race, is to him from the Old Testament downward the symbol of sin. He has a horror of hybrids, as of monsters against both nature and Jehovah. He stands as the great defender of national life built up through long ages of conflict, growth, and the leading of Providence from Ezra and Nehemiah to the present day. He is a living illustration, in his healthfulness, longevity, and energy, of a truth which the Gentiles have greatly ignored. The mixture of all the races of the earth in one common confusion—black, white, brown, yellow—would be as serious a blow to human excellence and progress as would the mixing of all the dogs in the world into one canine family, turning them into degenerates. The Jew has stood for the separation of noble individuals, of high types of a race, and their development amid proper surroundings to make them patriarchs and prophets, the bearers of natural culture, religion, and progress. Biology, sociology, Old Testament, and all human experience show the importance of this elect, covenant, separate treatment of mankind. It is as necessary and wise now as it was in the days of Nehemiah. The church stands for it, in a noble sense, as well as Israel does. The brotherhood of mankind must never be widened to make it grow over the graves of the noble races, such as the Celt, the Slav, the Anglo-Saxon, by means of which humanity has reached its present high estate.

St. Paul tells us that God made all nations to dwell apart, and determined the times of their natural existence, and their boundaries by mountains, streams, and seas, in order that, as separate nations in the way of national life, they should seek the Lord (Acts xvii. 26f.). National life, purity, unity, and development looked towards Jesus Christ. The holy nation of Israel was a model for all nations, and showed the way by which they as nations should turn unto the Lord. Think of the confusion of a blending of North America and South America! Imagine the races of Europe and Africa thrown promiscuously together! As Darwin repeatedly said, "Crossing obliterates characters." Such a mixing of races would destroy all the characteristic marks of higher civilization, culture, and morality; for, with physical deterioration would come also religious decay. Against all such demoralization the Jew utters his protest, and defends it with his life. He shows us what the consciousness of race does for man, whether he be Greek or Roman or Anglo-Saxon. Out of it grow patriotism, self-respect, honor, family dignity, and reverence for religion, which takes on new beauty when identified with all the vital traditions of race. What Jew is not thrilled by appeals to Abraham, Moses, and the prophets? What German does not feel a special throb in his heart at mention of Luther the great reformer, and Melancthon the *Præceptor Germaniæ*? Who among us does not bless God more gratefully at remembrance of such servants of his as Ridley and Latimer, Knox and Whitefield, Wesley and Jonathan Edwards, who were of our blood and spoke our language? Pure blood, pure race, true nurture, will tell for higher things among men as truly as among horses, dogs, and sheep. And as the animal world is elevated and ennobled by selecting the best types and developing them in chosen lines;

so the great masses of mankind, the confused tribes of Africa, Central Asia, and the islands of the sea must be lifted up by the conversion of individuals to high ideals, the separation of these in Christian homes, and the cultivation of them into a higher type, by means of which the race as such may be created and ennobled.

Among the Jews the noblest type, the Sephardim, or Spanish Jews, show the race of Israel at its best. Here for centuries the original nobility has been retained as nowhere else; though in later years they have mixed much with the Aschkenazim, or German Jews. Chamberlain says,¹ that, in the East, where the Sephardim shun all union with other Jews, the observer can see, as nowhere else, the importance of Judaism for the history of mankind (vol. ii. p. 275). He writes: "Here is nobility in the fullest sense of the word, genuine nobility of race. Beautiful forms, well-shaped heads, dignity in speech and action, the typical Semite as is the higher class of Syrian or Arab. That from such men prophets and psalmists could arise I comprehended at the first glance—though I could hardly imagine such a thing among the Jews of Berlin." It was the noble types of this race, men like Moses, Joshua, David, and the prophets, and not the mass of the people, that rose up to high conceptions of Jehovah and a Messianic Kingdom. Exile, wars, persecution, were all discipline to teach the Jewish race the lessons of those God-given leaders; when the final dispersion came, the best of the race, the priestly men, the Levites, the fanatics for their religion, the purest Jewish blood, Chamberlain says, went to Spain, and under Roman rule kept their race the purest. Their descendants, occasionally still met in Salonica or Sarajevo in the East, such names as Spinoza, Montefiore, etc., in the West,

¹ Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, II. Auflage.

show men of noble bearing, despising riches as compared with family honor and purity, men with whom the Hirsches and Rothschilds and Bleichröders cannot be compared in race nobility. They form a sort of Israel within Israel.

3. We come now to speak of a third characteristic of the Jew. Besides his loyalty to his race and his devotion to his history, he centers his religion in the cardinal doctrine of *one God whose will is law*. The only creed recited by the Jew for two thousand years is the *Sh'mah*: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord." The will of the Lord was the law in Israel. In close connection with this conception of religion is the social psychology of the Jew. His life, more than that of other men, is rooted in his *will*. The will of Jehovah and the will of the Jew stand forth together in the history of Israel. For, right or wrong, the Jew was stiff-necked, obstinate, willful, determined, stubborn. His will ran away with all his other powers. He was the worst idolator in all the Orient till after the Babylonian Captivity; and, when fully converted to monotheism, he became a fanatic for this faith. Outside this power of the will, the Jew is not superior to other men. He has never been a great philosopher, or warrior, or inventor, or literary man, or artist. The temples of Solomon and Herod were built chiefly through Gentiles. Jewish philosophers from Philo to Spinoza borrowed from the Greek and Christian culture round about them. Musicians like Meyerbeer, Mendelssohn, and Rubinstein were simply Jews writing Russian and German and Italian music. The Jew does not excel others in intellect, imagination, or moral sense. Where he does excel is in his reflection of the will of Jehovah, in his determination, his will-power, which sets all the energies of his being into persistent activity in study, business, politics, and presses them

on to a successful outcome. This persistency has, of course, its limitations. It makes the Jew strong, but it also makes him narrow, legal, and as a Hebrew capable of little progress. Renan writes of him: "The dreadful uniformity of the Semitic spirit knots up the human brain, closes it to every more tender thought, to every gentler feeling, to every reasonable inquiry, to set it face to face with the eternal tautology God is God." The fatalistic Mohammedan followed the Jew here also. He took the creed of Israel, "There is no God but Jehovah," and simply added to it the phrase, "and Mohammed is his prophet." The Moslem with a missionary spirit borrowed from Christianity, went forth to establish just about such a Messianic Kingdom as most Jews in the time of Christ expected and desired. What Mohammed did in the Greek and Persian empires was just what the Jews hoped their Messiah would do in the Roman Empire, viz. conquer it, make the conquering race dominant, and bring all others into subjection to Israel and Jehovah.

It is this narrow conception of the Jew which leaves no future of hope for Judaism as such. All the will-power of Israel is set to continue a pure race, devoted to a conception of religion which is largely Asiatic and national, and cannot become universal. Hence the Jewish religion and polity are just as helpless in the face of Europe and the nations of the earth as are the Sultan of Turkey and the faith of Islam. At the heart of the Jew, his history, his will, his religion, is the thought of ruling over the world. God made him so to do, he thinks, and his race has been preserved for that purpose. He identifies his race and his religion: neither can go farther than the other. The future belongs to Israel, as all the prophets foretold. But the Jews cannot think of this future supremacy of Israel apart from the Messiah, who is to be King of Israel in

her glory. A thoughtful Jew, Skreinka, recently wrote, "The existence of Judaism is conditioned by the retention of the Messianic hope." Upon that hope the Jewish religion rests; but that hope is ever so narrow, so national, so racial, that it carries a contradiction in itself. It is cherished by a fragment of humanity with no missionary impulse to give it to the world. The result is that the Jew takes a purely negative, a waiting attitude, practically saying to all men: "I have the true religion, but I offer it to no man: I simply wait till God will send all men to seek Israel as their guide and ruler in material and religious things." Such a sterile conception of his mission makes the Jew everywhere a stranger to the people among whom he dwells. His Messianic idea bears no fruit. He has no thought of a suffering Christ, of a Son of man who bears the burden of our sin and its sorrow. A Saviour for all men is a hope that does not touch his heart or his imagination.

The great Jewish historian Grätz could say of the crucifixion, "The Jews do not need this painful shock for their moral elevation, especially not among the middle class of our citizens." The Jew is too respectable, too intelligent, too good an observer of the law of Moses, to need a Saviour—that is his thought. Scratch the most plausible and liberal modern Jew, and too often you will find all the anti-Christian bitterness of the ancient days. A Spanish Jew, Moses de Leon, in 1880, called Jesus "a dead dog," and assigned his body to the dunghill. This hatred, Laible calls "the most national feature of Judaism." As he approaches Christianity, the Jew is seized with a rage and hate that resemble madness. To this day no believing Jew dare speak or write the name of Jesus. In recent years Hebrew scholars have collected all the vile passages in the Talmud against Christ, and published them in tract form ¹

¹ Chamberlain, Vol. i. p. 330.

for use among their people. After Rabbino-witz returned from Palestine a believer in Christ, he began to preach to his people in Russia to see where was the wound of the daughter of Zion that kept her in such sorrow. He attacked rabbis, the synagogue, the Talmud, the Old Testament, and Moses himself; but no Jew was troubled. Then he began to speak of the Messiah, the Son of David, the Man of sorrows, the suffering servant of Jehovah, whom he finally identified with Jesus Christ. Then the rage and fury broke forth, and he replied, "Here is the wound of the daughter of my people,—unbelief respecting the Messiah."

From the time of the New Testament downward, the Jew has been a thorn in the side of the Christian. He stirred Nero to persecute the church in Rome. He helped gather faggots to burn Polycarp at the stake. In the fourth century a synod in Spain warred against intermarriage with Jews. In the sixth century Gregory of Tours tells of forced conversions and opposition of Jews in Gaul. Under the Visi-Gothic kings here, Jews were active as slave-dealers and money-lenders. During the Arab rule in Spain, Jews were high officers of state, as Mordecai was in Persia; and when Christians seized power again, the Jews still held high places in church as well as state. The bishops and archbishops in Spain included not a few secret Jews. In the thirteenth century German princes put their finances often into Jewish hands, and the greed of gold marked the Jew in the time of the Crusades as much as now. Then as now, too, the people complained of Jewish usury and exactions. Shylock was abroad in all Europe. And then, as now, rulers were ever ready to check the financial tyranny of the Jew, who could act toward the Christian in a way that his law forbade him to do towards another Jew. The Emperor Tiberius, Richard the Lion-hearted of England,

Frederick Hohenstauffen, and other powerful monarchs tried to keep Jews from places of power. The reason was not always clear; but all men felt in some measure that Judaism was a foreign and hostile element in the national life. The distinguished historian Mommsen went so far as to call it "a state within a state"; and Goethe wrote, "How can we grant the Jew a share in our highest culture, when he rejects the very origin and source of it?"

We need not become adherents of the anti-Semitic party, and denounce Israel; but we may well inquire whether Jews as Jews, in their anti-Christian temper, may not form a community within a nation, that in its isolation, control of wealth, hold upon the press, grasp of business life and influence upon the credit of the country, may weaken the social life of the people, and the more loyal to its own traditions become the more opposed to the spread of Christian civilization. Voltaire, the great free-thinker, in the name of liberty, declared the Jew a danger to any nation. Many of the radical socialists of Christendom—Lasalle, Lasker, Karl Marx, Jacoby, and others—were Jews. The Jew claims to belong to the chosen people, to stand for the Lord and his Christ as no others, to occupy a peculiar and privileged position before all laws and courts of men in his God-given position in the kingdom of Jehovah. Hence there may always arise danger from some fanatical application of these principles, or even from their quiet reception in the hearts of this people. In such a publication as this, none of whose readers is an enemy of Israel, it is not out of place to consider these things, and ask how far the complaints of writers and merchants, peasants and rulers, artists and statesmen, citizens of all lands, all classes, all ages, were justified in their attitude toward the Jew. Is there any reason in the nature of Judaism, why for eighteen hundred years

Christian communities have risen in rebellion against these strangers in their midst, as soon as the Jews became strong enough to feel their own power?

Is there not a radical difference in the race feeling, the historic traditions, the religious convictions, and the ethical standards of Jew and Christian, which will ever keep them restive when they come into contact? Does not each claim the earth and the fullness thereof for God and his Christ, the one turning to the Christ that is and the other to a Messiah yet to come? No Jew can be faithful to Judaism as it has come down to him, and be truly neighborly with the Christian, or apply the same standard of right and wrong to both. He doubtless often is brotherly in behavior and perfectly just in dealing, but he is not, in doing so, following the teaching of the synagogues and rabbis. It is this deep chasm of Jew and Gentile, circumcised and uncircumcised, clean and unclean, covenant people and the nations beyond the covenant, tribes of the Messianic King and the babel of heathen opposing Jehovah and his anointed; it is this broad separation that belongs to the very heart of the faith of Israel as an *elect* people, which is the saddest feature in the life of the Jew when looked at from the point of view of the Christian. There is an element of judgment also in this separation, which must not be overlooked. It began at the cross, when the Jews cried, "Crucify him, crucify him." It is part of the hardness and blindness and deafness and sonship of Satan of which Jesus spoke. In it lie the veil, the darkness, the broken olive tree, the scattering among the nations. It is true we must not interpret the Old Testament to teach intolerance towards Israel; yet we must recognize the error of the Jew and the veil upon his heart, if we are to preach in power the truth of the revelation given the Christian. Chamberlain insists that the mod-

ern Jew is not a product of the Christian Middle Ages. "He fashioned his own fate. The first Ghetto," he adds, "stood in Jerusalem. It was the high wall which separated the orthodox in faith and life from the Gentiles, and forbade them to enter the Jewish city. Neither Jacob nor Solomon nor Isaiah would recognize in Rabbi Akiba, the great authority of the Talmud, their descendant, not to speak of such descendants as Baron Hirsch or the diamond millionaire Barnato" (vol. i. p. 344). Most rabbis, however, taught that Gentiles have no part in the life to come; hence the claim of some liberal Jews that their religion is "the religion of humanity" seems but a fresh illustration of that blindness of heart which has in part fallen upon Israel.

These strongly marked qualities of the Jew, of race and will, make him egotistic on the one hand and incapable of world-wide sympathies on the other. Hence, in the presence of all the sorrows and darkness of the heathen races, or the tyranny of Islam, or the needs of famishing Hindus or orphaned Armenians, his heart is little stirred. His intellect does not reach full cultivation, and his heart remains cold to many a noble appeal. What does the international millionaire care for patriotism or sentiment, for Turkish atrocities or slave horrors on the Congo, so long as his bonds and mortgages are safe? The money power in the hands of a universal Israelite alliance is but one illustration of the chilling influence of Judaism upon its people. The world-wide interests of the Jew are material, not religious; financial, not humanitarian. Hence he has no ideals for all men beyond those of trade and commerce. The great truths of regeneration, a Kingdom of God for humanity, a mission of grace to the world, and sharing the burdens of man as man lie outside current Judaism. Its faith centers in ten millions of people, and leaves the other

1490 millions out of sight. From the time of the exile in Babylon, the Jews have been dependent upon other nations; and have lost the power to connect their religion with free national life. In the narrow world of will and conscience they are free; but in the outer world they are still captives in exile. Herder truly said: "The Jewish people perished in its education, because it never reached maturity of political culture on its own soil, and consequently never attained the true sense of honor and liberty." To save his race and religion the Jew lost his place among the nations, and is now incapable of mediating between religion and culture, church and state, race and humanity. A purely humanized Jew is no longer a Jew; and so long as he is true to his religion, so long will he be at variance with humanity and all the powers that work together to bless the world.

4. This inconsistent, and in a sense impossible, attitude of the Jew towards modern thought and life, everywhere permeated by Christian influences, has led many in Israel to seek to adjust themselves to the new without surrendering the old; and it is pathetic to see the attempt of modern Jews to make Judaism do the work of Christianity. Judaism is full of divisions, and every shade of belief and unbelief prevails within it. There are the Karaites in Russia and the East, a small sect which rejects the Talmud and holds only to the Old Testament. They refuse to marry with other Jews, and are so non-aggressive that Russia exempts them from the laws passed against other Jews. The Spanish Jews, also, in the East lead a quiet life, and decline to intermarry with outside Hebrews. Race exclusiveness tends to form mutually exclusive Israels within Israel.

In the Western world, however, where the Jews have come out of the Ghettos and breathe the air of Anglo-Saxon and

American liberty, they fall into two great groups,—the orthodox Jews, who seek to retain Bible, Talmud, and the synagogue service of eighteen hundred years ago; and the Reform Jews, who endeavor to bring Judaism into agreement with modern life and thought. The orthodox include the Spanish Jews, also many from Russia, Poland, Roumania. They look for a personal Messiah, believe in the prophets, and hope to return to Palestine.

The Reform Jews boast much of the progress they have made since Moses Mendelssohn, in the eighteenth century, led them out of the Talmud and the Ghetto. They call their synagogue a temple, put organ and choir in it, seat the worshipers in family pews, treat the Old Testament chiefly as literature, reject a personal Messiah, and have little or no sympathy with Jews returning to Palestine.

Dr. G. Gottheil has an article in the *American Journal of Theology* for April, 1902, in which he describes this Reformation in Israel. It really meant the infusion of German thought and culture into Judaism. It is indirectly a product of Christianity. Hence Josephine Lazarus, in her book "The Spirit of Judaism," says that the idea of *duty* taught by Israel must join itself to the "sacred and immortal love" which Christianity brings, if humanity is to be blessed. "Judaism," she adds, "gives the Ten Commandments, and Christianity the Beatitudes; but only the two together can yield the perfect ideal—the love that is simply the highest duty, and duty that is lost in love." Moses Mendelssohn was unconsciously a disciple of Luther and Paul and Jesus, as well as of Plato and Isaiah and Lessing, when he preached his reform to the Jews of Germany. Under his influence the sermon became central in the synagogue, as in the church; Jewish theological seminaries arose after the Christian model; and historians of Judaism ap-
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peared like the historians of the church. For eighteen hundred years after Josephus, the Jews had no historian. German-Christian influences produced Jost, Graetz, Geiger, and others.

But this reformed movement has now been checked by an anti-Semitic agitation, which began about 1880 with the expulsion of Jews from Russia, and has spread over Europe. This check helped produce a third class of Jews, the extreme Reformers. They claim that true Judaism is "a religion without inconvenient customs or unreasonable dogmas, without miracles or any mysteries." Its creed is one God and a moral life among men. It is an Ethical-Culture movement as preached by men like Felix Adler. This religion of humanity, it is claimed, the Jew possesses, and it is his high mission to teach it to the world. This liberalism has carried many Jews into utter unbelief and secularism. Miss Lazarus says, that, while the religion of Israel is spiritual, "there is no people whose kingdom is so absolutely of this world, and who are so prone, so apt, so eager, to take advantage of all its opportunities." In Germany it is said that "ninety-five per cent of the Jewish youth is atheistic, and at best utterly indifferent. The other five per cent are divided between orthodox and reformed."¹ In England, we are told, "the synagogues are less and less frequented"; and Jewish mothers lament everywhere, "We are raising up a generation without religion."

This type of easy, cultured Jew, when smitten by anti-Semitic persecution, feels it keenly, because the heroic element has gone out of his character; the stuff that makes martyrs has largely disappeared. His Judaism is to him little more than an accident, and he protests most rhetorically against

¹ Quoted by Miss Lazarus, p. 139.

being blamed for it. Modern ideas have led these Jews to seek in external things to live as the nations about them. But in so doing they have lost their religion largely in social and literary amenities. They have become men without a mission; and such men in time become very lonely in heart. Miss Lazarus writes: "If Judaism would be anything in the world to-day, it must be a spiritual force." Now it cannot be such a force by keeping aloof; hence, she continues, "we must cross the Rubicon, the blank page that separates the Old Testament from the New, and read with fresh eyes, fresh hearts, the life and teachings of the one whom the world calls Master" (p. 62). She claims that Jews and Christians must enter a church large enough for both, call one another brothers, and labor together for God and man. The Jews should preach "a universal religion." Beyond this, Israel cannot go, and remain Jewish. These are the teachings of the pagan philosophers in the third and fourth centuries, when they saw that the future belonged to Christianity. They called for an ideal religion broad enough for Plato and Jesus, for Aristotle and Paul, in which all men might unite, with Jesus as the religious Master of them all. Is God leading thinking Israelites to such a position, from which they must pass into the Christian church?

A new Judaism, which shall include Christianity, is the gospel of these most advanced Hebrews. Claude Montefiore, in the Hibbert Lectures, advocates it. He declares that some of the sayings of Jesus have sunk so deep into the human heart, that it is not probable "that any religion which ignores or omits them, will exercise a considerable influence outside its own borders." That is a striking confession. It says that Israel is to give to the world a universal religion; but to do so it must adopt the teachings of Jesus. Wernstock, in his book

"Jesus the Jew," occupies the same ground. He repeatedly says: "Without Judaism Christianity would have had no foundation. Without Christianity, the spirit of Judaism would have wielded no universal influence." "Without Jesus and without Paul the God of Israel would still have been the God of a handful, the God of a petty, obscure, and insignificant tribe" (p. 28). He holds that "modern civilization owes a debt to Christianity which it can never repay," and which Jews should gratefully recognize. A prominent rabbi in a letter wrote recently: "Who publishes the bibles to-day? The Christian. Who reads them? The Christian. Who is willing to sacrifice an entire day each week for ownership and spirituality? The Christian. Who shows reverence, awe, respect, decorum, and silence in the house of worship? It is 'the Israelite of the spirit,' whom I call Christian."¹ No wonder Miss Lazarus says: "The times are full of signs." Here is Montefiore demanding a "new body of doctrine" for mankind, which must include the gospel of Jesus; and many other Jewish teachers saying that no religion can cover the earth without taking Christ with it.

Intelligent Jews are bewildered. Esther Ansell, in Zangwell's story, declared her life "a forlorn hope, an impossibility," and Josephine Lazarus writes: "We are wandering in the wilderness again." Emma Wolf says that true Jews and true Christians "hold the same broad love for God and man." But how the Jew is to help the Christian in labors of love neither she nor Miss Lazarus can tell. She takes as the motto for her book, St. Paul's words: "And now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity." These earnest, liberal Jews cannot pour out their desires without blending New Testament utterances with those of the law

¹ Quoted by Wernstock, p. 70.

and the prophets. Miss Lazarus says: "We stand upon the threshold of we know not what—unable to go backward, not daring to go forward" (p. 85). The Jew as well as the Gentile needs "the divine-human life," she confesses, "of which the type has been given to the world by a Jew" (p. 91), meaning, of course, Jesus Christ. Humanity, she reiterates, hungers and thirsts for the love of Jesus side by side with the *law* of Moses; "and in these circumstances," she continues, "our people are crying for bread, and we are giving them a stone" (p. 153). Her bread for Israel is the message of Jesus "living . . . in the larger spirit of our faith in a universal Father." Her whole book is an appeal to Jews to become missionaries of a religion of love to all the earth, which means at bottom to become Christians and preach the gospel to every creature. She sees no hope for Israel save in having "the life and spirit of Christ," which are everywhere shaping the destinies of the world. Compared with this, she tells us, Jewish literature shows "not a breath of the Spirit, not a hint of the spiritual life truly so-called" (p. 169). It has nothing of "the perfect love which casts out fear," the peace which passeth understanding and, because of these things, she appeals to her people to listen to Jesus saying: "Come unto me, come learn of me. I will make incarnate in myself this power and will to love, and thus reveal the Father to his children." The churches do not follow Jesus in his mission of love; therefore she calls upon Israel to follow him in doing what others fail to do. This liberal Judaism in America has about one hundred and fifty rabbis and synagogues following its teachings in varying degrees. What the outcome of this wonderful ferment of thought within Israel will be none can tell. It may well call Christians to prayer and increased sympathy and effort.

Conversions are taking place constantly from Israel; and we may hope that indirect Christian influences will prepare the way for still larger turnings to the Lord. The reformed teachings of Moses Mendelssohn led many into the church. In Berlin alone two thousand five hundred were baptized, about half the Jewish population of the city then. The rich and educated Jews especially became converts. Pastor de le Roi estimates that in the nineteenth century 224,000 Jews became Christians, of whom about 85,000 entered Protestant churches. The German census of 1900 reported 586,833 Jews in a population of 56,367,178. Since 1871, the Jews have diminished in proportion to the population by one-third of one per cent. This decrease is due partly to conversions. The conversions in the period 1895-1900 were 2,888. Intermarriages of Jews and Christians also weaken Judaism, for, according to statistics for 1901, of 3,281 children born of mixed marriage, in Prussia, seventy-six per cent became Christians. It is likely in most cases it was the mother who was an Israelite. It is estimated that in America ten per cent of Jews make mixed marriages, with perhaps similar results as in Germany.

Mission work among Jews, after a history of two hundred years, when started by the German Pietists, still moves very slowly. There are estimated to be ninety societies at work among Jews in all parts of the world, employing 648 missionaries in 213 stations, at a cost of \$673,000 a year.¹ During these two hundred years, one hundred and twelve larger and smaller societies have been engaged in preaching to the Jews. Still Israel is only touched by the gospel.

Race and religion are so inseparable for the Hebrew that it is doubly hard for him to accept Christianity, and Jewish Christian churches have not been able to survive. Social,

¹ Thompson, *A Century of Jewish Missions* (Revell, 1902), p. 292.

family, and business considerations make it almost impossible for a Jewish Christian to remain a Jew ; yet in such an association seems to lie the hope of Israel.

In 1850, Israel Pick, a Bohemian Jewish Christian, whom Delitzsch called a "prophetic man," sought to organize Jewish Christian churches within Israel by retaining the Sabbath, circumcision, and other customs, but he died on his way to the Holy Land, in 1859, and the effort failed.

A little later (1860), in Roumania, through reading the New Testament, a group of Jews became Christians, and sought to remain such among their own people, observing the law of Moses as national usage, but looking to Jesus as Saviour from sin.

In remote connection with this movement was that of Rabinowitz in Kischinew, of whom we learned in 1884 through Delitzsch, and his own visit to America, at Mr. Moody's invitation, in 1893. He called his followers "the Israelites of the New Covenant." But Russian law prevented them from becoming a regular congregation. Important, also, was the appearance of the Hungarian Rabbi Lichtenstein in 1886. While remaining a rabbi, he published works declaring his love to Jesus, and urging Jews to give up the impracticable Talmudic traditions, and seek the Saviour from sin. Driven from his place in the synagogue, he came closer to Christians, but without seeking baptism, for he would not break with his own people.

About this same time a Hebrew monthly magazine appeared in America called *Witness to Israel*, and sought by rabbinical methods to present Christianity as the true Judaism. It demanded, however, circumcision, the Sabbath, and other ceremonial usages. Later it was moved to Galicia in Austria. Its founder, Lucky, had great influence among young Jews, who

came through him to believe in truths of the gospel. He also induced many Jewish Christians to take new interest in Israel as a people.¹ These and other agencies and influences have in recent years stimulated national feeling among the Jews. The tendency to identify themselves as far as possible with the life about them has been checked; and anti-Semitic opposition is being met by the revival of a national consciousness in Jewish circles.

Jews find they never were regarded by the nations as part of their life, and they are turning now more than ever toward the thought of self-emancipation. The study of Jewish history is taken up with new interest. "Maccabee societies" are being formed. Finally Dr. Theodore Herzl gave expression to this new consciousness in his essay, "The Jewish State," in which he advocated the establishment of the Jews in Palestine. This led to the "Zionist" movement, which may be called the awaking of Israel again to national consciousness. At the sixth Congress, just held in Basle, only national questions were discussed; though it was impossible to entirely keep out the religion that underlies the nation.

Jewish Christians are especially interested in "Zionism," and among them also the feeling of nationality is growing. The past year has seen two significant meetings, which set forth this feeling. One was a "Jewish Christian Conference," held at Mountain Lake Park, Maryland, which discussed the possible union of all Jewish Christians, and the part they might take in the national movements of their people. The other was gathered in London, at which missionaries to the Jews and their converts studied, in the light of the Scriptures, the advisability of organizing a Jewish Christian church, its worship and relation to the world-wide life of Israel. It

¹ Cf. *Der Alte Glaube*, 1903, No. 46.

was stated at this conference that "the influence of the church upon Jews in Christian lands is seen most clearly in the extraordinary change of attitude which they have everywhere taken towards the person of Christ. . . . There appears on all sides among them a visible and increasing moral confidence in him." Religious Hebrews, national Zionists, Jews of various dispersions, orthodox and reformed, and Jewish Christians as well, seem to feel that a point of unusual significance has been reached in the religious and national life of Israel. Our limits will not allow us to pursue this inquiry further; enough, we trust, has been said to show how vitally the Jew is part of our life, and to interest us in his history and his future, with which our own are bound up by the purposes of God.

ARTICLE III.

OUR TRAINING SCHOOLS FOR CITIZENSHIP.

BY THE REVEREND RICHARD CAMERON WYLIE, D.D.

THE number of children of school age in the United States is more than twenty-two millions. The number enrolled in our public schools is nearly sixteen millions. In a few years these boys and girls will be the men and women of our country, bearing the responsibilities of citizenship. It is important that they receive the training necessary to fit them for these responsibilities. Our public-school system is the chief agency employed by the state for this purpose. We should be deeply concerned about the efficiency of this system. Patriotism requires that every thing possible be done to increase, and that nothing be done to impair, its efficiency.

That the school curriculum, in so far as secular studies are concerned, is well adapted to the end in view, is not seriously questioned. That the teachers are generally well equipped for their work is readily conceded. That mental training of a high order is given in most of these schools is shown by the results. If there is weakness anywhere, it is in the training of the moral nature.

There is in progress a triangular discussion as to the place the Bible and its system of morals and religion should have in the school-room. The three positions occupied by the parties to the controversy are the Secular, the Roman Catholic, and the Historic American.

Dr. W. T. Harris, Commissioner of Education, advocates the secular view in the following words:—

"The principle of religious instruction is authority; that of secular instruction is demonstration and verification. It is obvious that these two principles should not be brought into the same school, but separated as widely as possible. The analytical understanding is necessarily hostile and skeptical in its attitude toward religious truth. . . . When we come to teaching a live religion in the schools, we see that it must take a denominational form, and, moreover, it must take on the form of authority and address itself to the religious sense and not to the mere intellect. . . . We must conclude, therefore, that the prerogative of religious instruction is in the church, and that it must remain in the church, and that in the nature of things it cannot be farmed out to the secular school without degenerating into mere deism without a living Providence, or else changing the school into a parochial school and destroying the efficiency of secular instruction."

Mr. Herbert W. Horwill, in the *Atlantic Monthly* for September, 1903, advocates the same theory as follows:—

"Owing to the religious implications in the Bible, it is impossible to teach it even as literature or history without becoming involved in questions of acute controversy. . . . The moment the matter of the Bible is seriously considered, strife is inevitable. Nay, in these days it is more difficult than ever before to treat even the manner of the sacred writers without provoking acrimonious religious discussion. If you once begin to treat the Bible in the public schools as a religious and ethical textbook, instead of merely a literary model, you violate the principle of neutrality of the state in matters of religion. . . . The conclusion of the whole matter is that the teaching of religion is the work of the churches, and not of the state."

These quotations clearly define the meaning of the term "secular" as used in this controversy. It means, not merely the freedom of the schools from sectarian control, not merely the exclusion of sectarian tenets, but the exclusion of the Bible, together with its moral and religious teachings, whether given orally or otherwise.

Cardinal Gibbons states the Roman Catholic position in these words:—

"The system of public education in this country is imperfect and vicious, and undermines the religion of our youth. We want our children to receive an education that will not only make them learned but pious men and women. . . . We want them to be not only polished mem-

bers of society, but also conscientious Christians. We desire for them a training that will form their hearts as well as their minds. We wish them to be not only men of the world, but, above all, men of God. . . . The religious and secular education of our children cannot be divorced from each other without inflicting a fatal wound upon the soul. The usual consequence of such separation is to paralyze the moral faculty and to foment a spirit of indifference in matters of faith. . . . The remedy for these defects would be supplied if the denominational system which now obtains in Canada were applied in our public schools."

The Historic American position is embodied in the following quotations from a variety of sources:—

"Our public schools as such have as their primary function the promotion of good citizenship. If they fail to perform their primary function, they fail of the purpose for which they are maintained."—W. W. STETSON, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Maine.

"The American public school is the organized attempt of democracy to educate and train a people for the responsible and peculiar duties of citizenship in a republic."—HOMER H. SEERLY, Iowa State Normal School.

"The school is society shaping itself. Whatever should be in society must be put in the schools."—FRANCIS W. PARKER, President Cook County Normal School, Chicago, Illinois.

"A school or a school system that does not get beyond the training of the intellect would have small claims on the public for support. Our public-school system is to develop, normally and naturally, every part of the child's being—its intellect, sensibility, and will: its moral and spiritual nature."—G. R. GLENN, State School Commissioner, Georgia.

"Nobody knows how to teach morality effectually without religion. Exclude religion from education and you will leave no foundation upon which to build a moral character."—PRESIDENT ELIOT, Harvard University.

"Surely no reasonable person could object to the employment of such parts of the Bible, or other books, as teach justice, integrity, patriotism, humanity, benevolence, sobriety, industry, frugality, and all the virtues upon which depend the permanence of a government by the people."—T. B. STOCKWELL, Commissioner of Public Schools, Rhode Island.

"Resolved, that the attempt to separate the cultivation of moral and intellectual powers which prevails to a certain extent in the school system of to-day is unphilosophical, injurious to children, and dangerous to the state. Resolved, that, in the judgment of this Association, the Bible should be recognized as the text-book of ethics, and that the Word of God, which made free schools, should hold an honored place in them."—NATIONAL TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION.

These quotations fairly present the positions of the three parties to the controversy. To determine which is correct, all the essential facts should be considered.

Historical facts first claim attention. We are not now for the first time considering what sort of a school-system it would be wise for us to establish. We have a system which is almost as old as the country itself. From the beginning the Bible has had a place in the school-room. The founders of this system never supposed that any question could be raised about the wisdom of this use of the Bible. The dispute about its wisdom is of recent origin. No well-informed secularist will claim that the proposition to exclude the Bible is a proposition to return to the original type of American public schools. Neither will Cardinal Gibbons claim that his proposition has such an end in view. Both are plain propositions to introduce something new in this country. Hitherto the aim on the part of the aggressors in this controversy has been, not to introduce the Bible into the schools, but to cast it out. One of the first legal controversies about the matter was in the State of Maine in 1854. The Bible was used in the schools as a reading-book, and an effort was made to have it excluded. The case was carried to the Supreme Court, and, in giving its opinion, that Court held that such use of the Bible was not a violation of the Constitution and laws of the State, and interfered with no one's rights. There have been similar cases before the supreme courts of other States, and before the school-boards in a number of cities. In every instance the aggressors found the Bible in the schools, and began a crusade to secure its expulsion. Our system of education, therefore, has from the first recognized the right of the Bible to a place in the school-room. The denial of the right and the crusade against it are of modern origin.

In connection with these historical facts, certain legal facts should be considered. In nine States and the District of Columbia the school laws provide for the reading of the Bible in the school-room. In twelve others, decisions of supreme courts and of state superintendents of public schools sustain the custom. In seventeen others and one Territory (Oklahoma), the practice is generally sustained by public sentiment without the aid of law, except as moral training is required. In some of the States in which there have been legal controversies, decisions have been rendered against the custom. In Wisconsin the Supreme Court declared the Bible to be a sectarian book, and therefore excluded by the terms of the Constitution and the law. Similar opinions have been given by the Attorneys-General of California, Minnesota, and Washington, and by the Superintendent of Public Instruction of Montana. In most of these States, however, there are schools in which the Bible is used. In Louisiana and Nevada there is neither law nor judicial opinion relating to the matter, and but few schools in these States follow the custom. Also in the Territories of Arizona and New Mexico it would be difficult to find a school in which the Bible is read or a prayer offered. In a number of the cities in which there have been conflicts over the matter before the school-boards, the Bible and all religious exercises have been excluded. With the exceptions here noted, the reading of the Bible holds its place in the schools generally throughout the United States.

Another legal fact of striking significance is that Congress, in adopting the Ordinance of 1787 for the government of the Territory of the Northwest, declared that "religion, morality, and knowledge being essential to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." This means that schools shall

be established to provide these essentials. The same proposition is contained in a number of state constitutions. The most of the States require the teaching of morality in the public schools. Teachers are therefore legally bound to teach morals as well as grammar or any other prescribed branch of study. Our school laws also clearly show that the public schools are designed, not primarily to qualify young people for a business or a professional life, that they may do well for themselves, nor yet to train them for church-membership or to secure the salvation of their souls, but to qualify them for citizenship. The course of study best suited to this end should be adopted. No church has a right to complain if its creed is not made a part of the course of study.

There are facts concerning the course of study necessary to secure the end in view which demand careful consideration. It is clear, to every one who has watched the progress of this controversy, that it is not a controversy merely about the Bible in the schools. The consistent secularist is not satisfied till all religious references are excluded. Dr. E. E. White says, that he "once knew a principal who attempted to exclude religion from his school by marking for omission all selections or parts of selections in the reader that contained religious ideas and sentiments. The book was not merely despoiled of its literary treasures, but violence was done to the religious nature of the pupils. But he stayed his hand when he came to the music-book; for the exclusion of all religion from it necessitated the striking-out of not only the best classical music, but also our best national songs." But there are secularists who will not stay their hands even here. In the recent contest before the courts of Nebraska, the song entitled "America" was objected to because of the following stanza :—

"Our fathers' God! to thee,
Author of liberty,
To thee we sing.
Long may our land be bright
With freedom's holy light;
Protect us by thy might,
Great God, our King."

It is easy to formulate a plan of instruction devoid of all religion, but it is not so easy to put it into operation. Let us inquire whether it is possible to carry out the secular program, and whether, when carried out, anything is left deserving the name of a course of instruction, for which the people should be taxed. While this program formally demands the exclusion of all religious reading-lessons, it must allow the English language to remain. But the language of any people must partake of the religious character of that people, whether Mohammedan, Jewish, Pagan, or Christian. Ours is the language of a Christian people. It contains thousands of words in common use with distinctively Christian significations. Can any one learn the language as it is and not come to know these words? But the language must be learned as it is, not as the secularist might wish it to be. To exclude religion would require that our language be made over again so as to exclude from it all words with Christian significations. To do this the people who speak it must first be transformed so as to exclude religious ideas from their minds. The advocates of the secular program have undertaken a task of no inconsiderable dimensions.

History must have a place in every school that aims to prepare young people for citizenship. Can religion be eliminated from the history of our country? What shall we do with the Pilgrim Fathers, the Puritans, the Huguenots, and others who came to this country in search of religious as well

as civil liberty? Can we now secularize the Mayflower and Plymouth Rock? Can we now eliminate all religion from the charters granted those early colonists and from their compacts of government? Religion is interwoven with the warp and woof of our whole history. But there have been times when it has had a degree of marked prominence. This has been so in every time of calamity. Is it possible now to secularize this history and teach it correctly? Secularists may wish it were different, but how is it possible now to make the past other than what it was? History as taught in the schools must be true to the facts. The only way to exclude religion from the history of a people is to exclude it from their lives. Whether or not this will be done in the future, it is certain that Christ and Christianity have been the most potent of all factors in the history of the past nineteen hundred years. To exclude them from the narrative of human existence during these nineteen centuries, says Dr. A. P. Peabody of Harvard University, "is an immeasurably more gross, foolish, and stupid mutilation of history than it would be to omit the names and doings of Washington, Franklin, and Adams from American history."

Certain principles of political science are involved in this controversy. It is asserted, that, "if you once begin to treat the Bible in the public schools as a religious and ethical textbook instead of a merely literary model, you violate the principle of neutrality of the state in matters of religion." This raises the question as to the real nature of this principle of neutrality, and the extent of its application. Clearness here is essential. "Religion" is often regarded as either synonymous with "church" or as the exclusive possession of the church. Separation of church and state, which is one of the chief glories of our government, is erroneously regarded as

the separation likewise of religion and the state. From the separation of church and state it follows that the state shows no partiality to any sect or creed, levies no tax to build churches or to support ministers of the gospel, and prohibits its sectarian instruction in the public schools. With respect to all such matters as these the principle of neutrality is clearly applicable. But there are principles of political science which are positively religious. How can the question of the origin of the nation be answered without entering the religious sphere? It is superficial to say that, like railroad and banking companies, it originates by the will of man. The nation is an organism with life and growth, and is the sphere in which man as a social and political being has his existence. God made man a political being, and his political nature finds expression in the state, with its established government.

It is equally futile to attempt to solve the problem as to the source of the authority of civil government outside the realm of religion. That authority is too great to be the result of the surrendered rights of individuals. It is a political heresy to say that civil government has only that authority which has been given it by the consent of the governed. When did the criminal consent to give up his liberty or his life for his crimes? Nearly all writers of any repute hold that the authority with which civil government is clothed is from God.

A third question is here suggested, which cannot be answered outside the religious sphere. This is the question as to the end for which civil government exists. That end may be studied in a practical way by considering what the state does. It defines the rights, duties, and relations of all the people within its territorial sway. "It defines crime. It makes its prohibitions, and commands the measure of the lawful and the right. It employs force to an unlimited degree. It pun-

ishes by the infliction of pain to any amount it may deem necessary. It banishes, it imprisons, it puts to death." It wages war in defense of its own and its citizens' rights. It employs its armies in defense of the rights of weak and wronged nations. In short, governments exist among men for the maintenance of rights. Our Declaration of Independence states that "All men . . . are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights." Is not this statement true? Is it not a religious as well as a political truth? Should it not be taught to our children? Evidently "religion" and "church" are not synonymous terms, and religion is not the exclusive possession of the church. There is a wide religious realm which is not ecclesiastical, but political.

But there are also moral and religious principles which have a political character. One of these is the binding obligation of the moral law in every sphere of human life, not excepting the political. The nation is composed of human beings in their entirety, not of human beings minus their souls. The duties of citizenship are moral. Citizens should be trained for these duties by instruction in the moral law. Who is to give this training? It is usually replied, that this is the duty of the church. It is conceded that the church is partly responsible, but it is denied that the whole responsibility rests with it. On what ground can it be maintained that the state is wholly dependent upon the church for the moral character of its citizens? Not more than half the young people of the land are found in Sabbath-schools. Is the church responsible for the moral training of the other half? If so, should there not be a compulsory Sabbath-school law enacted by the state, and should not the state pay the church for the service rendered? The contention that the Bible and its moral system should have a place in the school-room is not a conten-

tion that the state should do the work of the church, but that the state should do its own work in the training of citizens, and not depend upon the church for this service.

It should be here noted that the obligations of the moral law extend over the nation itself. It exists within the moral sphere. In the exercise of its tremendous authority and power it is bound by the "Higher Law." Otherwise we have no right to raise the question of the right or wrong of a nation's dealings with other nations or with its own citizens. Where there is no law there is no transgression. Surely the moral law has a political character.

The religious principle that God rules in the affairs of men has a political bearing. It involves the truth that he governs nations. This principle is generally recognized in our state constitutions. Moreover, the state makes constant, practical use of the doctrine concerning God in the employment of the oath. If the oath is not religious, nothing is. If it is not religious, it is nothing. It is a direct appeal to God, whereby both the person taking it and the state, through its representative who administers it, recognize the being, authority, power, justice, and omniscience of God.

A fundamental error of secularists consists in ignoring all the facts and principles of national religion and adopting a definition of religion which makes it relate only to individual salvation, and life and worship in the church. From this definition the inference is drawn that any recognition of religious principles by a civil government is of the nature of union of church and state. But the facts here given show that there are politico-religious principles. Their banishment from political life results in political corruption.

Grave mistakes are often made with respect to the Bible itself. It is popularly regarded as a church-book exclusively,

and its contents spoken of as designed solely to inform us how to get safely out of this world into the next. But the truth is, that it is designed chiefly to tell us how to live in this world. Not less than two-thirds of it relate to national life and the duties of citizens. It is the greatest of all text-books on civil government. Its writers are aptly described by Milton,—

“As men divinely taught, and better teaching
The solid rules of civil government,
In their majestic unaffected style,
Than all the oratory of Greece and Rome.
In them is plainest taught and easiest learned,
What makes a nation happy and keeps it so;
What ruins kingdoms and lays cities flat.”

In some places the mention of the name of Christ has been forbidden in the school-room, because it is held to be sectarian. But the truth is, that, according to the Bible, Jesus Christ is the nation's King, Lawgiver, and Judge. Nations are established or overthrown according as they regulate or fail to regulate their lives by his will.

To suppose that, because we have solved the problem of union of church and state, by decreeing their separation, we have at the same time solved the problem of the relation of religion and the state by decreeing their separation also, is to confound things that differ, to treat the principles of national religion unfairly, and to do damage to the state.

It is evident that there are a number of things the state may do of a religious nature without violating the principle of neutrality in the religious sphere. This principle is not violated by the recognition of God as the Supreme Ruler. This is done by nearly every State in the Union. It is not violated by the use of the oath. This is done to secure the fidelity of officers, witnesses, jurors, soldiers, and others. It is not violated by the enactment of laws based upon the moral laws

of the Bible. Seven precepts of the decalogue form the basis of such legislation. Neither is it violated if all the moral and religious principles here involved are taught in the public schools. As the entire man, including the physical, the mental, and the moral nature, is the citizen; so the entire child, including this threefold nature, is the pupil in school. It is impossible to divide the man into sections, and assign one section to the church and another to the state. It is also impossible to divide the child into sections and educate a section at a time. The whole child goes to school, and must be provided for in the course of study, because the whole man is to bear the responsibilities of citizenship. The complete secularizing of the schools, and of the state whereby they are founded, would require that man himself be first secularized. But the Creator has made us moral beings, and of our moral natures we cannot be divested.

Roman Catholics are partly right in maintaining that the religious and the secular education of our children cannot be separated without peril to the soul. But the peril to the nation is as great as it is to the individual. Roman Catholics are wrong, however, in denying to the state all right to educate, and in claiming this prerogative exclusively for the church. They join hands with the secularists to exclude the Bible from our schools, not because they hold anything in common with them as to the theory of education, but because they seek occasion against these schools. They are opposed to them with the Bible in, because in their view the church alone has the right to teach religion. They are opposed to them with the Bible out, because there is no true education without religion. With the one club or the other they will attack our school system, and of the two the second is the heavier and the more deadly weapon. Their object is to secure a

division of the school fund, so as to obtain state aid for parochial schools. While true to the Historic American position, our school system can be defended against all assaults. It cannot be defended against the charge of godlessness if it becomes godless indeed.

The whole history of our public schools shows, that, while in the course of study the Bible and its moral system have had a place, sectarianism has been excluded. Judge Lyon, of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in rendering his decision with reference to the use of the Bible in the schools of that State, erroneously pronounced the book as a whole sectarian, but did not dare pronounce the whole book sectarian. He said:—

“To teach the existence of a supreme being, of infinite wisdom, power, and goodness, and that it is the highest duty of all men to adore, obey, and love him, is not sectarian, because all religious sects so believe and teach. . . . Furthermore, there is much in the Bible which cannot justly be characterized as sectarian. There can be no valid objection to the use of such matter in the secular instruction of the pupils. Much of it has great historical and literary value which may be thus utilized without violating the constitutional prohibition [of sectarian instruction]. It may also be used to inculcate good morals—that is, our duties to each other—which may and ought to be inculcated by the district schools. No more complete code of morals exists than is contained in the New Testament, which reaffirms and emphasizes the moral obligations laid down in the Ten Commandments.”

The assertion that all religious teaching must take the denominational form, and the further assertion that the moment the Bible is seriously considered strife is inevitable, are not sustained by experience and observation. The Bible is read in tens of thousands of our schools. Not once in a thousand cases does either of these results follow. An ounce of fact is worth a ton of theory. There are secular studies which are quite as prolific of strife as is the study of the Bible and religion.

But what is involved in the generally accepted proposition

found in so many of our state constitutions and schools laws, that morality shall be taught in our public schools? (1) That we have a system of morals recognized as binding; (2) that this system of morals shall be taught with necessary sanctions. By what sanctions can men be taught to act morally? Whatever theories men may adopt as to the origin of the feeling and the consciousness that some things are right and others are wrong, it remains a fact that the feeling and the consciousness exist. We are a Christian people, and our moral standard is the Christian standard. Its sanctions are the truths that there is a personal God who is our Creator and Ruler, upon whom we are dependent, to whom we are accountable; that we are under obligation to love and serve him in all the walks of life; and that there is a future life in which we will be rewarded according to our works.

Before accepting the dictum of Commissioner Harris, already quoted, we should carefully consider to what it would lead. His dictum is: "The principle of religious instruction is authority; that of secular instruction is demonstration and verification. It is obvious that these two principles should not be brought into the same schools, but separated as widely as possible." If this separation takes place, all moral as well as all religious instruction must be banished from the school-room, because morality cannot be taught apart from authoritative sanctions.

But if everything received on authority is to be excluded from our public schools, where will the work of exclusion end? In the earlier stages of education nearly everything is learned on authority. And when the higher stages are reached, and the learners begin to investigate the grounds upon which we trust the testimony of our senses and the correctness of our conclusions, they are brought face to face with the truth that

"reason itself must rest at last upon authority; for the original data of reason do not rest on reason, but are necessarily accepted by reason on the authority of what is beyond itself."

Mr. Harris makes a fatal admission when he says that "the analytical understanding is necessarily hostile and skeptical in its attitude towards religious truth." If this is true, and if, because it is true, religion and morality are to be banished from the school-room, the contention of Cardinal Gibbons, that the divorce of religious and secular education inflicts a fatal wound upon the soul, is established. While the state should not teach any church creed, it should not so teach as to destroy faith in all creeds. If it does, the public schools become schools of infidelity; which is the worst of all forms of sectarianism. In avoiding Scylla, let us keep clear of Charybdis.

In his Farewell Address, Washington used the following language:—

"Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotism who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness—these firmest props of the duties of men and citizens. . . . And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principles."

It follows from this investigation of facts relating to our school system, that all moral and religious instruction cannot be excluded from the school-room. It would be as reasonable to think you can admit the atmosphere into your room and yet shut out oxygen. Not more surely is oxygen one of the constituent elements of the atmosphere than is religion a constituent element in real education.

While it is admitted that there may be some difficulty in de-

termining just how much religion shall have a place in our educational system, the difficulty of excluding all religion is incomparably greater. But the former difficulty is not so great as many represent it to be. Certain lines to be followed have been clearly marked out. No sectarian creed is to have a place in the school curriculum. No church is to be entrusted with the task of preparing the course of religious instruction to be given. That course is not to consist simply of the religious principles on which all are agreed. This would bring the instruction in religion down to the level of the man who believes the least; and, as there are some who believe nothing, that method would banish all religion.

A family finds no special difficulty in determining what religion to teach in the home. There are certain principles which are essential to household religion with which all intelligent men and women may easily become familiar. Churches have no special difficulty in settling the question for themselves what religious truths they will hold and teach. There are certain great principles concerning the church's own relation to God, to Christ and to the Bible, and concerning what church-members should believe and do. These form the substance of church creeds. Even so there are certain great principles of national religion which set forth the relation of the nation to God, to Jesus Christ, and to the Bible. These, together with those moral and religious principles which relate to the lives of citizens in the state, should have a place in every school which aims to prepare young people for citizenship.

ARTICLE IV.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF AQUINAS.

BY THE REVEREND JAMES LINDSAY, D.D.

THE vastest and most systematic genius of the Middle Ages was Saint Thomas Aquinas. His architectonic work, the "*Summa Theologica*," embodies the whole philosophy of that epoch, expounded in the spirit of the time. That spirit was the spirit of Aristotle. Aquinas became the best representative of Scholasticism. Rosmini, who, in his "*Teodicea*," speaks of Aquinas as chief among Italian philosophers, set himself to perfect the philosophy of Aquinas by purging it of this Aristotelian leaven, with the pantheistic-materialistic tendency it bore. Aquinas, however, had borne so great respect to the teachings of Aristotle that only when they came into tolerably clear antagonism to Christian truth did he deviate from them. It is thus easy to see why Thomism as a system lacked in logical completeness, acute and massive as it was.

But Aquinas is not to be thought of as a mere reproducer of Aristotle, as is sometimes said; rather is it true to say that, with the aid of Aristotle and the fathers, he brought forth a philosophy all his own. For such fathers as Athanasius, Basil, the Gregories, Chrysostom, Ambrose, Augustine, were all used by Aquinas, whose Aristotelianism is brightened with an effluence of Platonic elevation, and touched with the charm of Socratic method. Aquinas gave system to the teachings of the fathers, the Areopagite, and the Lombard, doing for them, in reducing them to scientific form, what Aristotle had done for the Greeks, Egyptians, and Pythagoreans.

Aquinas was, as we have just indicated, conversant with Plato and Aristotle, but also with the Alexandrians and Arabians. He includes substantially the whole teaching of his great predecessor, Augustine, whose "*De Civitate Dei*" was, in spite of its defects, the nearest approach to the "*Summa Theologica*."

The procedure of philosophy—that of a rational ascent—which Augustine had so well described, is set forth by Aquinas also. Those who come to Aquinas will, as it has been put, find "their intellectual food cooked for them." The fullness of his contents, the fineness of his distinctions, the depth of his thought, and the sharp-sighted clearness of his judgments,—all mark him out as the great thinker he was. His aim was to shape philosophy so that its support should be gained for the upholding of Christian truth or doctrine.

As a philosopher, Aquinas sets out from a principle from which he never seems to deviate, namely, the principle of the demonstration of the infinite by means of the finite. Aquinas declares that reason can perceive and prove God through his works, for the existence of God is demonstrated by its effects—the invisible God is seen in his visible effects. And, indeed, Aquinas, after Albertus Magnus, gives final expression to the distinction between natural and revealed theology; natural theology simply signifying the doctrine of God, as established without revelation, to be found in the philosophy of Aristotle. In the case of natural religion, Aquinas took reason to be parallel with revelation in its working; whereas, in revealed religion, reason has merely ancillary functions, and works in subordination to revelation. God is an ineffable Being, in the view of Aquinas, and is raised above human knowledge. God is to Aquinas, as he has said, after Aristotle, the Prime Motor. He holds we must advance from finite effect to infinite cause; for, though such effect may not reveal the entire cause, it can

yet prove that it exists. Aquinas clung to the absoluteness of Deity, and did not fail to separate him wholly from all created things.

But indeed it was rather the externality of finite things to God, and their *quasi* independence of him, that Aquinas emphasized, making the category of causality the keystone of his thought. Of the alternatives of the Schoolmen, Aquinas preferred to lay stress on the *universalia in re*, and so laid stress on the creaturely essence, that the hold of Divine immanence was loosened. He, in fact, displaced the ontological argument of Anselm, that he might set up the Divine Existence in a *posteriori* fashion, since he thought the argument, to be complete, must be, at one and the same time, a *priori* and a *posteriori*. The reason lay in his accounting God the only being at once ideal and real, or whose ideality was identical with reality. God was to him *actus purus*, the absolutely reasonable substance, in whom will is subordinate to reason.

Two forms of being are found by Aquinas in God—real being and ideal being, the former viewing God in himself, the latter regarded him as archetypal idea. This distinction of being in God is afterwards found in Rosmini, but is not due to him. Aquinas holds it impossible to know ideal being in God, without knowing his real being. The trend of the thought of Aquinas is unfavorable to ontologism, which has sometimes professed to shield itself behind his authority. Man's knowledge of God, according to Aquinas, is analogical in character. Being and essence are not distinguished in God: his essence is his being, says the "Summa." By being he means the actuality of every form or nature. God is to him distinguished as the self-existent being—a necessarily existing essence. This metaphysical essence of Deity is root and foundation of his specific attributes, as we shall see.

As God alone is being by his essence, for that his essence is his being, so every creature is being *by participation*, and its essence is not its being. The Divine immensity is, to Saint Thomas, an absolute attribute, the totality of the Divine essence not being something commensurable with totality of place. God is in his Word: the Word is God: the Word God is the Idea. For the word, Aquinas expressly says, conceived in the mind, represents all that we actually comprehend. In God there is a unique Idea, and this Idea is God himself. The idea is the divine essence with Saint Thomas, which all things imitate, in so far as they are good.

As to the world, Aquinas says reason cannot apodictically show that the world was made in time. The eternity of creation he does not affirm, though he does not think it can be refuted, so repugnant to reason is a beginning of created things. He allows that the philosophers have been able to recognize the first thing, but denies that they have, independently of faith and by use of their reason, been able to demonstrate that creation took place in time. Saint Thomas avers that the most universal causes produce the most universal effects, and the most universal effect, he thinks, is being. There is no impression which the mind more fundamentally gathers, in the view of Aquinas, from the object than that of being.

This idea of being is the first of all first principles, and may be expressed in the negative formula, "Being is not not-being." Then being, he argues, must be the proper effect of the first and most universal cause, which is God. Creation is to him properly the work of God, who produces being absolutely. And the visible world is created after ideas that are externally existent in the Divine Mind, such ideas being of the essence of God—yea, being, in fact, God. But the separateness of God from the creation has to be softened down, and this

is effected by Aquinas through insisting on God as being in all things by his presence and power. When his First Cause—which, we have seen, he conceives as *actus purus*—has been obtained, he must needs endow Him with attributes which will explain particular effects in nature and in man. He makes God one, personal, spiritual, clothes him with perfect goodness, truth, will, intelligence, love, and other attributes. The world of effects he thinks is yet like him, though they are distinct; for the effect resembles the cause, and the cause is, in sense, in the effect.

Aquinas starts from created beings in his mode of rising to God. He has a stringent definition of creation as “a production of a thing according to its whole substance” (*productio alicujus rei secundum suam totam substantiam*), to which is significantly added, “nothing being presupposed, whether created or increate” (*nullo praeposito, quod sit vel increatum vel ab aliquo creatum*). Creation, that is to say, is the production of being in itself, independently of matter as subject. He distinguishes causality which is creative from causality which is merely alterative. He recognizes non-being as before being. Creation is to Aquinas the “primary action” (*prima actio*), possible to the “primary agent” (*agens primum*) alone. Material form for him depends on primary matter, being consequent on the change produced by efficient cause. And Aquinas has much to say of the *rappports* between substance and its accidents, and of form as that by which a thing is what it is. Intelligence, he expressly says, knows being absolutely, and without distinction of time. The processes whereby reason, as the active force of the soul, rises, for Aquinas, to God, are those of causality (*causalitatis*), excellence or eminence (*excellentiae* or *eminentiae*), and negation (*negationis*). All goodness and perfection for Aquinas

exist preëminently in God. Not always free from danger, however, is his mode of speaking, as for example, when he makes God simply the actuality of all things and separates potentiality from him, or when he tends to identify thought and being. Being he expressly regards as itself the most perfect of all things, in virtue of its actuality; being itself is to him the actuality of all things, and even of their ideas.

Aquinas holds to two degrees of Divine intelligibility: the first degree comes to us by natural light, and to the second degree we are guided by supernatural illumination. This distinction has a very fundamental place with Aquinas, and he thinks our confused and unpractised vision has need to grow in the use of the latter or higher light. So it, no doubt, has, but his former position that God, as Creator and Lord, is known through the things that are made, is one which seems rather to exceed the view possible to modern philosophy of religion, so deeply affected by Kantian and post-Kantian agnosticism. The light of human reason he holds to be a participation in the uncreated light of Divine reason; he takes the first principle to be known *naturally*, such knowledge being of God as the Author of Nature; and he regards this principle as the source of all human science and knowledge. It is on such a strong and assured foundation he will build his philosophical edifice.

God, having put within the soul its intellectual light, its knowledge of those first principles, which are the germs of the sciences, is, *par excellence*, the cause of human science in his view. Divine Reason is for him the law of all created things, and such law is eternal. In virtue of God's intelligence, his life is, for Aquinas, as for Aristotle, immortal and eternal. And the human soul, which is for Aquinas most perfect of all the forms which matter is capable of receiving, is, in his view,

also immortal, being the sole form which survives the dissolution of its corporeal organization. The soul is to him a being proper, an immortal substance, which comes not by generation, but proceeds from God by creation. It is important to observe, before we pass from these aspects, that Aquinas expressly holds intelligence to know being absolutely, and without distinction of time. Therein he has his points of contact with the thought of Augustine and of Dante.

We cannot dwell on the amazing comprehensiveness and subtlety of the religious and metaphysical philosophy of Aquinas: we have his ethical philosophy also to examine, but it can be best understood when his whole system of thought is kept in full view. The whole is to him always present in the part, but it is his philosophy in whole we shall most connectedly find from a broad survey of its parts. It may at this point be fitly recalled that his "*Summa*" is not only the Christian religion thrown into scientific form, but is also the orderly exposition of what a man should be. Hence the vision of the Divine Essence, of whom he treats with such theologic power and fullness, is for him that perfect blessedness which he takes to be the ultimate end of man. God also, as absolute activity of thought and will, he takes to act for an end, which everything in the world subserves.

The high dignity of man is found by Aquinas mainly in his will, only there is this trouble, that man is apt, in the thought of Aquinas, not to carry sufficient answer, in his original spiritual constitution, to the commands of supreme will imposed upon him. He is more scientific than Augustine or Anselm in his treatment of the will—a treatment closely related to other parts of his philosophy. Though his psychology is so largely drawn from Aristotle, yet his theory of the will has the merit to be much more complete than Aristotle's, and

has exerted large influence on European philosophy. He sets, as we have seen, the Divine will in a relation of dependence on the Divine intellect. So, in respect of man's nature likewise, Aquinas held the far-reaching doctrine that intellect is supreme; to him what reason approved, will obeyed. The good is commanded by God, in his view, because it is good, and recognized by his wisdom to be so. He holds will as a rational power, to be due to God. God both makes and moves it, but only to the willing of the good.

With fine clearness the Angelic Doctor says that God moves the will of man as universal mover and without this universal motion man cannot will anything, but at the same time man determines himself under application of his reason to a particular volition. Sometimes God moves men, he thinks, to a determinate particular volition of good, such being the case, in his view, of those whom God moves by his grace. But, even then, the grace, though premoving, is not predetermining. And grace, it may be said, is, in the system of Aquinas, rather apt to wear an external and accidental character, and to assume the form of power that is mechanical rather than vital in its cast.

Aquinas holds the object to which the will tends, to be presented by the intellect, and not by the will itself. Intellect is necessary in order to will, hence intellect is for him higher. Will, however, can direct intellect, and will is lord of its own life. The will of God predestinates, but necessity is not imposed on events, neither is contingency removed. Aquinas can say that this or that particular action of a determinate character is not owing to any other agency than the will itself (*non est ab alio determinante, sed ab ipsa voluntate*).

Perhaps one ought to say that freedom, as it is found in Aquinas, seems to exist rather too verbally, and not to be sufficiently real. He is apt to appear as though trying to retain

freedom and determinism at one and the same time. There is no lack of stress on freedom, as, for example, when he says the being is free that can rule its own action, for he is free who is the cause of himself; whereas that which is, by a sort of necessity, driven to action, is, he holds, in a state incompatible with freedom. Yet, though man's turning to God is ascribed by him to free-will, this turning of the will is declared impossible unless God himself so turn it. So that, on the one hand, Aquinas in the clearest manner declares movement of the will to be nothing less than inclination of the will itself towards the thing wished. On the other hand, he affirms that God alone can change the will, for that he alone is cause of the power of inclination—cause, in fact, of the will, which he alone can efficaciously move.

On which it may be remarked that the will may, no doubt, be moved by itself as intrinsic cause, and may yet be open to be moved by God in his grace as extrinsic cause, so that there is no real inconsistency. And yet it seems not easy to hold the presentation of Aquinas to be quite unambiguous, and this more or less equivocal character of freedom in his hands is more surprising in view of his genuine doctrine of Creation, with the distinctness of the world from God which it involves.

In respect of the Divine relation to evil, Aquinas teaches that the sinful act is both being and act, and that God is, no doubt, the cause of all action *considered as act*. But then, says Saint Thomas, sin is more than being and act; it is a defect—a defect springing from free-will as its cause, and not to be referred to God. That is to say, he makes God the cause of the act where there is sin, but not the cause of sin, since he is not the cause of the defect which there is in the act. His view of the character of evil is thus negative.

The optimism of Aquinas was of more moderate character

than that of Leibniz, or Malebranche, or Rosmini. As against the strong optimism of Abelard, Aquinas held that God could create another world better than this present one, but could not create one better adapted to the end for which this world has been made. It is by the end in view, he thinks, the order adopted must be judged. Divine Wisdom is limited to a determined order, only as the end chosen requires the best particular means of attaining it.

The soul itself is, in the "Summa," viewed—as already indicated—as the *substantial form* of a physical organic body endowed with rational life. This was in accordance with the theory of the Scholastics as to a radical substratum called *materia prima*—primary matter. His doctrine of the soul must wear to us a very materialistic aspect, unless it be carefully remembered that this substantial form was taken to be immaterial and perfectly simple. He expressly says that the human soul, which is called intellect or mind, is something incorporeal and self-subsisting. So the rational soul, he thinks, is properly said to have being, and to have been created or made. For being made (*feri*) ends in being. Not from pre-existing corporeal matter could it have been made, or it would then be corporeal; and not from preëxisting spiritual matter, as in that case spiritual substances would be mutually transformed; therefore he holds it could only have been by creation. To him the soul, as immaterial, was immortal, and could not be conceived as otherwise. Man is to him the intermediate link between material life and spiritual or immaterial activity.

In his philosophy of knowledge, Aquinas makes man's cognitive power—like the soul from which it emanates—partake of a double character, material and immaterial. All knowledge begins for him from the data of sensuous perception.

He distinctly says that our knowledge comes first from the senses, but maintains this does not mean that our sense-cognition is the complete and perfect cause of our knowledge, but rather that it supplies the material of the cause. He discards the notion of innate ideas. The intellectual faculty consisted of the active intellect (*intellectus agens*), and the passive intellect (*intellectus possibilis*). Aquinas held to the objective value of our knowledge in the most complete manner. The universe was for him mirrored—ideally and immaterially—in the mind of man, just as the likeness of a person is on a photographic plate. Such, in brief, was his epistemological position.

What men call Fate, Saint Thomas considers to be nothing but Divine Providence in its meanings and effects. Things which here seem done by accident are, he holds, to be referred to some pre-ordaining cause, which is Divine Providence. After Boëthius, he speaks of Providence as the Lord of the universe himself, directing all things according to his eternal plan (*divina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta, quae cuncta disponit*). But he does not allow that one is attributing things human to fate, because one may choose to call the will and power of Deity itself by the name of fate. One must say, however, that his own stress on Divine causality in second causes is apt to make Providence appear no more than fate in some sort, a circumstance which seems due to the influence of Arabian interpreters like Avicenna. And yet it seems due to him to say that as against the Arabian philosophers, Aquinas is not without strivings to recognize the efficiency of the second causes through which Deity works. His deterministic leanings were seen in his postulation of influence on interior constraint or inclination.

We may now make some remarks on features of this impos-

ing philosophy of the Middle Ages. Its realistic character is obvious, the real being for Aquinas the rational. He completed, in a Christian sense, the work of Aristotle. He vindicated the superiority of the contemplative life, as Aristotle had done, making the contemplation of God—the vision of his being or essence—at once highest good and highest truth. We have in Aquinas a fusion of dialectics and mysticism. To dialectics we owe his system, with its theory of the superiority of intellect to will, and its organic connection of dogmas. To mysticism were due alike its base in love, and its apex in the beatific vision of God. His thought had been affected by the mystical agnosticism of Dionysius the Areopagite, on which he made some notable advances. His mind had suffered a strange cleavage whereby the Divine and the earthly became parted into two quite separate worlds. This dualism was due to an ecclesiastical supernaturalism so strong as to prove able to lay the foundation of his system on this dualistic basis.

The bold character of his ontology strikes the mind, which finds the match of it only in Hegel. Less direct, and less pantheistic, was his view of creation as emanating from God than that of his master, Albertus Magnus, and so he represented the active will of Deity as that which, as Thought, wills and creates. The idea of order, as a ruling idea of the Middle Ages, finds in him its most symmetrical and proportionate expression. He develops it into a great living system, connecting the most manifold and diverse interests, so that therefrom he, with systematizing genius, builds up an all-embracing world-view. Christianity he brings into closer relation with science and culture, as these then existed. For grace comes to perfect nature, not to destroy it (*gratia naturam non tollit sed perficit*). A leader of the Christendom of his own

time Aquinas was, making truth the quest of his comprehensive mode of thinking. For the most part, he made knowledge and theoretic reason precede will and practical reason, and this rational element is a very precious feature in Thomistic philosophy. The being of God, the grounding of the world in him, and the soul's immortality, are to Aquinas truths already discoverable by reason. Reason is to him the precursor of faith, and with the independence of the former he joins its subordination to the truth of Christian revelation. Perhaps one should not err in estimating the elevation of his life, and his mild persistency in his immense task, as greater than his elevation above his own time. But it is certainly a tribute to his realizing in himself the highest developed thought of his time, that the mighty Dante sits so closely to the thought of the Angelic Doctor.

There can hardly be a doubt that the defensive attitude of Aquinas towards Platonism bore him further towards empiricism than would otherwise have been the case. The influence of Aquinas on the subsequent history of religious thought was undoubtedly great, and has lived on into the dogmatic thought of to-day even in the Protestant world. This was largely the result of Melanchthon's having taken up positions in sympathy with the Aristotelianism of Aquinas. Among subsequent thinkers influenced by Aquinas must be reckoned Spinoza, whose ethical and metaphysical philosophy owed much to ideas derived from the Angelic Doctor. For the place of Aquinas in the history of ethics is certainly not less important than his significance for the history of religious thought. In fine, one can think of no higher tribute to his work than is found in the fact that the greatest need of the world to-day is just that of an Aquinas to do for its vast body of synthetic knowledge what the Angelic Doctor did for that of the Middle Ages.

ARTICLE V.

WHEN DID ISRAEL ENTER CANAAN?

BY MRS. LOUISE SEYMOUR HOUGHTON.

THE pivotal importance of the question lies in its relation to the national development of the Hebrew people. The history of that development has come to be far otherwise important than for the sacred interest which attaches to the people Israel as the race whence, after the flesh, came our Lord. It has to do with the development of the political idea, as in modern times we have come to understand it. We know now that Israel was not in early days, nor ever, a separate people in the sense once attached to the word; but the importance, from this point of view, of the little nation which for centuries occupied that thoroughfare and battle-ground of the world, Canaan, is hardly yet recognized. Egypt had a culture, and Babylon a genius for jurisprudence, quite unknown to Israel; both were far richer and stronger than she; but neither has permanently influenced the world. Not only by reason of her geographical position, but far more because of the unique alliance between the religious and the political idea in Israel, she has been in a very literal sense the heart of the nations, the vital organ of the world. Her life has gone pulsing through the world's life, from the earliest day of her national existence until now. And as there is a supreme moment in the existence of the human organism when the mysterious life-principle awakes and the heart begins to beat, so there was a supreme moment when this heart of the world began to beat with the mysterious consciousness of divine

activity in national affairs, and that national idea which has ever since been slowly coming to maturity was made ready to be born.

Unquestionably the supreme moment when this life-principle awoke in Israel is the period of the Judges. For it was through the conflicts and triumphs of these untaught heroes that an unorganized horde of desert wanderers struggled into national self-consciousness, and gave to the world the truth, embodied in Israel's history from that time, latent in the history of all peoples, perceived by the pioneers of our own nation, but not even yet clearly apprehended by the world,—the truth that there is a divine element in national life; that a nation is something other than the sum of all its parts, and that that something other is divine. It is in the book of Judges that we learn to define the word nation as a "people working with God for the progress of the human race." This is why the book of Judges is, to-day, perhaps the most important work of ancient literature; this is why the intricate problems of that book are not met by any theory as yet current—as of synchronisms and the various origins of its strange hero tales. Though every one of these tales were proved to be merely legendary, and every date in the book the mere figment of a mind which saw an occult meaning in certain numbers, we should yet know that something like what is therein narrated actually took place, and that a considerable period was occupied by the events; because this is demanded by the previous and subsequent history.

Therefore the date of the entrance of Israel into Canaan is of practical moment. Not religion, indeed, nor any theory of biblical inspiration, but the history of human development, demands an answer to the question "How long was the Judges period?" Or, by way of gaining a larger perspective,

"What was the length of time between the Exodus and the building of Solomon's temple? When did Israel enter Canaan?"

The elements of the discussion are these:—

First.—The data found in the Bible.

1. The statement in 1 Kings vi. 1 that the fourth year of Solomon's reign was the four hundred and eightieth after the Exodus.

2. The claim of Jephthah to Israel's right in the country east of the Jordan, namely, that they had been in possession three hundred years (Judges xi. 26).

3. The notes of time in the book of Judges, which, added together, give four hundred and ten years from the death of Joshua to the death of Samson.

4. The fact that to this period must be added the time of the wilderness wandering (forty years), of the Conquest under Joshua (an unknown period), the judgeships of Eli (forty years), and of Samuel (an unknown period, as is also the reign of Saul), the reign of David (forty years), and the first four years of Solomon, making a total of five hundred and thirty years besides the unknown periods.

5. The statement of St. Paul (Acts xiii. 20) that the Judges period before Samuel was "about four hundred and fifty years."

6. The statement in Genesis xlvii. 11 that Joseph settled his father and brethren in the land of Rameses.

7. The statements in Exodus i. and ii. that the Israelites built for Pharaoh the cities Pithom and Rameses, being forced a part of the time to make bricks without any provision of straw.

Second.—The data from Archæology.

1. The somewhat recent discovery by Edward Naville of

the long-lost treasure-city Pithom, with a number of bricks made without straw.

2. The tablets found in 1887 at Tell-el-Amarna, on the Nile.

3. The so-called Merenptah stele found in 1896, bearing an inscription in which the name *Israel* occurs.

Third.—1. The general agreement of scholars, especially since Naville's researches at Pithom (Succoth), that the Pharaoh of the Oppression was Rameses II. of the nineteenth dynasty, and the Pharaoh of the Exodus his son Merenptah, or, more probably, his grandson Seti II.

2. Recent astronomical calculations, especially by Mahler, by which the dates of Egyptian kings of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth dynasties have been fixed with approximate accuracy, and that of Solomon's accession almost certainly at 990 B. C.

Even before the dates of these Egyptian kings were accurately ascertained, it had been understood, in a general way, that they were nearer the date of Solomon than the period apparently demanded by the book of Judges. This was not deemed a matter of importance. Scholarship has easily shown that the numbers of the Bible are often purely conventional, and the book of Judges, considered as a collection of local and probably synchronous stories, did not necessarily cover any long period. So far as these considerations are concerned, the Exodus might well have occurred as late as 1230 B. C., the date formerly given to Seti II., or even, as Meyer judges, under one of the weak kings at the very close of the nineteenth dynasty, a little before 1180, or, as McCurdy puts it, in the twentieth dynasty, between 1180 and 1148. But it is an entirely different matter when we begin to account for the social and the ethical development of the Hebrew people from a

horde of runaway slaves to a highly organized kingdom,—a problem whose elements we can only slightly appreciate by considering the social and the ethical development of our own negroes in a period considerably longer than that between Seti II. and Solomon, and under circumstances incomparably more favorable, even as they had been during the period of slavery. And there is far more in the problem than the development of the people Israel from a horde to a nation, from government by heroes of accident or circumstance to government by hereditary kings—a form of government, it must be remembered, utterly foreign to Semitic genius, although the Davidic dynasty is the most stable known to history. The essential element in the problem is not the development of the form of government, but the birth of the national idea, for this was nothing less than an entire revolution in the religious conceptions of Israel, from the conception of Jahweh as a mere tribal deity, like the tribal deities of other nations,—greater indeed than any other precisely for the reason that every boy's father is the greatest man in the world,—to the conception of Jahweh as the unifying bond of the nation. The gestation of such an idea must have been long.

These and other considerations have later caused the pendulum to swing the other way; and Professor Mahler, to whose astronomical investigations we owe the precise dates which are now ours, has calculated,—remembering the ancient Hebrew tradition that the Exodus took place on a Thursday,—that it could have occurred on no other day than Thursday, March 27, 1335 B. C. This brings the event back to the reign of the great Rameses II., commonly deemed the Pharaoh of the Oppression, the grandfather of Seti II., and this conclusion has been adopted by that weighty authority, the new “*Dictionary of Egyptian Archæology*.” This gives about one

hundred and fifty additional years to the period of Israel in Canaan before Solomon, and if it could be made to accord with historic conditions in Egypt and Syria it might be deemed satisfactory. But here, it appears to me, the theory fails.

The critical factors in the problem, beyond the astronomical conclusions, are the Merenptah stele and the Amarna tablets. The latter were written in the eighteenth dynasty (1587-1340 B. C.), and they mention Canaanitish towns bearing names which must be transliterated "Jakob-el" and "Joseph-el." Much more important is the fact that the great stele on which are inscribed the victories of Merenptah, commonly supposed to be the predecessor of the Pharaoh of the Exodus, speaks of Israel as already in Canaan. According to one translation (there are several, slightly varying but in substantial agreement) the closing lines run thus:—

"Vanquished is the land of the Libyans,
Tranquilized is the land of the Hittites,
The land of Pa-Kana'na [Phœnicia] is captured absolutely,
The land of Ashkelon is carried away,
The land of Gezer is seized,
The land of Suni'un [in Coele Syria] is brought to naught,
The people of Isra-el is devastated, it has no grain [or seed],
The land of Khan [Southern Canaan] is become like the widows of
Egypt.

All lands together are in peace.

Every one that was a marauder hath been subdued by the King Merenptah, who giveth life like the sun every day."

This inscription is dated in the second year of Merenptah's reign, a date which in the very year of the discovery of the stele was fixed at 1206 B. C. by the unearthing of a tablet recording the heliacal rising of Sirius, the "dog star."

For a time after the discovery of this stele, the allusion to Israel as already in Canaan was doubted. Professor Sayce, misapprehending the word "seed"—which in fact refers to grain—as figuratively denoting *offspring*, jubilantly argued

that it proved the story of the death of the first-born. It needed, however, only to recall the fact that, not Israel's first-born, but those of Egypt, had perished, according to the biblical narrative, to compel the acceptance of the word in its natural meaning, and admit the presence of some Israelites in Canaan before the supposed date of the Exodus and their share in the sorrows of Merenptah's victories. The well-known hypotheses of recent scholarship—for which, however, there is no basis except the pressure of necessity—that certainly the Israelitish clan Asher, and probably clan Judah, had, before the Oppression, broken away from the great body of the Bene-Israel and returned to Canaan by the direct route of the isthmus and the Negeb, has in general satisfied the conditions, but conclusions based upon well-nigh gratuitous hypotheses are becoming every year less satisfactory to the thinker, and some better way is being sought. As has already been shown, Mahler finds that way by placing the Exodus in the time of Raméses II., the father of Merenptah. It will be observed that while, in the stele, the determinative for the other proper nouns requires the English word "land," that for Israel is "people," and easily fits the condition of Israel before the completed conquest. The known condition of Syria under the strong rule of Rameses and Merenptah, however, does not lend itself to the theory that Israel had lately entered Canaan, when Merenptah came to the throne.

A careful study of the Amarna tablets as they have been put at the disposal of readers of English and German, comparing their indications of the internal history and civilization of Syria, especially of Canaan, at that period, with such indications of the relations of Canaan with the wider world as may be found in the books of Joshua and Judges, brings to light much unanticipated information. Much of it, indeed,

lies between the lines, both of the tablets and the biblical books, but he who cannot read between the lines of any product of the human mind loses much of what it has to offer. It appears to me that the data thus gained thoroughly satisfy the requirements of the historic problem, and enable us to throw the Exodus of Israel from Egypt farther back than it has hitherto been placed, even as early as the eighteenth dynasty.

The late dates usually assigned for the Exodus are based upon the fact of the strong control which Egypt exercised over Syria until the very close of the nineteenth dynasty. The Amarna tablets, however, have made it clear that the eighteenth dynasty offers a period when Egypt was pitifully weak in Syria, a condition precisely inviting the raid of a great nomadic horde. If, therefore, we should find that the Exodus actually did occur, and the conquest of Canaan, in this dynasty, the requirement of time for the development of ideas would be met and the biblical account supported. The counter difficulty then arises, that the Old Testament narrative gives no indication that Egypt was the overlord of Israel during much of the Judges period. But neither does the Old Testament anywhere give any obvious indication of the great world-movements of which we certainly know Canaan to have been in part the theater, during all the centuries after Thothmes III. of the eighteenth dynasty as well as before. We find in the so-called historic books no slightest suggestion of that awful devastation of Israel and Judah by the Scythians, in Josiah's reign, which Jeremiah so vividly describes in his fourth and sixth chapters. The silences of the Old Testament may be inexplicable, but they do not argue that none of its historic statements are to be accepted.

A brief review of certain familiar facts is necessary here. When Jacob migrated to Egypt with all his clan, Lower

Egypt was under the dominion of the Hyksos, originally a small race of nomads in part of Hittite origin, but in the main, like Israel, of Semitic stock. A native Egyptian was indeed weakly ruling in Upper Egypt, though much under Hyksos supremacy. The Hyksos, though they formed an eighth of the population of Lower Egypt, never amalgamated with the native people any more than the English overlords of Egypt amalgamate with the fellaheen to-day. As early as Joseph's time, these Shepherd Kings were engaged in a struggle for life with the Egyptians, and it became clear why every shepherd was an abomination to the Egyptians, and also why Pharaoh was glad to welcome a large clan of healthy, hardy adventurers of his own stock, and establish them "in the best of the land," on the eastern frontier. This frontier it was his special policy to guard, and to it, indeed, a few generations later, these Shepherd Kings and their clans were fain to retreat. For after a struggle of more than a century, the Southern dynasty threw off the Hyksos rule, driving the Hyksos Kings and all their clans first into the land of Goshen among the Bene-Israel, and finally out of the kingdom. The date of this event has recently been practically fixed from astronomical calculations. It was 1582 B. C., more than a hundred years earlier than the date which up to this time historians have given to the rise of the victorious eighteenth dynasty. At the final expulsion of the Hyksos, this eighteenth dynasty arose, a dynasty supremely important in Egyptian history because of the brilliant ability of its earlier kings, and the part they played in restoring Egypt to its long-lost place among the great nations of the world.

The first task of this brilliant dynasty must needs have been to humble the Hittite power which for centuries had been dominant in Western Asia; and thus Canaan became the

theater of a very bloody warfare. Armed hosts of Egypt and *Khita* were constantly traversing her highways, and war chariots deploying on the plain of Esdraelon, which, near Megiddo (the Armageddon of the Apocalypse), became the scene of the most sanguinary battle of ancient times. In the decisive victory which the great pharaoh of this eighteenth dynasty, Thothmes III., won in his twenty-fifth year at Megiddo over the Hittite King of Qadesh, and his numerous allies,—“all the kings from Egypt to the Euphrates and also Phenœcia and Cyprus,”—Thothmes took from the enemy nine hundred and twenty-four chariots, and even the golden-plated chariot of the Hittite King—the first chariots ever seen in Egypt. But though Thothmes was able to push eastward and even to keep a fleet on the upper Euphrates, the Hittite empire was by no means crushed. It took two hundred years of warfare, first and last, for Egypt to gain even such ascendancy over *Khita* that hostilities could be brought to an end by the marriage of the Hittite king's daughter to Seti I. of the nineteenth dynasty; and during these centuries Egypt was often in pretty desperate plight, as the Amarna tablets show. For internal troubles arose in Egypt, as they may arise in Germany, from the complications incident to the keeping of a great standing army. The eighteenth dynasty went to pieces under the heel of a military despotism, and during the time of weakness preceding this result Canaan had rest from invasion, a point of capital importance with regard to the date of Israel's entrance into this land.

Now if the Exodus occurred in the eighteenth dynasty, shortly after the brilliant victories of Thothmes III., the children of Israel on entering the desert would find themselves in the midst of a friendly people, the Hyksos, to whom they had themselves shown kindness in their recent time of trouble.

And this would explain the fact that, contrary to what would naturally be expected, the years of desert wandering were a time of peace. We are told that the reason why Moses led the people by the roundabout way of the desert was to avoid the risk that unwarlike Israel should "see war." But the desert was at that time by no means an unpeopled solitude, nor a place of safety to helpless wanderers, any more than it is now. Countless nomad tribes roamed over it, and the only way to account for the facts in this part of the history of Israel is by the hypothesis that the Exodus took place in the eighteenth dynasty, when the desert was largely peopled by the friendly tribes of Hyksos. If these joined themselves to Israel, we may have the mixed multitude of Exodus xii. 38 accounted for, and certain other difficulties resolved. And they were surely more likely to homogenize with Israel than those "island inhabitants," the pirates of Northern Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean islands, in whom Mahler, dating the Exodus a century later, in the time of Rameses II., finds the "mixed multitude."

The earlier date of the eighteenth dynasty fits also into the conditions of the Hittites. After their disastrous overthrow by Thothmes III., they were for a long time in a paralyzed condition, their southern outposts, Hebron in Southern Canaan and Zoan in Northern Egypt, being cut off from the mother country. The people of Canaan, also,—the Jebusites, Perizzites, and the rest,—were pretty well demoralized: for Thothmes III. by no means paused at defeating the Hittites. The story of his campaign, inscribed in the temple at Karnak, names a hundred and twenty conquered towns in Canaan, many of them familiar names, and shows him to have overrun the entire country from Galilee to the southern desert.

Now we know that when the children of Israel emerged

from the desert on the east of Jordan, a wide-spread fear of them prevailed in Canaan; and, having learned from tablets and inscriptions that at the time of Thothmes III. the Canaanites were a highly civilized people, far in advance of Egypt in arts and education, well protected in their cities and villages, furnished with chariots and arms, and familiar with the art of war, we are impelled to ask the cause of that deep-seated terror at the approach of a wandering desert horde of runaway slaves. We must seek for the cause of this terror in something other than superstitious fear, or the vague legend, as one scholar puts it, "that Israel was coming to his own again." Nothing short of their overwhelming defeat by Thothmes III. and the continued oppression of his immediate successors, can account for their willingness to consider the claim of the God of the Hebrews that his people had rights in this land. These various considerations speak for the year 1423 B. C., in the reign of Thothmes IV., of the eighteenth dynasty, the grandson of the great conqueror, as the year of the Exodus. That it almost precisely agrees with the figures in 1 Kings vi. 1 and in St. Paul's address, and with Jephthah's three-century claim to the land of Moab, is an interesting feature, and may have its bearings on certain critical questions which do not enter here.

A much-discussed word, frequently recurring in the Amarna tablets, appears to point to the same conclusion,—the word *Habiri*. The word has been bandied back and forth between scholars, but it is now conceded that it means Hebrews. It occurs in the reports of the Egyptian governor of Jerusalem, Ebed-Tob, or Abdi-Khiba. The *Habiri*, he says, are making much trouble. They are ubiquitous; they are enemies to Egypt, they are capturing forts, have devastated all the king's territory—"the whole territory of my lord the

king is going to ruin because of them"; they are fomenting war at Bethel and Beth-aven. They have taken Gath-rimmon and are in Judæa, pressing from the hills down to the plains.

Now if the Exodus took place in the reign of Thothmes IV., the second successor of the great conqueror Thothmes III., or in that of Amenhotep III., who followed the fourth Thothmus, both of whom were weak monarchs, it would be just about this time, forty years later than Thothmes III., that the Hebrews did take Bethel and "Ai" (Josh. viii.), a name which may signify "ruin," and which appears to refer to Beth-aven, the neighbor city of Bethel. Furthermore, in Joshua (xix. 45) we find Gath-rimmon appointed to Dan as if it were already a conquered city. And very striking is that expression of Abdi-Khiba, that the Habiri were "pressing from the hills *down* to the plain." For in Judges i. 9 we read that, after the children of Judah had fought against Jerusalem, and had taken it and had smitten it with the edge of the sword, and set the city on fire (causing that disquietude of which he tells us to the worthy governor Abdi-Khiba in his impregnable citadel on the crag above), then "afterward the children of Judah *went down* to fight against the Canaanites that dwelt in the Shephelah and in the lowland." The Hebrew word "go down" precisely describes the descent from a great height like that from Jerusalem to the sea. These coincidences of the biblical account with the inscriptions on the stele and the Amarna correspondence, slight in themselves, have a cumulative weight for the conclusion that the Exodus occurred fully two hundred years earlier than it has of late been placed, that is, in 1423, forty years earlier than 1383, the date of Akenaten's reign, the king to whom Abdi-Khiba wrote; namely, in the reign of Thothmes IV. It is therefore, also, almost certain that the Pharaoh of the Oppres-

sion was the great warrior Thothmes III., who, 1449 B. C., conquered the Hittites and the Canaanites, and thus indirectly made possible the conquest of Canaan by Israel.

As against this conclusion are the facts that Rameses II. was a great builder, that bricks without straw are found at Pithom, and that one of the treasure-cities which the Hebrew slaves built for the Pharaoh is claimed to have borne his name, Rameses. But Thothmes III. was also a very noted builder—in the Heliopolis and Karnak, at Wady Halpha and more than thirty other sites, and, though he built mainly of stone (as, indeed, did Rameses II.), we have descriptions of some of his buildings as of brick. So far as we know, no bricks without straw are found in these buildings, but forty years ago the same was to be said of those of Rameses, and, in fact, we are nowhere told that the Hebrew slaves made any bricks without straw, but simply that they had to procure their straw where they could. The name Rameses occurs in Genesis, in a passage assigned indeed to “our very latest sources,” but that fact is hardly conclusive proof for or against the existence of the name in Egypt at any period.

There are other slight points of contact between the Amarna tablets and the book of Judges, which suggest that the Old Testament account of the entrance of Israel into Canaan has a better standing than some recent conjectures would admit. For example, if the Exodus occurred in the eighteenth dynasty, there is no necessity for sending Asher to Canaan two centuries in advance of the other clans of Israel, and Professor Jastrow’s discovery of “men of Judah” in Canaan as early as 1400 B. C. needs no explanation. If the Pharaoh of the Exodus was Thothmes IV., the presence of Asher in central Canaan when the Amarna tablets were written, and certain inscriptions were made, is very accurately

accounted for by the scattered notices in Joshua and Judges. And the Amarna tablets throw into high relief many slight indications in Judges, especially concerning the tribes of Judah, Asher, Dan, Ephraim, and Benjamin, and offer at least a suggestion of an historical kernel to that story of Othniel's victory which has hitherto appeared to be purely legendary. Space forbids any attempt to trace these here, although they offer material for a fruitful study; but enough has been brought out, I think, to show that the theory of an early date for the Exodus, a date that would afford time for that remarkable development of the Hebrew people which we know did take place, is tenable in itself, and valuable for its far-shining light upon other questions.

The present study looks by no means to any support of the accuracy of the biblical data in the interest of any theory of inspiration. The indisputable inspiration of the biblical writers is argued from considerations quite other than those of historic accuracy. To any tenable theory of inspiration it is of absolutely no moment that the figures given in Kings and Judges and the Acts should be accurate. That they should prove to be substantially correct would be, however, a great historic gain. Such a conclusion clears up a psychological problem otherwise insoluble; it gives a kernel of fact to a group of unique hero tales, all the more valuable in the history of ideas because they are not entirely historic, but rather the beautified result of the play of the half-developed imagination around facts whose historic moment is beyond even its power of dreaming. It directs the mind of to-day to one of the most impressive events in human history, the birth in Israel, and not elsewhere, of that governmental idea which through the slow subsequent ages has gradually become dominant in human society.

ARTICLE VI.

PROFESSOR PARK'S THEOLOGICAL SYSTEM.¹

BY THE REVEREND FRANK HUGH FOSTER, PH. D., D. D.

THE remaining portions of Park's theological system were treated by him under the heads of Regeneration, Sanctification, and Eschatology. They will possess interest for us rather as showing the application of his main principles, and illustrating more fully his theological spirit, than as presenting us with anything that is essentially new.

REGENERATION.

Park began, as usual, with pointing out the relation of regeneration to the other doctrines of theology. The doctrine did not stand alone, it was a doctrine in a system, depending upon others and itself contributing to still others.

His definition was careful. Regeneration is "the change from a state of entire sinfulness to a state of some degree of holiness." As such, it was "the first change," differing from all other, subsequent changes, such as the repentance by which a Christian who has fallen into sin comes back to his duty, both in its origin and in the fact that it is of a fundamental character. It is also viewed by Park as the whole of the complex change from sin to holiness, and not merely, as some say, the divine side of the change. Regeneration thus embraces two elements, divine and human, but they are not so separated by Park as to assign them two separate terms, regeneration and conversion. Such a distinction had its advantages, but

¹ Concluded from p. 291.

upon the whole Park preferred merely to say that "conversion was the most important part of comprehensive regeneration."

Analyzing it more particularly, regeneration involves a change of the primary, predominant choice. It may be questioned whether there is any such fixed and conscious choice before regeneration, but after it there is such a choice, which is recognized by the Christian as determinative of his whole life. It has "stopped the old habit of uninterrupted sin" and has "introduced the new habit of holiness." "It is not merely a holy choice, but the first one of a series; and not merely that, but an influential choice which stands so related to the former and subsequent states of the moral agent that it breaks up the continuity of the sinful habit and introduces a new habit." It also involves a change in the sensibilities and a change in the intellect, such that, in the order of nature, the change in these precedes that in the will; but in the order of time there is no priority of either over the other, for, as a whole, regeneration is instantaneous.

These preliminary and explanatory considerations are no sooner completed than the fact becomes clear that the treatment of the subject is to be determined by the philosophy of revivals which had grown up in the revival atmosphere of New England in the early half of the last century. Professor Park had himself been a revival preacher, and drew to the last some of his most illuminating illustrations from his experience with his parishioners in Braintree in revival times. The two perpetual tendencies of his system join here again in conflict, the Calvinistic tendency, to exalt God, which is brought out in his doctrine that God is "the sole author" of regeneration; and the practical interest of the pastor to clear away obstacles and stimulate activity on the part of sinners and so eventually

to elicit the act of conversion. These chapters contain, therefore, a philosophy of revivals.

Thus, in the very "analysis," with the main points of which we were just now busy, he guards against the idea that the advocated "change in the intellectual view" of the man should necessarily involve new knowledge; for then the unrepentant man would not be responsible for not having yielded to knowledge which he did not have. It may be merely a new vividness of the old ideas. The emphasis placed by the very term regeneration upon the agency of the Holy Spirit is not to lead to inactivity, for man is not responsible in any way for what God does; but he is responsible for repenting. This he can do, this he ought to do, and this he is to be exhorted to do immediately. This is the fullness of man's liberty.

And, then, with his usual breadth, Park refuses to limit regeneration to any one fixed scheme. Some revivalists were always attempting, as some do still, to produce a single type of experience, their favorite type, which they understood most fully and could guide most easily to the best final result. Thus, while the "antecedents of regeneration" were defined as "increased thoughtfulness, fear and alarm, conviction of sin, endeavor to secure the favor of God, despair of securing this by works," he said most explicitly that "we must not insist upon these antecedents in the *order* specified above, nor in any uniform *degree*, nor must we insist upon them at all as the ultimate or chief *aim* of the sinner, nor regard them as *conditions* which ensure regeneration." Experience varies as the individuals which undergo it vary. There is one, and one only, condition of salvation, and that is repentance and faith. We are to insist upon this one thing only, and to admire the ways of God in what he otherwise gives and does.

And now there enters again, and for the last time in this

review, that strange hesitation upon Park's part between freedom and determinism which characterizes his treatment of the will, to modify his treatment of regeneration. He is about to prove that God is the author of regeneration. By author, in this connection, he means the one who plans for a certain end, chooses it, adopts the means to bring it about, and actually employs these. God is the only one that thus has regeneration in mind, and thus effects it, and hence he is its only author. Park might have advanced here upon the straight road that lies before the determinist. He would then have said: God acts upon the sensibilities and the intellect directly and indirectly, and also sets in action trains of motives operating upon the will, and thus determines the whole man to the new act of repentance. God would thus have been made the author of conversion. But of this, because it is the act of the will, God could not be the author without becoming also the author of every other act of the will, and thus of sin. Hence man must be made the sole author of conversion, and God's authorship of regeneration must be proved by a method which shall leave out this element. But there is enough place, in the composite thing which regeneration had been defined to be, in the change of the intellect and the sensibility, for the action of God, and here it can be said to be a special, supernatural (in distinction from miraculous) exercise of his almighty power. Thus Park was landed in the strange position that God was the *sole* author of the whole comprehensive change called regeneration, while man was the equally *sole* author of the act of conversion, which is the central and vital thing about it all. He could have made a better distinction, and one which would have better conveyed, I am persuaded, his real thought, if he had asked the question, Who is the author of Conversion? and had answered this question by saying that both God and man

are its authors,—God in the sphere of *influence*, as the source of that series of influences which in their combined working lead ultimately to repentance, so that without them the man never does repent,—man in the sphere of *power*, because the final action which constitutes conversion, the choice, is entirely his, as the work of his free sovereignty.

Into the further definitions and distinctions of this subject we do not need here to enter, for it will be readily understood that Park would teach that the soul is both active and passive in regeneration, and that regeneration, while theoretically resistible, is practically unresisted. We pass, therefore, at once to the subject of

SANCTIFICATION.

This, according to Park, is the gradual development of holiness in the Christian under the guidance and by the agency of the Holy Spirit. The question is immediately suggested, What is holiness? and to the answer of this he turns first. One would think that it had already been abundantly answered in the discussions upon virtue which have been earlier reviewed. But Park now goes into the matter afresh, partly because he is considering it upon its human side, and partly because, since this is the place for the entrance of “ethics” into the system, it is the place to come to an understanding with divergent theories of morals, such as the utilitarian.

Virtue is therefore defined afresh, and this time as follows: “The preference of the greater and higher sentient being, on the ground of its value, above the less and lower sentient being.” The definition does not differ in meaning from those already given, and we need spend no time now in elucidating that meaning.¹

The discussion of Utilitarianism is introduced under the

¹ See *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. 1x. p. 688 ff.

head of an objection to Park's own theory, that it is in essence the utilitarian theory. The utilitarian theory, he says, "pronounces happiness and the means to happiness the chief good and only good. This theory, on the contrary, makes happiness the lower good and holiness the higher. The utilitarian theory teaches that we have no idea of right apart from the tendency of an act to happiness. This theory asserts that right is a distinct idea. The utilitarian theory teaches that a thing is right because of its tendency, and hence that the love of the general happiness would be wrong if it did not promote the general happiness. This theory is that a thing has its tendency to happiness because it is right, and that right would be right whatever its tendency might be. In fact, there is a universally acknowledged distinction between the right and the useful."

Neither is a thing right because it is agreeable to the will of God. Benevolence, for example, is agreeable to the will of God, but it would be right and possess the attribute of imperative obligation if it were not agreeable to the will of God. Nor is right right because it is agreeable to the fitness of things. In opposition to all such theories Park taught that "right is a simple term, which can only be defined by reference to the occasions when the idea arises in the mind. Rightness, virtuousness, is that quality of an act which conscience approves, obligates us to practice, and feels complacence in; and which has a desert of reward. In other words, right is the correlate of conscience which perceives the right immediately and affirms our obligation to perform it." And, again, "benevolence is right in itself, eternally and immutably. It is right because it is right." Park sometimes called himself, in distinction from Utilitarians, a Rightarian.

Sanctification is the production of this holiness more and

more in the heart and life of the Christian. The agent of sanctification is the Holy Spirit. The means is the truth. It differs in no essential respect in its nature from regeneration, except that that is the introduction of the holy life, and is a fundamental reversal of what has gone before, while this is the consistent development of what is already begun, and the strengthening and deepening of holy habits, or distinct holy choices, in accordance with and in consequence of that first "primary, predominant" choice. We need, therefore, spend no more time upon this topic. Of course the great historical controversies into which American theology had fallen over these themes were sketched and illuminated; Oberlin had its share of attention, with sharp criticism of certain points, but in the most kindly spirit; but Park came out in nothing peculiar or calling for especial attention to-day.

Of Justification it is, also, unnecessary to add more than that he made it synonymous with forgiveness, stripping it of the forensic elements of the older Calvinism; and that he grounded it wholly in the atonement of Christ.

ESCHATOLOGY.

The discussion of the theological system of this great thinker has hitherto brought us in contact chiefly with its rational side. Here I have once ventured to say that it is "essentially unbiblical in style and occasionally in substance." We now come to a topic which will exhibit as no other could how loyal Park was to his understanding of the Bible, how it possessed to him the character of a true authority, and how he accepted its statements because they were biblical statements, although he believed them at the same time to be thoroughly rational, and sought to exhibit their rationality by all the force of his royal mind.

The topic has an element of special and personal interest

in the fact that the "new theology" which succeeded the theology of Park at Andover began by propounding certain eschatological principles which he believed to be utterly unscriptural, and which he opposed as he could to the end. It was perhaps the hardest statement with which he ever had to put up in his long life of theological controversy when the favorers of the new scheme claimed that they were simply following out to their logical conclusions his own positions as to a general atonement and human freedom. If his mind had at all failed, his testimony, at the age of about seventy-five, against the new theories would have little weight. But it had shown no signs of failure at ninety. The fact that he had continued to adhere to the views which he had earlier taught was the result of his convictions as to the meaning of the Bible. It shows the firmness and sincerity with which he held to the authority of the book.

We may limit our discussion to the question of future punishment, for this was to Park, and is still in the thinking of the day, the crucial point of the whole theme. It has been already pointed out that Park did not suppose that the great majority of the race would be lost, but he did believe that those who were finally impenitent when overtaken by death would remain in sin and would be punished by God forever. It is his support of this doctrine to which our attention is now called.

The evils which come upon men in consequence of sin and which possess the character of moral discipline are divided by Park into two classes, chastisement and punishment. Chastisements are all those pains inflicted upon a sentient being to prevent or correct sin, or to secure or increase the holiness of himself or other beings. All the evils coming upon us in consequence of sin in this life are of the nature of chastise-

ment. They come under the head of grace, and are reformatory, corrective, and directly beneficial in their character. Punishment is, however, something radically different. "Real punishment is pain inflicted by the Lawgiver upon the transgressor for the purpose of satisfying the Lawgiver's distributive justice. The pain must be inflicted by the Lawgiver, upon the law-breaker, because it is deserved, and in order to satisfy distributive justice." The meaning of distributive justice as earlier brought out must be held constantly in mind. It is determined by benevolence, for, as Park adds immediately to the definitions just given, "The design of distributive justice is to promote the welfare of the universe."

With these distinctions as to discipline, Park now proceeds to a more careful explanation of the design of punishment. "What is the design of God in satisfying his distributive justice? Why can he not let it go unsatisfied, as men often do?" This question he answers:—

"1. Punishment is designed to vindicate the character of the law. The threats of the law are necessary to the very idea of law. The infliction of the penalty is necessary to the reality of the threats, and hence to the maintenance of the character of the law.

"2. Hence punishment is designed to honor the character of the Lawgiver. It expresses his benevolence, because he thereby inflicts those evils which are necessary to the promotion of good. It honors his distributive justice, his holiness, and his veracity.

"3. Hence the design of punishment is to prevent sin in the subjects of the law, and to promote their holiness."

Up to this point many of the advocates of final restoration would be willing to keep company with Park. He has put punishment directly upon the basis of the divine benevolence.

But he next lays down the principle that "the punishment of the wicked will be eternal." In preparation for the proof of this principle, he lays down a number of preliminary propositions which contain substantially his apologetic for the doctrine. Thus he says:—

"God's government respects other worlds than this. The Universalist says that it is impossible to believe that God will make a race and punish the majority of that race. But he might punish all for the benefit of another race, or for many races, and still be benevolent. Positive benefits flow to others from condign punishment. One generation receives benefit from the summary visitation of the law upon a previous generation. Still we suppose that the majority of this race will be saved. Hell in the universe will occupy no greater place in comparison than the state's prison in the commonwealth. Again, man is free. He knows that if he sins he shall be punished, and he is free to sin or to refrain. It is the overlooking of this fact that gives so much difficulty with the subject of punishment."¹

But Park went even further than this in his apologetic. Universalism proceeds upon the supposition that wicked men will finally repent. Park meets this position by the proposition that "men may be punished even if they are penitent." He may have believed upon the whole that every penitent being would somehow be saved. He is reported to have once said that if the Devil would repent, God would find some way to save him. I myself never heard this remark, and have heard him say that "no atonement had been provided for the devils in hell,"—which at least hints strongly at the impossi-

¹ It is worthy of remark that one of the latest forms of Universalism, that of Dr. G. A. Gordon, of Boston, involves a philosophy of determinism. God is finally to have his way; and man's freedom is enswathed in a divine determinism.

bility of their salvation even if they should repent. All such questions, however, he regarded as belonging in the region of groundless and unprofitable speculations, for he believed firmly that men dying impenitent and the devils would continue obstinately in sin, and that eternally. Still he would invalidate the last refuge of his opposers, and hence he maintained, whatever might be our speculations, that even repentance did not carry with it the certainty of forgiveness, for "even Christ, though he was holy, was not perfectly happy, but was the greatest of all sufferers." He even said: "The holier a man is, the greater his remorse for his past sins. How the redeemed spirits can be happy in spite of their past sins is the mystery of the atonement of Christ."

The last turn of thought suggested the further remark that "the distinctive punishment of hell is remorse and the other painful emotions of conscience. Punishment is rational, that is, it is produced according to the nature of the mind. If there be physical punishment, it is only to excite the action of conscience. If a man sin, he shall forever reflect upon his sin, and shall let conscience work according to its own laws. This is the doctrine of eternal punishment."

Park is now prepared to begin his proof of the doctrine. He sets the rational arguments in the front.

1. Sin deserves eternal punishment. Sin deserves remorse of conscience. This is an axiom. Now remorse is perpetual. Guilt is personal and eternal. It is contrary to the first principles of the mind that punishment should diminish guilt. Once guilty, always guilty. This eternal remorse is eternal punishment. "The whole idea of hell is this: You have been free, you have chosen to pursue a certain course, you must reflect on it forever."

2. The nature of conscience proves eternal punishment.

There is a presumption that the mind will always act in accordance with its present laws. It is a law of conscience to inflict pain for sin. Left to itself, conscience will always reprove men of sin. If this is not to be so, God must interfere to prevent the normal action of this power which he has given men. He is under no obligation to do this, there is no evidence that he will, and the very nobility of the faculty of conscience shows how irrational it is to suppose that he will interfere. Men will be left to themselves.

3. The fitness of eternal punishment to the nature and tendencies of sin. The tendencies of a single sin are to unending evil. Every sin adds to the facility of committing another, and the sin of one man tempts another to sin. It is fit that the pain which thwarts these tendencies should be unending also.

4. Men may be punished as long as they sin, and they will sin forever. The mere possibility of eternal sin renders it impossible to prove universal salvation, for if men sin forever they will be punished forever. But there is more than a probability here. There is evidence that the impenitent at death will sin forever. Their persistence in sin to the end of this life leads us to infer that they will sin forever, unless we have evidence to the contrary, and there is no such evidence. They have remained depraved in spite of good influences, and we infer that they will remain so forever. More, they grow worse and worse under good influences. Affliction and chastisement serve only to harden them, if they remain impenitent. And, then, the Bible represents the impenitent as continuing in sin, as long as it speaks of them at all, for they are sinners through life, at death, in the intermediate state, at the judgment. Now, after the judgment certain great advantages will be lost to them, "from him that hath not shall be taken away

that which he hath." And there will be positive disadvantages, the power of habit, intensified and accumulated, the exasperating effects of unsuccessful punishment, etc. All these things will operate to perpetuate sin, just as similar things will operate to secure the eternal holiness of the repentant. In one passage eternal sin seems to be asserted of a certain class, "Whosoever shall blaspheme against the Holy Spirit is guilty of an eternal sin" (Mark iii. 19).

5. The holiness and sincerity of God. God is infinitely holy. He must be sincere in expressing this feeling, and the sincere expression of God's abhorrence of sin is eternal punishment.

6. The benevolence of God. We have already touched upon this argument, and remarked that Park could not maintain eternal punishment upon his theory of the divine action unless he could show how benevolence required it. This he now more fully undertakes. His successive points are:—

(1) The eternal and deserved punishment of sin does good. It results in an increase of holiness in the universe, because men are deterred from sin by the fact of punishment. It thus promotes the general good.

(2) As sin tends to work unending injury, benevolence requires that it have an unending connection with pain which will counteract the tendency of sin. This would not be so if men did not deserve to suffer, but they do deserve to suffer all that is useful in counteracting the evils which their sin has wrought.

(3) Benevolence requires of God to hate sin more than any object in the universe, and particularly to hate sin far more than pain; and benevolence requires him to express this hatred, for otherwise it cannot enter into that system of moral influ-

ences by which he is guiding the world to its salvation. The only fit expression of this hatred is eternal punishment.

(4) In the long run, benevolence requires what is fit and just; and eternal punishment fits eternal sin.

(5) Facts confirm the supposition that benevolence requires eternal punishment. In proportion to men's conception of the evil of sin they are convinced of the eternity of punishment. Even men who doubt it are obliged to use the scriptural threatenings to the evil-doer. The tendency of men is to form low estimates of any punishment that will end; eternal punishment is adapted to this peculiarity of the human mind.

7. The veracity of God proves eternal punishment.

Up to this point we have been busy with the rational argument which Park brings in favor of the doctrine. With this head he passes to the biblical doctrine, for it is his position that the Bible, which is God's word, has plainly declared that there will be eternal punishment, and hence if God has told us the truth, that is, if he is Truth himself, punishment for some must be eternal. As this is, after all, his decisive argument, we shall trace it somewhat carefully.

(1) Some sins are certainly threatened with eternal punishment, as the sin against the Holy Ghost (Matt. xii. 31, 32), the sins "unto death" (1 John v. 16, 17), and those who fall away into willful sin (Heb. vi. 4-8; x. 26, 27; 2 Peter ii. 20-22).

(2) Some sinners never will be saved, & g., Judas (John xvii. 9-12; cf. Mark xiv. 21).

(3) The Scriptures declare that some men receive their good things chiefly in this life (Luke vi. 24; xvi. 25; Ps. xvii. 14).

(4) The Scriptures declare that men of a certain character shall not be saved (John iii. 36; Luke xiv. 24).

(5) The Scriptures declare that some men shall perish, or be destroyed (2 Thess. i. 9, etc.).

(6) Some sinners shall be subjected to the action of instruments of punishment which shall be eternal (Matt. iii. 12, etc.).

(7) The circumstances under which sinners are said to be excluded from the kingdom of heaven imply the doctrine of eternal exclusion (Luke xiii. 23-28; Matt vii. 21-23; Luke xvi. 26. Note that there is no intimation in these passages of repentance upon the part of the excluded.).

(8) The doctrine of election implies hopeless punishment of the non-elect.

(9) The constant and great contrast between the state of the righteous and the wicked.

(10) The express assertions that the punishment of the wicked shall be eternal. (a) The only words which writers of the New Testament had to express eternity (*αἰών, αἰώνιος*), they used. (b) The same words are used to express eternal misery as to express eternal happiness, or (c) to express the eternal attributes of God. (d) The same words are used to express the happiness of the righteous and the misery of the wicked in the same verse (Matt. xxv. 46). (e) As to the words *αἰών* and *αἰώνιος* the predominant usage is in favor of their meaning unlimited duration. When not so used their signification is limited by the nature of the thing to which they are applied, or by positive announcements. There are no such limitations in respect to these words when used of future punishment. Our own use of the words "always" and "forever," "eternal" and "eternity," corresponds exactly to the biblical usage, and will suggest the modes in which they are used in the Bible.

(11) The Bible has taught the doctrine of eternal punishment in every way consistent with its style. It never says

"eternity in the strict sense of that word," but that is not the style of the Bible. It does, however, teach it by assertion and implication, in positive and negative forms, with all variety and great intensity. It could do no more.

We have given this disproportionate amount of space to the subject of Eschatology for the sake of illustrating, as already said, Park's loyalty to the Bible. He believed the doctrine eminently rational, because he believed in the possibility of a fixed evil will, and for such a will saw nothing fit except eternal punishment. But he believed the doctrine because it was biblical. Take the book as a religious authority, and interpret it according to the principles of objective exegesis, and you will necessarily get as its teaching the eternity of future punishments. Upon this ground Park unswervingly held the doctrine.

The true estimate of any thinker is the historical. He must be judged by his relations to his predecessors and his successors. It is therefore still too soon to say what place Park is ultimately to have in the history of American theology, for it is not at all evident what the actual outcome of the present period is to be.

In reference to his relation to his predecessors, it may be said that he was the eager student of them all, and that he incorporated into his own teaching every great idea which any of them had let fall. His pupils, if they subsequently turned their attention to the historical study of Edwards, or Hopkins, or Emmons, or Taylor, found themselves already familiar with the best these various writers had to say. Park had been truly teaching them New England Theology. He often quoted from great Germans by name. He did not so often mention by name the sources of his acquisitions from

his predecessors. He stood in the line of the New England development, and all that had been done was his and his pupils'.

There may be said to be two lines of New England development, that proceeding from Bellamy, of which the prominent members are in succession Drs. Edwards, Dwight, and Taylor; the other proceeding from Hopkins, the line embracing Emmons and then Park. But Emmons, though he was theologically a Hopkinsian, had received his education in theology from Smalley, a pupil of Bellamy; and Park drew much from Taylor, who next to Edwards was the great original mind in the New England school. Hence in Park the whole school is represented by lineal descent and in consequence of the loving study of unnumbered hours. Considered as a system, Park's does not go beyond the other New England divines. As a man he possessed a far wider outlook than any of them, and was acquainted with the results of the age in which he lived as none of them were acquainted with the thinking even of their own times. They were thinkers in a sense sometimes to exclude the element of mere learning. He was not only a thinker, but a man of wide reading. Yet the *crux* of his system is their *crux* also, the *crux* of the school as a whole. They saw a light gleaming in the distance, to which Park and Taylor approached much nearer; but none of them, not even Park, saw that light dispel the darkness that was spread by the deterministic philosophy of the Reformation.

As a preparation for the future, New England theology stripped off from the old Calvinism its forensic and its artificial elements. Park, in particular, emphasized the distinction between the essential and the incidental in the system. He cultivated in this, and in every other way, freedom of outlook. To him more than to any other member of the school,

but substantially to the school as a whole, to the spirit which it cultivated, and the hospitality which it showed to new ideas, is it due that Congregationalists have come over into the new period with less of friction and internal disturbance than almost any other Christian body, and are readjusting themselves rapidly, and apparently successfully, to the new thinking of the times.

The distinctive character of the present day is the introduction of the idea of evolution, and the effort to understand it and to digest it. The tendency has been to a disguised materialism, and, strange to say, to the old determinism, out of which original Calvinism came. It would seem as if a reaction must eventually set in which should give due prominence to the truths for which idealistic realism has stood, and to the acknowledgment of the truly supernatural in the religious history of mankind. When such a reaction attains any magnitude, the influence of Park may become again great. There is still a deal of power in the "philosophy of common sense," and a deal of valuable and imperishable material gathered by the painstaking exegesis of former days. It would be in vain to attempt to maintain that our own time equals in minute and exact exegetical scholarship the school of Moses Stuart. That school, and the allied school of dogmatical theology associated with it, has still much to teach us; and of both these schools the foremost figure was Park.

ARTICLE VII.

AN APPEAL TO THE NEW SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY.

BY MR. PHILIP HUDSON CHURCHMAN.

I.

It can hardly be said that we instinctively turn to comic papers for wise counsel on serious problems; but even the most trivial and cynical of them may occasionally contain a keen and true diagnosis of existing conditions. Some months ago a rather significant joke appeared in one of our humorous publications. A man had asked his friend for the cause of the trouble in a certain church, and the reply was that the minister was being "tried for orthodoxy." A little more recently a similar piece of wit tells of a woman's admiration for a visiting clergyman because "it is such a relief to hear a preacher that has nothing to say against the Bible." In Germany, too, they must like the same sort of jokes; for *Simplicissimus* represents the Herr Pastor as saying that his tears in the pulpit are because he "cannot believe what he preaches."

These flings, I say, are significant; they indicate the general belief in a revolution in things religious. One need not discuss the depth and scope of this real or imaginary movement to reach the trite conclusion that questioning, doubting, and reconstruction are characteristic of much of the religious opinion of our times. The popular divinity of the shallow crowd is change, novelty; and for not a few of a more serious mold, reconstruction has become a necessity. "Old things have passed away, and all things are become new,"—this is the chant

of the unthinking crowd, and many of the more thoughtful few give at least partial assent. Conservative notions are unpopular; the star of the New School is in the ascendant; for the time being, their word is law and gospel in the minds of many that are Christians, and of most of those who are not. If this be true, then, humanly speaking, the religious weal or woe, the faith or unfaith, of coming generations is largely in the hands of the representatives of this so popular movement. Does not such a responsibility invite a most careful self-criticism on the part of the leaders of the movement? Is not a severe analysis of their position imperative?

Now let it be clearly understood that this analysis, this criticism, comes from no unfriendly pen. Personally the writer remains indifferent to many of the points at issue between conservatives and radicals; on other questions he inclines toward the new view; and if he is "old-fashioned" in a few of his ideas, he does not feel that this fact incapacitates him for a fair discussion of the problem before us.

At this point a word of definition would be wise. What is meant by the "New School"? Whatever may be properly the notion conveyed by this term, in this discussion it will be limited in its application to three sets of thinkers, not *necessarily* identical, but all characteristic of the age, and, I venture to assert, on the large average, sympathetic, if not identical—I refer to the Anticreedists (if I may invent such a term), to the Reconstructionists, and to the Higher Critics, particularly those whose work has been preponderatingly negative and destructive. Now, though I have hinted at this trisection of the New School, nearly all that is said is meant to apply to the school as a whole, and not simply—if chiefly—to that especial type of thought in connection with which it is here discussed.

II.

"It is not what you believe, but what you do, that is important," or even, "Be good, and it makes no difference what you believe," are the words in which the faith of those whom I have called the Anticreedists is most often expressed,—statements to which nearly every Christian will give a more or less qualified assent, beginning with him who wrote, "Neither circumcision nor uncircumcision availeth anything, but a new creature." But expressed, as it so often is in an unqualified and dogmatic way, with sneers and vituperation for those who dare demur, I think I see in these phrases an element of danger and of rank injustice, besides an occasional lack of clear reasoning. At this point let us look for a moment at the constituency of this faith. In the first place, we shall notice a large body of earnest, thoughtful men (among whom most of the leaders of this movement should be numbered), who, sick of the preponderating attention sometimes given to mere belief, and longing for real moral progress, have taken a justifiable step; but who, being human and fallible, have run to an extreme, and need to be warned of their lack of balance. But, making allowance for these, we find in the same ranks others whose discernment or whose sincerity is not of the highest order.

Here, for instance, is a man engaged in the crusade against creeds. You talk with him, and find that the very center of his Christian life is a strong faith in those things whose importance he would seek to minimize. He tells you that what we need is not theology, but the spirit of Christ; and yet his whole attitude betrays a conviction about Christ (he would not let you call it his "creed") which is an essential part of his life, and which is theological though it be a little vague. Such a man does not understand himself. His thinking needs

a tonic. An interesting example of this failure to reason clearly, coupled with an eagerness to go far out of one's way in order to slap at theology, once occurred in the writer's presence. We had been discussing feminine morality, and one young man, though of skeptical tendencies, maintained that the woman who is religious is less likely than others to fall. This was too much for another of the party, whose hatred for theology may or may not be due to his close relationship with a theologian of a radical type. Instantly he replied: "I don't believe it. Such things are questions of right and wrong, and have nothing to do with theology." Think of it! Theology had not been mentioned, except as implied in religion; and yet so strong was prejudice in this man, a fine fellow and presumably a Christian, that he must go thus far out of his way to rob the religion of Jesus of a virtue accorded to it by far less sympathetic thinkers. And then this "no-matter-what-you-believe" idea is exceedingly popular with a large crowd of nominal Christians, and of most unchristians who prefer *morals* that are not too strenuous as well as diluted theology.

I do not maintain that this is a shockingly immoral class of people, nor do I ignore the fact that some lives of crystal purity have been lived without any religious faith whatever; but is it not just to say that many of these superficial admirers of ethics, and enemies of theology, are people who look with smiling disdain on a Christian Endeavor badge, who rail at temperance cranks (the writer is neither a C. E. nor a prohibitionist), and who turn up their noses at "Sunday-school boys,"—to whom, in short, all of the great, strenuous, positive, moral movements of the day (and it would be strange if their opposition to *all* is on purely intellectual grounds) are as distasteful as are "worn-out creeds"? On the outskirts of this clan is the really immoral man, who puts in his word against

creeds. One such man I knew who spoke proudly of our age as "getting away from creeds," soon after of the missionaries who teach "what they say are the truths of Christianity," and at another time plainly declared his approval of what moralists of almost every type agree in pronouncing one of the worst of sins—and this, I feel safe in saying, not from conviction, but purely from the lack of moral earnestness. There you have it—the earnest, the illogical, the indifferent, and the immoral, all joining in the hue and cry against creeds.

This hasty and imperfect sketch of the personnel of the Anticreedist army has naturally anticipated a criticism of its standards. First and foremost among those objections is the great danger arising from its extremely negative character, and the natural inference that the whole movement betokens a lack of conviction. Dr. Van Dyke has put the case cogently. "But," says he, "in all this renewal and expansion of what is well and proudly called practical Christianity, there is, if I mistake not, a danger, or at least a serious possibility, of loss. The life of man is not only practical, it is also intellectual. . . . He cannot help acting, neither can he help thinking. . . . If the Christianity of to-day, by dwelling exclusively or too much on the ethical side of the gospel as a beautiful and beneficent rule of conduct illustrated by a perfect example, tends to ignore the intellectual necessities of man, and fails to realize that it has a message to deliver in the realm of truth as well as in the realm of righteousness, it will not and it cannot meet the deepest wants of the present age. . . . It may even aggravate those wants. . . . It may seem to give assent, by silence, to the desperate assumption of skepticism that the unseen world is unknown and unknowable. . . . It may preach in effect a Christ whose character and conduct are to be accepted as infallible, but whose convictions in regard to God

and the soul and the future life are mere fallacies and illusions."¹ Listen next to the trenchant words of Phillips Brooks,—words which, if they had come from one of "the bats and owls of orthodoxy," might be laughed to scorn; but no sane man can accuse the splendid bishop either of narrowness or of unreasoning conservatism. This is what he says:—

"The decrying of creed in the interest of conduct is very natural, but very superficial. If it succeeded, it would make life and conduct blind and weak. There is no greater misnomer applied to creeds and opinions than that which lurks in the word 'advanced.' The man whose creed is the smallest, the most crude and colorless and flimsy, is called 'advanced,' while he whose beliefs are richest, and most full of hope and liberty, is called 'slow,' 'behind the times,' and other tardy names.

"The man who believes nothing with any energy; who masks the doctrines of our Lord's gospel under negations; who evaporates them into a thin mist of speculation; who emasculates them of their energy by faith—such a man is called an 'advanced thinker.' The cheerless iconoclasm, which is forever breaking down the strong barriers erected in a former time, parades before the world as 'free thought.' It is no advance, but inertia—no free thought, but dullard slavery—which leads man into a state like that. Exactness, earnestness, and precise fidelity to the truth of things are better than a limp negation, and make a man a true, free, and advanced thinker."

Moreover, this shallow defense of the unbeliever rests on the failure to see that skepticism can enter the sphere of morals as well as of theology. It is by no means impossible or unusual for doubt of morals, or at least of responsibility, to

¹ *Gospel for an Age of Doubt*, pp. 171-172.

follow close on the heels of religious unbelief. In fact this would seem to be a law of history.

"Modern fiction," says Dr. H. C. Minton, in another connection, "reeks with this false gospel of self-gratification. The culprit's answer to every charge is, 'I am built that way.' Temper is substituted for will, and temperament for character. Realism in art, with all its salacious appeals and vice-breeding influences, is its hellish spawn. Renan was a brilliant high-priest at this altar of instinctive lubricity. Tess of the D'Urbervilles breaks an accepted social law, but obeyed a natural impulse, and, although men said she had fallen from her innocence, men lied; Tess is as guiltless 'as the sleeping birds in the hedges, or the skipping rabbits on a moon-lit warren.' She has her philosophy and these are her words: 'Feelings are feelings. I won't be a hypocrite any longer, so there! . . . I must be as I was born.' Again and again does Mr. Hardy apologize for adultery and seduction because they have the sanction of impulse."

These creed-haters will tell you plausibly enough that

"There lives more faith in honest doubt,
Believe me, than in half the creeds":

but you must beware lest, before you know it, their song have become

"For God is not censorious
When his children take their fling."

This is no defense of theology-slavery; the contention here made is that the indiscriminate hostility to all theology, now so popular with the less thoughtful, is a perilous attitude, and may inflict a mortal wound in the very heart of religion. I rejoice in the decay of microscopic differences in theology. Schools of thought that once branded each other as allies of Satan now gladly dwell on what they have in common, and are willing to admit that one may disagree with them on mi-

nor points without being wholly bad. I rejoice, I say, that denominational differences are weakening; but how can a sane man believe that this movement involves the belittling of the fundamentals of religious belief? Arminian and Calvinist can and should fraternize: are we to infer that it makes no difference what view we have about Christ, or the soul, or moral responsibility?

We all know the man who thinks that the sum and substance of religious education is learning some highly elaborated philosophical system embodied in a catechism, with a minute dissection of salvation and accurate descriptions of the Almighty's state of mind at every stage in the proceedings. Now it is not casting aspersions upon the historical value of these sometimes wonderful expressions of religious thought, nor upon their dynamic virtues in the past and, when wisely used, the present time too,—it is not decrying catechisms and confessions of faith to question the wisdom of cramming the undeveloped mind with intricate systems or unessential teaching. In doing this, the progressives have done well. But have they stopped there? Examine critically their method, and you will find a wide use of an old fallacy that we learned in school to abhor,—arguing from the particular to the general. "Intricate catechisms," we hear them say, "are not religion; therefore all theological teaching is useless for religious purposes, and we want none of it. Let us teach our children to be honest and virtuous truth-seekers, and that will be religion enough." Could anything be more absurdly false to simple logic and simple Christian teaching? If this view be true, let us be honest with ourselves, and preach a real, not a disguised, ethical culture or positivism; let us admit that religion is dead, and that its place must be taken by sociology and science; let us support *The Philistine* in its efforts to found a new church,

“Church of Man,” and “turn our attention from God, who does not need us, to his children, who do.” (But when you have lost God, are you very sure you will keep on caring for “his children”?)

Nine-tenths of the serious objectors to the theological element in religion would promptly answer, “No,” when the question is thus baldly put; and when this is done one object of this discussion has been attained, for the issue will have been clearly drawn between the effort to do away with some of the bitter hair-splitting polemics of the past and this apparent hostility to all and any doctrinal teaching. Let us be explicit. The objection here raised is not aimed at the ethicizing tendency *in toto*, but at its preponderatingly negative spirit,—one that saps the very life from our religion. The thinking man needs, demands, a rational basis for his moral and religious life. It would be difficult to overestimate the effect “mere belief” has had on public morals. Can one imagine Christian civilization without the fundamental beliefs of Christianity? “In their beginning,” says John Fiske, “theology and ethics were inseparable; in all the vast historic development of religion they have remained inseparable.” “Neither in the crude fancies of primitive men nor in the most refined modern philosophy can theology divorce itself from ethics. Take away the ethical significance from our conceptions of the unseen World and no element of significance remains. All that was vital in theism is gone.”¹ And yet some spiritual spendthrifts would have us squander or neglect our theological principle which is paying its rich ethical dividends, heedless of bankrupt generations to come.

Professor Goldwin Smith has attacked liberalism in its very vitals by his recent article on the future of ethics. After mak-

¹Through Nature to God, pp. 172-173.

ing the rather peculiar statements that recent scientific discoveries have destroyed theism and the advance in criticism weakened Christianity, he reaches the conclusion that, whatever may be the basis of the newer ethics, *it certainly will not be the Sermon on the Mount*—alack, alas! and if you listen to some liberals, the Sermon on the Mount is the only thing in the Gospels worth having.

Take another case,—a Scotch friend of mine of a skeptical, speculative turn of mind. “Why make such a fuss,” said he, “about the personality of Christ any more than about Plato? We have the teachings of both, and ought to be thankful for them.” Place beside that this other statement of his, and then ask yourself whether a better theology would have helped him? “Jesus had no æsthetic sense; his remarks about looking lustfully on a woman made a German prince destroy a splendid work of art, and have caused lots of suffering in the world [that is to say from self-restraint]. We make too much of purity. How can a mere marriage ceremony make things different?” In another place it might be pertinent to question whether we can be said to have the teachings of Jesus and be wholly indifferent to his personality, or perhaps my friend’s philosophy of purity (not to speak of his habits) might come in for criticism; but all that is in place here is to point out to our creed-haters the kind of moral challenges they will be getting when religious belief is quite dead.

The question is not so much whether a few hundred ethical culturists can lead pure lives without religion, but whether, given an unthinkable society with a *complete absence of all religious beliefs*, the great mass of average humanity would care a fig for morals, and in fact whether even the ethical-culture idea itself would have arisen. A keen skeptical spirit will rob you of your very ethics unless you are more careful.

How long will a high moral tone outlive the general belief in God and immortality? How long are we going to be sure of the soul and of a God who loves us and will hold us to account, after Christ's teachings have ceased to be authoritative? Ah! gentlemen of the New School, you have fought a noble battle against ultracreedism, and you have won many a victory; beware lest unthinking enthusiasm for a single idea carry you to a point where friend may lament, and foe rejoice, that you, the unconscious apostles of Nihilism, came not to fulfill, but to destroy. No more convincing exposition of man's need for something more than mere morals need be sought than a recent editorial in a prominent weekly magazine on "What is Religion?" Here from no reactionary pen one may read the calm convincing warning that if a man is to be saved from sin he needs a strong spiritual life based on a firm grasp of spiritual realities.

At this point a serious question emerges. Our modern theologian may say: "You are astray. Our fight has been, not against a doctrinal religion, whose importance we join with you in asserting, but against the teaching that all who are unable, for purely intellectual reasons, to accept these doctrines ["honest skeptics"] are under the wrath of God. When you maintain that doctrine is essential, do you mean to the existence of religion or to salvation?" I beg leave to make three simple assertions of opinion in reply to this perplexing problem: 1. Whatever may be the motive of the battle against creeds, its manifest influence has in the main been sweepingly hostile to doctrinal teaching of every kind; 2. It is manifestly every man's duty to "respond to Christ"¹ in so far as he puts a demand on his faith and practice; 3. That an honest and even intelligent man may maintain an agnostic

¹ *The Fact of Christ*, by P. Carnegie Simpson.

and at least a hopeful position regarding those whose reason leads them away from God and Christ.

Nor is there great weight in the objection that creeds are exclusive. Some tell us that "Orthodoxy is my-doxo, and heterodoxy is your-doxo," and there is a certain catchiness about the phrase that might deceive the superficial, as well as a disconcerting *argumentum ad hominem*, with its insinuation that self-conceit is the only basis for religious conviction. But just try to imagine for a moment that John Fiske is the speaker and Robert Ingersoll the person addressed, and you will then discover that, according to these critics, belief in God is orthodoxy while atheism is heterodoxy, a rather unusual use of the terms, and one that reflects a little on the ability of various eminent writers to frame definitions in the religious field. One of the many perplexing things in life is the fact that sincere and intelligent men differ so widely about so many important matters. Yes; it must be admitted; creeds do divide and exclude. Theism cuts out atheists and agnostics, and theism is theology. But a pure ethical code, too, cuts off the immoral and the careless, does it not? Let us make our creeds as wide as we dare. Let us leave out everything but the most essential points; but then let us jealously guard the residuum; and fearlessly, but humbly and kindly, proclaim that anything less than this is, in our estimation, not the Christianity needed by humanity and taught by Jesus Christ and his followers.

And then there is that absurd habit of insinuating that people who emphasize belief are apt to be weak in their morals or indifferent to the needs of their fellowmen—an accusation which, while doubtless well founded in individual cases, all history and observation of those around us will easily show to be unjust. I have watched men of various sorts, and I cannot help noting that those who are indifferent to the princi-

ples of religion and who seize every opportunity to ridicule "theology," and orthodoxy in particular, also have their slur ready for "piety." Your experience has been different from mine if you have never met the man who is always ready with blatant denunciation for religious thought and religious people from theism to foreign missions, and who, when his turn comes for preaching, draws his ideals from the Erasmian spirit of compromise with right, or gets a text from Omar, "Take the cash, and let the credit go,"—or perhaps even stoutly defends sins of the grossest sort. Far be it from me to assert that such a man is wholly depraved,—perhaps he is only silly; nor dare I assume that his is the prevailing type of Anticreedism,—perhaps it is only very common; but I should like to protest against the ordinary assumption that the majority of the Anti-theological crowd are high-browed, lofty-minded youths who tell us with a pained expression that they "cannot accept the old orthodox position" on this or that question, and whose morality exists in inverse proportion to their beliefs. Such cases, of course, are not infrequent; but every one very well knows that much, if not most, of the clamor against creeds (excepting the leaders of the movement) comes either from people who think they are doing something very smart, or from those who have no use for religion whether expressed in terms of philosophy or of ethics.

After all, could not this spirit of anticreedism, when expressed in saner, more moderate, terms, be accepted by all of us? If one were to maintain that the Christianity of the last few generations laid far too much emphasis on mere belief, and that practice as well as faith is essential to true religion, who would demur? "It makes no difference what you believe?" Can we go so far? "The importance of be-

lief on minor points has been greatly exaggerated"; is it not self-evident?

Thus far doctrinal teaching has been discussed in a purely theoretical way. Let us now, in passing, ask ourselves whether there was anything more than ethics in the minds of those who first tried to spread the great Christian religion. Here the unlearned layman must look out for the rocks. When profound scholars are disputing about the essence of Christianity, how can he be sure of his ground? This is a discouraging thought. Is nothing about the whole matter sure or even probable? Possibly; but in default of scholarship most of us must use our humble common sense, and this tells us two things pretty plainly: (1) that there is undeniably a large doctrinal element in the recorded writings of such people as Paul and Peter, who, it may be presumed, had an idea of Christ's teachings that would compare favorably even with that of some of the modern scholars; and (2) that in the record of Christ's life (made, most men say, do they not? by his contemporaries), the ethical and the doctrinal are so closely interwoven that an unprejudiced person would find it difficult to discard the latter without damaging the authenticity of the former. It is, however, a question whether a discussion of this sort has not the right to take more for granted. The apologist himself yields but little more, and it surely goes without saying that we are here assuming Christianity to be true.

Be that as it may, when some of the extreme advocates of mere ethics advance an obligatory system of morals joined to the assertion that "it makes no difference" what you think of Christ's person, the purpose of his coming, his alleged miraculous powers and resurrection,—when, I say, this theory is calmly presented and labeled Christianity, common sense

is bound to assert itself, and ask, Why then is this ethical system obligatory? What do you think Paul and John would say of it? And how do you know anything about Christ, after all, if you thus suit yourselves about rejecting so large parts of the only record of his life and teaching? No; this will not do. The needs of man and the evident spirit of early Christianity make belief an essential part of our religion.

III.

Closely connected with the idea just discussed is the passion for reconstruction in religion, which is characteristic of much of our modern theological thinking. Now with reconstruction as such no intelligent man can quarrel. The conservative assertion that one cannot change the old doctrines may be true; but it is always in order to ask what basis these old doctrines have, and, moreover, whether our conception of them is correct. Jesus Christ was a reconstructionist, in the eyes of his contemporaries at least. So were Luther and Calvin. If some pretty serious tearing down and rebuilding had not taken place, some of our contemporary opponents of all change would probably be staunch supporters of the Papal See. On, then, with free criticism, and let us rebuild what is faulty. The great weaknesses to which this spirit of reconstruction may lead us are an exaggeration of the destructive elements, and a blind worship of novelty, with its accompanying contempt for the past. As intellectual beings we cannot, of course, believe more than we think true; but those of us who pretend to be teachers of Christianity must remember that it is not much inspiration to struggling men simply to be told continually how we have "outgrown this old notion" or "given up that tradition," with but a scant word of positive teaching. And then the allurements of novelty must be guarded against. It is sometimes amusing to call our forefathers

names, and sometimes they (but especially those now alive whose reverence for the past is little better than ancestor worship) richly deserve it. But not all the past is bad or foolish, and our fiery steed of progress must be held in check by reason. Mere ridicule of the atonement as "mediaeval legalism" can easily beget, and shortly, a similar contempt for the "mediaeval mysticism" of the indwelling Christ who works regeneration; and then, having sneered regeneration out of court, we shall be ready with our "tardy names" for the "mediaeval credulity" that yields unquestioning obedience to Jesus' moral and spiritual authority. Noveltyism, misnamed progress, may get us into trouble.

Not only is an excessive zeal for reconstruction prone to be dangerously negative and foolishly fond of any new idea, but it is not always strictly logical in the way it reconstructs. I mean that it is apt to pick out the beliefs that suit it, rather than those demanded by the stern logic of the situation. For instance, I suppose that the two positive opinions most conspicuous in the meager assortment offered by the New Theology (I refer here chiefly to the leaders) are God's love for man, and the claims of moral obligation. Now I should like to ask where you find God's love in earthquake or plague, in claw or fang, in sin or suffering? And as to the general principles or the details of ethical conduct, who will assure us that God cares, that life means duty, and that duty means destiny here and beyond the tomb? And how shall we decide these vexing questions of conduct? Back will come a prompt reply: "Why these things are, beyond question, the essence of Christ's teaching. In him you will find the solution of all your problems." Exactly. But, my dear sir, is it not also true that the "most advanced" of modern theologians are rather uncertain on this very point of Christ's authority? Un-

less we feel pretty sure that he has the right to demand our attention, why should we believe that God loves us, and holds us to account, simply because "Jesus" says so?

I grant that we may get some foundation for religion in philosophy and in science; let us be thankful for it, let us not disparage these sources. But it seems to me that some very loose thinking is being done by those who believe what they want about God and the soul, because of teachings recorded on the same page with other statements which they reject or seek to minimize, and on an authority which they do not allow. Is it not natural that one should, in this connection, be reminded of George Romanes' words, "Those in whom the religious sentiment is intact, but who have rejected Christianity on intellectual grounds, still almost deify Christ"?¹ Here is John preaching the love of God and (admittedly, does he not?) the absolute divinity of Christ. Is it logic or divination or partisanship, that leads us to reject the one we dislike and accept the other? Read, if you will, Professor Howison's comforting defense of God's personality and of human immortality from the philosopher's point of view. To the book as a whole, Christians of all classes should repeat the loud Amen; but the chapter on reason and religion cannot fail to arouse protest. Passing by such flaws as the surprising self-confidence which allows a man flatly to assert the impossibility of the Incarnation² and of miracles,³ and not dwelling on the

¹ *Thoughts on Religion*, p. 169.

² *The Limits of Evolution*, p. 233. "The entire theory of external evidence for Divine Revelation is shown . . . to be a survival from the religious consciousness of primitive times when men really thought that God could be clothed in a limited body."

³ *Ibid.*, p. 240. "Superficial philosophy which treats miracles as real possibilities."

Contrast George Romanes' statements, in his *Thoughts on Religion* (p. 178): "Pure agnosticism must allow that reason is incompetent to

weak objections to a belief in authority (however rationally derived), nor giving more than passing mention to the dogmatic rejection of human testimony because documents and witnesses are not absolutely indefectible (is the professor's belief in God and immortality established, then, beyond a cavil?), let us turn to the significant close of the chapter.

Here we find Christianity reduced to these terms: God is love; duty is paramount. Fine, wonderful conceptions; but why ignore the whole body of apostolic teaching and all of the gospel record except what suits us, in order to prove that Christ taught no high doctrine about himself or about many other things written large on every page? But the climax of the fallacy is reached in these words, "Christ taught and revealed by his life, but especially by his death, the previously unknown truth that God is a being of exhaustless Love."¹ Obviously we must not employ a mere trick of debate, and make too much of the perhaps unwisely chosen verb, "revealed"; but suppose we make it mean nothing more than "taught for the first time in human history." Suppose it is to be taken as the simple counsel or teaching of a man who made no unusual claims, and had no unusual testimony to his value, what then? Are we to accept it blindly? Shall we believe that God is love simply because a Buddha or a Socrates or a Jesus "revealed" it? And yet it honestly seems as though the gifted philosopher, after allowing himself to denude Christianity of most of the teachings that seem to have given it power in its incipency, gladly, but most unphilosophically, adjudicate *a priori* for or against Christian miracles, including the Incarnation"; and (p. 191) that "the antecedent improbability of miracles wrought by a man without a moral object is apt to be confused with that of its being done by God with an adequate moral end."

¹ Limits of Evolution, p. 246. Moral freedom and responsibility are also added as part of Christ's teaching, and on page 251 we find the further statement that "his theistic step was absolutely revolutionary."

sophically, accepts without a question the teaching of Jesus, as he conceives it. And how about this "previously unknown" truth, this "revolutionary theistic step"? If Plato and Confucius were ignorant of it, what right had Jesus to feel so sure about it, and why should we in the twentieth century be more ready to believe it than men who lived before our era, upon the mere statement of Christ?

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]

ARTICLE VIII.

THE DEATHS OF ANTIOCHUS IV., HEROD THE GREAT, AND HEROD AGRIPPA I.

BY EDWARD M. MERRINS, M.D.

BOTH in sacred and profane literature it is recorded that, during the last illness of various eminent persons, the fatal issue was accelerated, and the circumstances of death made extremely repulsive, by parasites infesting the body to such an extent as to give the impression to the beholders, that the unfortunate patient was being literally devoured up with worms. A familiar instance is the death of Herod Agrippa as narrated in the Acts of the Apostles,¹ and the closing scenes in the lives of Antiochus Epiphanes² and Herod the Great³ were even more distressing from the same cause. As all three kings were guilty of blasphemous impiety, it has been assumed by some commentators, that "he was eaten of worms" is simply a picturesque phrase, without any foundation of actual fact beneath it, which has been added to the narrative to intensify the description of the horror and pain of the death, considered to have fallen upon the offenders as the just punishment for their particular sin. There is nothing intrinsically improbable, however, in a single detail of these narratives; on the contrary, the clinical observations, as far as they go, are so accurate as to enable us practically to identify the

¹ Acts xii. 20-23.

² 1 Macc. vi. 4, 8; 2 Macc. ix.; Josephus, *Antiquities of the Jews*, xii. 9; but see Polybius, xxxi. 11.

³ Josephus, *Antiq.* xvii. 6; *Jewish Wars*, i. 33.

particular disease and its complications, from which each of these royal patients suffered, and it is quite certain that parasites of various kinds, either directly or indirectly, have been the cause of many deaths. The only doubt and difficulty lie in determining precisely the creature that is meant by "worm," a term which is as indefinite in Hebrew and Greek as it is in English. Three words are translated "worm" in the Old Testament:—

1. Hebr., *Sās*; Gk., *σῆς*.

This denotes the larvæ of moths, found in clothes, tapestries, and carpets: "For the moth shall eat them up like a garment, and the worm shall eat them like wool" (Isa. li. 8: see, also, Job iv. 19; xxvii. 18; Isa. i. 9).

2. Hebr., *Rimmah*; Gk., *σαπρία*, *σῆψις*.

3. Hebr., *Tôlē'ah*; Gk., *σκώληξ*.

These two words appear to be synonymous, and denote:—

(1) A species of caterpillar probably, as in Jonah iv. 7: "God prepared a worm when the morning rose next day, and it smote the gourd."

(2) The larvæ of moths and weevils which devour vegetation; e.g., grapes¹ (Deut. xxviii. 39); manna (Ex. xvi. 24).

(3) The crimson dye-stuff consisting of the dried bodies of cochineal insects (Isa. i. 18).

(4) The creeping things that burrow in the earth: hence applied to man in a depreciatory sense (Job xxv. 6; Ps. xxii. 6; Isa. xli. 14).

¹The vine-weevil; the convolvulus of Pliny (Nat. Hist. xvii. 47) and Cato (De Re Rustica, chap. xcv.), who prescribe elaborate precautions against its ravages. Plautus (Cistell. iv. 2) calls it *involutulus*. Bochart (Hieroz. Part ii. lib. iv. chap. 27) identifies this worm with that called *ξ* or *ψ* by the Greeks. [Note in Speaker's Commentary.] But the enemies of the vine, consisting of insects and parasitic fungi, are very numerous. Of the former there are at least thirty two species.

(5) Parasitic creatures which infest living beings, as in Job vii. 5; "My flesh is clothed in worms and clods of dust; my skin is broken and become loathsome." It is most reasonable to suppose that reference is here made to the small worms or maggots, the larvæ of various insects, often found on ulcers and sores, where there is a lack of proper care and cleanliness. The writer well remembers a patient coming to a hospital in Jersey City with a large ulcer of the leg, the dressing of which had not been changed for several days. On removing the soiled bandages, the leg was seen to be swarming with maggots to such a degree as to arouse the amazement and disgust of all who were present. In Eastern countries, where the dogs come and lick the neglected sores of every Lazarus, this condition must always have been very common. A high authority on this subject writes: "In the heat of summer and in hot climates, the larvæ easily get into badly managed, putrid, and open wounds. Nay, even the short time occupied in dressing the wound is sufficient to enable the fly to deposit her brood in it, if particular care be not taken."¹ Herodotus, in speaking of the mother of Arcesilaus being destroyed by worms,² uses the word *εὐλή* which certainly denotes the worms or maggots bred in decaying flesh, whatever else it may mean.

(6) The larvæ, or maggots, which appear in the dead bodies of animals and men,—those "laborers of death," as they have been strikingly called,—that perform the beneficent work of ridding the earth of all decaying and dead organic substances. "When a man is dead," says the son of Sirach, "he shall inherit creeping things, beasts and worms."³ To the same effect, and with the implication that the laborers

¹ Kuchenmeister, *Manual of Parasites*, ii. 98.

² *Hist.* iv. 205.

³ *Ecclesi.* x. 11.

find pleasure in their work, Job affirms that "the worm shall sweetly feed on him."¹ In another passage in the Old Testament² it is said of those who transgress against the Lord: "Their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched; and they shall be an abhorring unto all flesh." Here the slowly devouring worm becomes a symbol of eternal punishment, and is so used in the New Testament,³ where the Hebrew word is translated into the Greek, *skolex*. This in turn, translated into Latin, becomes *lumbricus*, which is also the translation of the Greek, *ἐλμυς*.

But the question as to what kind of creature is meant by "worm," cannot be satisfactorily settled in every instance by etymological or other scholastic considerations. The identification must be made by working backward from our knowledge of the parasites which we positively know infest the human body at the present time, and by assuming, as we safely may of nearly all our diseases and infirmities, that matters in this respect were very much the same thousands of years ago as they are to-day.

The most common of these parasites are the following:—

1. *Ascaris lumbricoides*, or round worm.—These worms resemble the common earthworm in appearance, their length varying from one to nine inches. They are found in the inhabitants of every land, and are so common in hot countries that scarcely a single individual is free from them. Sometimes they are present to an incredible degree, not simply by tens and hundreds, but by thousands.⁴ Their usual habitat is the small intestine, but they may wander to almost any part

¹ Job xxiv. 20; see also, xvii. 14; xxi. 26; Isa. xiv. 11.

² Isa. lxvi. 24.

³ Mark ix. 48.

⁴ Allbutt's System of Medicine, ii. 1033, and see account in Memphis Medical Monthly, March, 1904, of a baby in this country passing 1,992 in two weeks.

of the human body, and occasion very serious ailments. They have been known to set up fatal peritonitis by perforating the walls of the intestines, and multitudes have died from common complaints, who would certainly have recovered, if it had not been for these parasites.¹

2. *Tapeworms*.—Of these there are several species which take up their abode in man. They are long, flat, ribbon-like worms, several feet in length. The "scolex," comprising the head and neck, is very small. Springing from it are the innumerable segments of the body, each of which may be regarded as possessing independent life. On reaching maturity, these segments break off in ones or twos, or in strings, and leave the body of the host. They are easily recognized as white, oblong bodies, capable of active movements.

These parasites, especially the beef tapeworm, are extremely common in Egypt, a writer recently stating that a cadaver is seldom opened in that country without finding specimens of one or more of them. Many of those who entertain these ugly visitors suffer no inconvenience, but generally there are symptoms of impaired digestion and irritability of the nervous system. The segments of these worms may appear in abdominal wounds. To illustrate the broad view that must be taken of maladies described by the Oriental events of antiquity, an Arab writer relates of one of his patients, that "God tried him with a disagreeable disorder called Chabb al-kar, which consists in a worm fixing itself at an issue of the body, which gnawed the intes-

¹ In an article published in the Indian Medical Gazette, April, 1904, on intestinal parasites as factors in the mortality of prisoners confined in the gaols of Hindustan, the author tells how he has saved hundreds of lives, reducing the death-rate per mille from 76.65 to 12.49 solely by the use of anthelmintics directed especially against the *ascaris lumbricoides*; and he urges that "the sickness and mortality produced by this parasite ought to be impressed on the people at large."

tine and neighboring parts" to such a degree that the man died. The details cannot be given, but the case was undoubtedly cancer of the termination of the large intestine, probably complicated by tapeworms.¹

3. *Flukes*.—These are mostly flat, leaf-shaped, unsegmented worms. They occasion the destructive disease in sheep known as "the rot." Of the varieties which infest man, one is extremely common in Egypt, the larvæ abounding in the canals and river Nile, whence they are taken into the system with the drinking water. They produce a formidable train of symptoms, the principal being dysentery and hæmaturia.

4. *Oxyuris vermicularis*.—This is the common thread, pin, or seat worm, common in all countries. It is very small. When present in great numbers they cause a great deal of local irritation.

5. *Trichocephalus dispar*, or Whip-worm.—Very common everywhere, but especially so among the natives of warm countries. It is rare to find more than a few in one body, and they are not often a source of trouble.

6. *Ankylostoma duodenale*.—Also known as the "tunnel worm," on account of the disasters it caused among the men engaged in excavating the Mt. St. Gothard tunnel. It is very common in Egypt, producing the severe anaemia known as Egyptian chlorosis. Diarrhoea and dropsical effusions are among the other symptoms. As these worms are extremely difficult to dislodge, it is not likely they were ever observed prior to their discovery in 1838.

7. *Filaria medinensis*, or Guinea worm.—This is a very interesting parasite, as it is supposed to be identical with the "fiery serpents" mentioned in the Pentateuch. It is a fine

¹Kuchenmeister, *Op. cit.*, i. 108.

thread-like worm, from one to six feet in length. Introduced in the embryonic state into the human system with the drinking water, it migrates into the tissues just beneath the skin, the legs and feet being favorite sites, and there matures. As it grows, an abscess forms, which eventually bursts and exposes the worm. The treatment is to draw it gradually out, inch by inch, taking care not to break it. This little operation may extend over many days.

There are very many other parasites which infest the interior of the human body, but for various reasons they are not likely to have attracted the attention of observers in ancient times.

The parasites hitherto mentioned effect a surreptitious entrance into the body, and assail man from within. There are other parasites, mostly belonging to the Insectivoræ, which assail him from without. Among these is the itch-mite, very common indeed in warm countries; but, as it is not easily seen with the naked eye, it may for our present purpose be disregarded.

The parasite which attracted the greatest attention in by-gone times, and was thought to give rise to the horrible disease known as Phthiriasis, was the body louse.

In the States it is usually seen only among "the great unwashed,"—the dirty poor from foreign countries, beggars and tramps. In Europe, not so very long ago, it seems to have infested all classes and conditions of men, as it still does in the Orient. When these parasites are present on the body in large numbers, their bites, combined with the frantic and incessant scratching of the victim, cause boils, ulcers, and other lesions of the skin which are often quite severe, and in little children may result in an infection of the system ending in death.¹

¹ See *Lancet*, September 21, 1901, p. 819.

It was a general belief with the ancients, that phthiriasis as a disease had its seat in the heart, whence it developed in the system by the production of insects in the blood, which ultimately consumed the body of their host. Pliny states this was proved by observation when certain Egyptian kings ordered the bodies of the dead to be opened and examined, for the purpose of testing some remedy that would dislodge them from the heart.¹ The examiners were probably misled by the "vegetations," which in certain cardiac diseases form on the valves of the heart. The belief that lice may multiply in the human body itself to an incredible degree and then make their way through the skin, was quite general down almost to the nineteenth century, and has not yet entirely disappeared. Thus of Pherecydes, the tragic poet whose death is attributed by Aristotle to this disease, it is said that "he first of all sweated greatly, and then lice grew, and his flesh decomposed into lice, there followed dissolution, and so he gave up the ghost."² Curiously enough, in China at the present day, almost the same belief is held, and these troublesome and repulsive insects are supposed to be under the control of an inferior deity.³ During his earthly, human life, this deity was a famous general. When in command of a besieged city he became so engrossed in its defense day and night, that for several weeks he had not the time to change his clothes. Consequently he was covered with these insects, which the natives say are generated by perspiration in the pores of the skin. They gradually drank all his blood, and were thus as fatal to the doughty warrior as the enemy's sword could have been. For his devotion and valor, he was canonized as the god of lice, rather a dubious honor one would think in any land but China.

¹ Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* xix. 26. See, also, Arist., *De Hist. Anim.* v. 31.

² For an enumeration of the various persons who are said to have died from this malady, see Hebra's *Diseases of the Skin*, v. 276-281.

³ Du Bose, *The Dragon, Image, and Demon*.

For ages this disease was regarded as a special punishment inflicted by the Deity upon those whose moral offenses were very great, despotic and atheistic rulers being especially singled out;—e. g., Sulla the Dictator; the Emperor Valerius Maximus; the uncle of Julian the Apostate; the Emperor Arnulf; Honorius, King of the Vandals; and Scio, King of the Danes, of whom it is said that he was eaten away to the bare bones. What is more to the point, certain writers are of the opinion that the “worms” which attacked Antiochus Epiphanes, Herod the Great, and his grandson Herod Agrippa, were these particular insects. Pope Clement VII., two simoniacal bishops, and Philip II. of Spain were also infested with them. But men of all classes and disposition are said to have fallen victims to this parasite, even the revered name of Plato being included in the list.

It is now established beyond question that narrations of these vermin having emanated from the body are in part mere myths, and in part have originated in a confusion with maggots, which, as we have already seen, are not infrequently found in wounds and ulcers, especially in warm climates.

Each of the cases which are the subject of this article may now be individually considered.

Of the disease of Antiochus Epiphanes, “a king who was another Sardanapalus in his luxuriousness, and withal a bigot animated by the fiercest religious intolerance,” we gather the particulars from Second Maccabees (chap. ix.) and Josephus’s “Antiquities of the Jews” (bk. xii. chap. 9). During a military expedition to Persia, he heard news of his old enemies the Jews, that made him “swell with anger.” He vowed that he would go to Jerusalem, and make the city a common burying-place. Then his fatal illness commenced. “The Lord Almighty, the God of Israel, smote him with an incurable

and invisible plague; for as soon as he had spoken these words, a pain of the bowels that was remediless came upon him, and sore torments of the inner parts." His rage in nowise abating, he proceeded on his journey with the greater speed, and as a consequence of this violent haste, he was thrown from his horse-litter, "so that, having a sore fall, all the members of his body were much pained." The disease was aggravated by this bodily injury, and as it grew worse, "the worms rose up out of the body of this wicked man, and while he lived in sorrow and pain, his flesh fell away, and the filthiness of his smell was noisome to all his army." After a long illness with steadily increasing suffering, "the murderer and blasphemer having suffered most grievously, as he entreated other men, so died he a miserable death in a strange country in the mountains."

This king's disease was evidently an acute attack of dysentery, which passed into the chronic ulcerative form, a condition which presents "a spectacle of distress of as pitiable a kind as can be found in the history of human suffering." Its commencement in a military camp in time of war; the colicky abdominal pains that could not be relieved; the tormina and tenesmus described as the sore torments of the inner parts; the falling away of the flesh, which may mean emaciation, but more probably the sloughing of the tissues of the intestines, though the disease would certainly be accompanied by emaciation; the noisome smell, described by modern writers as the most offensive and penetrating of all organic effluvia; the continued sorrow and pain until death put an end to his sufferings;—all the symptoms point strongly to this diagnosis. "There may be diseases of a more fatal character than dysentery," says a medical writer in his report on the condition of a military establishment, "but there are few which entail so great an amount of suffering; for when once

it has passed into the chronic form, it slowly, but not the less surely, continues, by a most loathsome process, to exhaust the vital energies, until death relieves the patient of an existence rendered almost intolerable by pain, debility, and the offensive nature of the discharges."¹ It was of this disease that Jehoram king of Judah died; and that every one thought his death was a happy release is evident from the words of the chronicler: "he departed without being desired" (2 Chron. xxi.).

As to the worms, possibly the sloughs and shreds of tissue cast off in the excretions may have been mistaken for them; and there is a very rare disease, with dysenteric symptoms, in which living maggots or flies live in the intestines and are expelled from time to time *en masse*, that may have been a complication.² But when we remember that in the chronic form of dysentery, patients lose all control over their natural functions, so that in the circumstances in which Antiochus was placed, among the soldiers in a military camp, or travelling from post to post, it was impossible to keep him and his garments clean, the easiest and most natural explanation is that he simply swarmed with vermin of every description, a conjecture which seems to be confirmed by the peculiar expression, "the worms rose up out of the body of this wicked man." He came to his end, and there was none to help him.³

The symptoms of Herod the Great's last illness as described by Josephus,⁴ are as follows: A low fever, "for a fire glowed in him slowly, which did not so much appear to the touch outwardly, as it augmented his pains inwardly"; difficulty of breathing, "so that he could not breathe but when he sat upright"; offensive breath; dropsy of the abdomen

¹ Bryson, Br. and For. Med. Chir. Rev., 1855, p. 45.

² Schlesinger, Journ. Amer. Med. Assoc., February 1, 1902.

³ Daniel xi. 45. ⁴ Antiq. xvii. 6; Jewish Wars, i. 33.

and feet; severe intestinal inflammation and ulceration, particularly of the colon or large intestine, with constant and violent abdominal pain; intolerable itching over all the surface of his body; perverted appetite; putrefactive ulceration of certain external parts of the body with the production of worms; convulsions "which increased his strength to an insufferable degree."

These symptoms indicate a form of chronic Bright's disease of the kidneys, probably complicated by cardiac trouble. Herod was an old man who had lived an unrestrained life, and quite likely was very gouty, a condition that is often introductory to Bright's disease. In chronic renal disease, gastric symptoms are common, which would account for the offensive breath and perverted appetite; hemorrhages and ulceration occur in many parts of the alimentary canal, and ulcerative colitis is quite a frequent complication, lesions which explain all the abdominal symptoms: the failure of the renal and cardiac functions produces the dropsy; asthmatic attacks with an agonizing want of breath are frequent; and to the saturation of the skin with uremic products are due the intolerable itching, and various eruptions which in some cases go on to form superficial abscesses, discharging fetid pus. In time the brain becomes affected by the poisons retained in the system, and the patient becomes restless and of an irritable temper,—Josephus says Herod had a "barbarous temper"; or he is despondent, and may attempt to commit suicide, as Herod tried to do on one occasion; or there is transient delirium, or temporary mental failure with delusion. Indeed it is charitable to suppose that Herod's outrageous conduct as his life was closing, including the slaughter of the babes of Bethlehem, one of his last public acts, was at least partly due to his mind having become unbalanced by his disease.

His end was the same as in all such cases, convulsions and coma usually closing the scene.

As it is distinctly stated in this particular case that the "worms" were produced by putrefactive ulceration, there can be little doubt as to their being maggots. But all kinds of vermin would infest the body of a person so afflicted, unless the very greatest care were taken to keep him scrupulously clean, and this too, in spite of his irritable opposition. But who would dare to do such risky and unpleasant work for Herod, with his barbarous temper and autocratic power of passing sentences of death? Each time an attendant left the royal presence, he must have felt his neck as did the courtiers of a Persian despot, to be quite sure that his head was still joined to his body. Notwithstanding his high position and wealth, the king must have been largely left to his own devices, as every one both hated and feared him, and his physical condition, therefore, must have been deplorable.

Very closely resembling this is the case of King Philip II. of Spain. Of him we are told that after he had suffered for a long time from gout, dropsy, etc., he had a severe abscess of the right knee, and after this was opened, four others formed on the chest. . . . Finally he suffered from numerous ulcers on the hands and feet, dysentery, hydrops, tenesmus, and all these were associated with such quantities of lice crawling about, that confined to his bed as he was, he could not get rid of them until his death.¹ According to the description of the modern historian:² "During the spring of 1598, the king was almost unable to move from gout, but still continued his work at his papers. At the end of June he was carried to the Escorial in a litter, and some time afterwards malignant tumors broke out in various parts of his limbs.

¹ *Hebra, Op. cit.*, v. 279. ² Martin Hume, Philip II. of Spain.

The pain of his malady was so intense, that he could not endure even a cloth to touch the parts, and he lay slowly rotting to death for fifty-three dreadful days, without a change of garments, or the proper cleansing of his sores, a mass of vermin and repulsive wounds."

In the death of Herod Agrippa the conditions we meet with are quite different. He is a much younger man than either of the other royal patients and his disease runs a very rapid course. We may assume that he was careful of his person, as he was certainly very vain of his appearance, for during a festival he puts on "a garment made wholly of silver, and of a contexture truly wonderful," in which to appear before the people. When illuminated by the rays of the sun, it shone in such a surprising manner as to make a deep impression on his superstitious subjects, some of whom hailed him as a god, a flattery which the king did not rebuke. "Immediately," writes the sacred historian, "the angel of the Lord smote him, . . . and he was eaten up of worms and gave up the ghost."¹ The account of the fatal event in Josephus² is a little more detailed. According to him an unlucky omen appeared, which threw the king into the deepest sorrow. "A severe pain also arose in his belly, and began in a most violent manner. . . . Accordingly he was carried into the palace; and the rumor went abroad everywhere that he would certainly die in a little time. . . . And when he had been quite worn out by the pain in his belly for five days, he departed this life."

The immediate cause of death in this case was surely peritonitis. A variety of morbid conditions, such as the rupture of a distended gall bladder, inflammation of the pancreas or of other abdominal organs, or the perforation of a gastric or

¹ Acts xii. 20-23.

² Antiq. xix. 8.

intestinal ulcer, may set up this fatal inflammation; but in an adult male apparently in good health, in whom it appears shortly after or concurrent with severe abdominal pain, appendicitis is the most frequent cause, and so it may be assumed this was the primary disease of Herod Agrippa.

As already stated, there are very few residents in Eastern countries who are free from the *Ascaris lumbricoides* or round worm, and it was not likely that Herod was an exception. As long as the alimentary canal is in a normal condition, these worms seldom occasion in an adult any serious trouble; but when any part of it becomes diseased, as in appendicitis, their presence and activities may greatly increase the peril of the patient's condition.¹ It is quite within the bounds of probability, therefore, to hold they contributed greatly to bring to fatal termination the brief illness of Herod Agrippa. Those in attendance on the king may well have believed these creatures had much to do with his death, as "it is a curious fact that in acute disease, and as death approaches, round worms often exhibit a disposition to quit the patient's body."²

In conclusion, it may frankly be acknowledged this whole subject is neither attractive nor cheerful, nor does the writer know that it is particularly elevating; but it may not be labor altogether useless, to thresh out some of these minor points connected with biblical characters, repulsive though the details may be, particularly if, by so doing, statements thought to be vague and deemed unsubstantial, can be proved to rest on solid fact.

¹ Ager, "Perforation of Normal Intestines by *Ascaris lumbricoides*," Journ. Amer. Med. Assoc., Feb. 28, 1903. Hubbard, "Intestinal Parasites in Appendicitis," Boston Med. and Surg. Jour., Dec. 3, 1903.

² Allbutt, System of Medicine, ii. 1033.

ARTICLE IX.

NOTES.

"THE TWO BODIES."

IN BIBLIOTHECA SACRA for July, 1903, appeared an article by Dr. Boardman called "The Two Bodies," which is in its content an exposition of Paul's thought (1 Cor. xv. 35-44) on the resurrection of Christians and the nature of their bodies before and after that event.

I want to take the opportunity which his article offers to set up my little candle and throw its light on a simple phrase in the Greek of that famous passage which seems to have tripped up the idiom of every English translator from Wycliffe down, though happily the *German* Testament presents us with a modern rendering which is both literal and idiomatic.

In verses 42-44 the Greek impersonal verbs "*σπείρεται ἐγείρεται*" are uniformly translated "*it is sown it is raised*" in all the leading English versions. Now, it is a matter of common knowledge that the impersonal verb in a foreign language may be rendered in English in one or another of three ways, according to circumstances: (1) by the third person of the verb taking the expletive "*it*" as its formal subject, e.g. "*it is raining*"; (2) the same construction with the expletive "*there*," e.g. "*in the field there are planted beets, onions, etc*"; (3) the principal verb is in the *gerund*, which stands itself in form as subject of some other verb whose distinctive meaning is unimportant, the construction being purely idiomatic, e.g. "*the saying is*," "*the saying runs*," "*the saying goes*," all of which are equivalent to "*it is said*." But these expressions are not interchangeable without limit. For example, we never say, "*Beside the road it is planted a tree*," but always, "*There is planted*"; never, "*In*

this field *it* is sown oats with good results," but either, "*there* are sown," etc., or, "The *sowing* of oats in this ground is profitable." So in verses 42-44 there is no particular "*it*" to be sown; the only possible antecedent of "*it*," regarded as a pronoun, is "resurrection" in the preceding sentence—a parsing which is patently absurd. As soon as our attention is directed to a comparison of the English with the original, we see that the "*it*" is not a pronoun, but an expletive, and immediately perceive that the English idiom never takes "*it*" as subject in the impersonal use of the verb "to sow."

If we wish to be very literal, we may most accurately misrepresent Paul's *σπείρεται ἐν φθορᾷ* by the words "is sown with [or in] corruption." The German idiom allows a literal translation, "*es wird gesäet*," which English idiom turns into "*there is a sowing*." The most literal representation of the Greek, therefore, which English idiom allows would be, "The sowing is with corruption," that is, *attended* with corruption; and a really intelligible translation of the whole passage must run about as follows:—

- 42. So also is the resurrection of the dead. The sowing is characterized by corruption, the raising by incorruption; the sowing by dishonor, the raising by glory; the
- 43. sowing by weakness, the raising by power; there is sown an animal body (a body adapted to the sentient soul),
- 44. there is raised a spiritual body (a body adapted to the life-giving spirit). If there is an animal body (a body for the *anima* or soul), there is also a spiritual body (a body for the spirit).

A noticeable illustration of this same idiom occurs in the verse (41) which immediately precedes those just translated: "*There* is one glory of the sun and another glory of the moon," etc. Here the King James translators placed the inserted words "*there is*" in italics to show that they represented merely the requirement of English idiom; it never occurred to them—consciously composing in their own language—to say, "*It* is one glory of the sun," etc. The "*it*" in verses 42-44 is, in fact, simply a curious little slip which, once made, has never been corrected in the later versions.

How slight in itself, yet how clarifying for the whole passage this simple correction! In spite of Paul's express intimation that our present body is *not* the body that shall be—for "that which thou thyself sowest, thou sowest *not* that body that shall come into existence, but a naked kernel" (verse 37),—we have gone on arguing for and puzzling to explain the *identity* of this present corruptible body with that future glorious body, whose particular nature Paul thinks we are foolish to bother ourselves about.

Paul's views may or may not stand the test of modern science, but in themselves they are certainly far more clear and logical than our own, if we think that the utter disintegration and dispersion of Paul's present "corruptible" body works any diminishment of his incorruptible body "that shall come into existence." *We* sometimes say, "Both oak and acorn are one and the same individual organism: it is sown an acorn, it is raised an oak." Paul says, "Not so: the acorn is one organism, the oak another. There is sown an acorn, there rises an oak—distinction of organism, but *continuity of life*. The identity is in the life, and in the life alone: the bodies are diverse; but speculation about them is a waste of time. What is of practical importance for us is that the *soul* is exalted from animal to *spiritual* life, retaining its self-conscious identity; the provision of a *new body* is a minor matter which we leave to God's good pleasure."

Right here it is well to emphasize what Dr. Boardman points out, that Paul's contrast is not, as the Authorized Version seems to imply, between what is "natural" and what is "spiritual, between a material and an immaterial *body* ("immaterial body" is as absurd as "bodiless matter"), but between the two planes of man's *inner* nature, the "psychical" (or animal-soul) stage and the "spiritual" (or divine-human) goal. The psychical body is a body *suited* to the psyche, or soul, not a body *composed* of soul; the spiritual body is a body *suited* to the spirit, not—as we sometimes confusedly imagine—a body *composed* of spirit. Body is always composed of matter, for body is measured in such terms as length, breadth,

thickness, weight, *etc.*, which constitute the essence of matter. Soul and spirit are measured in terms of consciousness, such as intelligence, courage, faith, love. In predicating a future "spiritual" body, Paul had no intention of describing it as "immaterial," any more than by calling the fleshly body "psychical" he meant to imply that it was not composed of matter but of soul. In fact, if our own soul has at all been quickened into spirit, an attentive reading of our Beloved Missionary's words in this message will be understood as a rebuke of undue interest in the body, and a reminder that the real entrance into the eternal life of the spirit is open only to "those who seek esteem and honor and an untainted character by the method of patient good work" (Rom. ii. 7).

Paul's argument is thoroughly logical, and is by no means committed to any theory of the identity of the two bodies. It is the mere irony of psychology that we his English followers have not only turned Paul's rebuke into a source-text for the very speculation rebuked, but have actually misused our own language to prevent, if possible, his spiritual enthusiasm from arousing us to anything higher than psychical research. Moreover, "befooled by our own speculations," we allowed the un-idiomatic translation which we had made to mislead us into thinking that we had at last, like Tennyson, "come upon the *δυνος ὧν*," that we had found the primordial monad, the *Ding-an-sich*, the Thing-in-itself, in an "Absolute-it" that is both sown and raised, both corruptible and incorruptible, both glorious and dishonorable; that never really existed, yet never will die as long as we "simple ones" persist in raising the question, "But with what *body* do they come?"

WILLIAM DEAN GODDARD.

Washington, D. C.

THE AMERICAN BIBLE LEAGUE.

UNDER this title an influential body of laymen and scholars of all denominations have united for the purpose of setting in the foreground the evidence of the inspiration and authority of the Bible, and of meeting the fallacious attacks upon these doctrines from a critical school which is assuming a monopoly of knowledge upon the subject, and by such assumption is misleading the populace, and preparing the way for an age of unbelief. The officers of the League are: President, William Phillips Hall, New York; Vice-President, John H. Converse, LL.D., Philadelphia; Treasurer, Rush Taggart, Esq., LL.D., 195 Broadway, New York City; General Secretary, Daniel S. Gregory, D. D., LL.D., 82 Bible House, New York City, with twenty-four eminent biblical scholars and theological teachers as directors. The League publishes a monthly periodical entitled *The Bible Student and Teacher*, and proposes to establish branch leagues throughout the country, for the dissemination of literature adapted to accomplishing the purposes had in view, and for the production of such literature ranging from Bible primers to a Bible dictionary.

In furtherance of the interests of the League, a convention was held in New York City, May 3, 4, and 5, which was largely attended, and was the occasion of the presentation of many addresses and papers more fully setting forth the reason for the organization and the lines upon which its purposes are to be accomplished.

Inasmuch as some respectable journals have questioned the propriety of the organization of such a league, it may be worth while to consider the situation a little in detail.

The papers which are protesting the most loudly and sarcastically against the organization of the League would be glad to be regarded as independent journals, and yet no one can read a single number of them without seeing that they are the organs of a certain more or less respectable body of citizens who have very definite ideas to propagate concerning all political, sociological, and indeed religious questions; so

that it is easy for any one who has read the journals for any length of time to foretell pretty accurately what they will say upon any new question which comes up involving the principles which these papers are defending.

To this we make no objection, but simply point to it as a fact. Properly enough every great interest in the world has its organ. The men who have entered upon the publication of a paper are supposed to have sufficient knowledge and experience to afford them certain well-grounded principles which they are prepared to propagate, and to defend against the misunderstandings of the ignorant and the misrepresentations of less scrupulous opponents. The justification of the existence of such organs rests upon the same principles on which we justify the court proceedings of all civilized countries. There are two sides to every question. No finite mind is fully capable of seeing both sides at once. The jury needs to be protected from a one-sided presentation of the facts. We have, therefore, a judge to preside, and opposing counsel to represent to the jury in the fullest manner possible both sides of the case. It is by such a procedure that the truth is most likely to be attained.

It would have been a curious management, or rather mismanagement, of the case involving the responsibility for the losses inflicted by the Alabama during the Civil War to have submitted it to a court without any counsel to array the facts and principles before even the learned and distinguished judges that were appointed to give final verdict.

Now, although there is no formal trial of Christianity going on, as there was before Caiaphas and Pilate, or as may go on respecting particular cases before ecclesiastical courts, there is in reality a constant trial in progress, with the people at large as jurors and judges. Each generation comes upon the stage with everything to learn. From the outset, innumerable agencies are at work to press upon the attention of the public the views of truth which have been adopted by various classes among the leaders of public thought. During certain periods of history the organized church, with its clearly defined

creeds, was so active in imposing the results of its thought and experience upon the rising generation that it practically forestalled all other effort. At other periods, opponents of Christianity like Voltaire in the time of the French Revolution, have so effectually controlled the avenues of approach to a large body of the reading public that they have forestalled a proper consideration of the evidences upon which the Christian faith securely rests. At the opening of the last century, for example, the students in Yale College were nearly all unbelievers, and so it was pretty generally throughout the country.

This sad condition arose from a variety of influences, but chiefly because, in the engrossing political and national affairs, the defense of Christianity was permitted to go by default. The organization of the orthodox Congregational churches in New England, the founding of Andover Theological Seminary, the establishment of the periodical called *The Spirit of the Pilgrims*, and the work of the American Tract Society and the various publication-houses of the evangelical denominations, in due time gave such a new perspective to the argument that the merits of the Bible were more fully appreciated, and it was restored to its proper position. No one who is familiar with the progress of events during the first half of the nineteenth century can doubt the wisdom of the positive efforts that were put forth by evangelical believers to give due prominence to the facts and arguments upon which their faith rested. During the second half of the nineteenth century the evangelical churches moved forward in their work largely through the momentum of the revival interest generated by the stronger faith attained by close study of the facts during the first half of the century.

At the beginning of the twentieth century a condition of things is arising somewhat similar to that at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In many of the theological seminaries which were established for the defense of the Bible, are professors installed, who have little sympathy with their client, or, indeed, who have practically gone over to the other

side. Any one who will be at the pains of reading the controversial literature between Andover Seminary and Harvard Divinity School during the third, fourth, and fifth decades of the last century will easily see that the position of the Harvard men was at that time more orthodox with reference to the authority of the Bible than is that of numerous representatives of the orthodox party now sitting in the seats of their centers of learning.

The poison, if it be poison, which such men cast into the fountains, must speedily be disseminated throughout all the drinking-fountains of the people. These instructors cannot complain if the great body of evangelical believers unite to analyze the compound which they are casting into the waters, and hold them to a high standard of responsibility.

From similar causes a large number of the publishing-houses of the country have fallen into the hands of managers who have no special interest in the truth of what they publish, so only it can command a market to give them profit. To an alarming degree, therefore, these publishing-houses are becoming the allies of the more active and self-assertive professors and biblical students who are propagating views antagonistic to the proper claims of the Bible.

The periodicals referred to at the outset practically take the ground that the prevailing school of biblical critics possess such a degree of infallibility that their agreement upon any point is supposed to be as much of a finality as was the agreement of the early church fathers upon conclusions contrary to those now entertained. In other words, the whole world is asked to bow to the authority of a self-constituted clique of critics as the ancient church bowed to the authority of their ecclesiastical superiors.

Nothing can be more alien to the spirit of Protestantism than such an attitude of deference to self-constituted authorities. Protestantism in its true and rightful province is bound "to try the spirits" to see whether they be of God, and, while "proving all things," to hold fast only to that which is true. What the American Bible League believes is, that, when we

set ourselves to "verifying the references" of the destructive critics and to examining the basis of the arguments with which they are now flooding the channels of literature, their specious reasoning can be shown to be unscientific and misleading; for, almost without limit, they assume, as fundamental facts, things which are not facts, but theories, and at the same time disregard the great body of well-established facts respecting the Scripture which should mainly guide us in judging of its claims. At any rate, the modesty of the rationalistic critics is not so great that they can complain of a little self-assertion on the part of those who radically differ from them in their conclusions.

TCHAIKOVSKY'S MUSIC SET TO THE RUSSIAN LITURGY.

SINCE the publication of the article, in the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA for January, upon "The Influence of the Russian Liturgy," the Second Church choir of Oberlin, on two different occasions, have rendered the work entire: (1) before a large audience of musical critics in Cleveland, and (2) as a special vesper service in Oberlin. As, in both cases, it was given, not as a concert but as a religious service, we are able to speak with more confidence concerning its fitness for occasional repetition in Protestant churches, where it will serve both to relieve the general barrenness of the non-liturgical services and to impart in a most attractive and impressive manner the central body of Christian doctrines to worshipful congregations. In place of the symbolical ritualism by which the musical parts are introduced in the Russian service, the conductor of the Protestant service can supply the connecting thoughts by judicious selections from the liturgy. In the renderings already given the following selections were used:—

The Minister:—

Now, unto the King eternal, immortal, invisible, the only wise God, be honor and glory forever and ever. Make us worthy, O Lord, we beseech thee, of the grace of thy sancti-

fication, gathering us together within thy holy church, which thou hast purchased by the precious blood of thy only-begotten Son, our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, with whom thou art blessed and glorified, together with the life-giving Holy Spirit, now and forevermore.

Response by the Choir:—

Lord our God, have mercy. Hear thou our petition.

The Minister:—

O thou only-begotten Son and Word of God immortal, who for our salvation didst humble thyself to take upon thee our nature, and to be born of the Virgin Mary; thou, O Christ our God, who was crucified, and didst by thy death tread death under foot; thou who art glorified together with the Father and the Holy Spirit, have mercy upon us, and save us.

*Response by the Choir:—*Glory to God most high.

The Minister:—

For the peace that is from above, and for God's love to man, and for the salvation of our souls, we beseech thee, O Lord.

For the peace of the whole world, for the unity of all the holy churches of God, we beseech thee, O Lord.

For the remission of our sins, and forgiveness of our transgressions, and for our deliverance from all tribulations, wrath, danger, and distress, and from the uprising of our enemies, we beseech thee, O Lord.

Response by the Choir:—

Let us worship and adore him, bow down before Christ the Lord.

The Minister and the Congregation unite in repeating the APOSTLES' CREED.

*Response by the Choir:—*Alleluia, Alleluia, Alleluia.

The Minister reads selections from the GOSPELS.

Response by the Choir:—

Glory be to thee, O Lord, glory to thee. Gracious Saviour, hear us.

The Minister:—

Most merciful and gracious God, thou who didst so love the world as to give thy only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life, help us as we contemplate that love which was obedient unto death, to stand with fear and trembling, and drive all earthly thoughts away:—

For the King of kings and Lord of lords, Christ our God, goes forth to be sacrificed, and to be given for food to the faithful, and the bands of angels go before him with every power and dominion; the many-eyed cherubim and the six-winged seraphim, covering their faces, and crying aloud, Alleluia, Alleluia, Alleluia.

*Response by the Choir:—*CHERUBIM SONG.

The Minister:—

Remember us, O Lord, in thy goodness, and let thy mercy abound unto us as we look upon the face of thine Anointed, for hallowed and glorified is thy great name, O Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, now and ever, and to all eternity.

*Response by the Choir:—*Come near, gracious Lord.

The Minister:—

Let us attend to the teaching of the prophets, the apostles, and of the only-begotten Son of God, Jesus Christ our Lord, as summarized in the Nicene Creed.

*Response by the Choir:—*THE CREDO.

*The SERMON.**The Minister:—*

With the great forerunner of our Lord, let us cry before him, Behold the Lamb of God that taketh away the sins of the world. With the children in the streets of Jerusalem, let us cry Hosanna, Hosanna in the highest. Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord.

Response by the Choir:—

Gracious, lamblike Victim, we praise thy name.

The Minister reads from the Psalms, including the Ninety-fifth or the One Hundredth.

Response by the Choir:—

O thou from whom all blessings come, thanks to thee o'er-flow.

The Minister:—

If God be for us, who can be against us; who shall lay anything to the charge of God's elect? -

It is God that justifieth. Who is he that condemneth?

It is Christ that died, yea, rather that is risen again, who is at the right hand of God, who makes intercession for us.

Worthy is the Lamb that was slain, and hath redeemed us to God by his blood, to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honor, and glory, and blessing.

Blessing and honor, glory and power, be unto him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb forever and ever. Amen.

Response by the Choir:—Forever worthy is the Lamb.

The Minister:—

Lord, open thou my lips, and my mouth shall show forth thy praise.

Let my mouth be filled with thy praise, O Lord, that I may tell of thy glory, and of thy majesty, all the day. Grant unto us thy Holy Spirit to indite our supplications, and teach us to praise thee with our lips.

Response by the Choir:—Send thy Spirit, O Lord.

The Choir then renders the Lord's Prayer.

The Minister reads a portion of the Scripture setting forth the triumphs of the gospel.

Response by the Choir:—

Sing praises to God most high, to God most high. Alleluia, etc.

The Minister repeats ST. CHRYSOSTOM'S PRAYER, and pronounces the BENEDICTION.

Almighty God, who hath given us grace at this time with one accord to make our common supplications unto thee; and dost promise that when two or three are gathered together in thy name thou wilt grant their requests; fulfill now, O Lord, the desires and petitions of thy servants, as may be most expedient to them; granting us in this world knowledge of thy truth and in the world to come life everlasting. Amen.

The Lord bless us, and keep us. The Lord make his face to shine upon us, and be gracious unto us. The Lord lift up his countenance upon us, and give us peace, both now and evermore. Amen.

Response by the Choir:—

Oh, give us, Lord, thy benediction and blessing.

The composition reveals Tchaikovsky in a light in which he is little understood. The great popularity of his operas, symphonies, songs, and compositions for string quartets and the piano have led us to overlook the great work which he did for Russian church music, almost all of which has been edited by him; while much beside this masterpiece was composed by him. The striking thing about it is its singableness, its general simplicity, the beauty and variety of the themes introduced, and the inexpressible richness of the harmony. It is written to be sung without accompaniment, and by male voices, boys singing the soprano in the Russian churches.

As will be observed, the liturgy covers the whole range of religious thought and emotion. Beginning with the pathetic plea for mercy and the forgiveness of sins, it turns to the majesty of Christ and his humiliation, his death and resurrection, to obtain the hope for which the soul most deeply longs. After the thought is directed to the theme involving Christ's condescension in laying by his heavenly glory to become like unto man, the Cherubim Song comes in, with its beautiful harmonies and its majestic concluding alleluias. The Credo, the words of which are the Nicene Creed, is interpreted by the music in a most impressive manner. Beginning in a majestic contrapuntal movement, expressive of the belief in God Al-

mighty, it passes into the description of the nature and offices of Christ, which are rapidly related in chanting style, but with remarkable progressions and harmonies, beginning softly and rising to a climax in Christ's ascension and the establishment of his kingdom. The most exquisite part is in the closing measures, where we are led to hope for the remission of sins, the resurrection of the dead, and the everlasting life. Instead of the exultant strains of such a mighty fugue as Beethoven has written to express the hope of everlasting life, Tchaikovsky brings the whole composition to a close in a simple piano passage, strong in its harmony, and resolving itself into a beautiful pianissimo chord at the end, by which one is made to feel that he is standing on holy ground under the influence of an awe that is too deep for expression.

The shorter choruses, "Gracious, Lamblike Victim," "O Thou from Whom All Blessings Come," and "Forever Worthy is the Lamb," are each most beautiful, and both in words and in music are a distinct addition to our repertory of church anthems. The effect of the harmonies to which are set the words "Incorruptible, incorruptible, Jesus Christ our Lord was born. My soul longeth to be like thee. Glory to thee, O Lord, most high, thou all in all," is irresistible.

To many the gem of the whole service is the Lord's Prayer, which can be rendered by any choir without accompaniment. To others the most impressive part is the triumphant Alleluia Chorus, which comes in to express the emotions which arise after the Communion when the whole work of Christ is contemplated as complete, and we rise from the contemplation with a sense of sins forgiven. This begins pianissimo, continues for fifteen measures on the same notes, where it swells into a fortissimo passage, repeating the phrase "Sing praises to God most high," all the parts moving upward, prolonging the sound until the alto starts out in the first figure of a fugue of alleluias which continue for several pages with marvelous combinations of melody and harmony, from which you are brought down to the close in a few alleluias that die out in the distance as though sung by heavenly voices winging their way into the ethereal realms above.

The remarks of Professor Dickinson upon the second rendering at Oberlin will command the attention of all who are interested in elevating the standard of our church music, and of making this heavenly art accomplish its full purposes in purifying the taste of the people, and in duly impressing them with the inspiring truths of the Christian religion.

"The music of the Russian Church is almost of necessity a *terra incognita* to the musicians of Western Europe and America. Reports of its singular richness and dignity reach us vaguely from time to time, and connoisseurs who have had opportunities for judgment agree in declaring that the choirs of Russia are unsurpassed elsewhere, and that their music, so far as it is based on national styles and orthodox traditions, is unequaled by any other except perhaps the Catholic chant and the choral music of Palestrina and the sixteenth century Italian school. Tchaikovsky's setting of the liturgy is not a mere harmonizing of the ancient chant, it is of his own free inspiration; but its style, so different from that of any of the secular works of this composer, plainly indicates that he had drunk deep from the pure springs of the ancient liturgical song. The many long chant-like reciting notes, the frequent repetitions of short phrases, the abundant use of simple diatonic harmonies, are not derived from any secular standard, but bring to us in the garb of a recent time an austere type of utterance, which carries the inevitable suggestion of an unmeasured antiquity.

"The sweetness, the strength, the serenity, the uplifting devotional quality of this music of the great Russian master are beyond all eulogy. One whose taste in church music is formed upon the music of the modern Protestant and Catholic churches may find it a little difficult at first to feel the peculiar power of this unfamiliar style. But let him extend his experience into those forms of music that were sung and taught by the fathers of the church when the early and the later faiths were in the first flush of their enthusiasm—the Gregorian chant, the Anglican chant, the German choral—and he will hear the accents of a somewhat similar inspiration. It is well to remind lovers of church music that the pure ecclesiastical

style—the style that has grown up in the bosom of the church—is entirely vocal in origin, while a great deal that masquerades as church music to-day is not ecclesiastical by birth, but draws much of its form and the character of its melody and rhythm from a style that arose under instrumental and secular influences. Music of the latter class betrays its source and associations in its frequent dance-like rhythms, its florid accompaniments without organic relation to the voice parts, its noisy climaxes.

In the liturgic music of Tchaikovsky we have a style that is purely vocal and purely churchly, without any reminiscence of the dance, the opera-house, or the concert-hall. There is no ostentatious parade of counterpoint, no organ pyrotechnics, no choral shouting and scrambling. True also to the church tradition, there are no solo performances. All is impersonal, restrained, solemn. But these cadences are such as angels might sing, and their effect penetrates to the depth of the soul. The pleadings and loving ascriptions of the Eastern saint—John of the Golden Mouth—are clothed in tones which he himself would have deemed worthy. In them profound effect is produced with the simplest means. These tender melodies, these ineffable harmonies, breathe the very temper of devotion. They remind us that church music is or must be prayer, and must promote the spirit of prayer. Every criticism of church music must have this conviction for its basis.”

ARTICLE X.

NOTES ON BRITISH THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

It is a pleasure to commend to the notice of readers of the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA the two volumes just issued, on the Gifford Foundation, by Professor Edward Caird, LL.D., D.C.L., D.Litt., Master of Balliol College, Oxford. They are the last terms in the series that forms a brilliant record of work done in Kant, Hegel, Comte, and other philosophical representatives. The distinguished firm of publishers, Messrs. Maclehose and Sons, of Glasgow, have done for the volumes, in type and finish, all that publishers could do. The volumes are marked by all those excellences of style and thought which have made Dr. Caird the superb lecturer he has ever been—so superb that it does not appear we in Scotland shall soon see his like again.

There are two ways in which we may estimate this work. One is as a contribution on the Gifford foundation, and the other is, as a general contribution to religious and philosophical thought. Now, in the latter, and fortunately the more important, aspect, the work seems to me to rank much higher than in the other view. For it is obviously a somewhat circuitous and indirect mode of approaching the problems of natural theology, to reach them through an exposition of early Greek philosophies. But, on the wider view, such a work has so great value in itself as a contribution to the subject of which it treats, that it can scarcely be too highly praised. That subject is, "The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers."¹ The opening chapter is on "the relation of religion to theology," and has an exceedingly fresh and well-

¹ Two vols. Pp. xvii, 382 and xi, 377. Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons, publishers to the University. 14s., net.

balanced statement of the relations of reason and faith. I am so heartily in accord with what the gifted author says that only with reluctance do I enter upon criticism. Yet no statement on such a theme can hope to win universal assent, and criticism is the greatest compliment we can pay to its value.

The contention of the Master of Balliol is that the opposition so often existent between faith and reason can only be relative—not absolute—and must more and more disappear, as each comes to its own in fully developed spiritual life. He proposes (vol. i. pp. 18–20) no more new or striking idea than that of evolution—the usual catchword of our time—as an eirenicon in the hope of bringing both terms to better mutual understanding. As to his main contention, enlightened theologians have long been agreed upon it, and do not regard the opposition of faith and reason as more or other than accidental. Dr. Caird says there is “no third power beyond both” to determine them, and that is, no doubt, true, although it leaves the matter in somewhat loose and indiscriminate form: there are theologians who discriminate the *spiritual* reason from the *natural* reason, the dialectic process in the former not being divorced from ethical conditions. The same laws of thought are, no doubt, valid for both, but it is reason as regenerate and spiritually enlightened that is held to surmount the oppositions between faith and reason.

As to the proposed eirenicon, I venture to think it not without its disadvantages, and hardly feel prepared to rate it so highly as our author does. The reconciliation of faith and reason is sought to be effected within the more or less discordant spiritual subject, and the idea of evolution—which, as a result of modern science, is certain to be conceived as very largely exterior to that subject—will be very apt to make the reconciliation sought too much in what lies beyond ourselves. It seems to me that a truer eirenicon lies much nearer, and is found in the progressive and symmetrical development of the rational *and*—I do not write “or”—spiritual life of the subject. There may, no doubt, be an exterior aspect which the

term Evolution covers, but it seems to be undesirably over-weighted in value when the subject's attention is drawn off so largely to exterior aspects. I am by no means sure that the author does not unwittingly make the opposition between reason and faith, which he means to heal, at times appear greater than it is. He leaves the impression that faith is mainly a passive and unreflective thing—the “unreflecting faith” of religion, as it is later (vol. i. p. 380) termed—which must “develop into reason,” whose “criticism” is “directed against” it. A deeper spiritual analysis would show how unsatisfactory such a presentation is. We had thought the day was past when any would treat faith, like Mansel and others, as though it were only unreflective or receptive, and not also constructive.

But perhaps philosophy is lagging at one point behind theology. The one and only faint trace of any better view (foot of p. 19, vol i.) is quite overborne by the whole trend and tendency of the discussion, which does no manner of justice to the rational character of faith in its developed reaches. It is entirely overlooked by the author that the whole function of reason is not correctly represented when it is set forth as a coming after faith to “criticise” it. Reason must also go *before* faith and justify its confidence, by showing how rational are the grounds of such confidence. Faith is faith—faith believes—just because it is seen to be more rational to believe than not to believe. Faith does not “develop into reason,” but into perfect harmony with reason. It is not only that faith and reason are not absolutely opposed—as Dr. Caird rightly contends—but that they are not so separate and independent as he represents. This prior and justifying assent of reason, in faith's most living forms, strangely enters not within Dr. Caird's purview. As we have seen faith, in its more developed workings, to be so highly charged with rationality, so it should be seen reason involves an ultimate element of faith. If faith is to “develop into reason,” we should need to preserve the balance by calling in Pascal's saying that faith is “the last step of reason.” For it may, with not less cogency and truth,

be shown that faith is itself the highest reason—reason sublimed—the crown of our intellectual activity. But there is really no need to put it either way.

Another point. We are, of course, in perfect accord with the author's insistences on the "universal" character of Christianity, the "kernel" of which "is essentially rational," and on the need "to break away from the local and national influences of the region in which it was born." But, in the principle of dropping what was local and accidental, we have something which, in the hands of some who occupy Dr. Caird's reflective standpoint, would carry us so far that it had been better for Dr. Caird to show the principle at work. But he merely says, "I will not conceal my conviction that its dissolving power must be fatal to many things which men have thought and still think to be bound up with their religious life, but I do not believe that it will destroy anything that is really necessary to it." Such reserve, however prudent or permissible, can hardly be satisfying to his readers. In less reserved—or more courageous—writers of the same school, we have before now had the Incarnation, Death, and Resurrection of our Lord, dropped or dismissed as historic fact, while their ideas were retained. Are such facts among those meant to be treated as "local," "temporary," "provisional," and without "universal" relation or cosmic significance? The Master of Balliol expressly recognizes the difficulties of such an intellectualized Christianity, with its projection of ideas *minus* a basework of historic fact, but it cannot be said that the help he gives is great.

There is, in fact, no real facing of the difficulty, and we are left to conclude that the tossings betwixt idea and history are to be obviated by taking history as idea for our mediating thought. Now, the services of writers like Professor Caird towards a spiritual interpretation of the universe are so great—so inestimably great—that it is real pity they cannot be brought to see how greatly they sin against events and against the needs of humanity in treating historic fact as the mere

husk of thought. Guarantee for the continuance of spiritual idea is gone when it is no longer wedded to actual or historic fact, in the light of which the idea is understood, and by the presence of which the idea is continually nourished and enriched. This idealistic sacrifice of history—which Dr. Caird suggests and implies rather than illustrates—is a two-edged defect—religious and philosophic—of the school to which he belongs, and is a mode of thinking doomed to transiency before the inherent strength and richness of fact, and the temper of historic justice so characteristic of our time.

Dr. Caird finely insists that philosophy shall not be severed from life, but then religious life has always been nourished at the fountains of fact, and if the facts are spirited away, what sort of life will there be to criticise? Philosophy will be, in Dr. Caird's words, "smitten with barrenness." Of course, the thinker will always make, for his own purposes, a large and legitimate abstraction of ideas, for he is concerned with pure truth rather than its forms; but that is not to admit the wisdom or the power of reflection *away from* the facts, rather than *upon* the facts, until their meaning is seen down to its deepest crystalline depths. May we not say there is defective apprehension of the real case for Christianity, if the true unity and mutual interpenetration of absolute ideality and historic reality are not grasped? If it is the absolute religion, the God-man is no contingent being, but One in whom absolute ideality is so given to us. If we reduced it to a religion of mere ideas, this would show we had not apprehended what is really involved in it as the absolute religion. He is no mere—and transient—Redeemer; He is *Christus Consummator*. Despite these critical reflections, there is a great deal in this admirably written chapter with which one can heartily agree, and which one must cordially admire.

The second chapter deals with the evolution of theology, and after insisting on the principle of unity as that which is most fundamental in all religions, proceeds to deal with theology as having its beginning in ancient Greece. What the author

says of the underlying principle or originative power, we like better than any previous statement he has given us. The only exception that could be taken by any would be, that the emphasis on the abstract principle of unity is so great that we have to suppose for ourselves that the God, who is this principle of unity, is also a self-conscious, self-determining Being, which is, of course, meant to be understood. The rest of the chapter is excellent, the whole being very clear and fine. The chapter which follows, on "the precursors of Plato," is altogether admirable, and will charm the philosophic reader. Through six succeeding chapters he will tread the paths of Platonic idealism under the firm and sure-footed guidance of a master, who is all through at his best.

Chapter the tenth treats of "the transition from Plato to Aristotle," and is very good. Four chapters on Aristotle follow, and the great Stagirite is handled with the same sympathy, discrimination, and luminous power, that marked the treatment of Plato. Interesting and suggestive are the discussions on pure and practical reason, and on the primacy of reason or of will. In the course of the latter, it is said (vol i. p. 381) that "it is an imperfect religion which withdraws itself from any of the concrete interests of life," and that "it is an imperfect philosophy which finds the highest truth in a pure contemplation, which confines itself to the most general ideas, and throws no new light upon the result of natural or ethical science." But now, what becomes of the self-consistency of Dr. Caird's thinking? Have we not already seen that it is precisely such a drawing off, "by the way of abstraction," in the case of Christianity, from the "concrete interests of life" as religious which he claims and counsels? This, of course, since the religious life is based upon, and busied with, the "concrete" facts of historic Christianity. Was it, then, judged by this—his own—standard, an "imperfect" philosophy he was earlier giving us, when he was finding "the highest truth in a pure contemplation" of the ideas of Christianity—its "most general ideas"—with "no new light" to cast upon particular

facts or results? The last of these chapters on Aristotle has taken us into the second volume, which pursues through many chapters the post-Aristotelian philosophies, especially Stoicism, and the teachings of Philo and Plotinus.

The discussion of Stoicism is marked by the same sympathetic discrimination and fine philosophic justice which have marked these lectures all through. The treatment of Plotinus seems more discursive, and in some respects less successful, than the handling of Stoicism. In both cases interest is heightened by the discussion being carried on within select and somewhat narrow lines, within which essential principles are firmly grasped and finely presented. There is, however, the consequent effect that one feels some sense of loss of the fullness and richness of the systems. The chapter on "Plotinus and the Gnostics" is concerned with his antagonism to the dualistic position of the Gnostics as to evil, which Plotinus opposed as far as his optimism would allow.

The last chapter of all is occupied with "the influence of Greek philosophy upon Christian Theology." The opening part of the chapter is a statement—and an imperfect one—rather of the influence of Christian theology upon the conceptions of Greek philosophy. Then we come to a reference to the influence of the Logos idea of Philo on the Jewish Church. This is followed by a somewhat discursive treatment of the doctrinal discussions of the early Christian centuries. At length (vol. ii. p. 363) we are reminded that Greek philosophy supplied the form of reflective thought, its intellectual weapons and categories, and was a form profoundly dualistic. Also, that through the Gnostics and the Alexandrian School, the ideas of neo-Platonism became impressed on Christian theology, emphasizing always the negative rather than the positive elements of Christianity. "Its central idea of the unity of the human with the Divine" was not lost, but it was "driven back to its last entrenchment in the consciousness of Christ."

Next, it is maintained that the same breach between the unity of the human and the Divine took place with respect to the

doctrine of the Trinity. Thus, it is said the dualistic tendency of Christian development was due to neo-Platonic influences, which yet could not yield a solution. And we are shown that this negative dualistic influence of neo-Platonism was "a very useful office."

To any one conversant with recent discussions, the results of these brilliant and suggestive lectures, as presented in this chapter, must seem a very disappointing close. There is lack of depth and thoroughness, and there is the very fault which the Master of Balliol is never weary of contending against—there is taken a too external and mechanical view of the whole matter. One may very well grant the need and motive which Christianity had in common with these Greek philosophic systems. One may grant the influence of Greek forms of thought on early Christian theology, but what one looks for is some scholarly and thoughtful determination of the precise character and real extent of that influence, and especially how far Greek influences carried early writings or documents beyond being intellectual equivalents of Christian thought—even unto being additions upon the same. It cannot be pretended there is such a discussion here. What our author fails to appreciate—and his fine chapter on Philo makes the failure more surprising—is, that the unique triumph of Christian speculative genius was to make the Logos no more external and subordinate, but an immanent personal principle in the very nature of the Absolute Being. The Logos principle was incarnated in the personality of Jesus. The discovery made by Christian reflection was that reason is rooted in personality. Personality was seen to be an immanent category of the Divine Logos or Primal Being. The unity of the Divine Spirit and the human is thus from the outset assured, and is due to the Logos being the immanent principle of the soul of man. But, of course, it was imperfectly apprehended, and had to fight against the dualistic influences which Dr. Caird so well describes.

The Logos principle is thus the ideal principle that over-

comes the dualism of actual life. It makes a knowledge of the Absolute possible. It gives rational mediation to the world-process. Through the ideal Mediator, in Whom it centers, a sinful race is ushered upon a spiritual life destined to be infinite. The emanational and mediational features of latter Greek speculation significantly wore a quasi-personal aspect, which makes it the more important to realize the significance, in the new Christianity, of the category of personality. Of course, earlier impersonal and abstract elements could still less yield advance. This importance of the Divine Word or Logos is felt in theological reflection from Justin onwards, so that from this time the eternal immanent self-evolution of the Logos comes into view and prominence, and does not evince in history such easy yielding to Greek ideas of dualism as Dr. Caird assumes and asserts. Sympathetic as men like Clement and Origen were towards Greek philosophy, it is not easy to find in their writings that it had at all so extreme effect on them as Dr. Caird represents. It seems strange, too, that never does Dr. Caird make any determination of differences in the Johannine conception of the Logos from its connotation in the speculations of Philo. These remarks must close with the observation that there is paucity of proved result and want of real impact about this closing chapter which make it perhaps, the least satisfactory in these two volumes.

Of the volumes taken in whole, however, one may take leave to doubt whether the mature learning and ripe reflection of the Master of Balliol have ever given us any more valuable or inspiring piece of work than that which lies embedded in these most delightful volumes.

Kilmarnock, Scotland.

JAMES LINDSAY.

ARTICLE XI.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THE TEACHING OF JESUS CONCERNING HIS OWN MISSION.
(The Teachings of Jesus.) By FRANK HUGH FOSTER,
Ph.D., D.D. 12mo. Pp. 136. New York: American
Tract Society. 75 cents.

This little volume is worthy of the close attention of scholars as well as of the general public; for, while designed for the instruction of the rank and file of the church, it is written from such fullness of knowledge of the Bible and of theological discussions, and with such clear understanding of the principles of interpretation applicable to the subject, that it is as well calculated to convince the learned as the unlearned, to whom it is addressed. Altogether it is a fitting tribute to the memory of John Henry Thayer, to whom it is dedicated, whom the author styles "grammarian, lexicographer, and translator of the New Testament, painstaking teacher, accurate and learned exegete, knight without fear and without reproach, faithful friend."

The method of the study is to limit the discussion to a proper exposition of Jesus' words. But, as exposition implies a study of the entire environment, the discussion is permitted to take a pretty wide range. First, attention has to be given to the accuracy with which the words of Christ are reported, for it is the reported words of Christ which bring to us our knowledge of his personality. Dr. Foster assumes a position which the advocates of verbal inspiration would find little occasion to criticise:

"The Jesus whom we know is the Jesus whom the evangelists portray. We cannot know him apart from their conception of him, for they have given not *him*, but their *conception* of him. If the two are different and contradictory, then we can never know Jesus. We must go back to the *words of Jesus*, if we are to gain the best knowledge of his mission

into the world; but these are not his words *in distinction from* their report in the Gospels and the evangelists' understanding of them, but his words *as reported to us*. Efforts which separate between these things are foredoomed to failure in attaining the teaching of Jesus. They may gratify the ingenuity of men, but they can never commend themselves to any but those who make them. To success it is essential to assume, as this present study will frankly do, *the equal substantial value of all the evangelical representations of Jesus'* teachings, whether they be report, or comment, or application, or implication. And thus the whole text of all the Gospels will be employed as the necessary and indispensable means of interpreting the reproduction found in them of the Saviour's words" (pp. 7-8).

The alleged inconsistency between the Fourth Gospel and the Synoptic Gospels is the product of "falsely so-called critical processes." "The Christ of the four Gospels is a single and consistent personality" (p. 10). A consideration of the environment of the Gospels leads to a discussion of the Epistles. From this, Dr. Foster concludes that "we cannot separate between 'a theology of Jesus' and a 'theology of Paul,' the former of which should teach, for example, free forgiveness without an atonement, the latter the necessity of an atonement. At least, we cannot do this before examination. If we should find clear proof of such differences, we should have to accept them; but to infer them from the fact that one is silent, or indefinite as to some doctrine which the other teaches—that would be to forget the principle of environment. When two explanations of passages can be given, one of which makes them agree and the other makes them differ, the former is to be preferred" (pp. 14-15).

After passing under review the teaching of Jesus concerning "the preparation," "the lost world and the kingdom of heaven," "the salvation of healing," "the salvation of knowledge," "the salvation of repentance and the new life," he reaches the central point of interest touching "the salvation of redemption and forgiveness," closing with a consideration of "the salvation at the last judgment" and with a perspicuous "summary."

The author's treatment of redemption and forgiveness is extremely satisfactory. After showing that the Old Testament use of the words translated "ransom" cannot be decisive as to their New Testament meaning, he passes to a consideration of the overwhelming evidence that the whole environment of the New Testament teaches the doctrine that the death of Christ is a propitiatory offering. Matthew xxvi. 28, "This is my blood of the covenant which is poured out for many unto remission of sins," is fundamental in its importance. The "'blood of the covenant,' 'shed unto the remission of sins,' are pivotal words, and point immediately back to the sealing of the covenant by Moses at Sinai" (p. 91). So any Jew familiar with the Scriptures would be sure to understand them. So the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, as seen in the ninth chapter of that book, clearly understood them.

To the critical objections that the words "unto remission of sins" are not found in the parallel passages, and are therefore perhaps not a genuine portion of the earliest tradition, and that Jesus is said never to manifest any interest in the ritualistic and institutional elements of religion, and therefore never could have given utterance to these additional words, our author well replies:—

"The fact that the words in question are found in but one of the evangelists counts but little against them. If Matthew may be said to have added them, it is equally easy to say that the others may have omitted them, for they add nothing essential to the idea conveyed by the phrase 'blood of the covenant,' which was always propitiatory. It is equally easy to say either, and equally useless. The words stand as an undisputed portion of the text, and can be removed only by the arbitrary methods of a subjective criticism, which has only such value as its originator feels inclined to assign it, and then only for himself. The added argument that Jesus *could* not have said it, is equally valueless. 'Jesus never speaks of institutions and ritual,' they say. 'But here is a case,' it is replied, and other cases are to be found when he speaks of the 'church' and of 'baptism.' 'The text is corrupt in all these cases because it would overthrow our proposition,' is the rejoinder. In other words, *the criticism assumes such a*

knowledge of Jesus apart from the records, that it can dispute the records on the basis of that knowledge. But one ounce of fact, such as is given by this text, is worth a ton of conjecture. If the criticism is to be allowed any value, it will put itself in better condition before itself and before the world, if it frankly admits that it believes we know nothing indisputably certain about the teaching of Jesus. But then serious men will not continue to busy themselves with the study of so unknown a teacher" (pp. 94-95).

To the objection that Jesus omitted to say anything about the doctrine of the atonement in various places where it might have been appropriate, as, for instance, in the parable of the prodigal son, Dr. Foster replies:—

"But a 'large' treatment of a subject can never be successful if it neglects the first elements of interpretation. One of these is that a speaker is not compelled to say *everything* pertaining to a subject *every time* he touches it. Is the doctrine of forgiveness upon condition of repentance true? Then Jesus may teach it, without necessarily discussing its ground. Another principle of interpretation is that a parable can be held to teach only the truth designed to be taught, and that it cannot be quoted in favor of all the possible inferences from its mere language aside from its main intent. Thus, from the parable of the vineyard, you cannot infer that the divinely intended business of the Jews was exclusively viticulture! or from the parable of the mustard seed (a pungent tasting seed-let) that repentance is always a bitter thing.

"Now, as to the parable of the Prodigal Son, one thing is intended by Jesus, and but one, viz., to enforce the position that the Gospel was provided for 'sinners,' and that God had a new joy over a repentant soul simply because he had been lost. The joy of the father is the point; all the rest is accessory. Of course, certain other doctrines could not fail to be taught, for they contribute to the main effect of the story, or are essential to it. Thus the fact and misery of sin; the motives to repentance; its nature and thorough-going character; find illustration in the parable; but the readiness of the father to receive the sinner, and his equal position in the favor and love of the father with any who may not have gone so grievously astray, is the main thing, and nothing not essential to this can be demanded of the teacher as a necessary portion of his story. Until modern preachers, who believe in the atonement, can be held to mention it every time they speak

of forgiveness (and what rhetorician could be as foolish as this?), Jesus cannot be said to have been ignorant of the doctrine or to have rejected it because he did not insert it in such instances as this parable" (pp. 105-107).

After, in the concluding chapter, summarizing the mission of Jesus in directly promoting righteousness by all ordinary natural means, the author well says:—

"But there was a further task. All this could be done by *living*: now he had to do something which demanded *dying*. God made him the sacrificial Lamb, who was to bear the sins of the world, on whom was to be laid our iniquities, and by whose stripes we were to be healed. Why this was so, the four Gospels give no hint. But God gave him the commandment that he should lay down his life; and he laid it down of himself. He gave his flesh and blood to the world for its food. He thereby made *himself* the object of faith. Man needed something more than repentance: he needed forgiveness. He could repent himself: he could not 'bear his own sins,' or provide for his forgiveness. He needed a Saviour to do this for him, as totally beyond his powers. And Jesus made himself this needed Saviour, when he ascended the cross and bore its solitary burden. When he cried, 'My God! My God! Why hast thou forsaken me?' then he was bruised and smitten by Jehovah, and when he cried, 'It is finished,' then he had made atonement for sins and purchased to himself forever by his blood his church, and thus become the Saviour.

"And he who saves, shall finally judge; a judgment which shall open the kingdom of heaven to believers, and shall re-mand those who love darkness rather than light to the outer darkness which they love—and inexpressibly hate and fear.

"In a word then Jesus is Saviour, because he is and does everything necessary to our salvation, provides it for us, and leads us unto it" (pp. 125-126).

THE TEACHING OF JESUS. By the Rev. GEORGE JACKSON, B.A., author of "A Young Man's Religion," etc. Crown 8vo. Pp. xii, 252. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1903. \$1.25, *net*.

A clear, able, and conservative treatment of a subject upon which special emphasis is laid at the present time. The book will be instructive to all, and can be safely taken as a guide by the ordinary reader.

NEW LIGHT ON THE LIFE OF JESUS. By CHARLES AUGUSTUS BRIGGS, D.D., D.Lit., Edward Robinson Professor of Biblical Theology, in Union Theological Seminary. 12mo. Pp. xiii, 196. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$1.20, *net*.

The new light which Professor Briggs thinks he is able to shed upon the life of Jesus relates largely to chronology and the readjustment of material which will be permitted by his chronological system. Having studied under Dr. Edward Robinson, and later under Dr. Dörner, he accepted the chronology of Christ's ministry based on the order of the Gospel of John and of Mark, but further and prolonged study led him to believe "that there was a Galilean Ministry of Jesus prior to the arrest of John the Baptist, and that while five pairs of the Twelve were absent on a Mission in Galilee, Jesus with James and John, one pair of the Twelve, was carrying on his ministry in Jerusalem, and at intervals with another pair, Thomas and Matthew, in Peræa" (p. ix). He finds support for this view in the fact that it is in accord with Tatian's arrangement of the material. The author explains the abrupt beginning of the Gospel of Mark with the baptism of Jesus, by supposing that the previous work was merely preparatory, under the shadow of the Baptist.

Apart from the particular theory urged by the author, the volume is full of interesting discussions concerning disputed points in our Saviour's life. On page 63 he defends the position that the crucifixion was on the fourteenth of Nisan at the time when the paschal lamb was to be offered, and that the Jews did not celebrate the Passover until after the burial of Jesus. On page 414 he maintains that, though the appendix of Mark does not come from Mark, yet it is a condensation of the story of the resurrection given by Mark at the beginning of his Jerusalem source of the book of Acts, which was added to the Gospel by a later editor, to give it a completion after the Gospel had been detached from its continuation. The volume is to be followed by another, soon to be published, in which the author is to trace "an orderly development in the entire ethical teaching of Jesus."

THE DIRECT AND FUNDAMENTAL PROOFS OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION: An Essay in Comparative Apologetics, based upon the Nathaniel William Taylor Lectures for 1903, given before the Divinity School of Yale University. By GEORGE WILLIAM KNOX, Professor of the Philosophy and History of Religion in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. 12mo. Pp. viii, 196. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$1.20, *net*.

The cavalier way in which the author, in the first chapter of this volume, disposes of the classic argument for Christianity as presented by Paley and Butler creates a prejudice not only in the mind of ordinary believers, but of the more thorough students of the questions at issue. Nor will the prejudice be wholly removed by a perusal of the author's own argument, since he denies himself the powerful support of that cumulative evidence which arises from the combination of the arguments so tellingly presented by Paley and Butler with those which are presented by the author himself. To assert, as the author does (p. 114), that the proofs of Christ's divinity are not in any way dependent upon the ordinary historical proof of the resurrection is a gratuitous surrender of a most important vantage ground; in fact, is a surrender of the whole field of historical evidence. One is led to question, also, the proposition with which the eighth chapter opens: "Christianity offers the ethics of Christ as its fundamental proof, but his teachings are religious in the highest sense, and from this religion his ethics gain power, for the problem of ethics is not only what is right, but also how shall right conduct be inspired. Religion is the intuition of unseen reality, and its experiences show the nature of the supreme reality which is worshipped as God" (p. 141).

With this definition of religion it is difficult to find any place for the historical facts of Christianity, unless in his intuitions of unseen realities he includes an intuition of the strength of historical evidence. The answer to the question "How shall right conduct be inspired?" has generally been supposed to be "By faith in the person of Christ which has

been revealed through historical lines of evidence." To cut one's self off from the influence of the objective facts of Christian history is to leave the solid ground and place himself in a position where he can only beat the air with limbs which were not made for flight. The vagueness of the author's ideas crops out at almost every turn. For instance, compare the example just given of religion with that given on page 162, where it was said that "ethics is the manifestation of religion, and religion is the principle of ethics," whatever that may mean.

HISTORICAL EVIDENCE OF THE NEW TESTAMENT: An Inductive Study in Christian Evidences. The Facts mentioned in the New Testament Demonstrated to be Historical by the Worst Enemies of Christianity who lived in the First Three Centuries of our Era, Confirmed by as many Christian Writers of Fame, Contemporaries who wrote in Different Countries and Periods: the Whole Reconfirmed by Many Remarkable Evidences recently Discovered: Ancient Documents, Monuments, Arches, Inscriptions, Coins, Superscriptions, and Christian Art. By Rev. S. L. BOWMAN, A.M., S.T.D. Pp. 732. Cincinnati: Jennings & Pye; New York: Eaton & Mains. \$4.00.

For some time there has been a manifest lack of anything corresponding to Lardner's great work on the "Authenticity and Credibility of the New Testament" brought up to the present time. This is now supplied in a very satisfactory way by the present volume, which would seem to have everything demanded by those who would for any reason desire to make a really thorough study of the evidences of Christianity. The volume contains all the material from all sources bearing upon the "Christ of History," the "Work of Christ," the "Public of Palestine," "The Roman Rulers," "The Jewish Rulers," "The Jewish Nation," and "The Gentile World," shedding light upon the genuineness and authenticity of the New Testament. All disputed points are fully discussed in a dispassionate manner, accompanied with the statement of the attitude of modern scholars respecting them. It scarcely need be said that such a volume arrives at conclusions in striking contrast to those

reached by the narrow and one-sided methods employed by many writers of the modern critical school. The prevalent destructive criticism very clearly closes its eyes to the great mass of irrefragable evidence which with cumulative power supports the ordinary views concerning the authoritative character of the New Testament. We hail this book as a sign of the return of saner methods of argument in which the irresistible presumptions established by the best witnesses and the clearest evidence are allowed due weight in shedding light upon the obscurer portions which are capable of various interpretations. Without maintaining the high-church views of an official indorsement of the New Testament, we can establish the fact beyond all reasonable doubt that the New Testament as we have it is a trustworthy and authoritative statement of the facts and doctrines which are the sole support of the faith of Christendom. Through the channels of historical evidence the inspiring truths of Christianity come into the life of the world. To neglect and minimize and practically discard this evidence is to do violence to all scientific principles, to abandon progress, and revert to the condition of prehistoric times, when there was no written history, and when every man was dependent upon his own personal light from heaven. Dr. Bowman's volume should be accessible to all ministers and intelligent laymen.

THE TEACHING OF THE GOSPEL OF JOHN. By J. RITCHIE SMITH, Minister of Market Square Presbyterian Church, Harrisburg, Pa. 8vo. Pp. 406. New York, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co. \$1.50, *net*.

This volume is an excellent illustration of the good work which may be done by a studious pastor in illuminating portions of the Bible which he is privileged to expound to a waiting congregation. The volume is not in any sense a collection of sermons, but presents that close and critical study of the Fourth Gospel out of which sermons grow. The author has made special study of the commentaries of the early church fathers, and has given adequate attention to all modern literature upon the subject. As a result he has succeeded in preparing one of the most useful studies upon this Gospel which

have been published in recent years. Instead of giving a detailed commentary, he discusses the subject under the various topics of the Relation of the Gospel to the Old Testament, to the doctrine of God, to the Word (three chapters), to the Holy Spirit, to the doctrine of Sin, to Salvation, to the New Life, to the Church, to the End of All Things, to a Comparison of John and Paul. The standpoint of the author is that of the moderate Calvinistic school, to which he belongs. It is interesting to note, in the chapter upon "The End of All Things," that he presents a long list of leading Presbyterians, ending with Professor Warfield, who maintain that, according to Scripture, they are permitted to believe that the finally lost will be a "relatively insignificant body." Among the few points in which we should disagree with the author, is that relating to the significance of the blood and water which issued from the Saviour's side when pierced by the soldier's spear. This he regards as miraculous. But if he had consulted Stroud's book upon the subject, he would have learned that that is a natural occurrence which may follow rupture of the heart, and so comes to be one of the most convincing of the incidental evidences of the truthfulness of the narrative.

LA JOHANNIQUE NOTION DE L'ESPRIT ET SES ANTECEDENTS HISTORIQUES. ÉTUDE DE THÉOLOGIE BIBLIQUE. Par MAURICE GOGUEL, Licencié ès lettres. 8vo. Pp. 171. Paris: Fischbacher. 1902.

In the preface the author says, "We have desired to bring into this study a strictly historical spirit, that is to say, one having reverence for facts." Among the facts, however, he includes some things which the church as a whole has been loath to credit as being anything more than theories; as, for instance, that the disciple John was not the author of the fourth Gospel,—quoting Harnack and referring to Jean Réville to support him in this,—and that in the Gospel we have presented to us the opinions of the writers rather than the words of Jesus himself. Throughout the whole book, the author shows that his "facts" are such conclusions as are generally held by the ultra-liberal school of theological writers.

Judged from the view-point of this school, the work is a careful, scholarly attempt to trace the evolution of the idea of the Holy Spirit from the earliest mention of the same in the Old Testament to its final form as expressed by the author of the fourth Gospel. Briefly expressed, this is as follows: "The fundamental idea of this theology is that of a divine force acting upon the hearts of men." For our author the only question is: "How can a man gain life eternal?" and he replies to this question, "Through the gift of the Spirit, which will be given to those who believe in Christ; for it is the Spirit which quickeneth."

There is a good bibliography given, but no index.

FREDERICK W. HASS.

SELECTIONS FROM THE LITERATURE OF THEISM. Edited, with Introductory and Explanatory Notes, by ALFRED CALDECOTT, M.A. (Lond.), D.D. (Camb.), Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy, King's College, London; Examiner in Historical Theology in the University of London; late Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge, and H. R. MACKINTOSH, M.A., D.Phil. (Edin.), Minister of Beechgrove United Free Church, Aberdeen; Translator of Ritschl on "Justification and Reconciliation." 8vo. Pp. xiii, 472. New York: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.50, *net*.

This volume will meet a very wide-felt want by bringing within the reach of ordinary bookbuyers full summaries of the treatises of the great leaders of thought who have written upon theism. He will here find the substance of what has been written upon that subject by Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, the Mystics, Berkeley, Kant, Schleiermacher, Cousin, Comte, Mansel, Lotze, Martineau, Janet, and Ritschl. Naturally the volume consists largely of extracts, so that the reader has in that way direct access to the original discussions. Well-selected literary references also accompany the chapters. Altogether it is a volume which the more intelligent class of readers cannot afford to fail to have upon their shelves.

NARRATIVES OF THE BEGINNINGS OF HEBREW HISTORY from the Creation to the Establishment of the Hebrew Kingdom. (The Student's Old Testament.) By CHARLES FOSTER KENT, Ph.D., Woolsey Professor of Biblical Literature in Yale University. With Maps and Chronological Chart. 8vo. Pp. xxxv, 382. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.75, *net*.

In this volume Professor Kent carries out into minute detail the critical principles which he has adopted as applied to the first seven books of the Old Testament. The work will mainly be useful as showing what crudities, inconsistencies, and unwarranted conclusions these principles lead to, and so will serve as a valuable *reductio ad absurdum* of the work of the critics whom he has innocently taken for his guides. The story of Abraham he regards as representing "the greater Aramean movement which brought the ancestors of the Hebrews to Palestine" (p. 9), although he does hold to the theory "that back of the varied stories associated with the name of Abraham, there was a man of strong personality—probably a leader of one of the earliest Aramean migrations—who made a deep impression upon his own and later generations." Isaac, he thinks, "was probably the local hero or deity of the nomadic tribes which frequented the southern shrine at Beersheba." He begins his composite narrative of Genesis by wrenching the first verse of the second chapter from its proper place, and putting it at the head of the first chapter. The reason he gives for this is simply his own opinion, which is certainly incorrect, but which, without directing the attention of his readers to both sides of the discussion of the subject, he would impose upon them as beyond dispute. And so, in places without number, we have a new tradition presented for the popular mind to accept without question. In giving the second chapter of Genesis, for instance, he omits the word "God" wherever it occurs in conjunction with Jehovah, because, forsooth, in his opinion, "it was evidently added by an editor who wished to make it clear that the *Jehovah* of the prophetic was identical with *God* of the preceding priestly narrative. Moreover, the double word is not only awkward, but practically meaning-

less" (p. 54). If the author had been frank enough to refer his readers to numerous standard discussions of the subject, especially to the volume of William Henry Green upon "The Unity of Genesis," they would have been able to see that there is little reason for this oracular statement. But here, as often elsewhere, the readers are left to grope in the dark for the literature that would set them right. It will require but a few more books of this sort to bring into serious disrepute the class of writers who are attempting to popularize the results of the divisive critics. They cannot go on deceiving the people always.

THE CODE OF HAMMURABI, KING OF BABYLON ABOUT 2250 B. C. Autographed Text, Transliteration, Translation, Glossary, Index of Subjects, Lists of Proper Names, Signs, Numerals, Corrections and Erasures, with Map, Frontispiece, and Photograph of Text. By Professor ROBERT FRANCIS HARPER, Ph. D. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1904. \$4.00, *net*.

The University of Chicago may be proud of this beautiful edition of the famous code of Hammurabi, which is indeed a kind of *édition de luxe*. The title describes the contents exactly. It is needless to say that Professor Harper has edited the code well. The translation is literal, but not slavishly so. Technical and legal language has been avoided, wisely, for it is easy to create a wrong impression among laymen in regard to the advance of civilization at Hammurabi's time, when our modern technical terms are used.

It is rather an interesting and at the same time also a difficult question who the *mushkênum* was, and how the term should be translated into English. Society consisted legally of three classes: (1) *awîlum*, according to Harper "the householders, property-owners, the wealthy and upper classes," which is, however, too narrow, for the *awîlum* is simply the freeborn, whether rich or poor makes no difference; (2) *mushkênum*, which Harper translates "*freeman*"; (3) *wardum-amtum*, male and female slaves. Winckler translates *mushkênum*, "*freedman*"; Scheil, "*un noble*"; D. H. Mül-

ler, "*Armenstiftler*"; Oettli regards him as a freedman belonging to the court, a kind of half-free official. To come to some understanding, we must notice that (1) the *mushkênum* is not necessarily a poor man. He can hold property and slaves. The idea of poverty is not inherent in the root. The Hebrew *miskên*, which is regarded by some Assyriologists as being a Babylonian loan word, *mushkênum*, has indeed this meaning, but its etymology is not settled; (2) he is mentioned in connection with the palace (sects. 8, 15, 16, 175, 176), and it is apparent that he has some relation to the palace, whatever that relation may be; (3) he pays less than an *awîlum* for the services of a physician (sect. 222). The amount of the money he has to give to his wife whom he wants to divorce is only one-third of that paid by an *awîlum* (sect. 140), and so is the amount he has to pay for inflicted injuries (sect. 208); (4) he gets, as a compensation for injuries received, money, while the *awîlum* gets only the benefit of the *ius talionis* (sects. 198, 201, 204). The last two points would indicate that the *mushkênum* is more than an *awîlum*, and since, according to (2), he has some relation to the palace, we may think of court-officials, only not of half-free but of entirely free men, who have certain legal privileges over the ordinary citizens. Probably Scheil's translation "nobleman" is as near the point as we can get. Harper's "freeman" does not strike me as a happy translation, for an *awîlum* was a freeman; a *mushkênum* is an *awîlum* of a certain rank or position at court.

The practice of an ordeal is referred to in sects. 2, 132, the person charged with sorcery (sect. 2) or with adultery (sect. 132) throws himself or herself into the river, and the River-God decides the question. It is rather unfortunate that Professor Harper has not indicated in the translation that there is a difference between the ordeal and the punishment which consists in the throwing of the guilty into the water (sects. 108, 129, 133A, 143, 155). Here we have *ilu Nârûm* referred to, there simply *ana mê nadû*. In col. ii. 48, curiously enough, Dr. Harper translates *salûl matim* "the divine protector of the

land." The ideogram *ilu* points, of course, to the fact that originally a god was thought of, but it is questionable whether the combination of the two signs which means *salûlu* has still retained the force implied in the translation *divine*; not that there is any objection to Hammurabi's regarding himself as a *divine* protector. The prologue shows plainly enough what a good opinion he had of himself.

Sometimes it is possible to translate literally without giving the right interpretation by the translation. Such appears to me to be the case in sect. 280, where Dr. Harper translates *ba-lum kas̄pima an-du-ra-ar-shu-nu ish-sha-ak-kan* by "he shall grant them their freedom without money." By itself this is correct, but sect. 281 shows that not their freedom is meant, but their release to their real owner; they are not freed, but he has to release them to their owner without receiving a compensation.

Is not D. H. Müller right when he compares *litu*, e. g., (sect. 202) with Hebrew *lehi*? The one strikes the other on the *cheek*, which is what we expect, for in the preceding laws definite parts of the body are mentioned. As to the etymology, compare, e. g., the contraction *iltum*=*ehiltum* in our code. It is true we have also *lahû* in Assyrian.

In the Glossary, Dr. Harper gives "every occurrence of every form found in the code," which is a real boon to the student. Personally I wish he had arranged the Glossary according to roots, which is really the only satisfactory manner for such a book. Extreme exactness is necessary in such a Glossary, for the scholar does not so much want to know what the different roots and forms mean, unless it is a hitherto unknown word, as to know in just what meaning they are used in this code. To illustrate, *mârûtu* is given in the Glossary as meaning "sonship, inheritance." Now, of course, it means the child's portion, i. e. inheritance, but in this code it means in all passages "sonship"; for "inheritance" the code always uses the synonym *ablûtu*. Would it then not be better to omit "inheritance" in the Glossary? *Pihû* means to make tight by closing all joints, it is used here apparently as

the *terminus technicus* for "building" a ship, but *pihû* does therefore not simply mean "to build," it does so only in this connection.

It was not in Dr. Harper's plan to give in the Glossary, also, the compound expressions and phrases, such as *tîl abubim*, *ana shimtim ittalak* and to explain them. It would have been a fine thing if he had done so. Some little inaccuracies, if they may be called so, would thereby have been avoided. Thus, e. g., *shêru* is given as meaning "flesh, well-being"; it signifies both, but "well-being" only in connection with *tâbu* (at least in this code, if not always). *îlu Ashnan* (col. xliii. 11), "corn," is omitted in the Glossary by an oversight.

I wish Dr. Harper had given a number of explanatory footnotes, or had set himself to give a concise commentary of the code. What a mass of cultural and religious hints there are in the code! How interesting, e. g., the ideogram of divinity with "corn," how significant the curse "Below, within the earth, may he deprive his spirit of water!" or the fact that inns are kept by harlots when compared with the story of the spies at Rahab's house! But all this was outside of Dr. Harper's plan. To my regret I notice that the second volume, to be prepared by the brother of the author, is to discuss merely the relation of the code to the Mosaic code.

Let me close, as I began, with congratulations to Dr. Harper on the completion of so beautiful a piece of work.

JULIUS A. BEWER.

DAS GESETZ HAMMURABIS UND DIE THORA ISRAELS. Eine religions-und rechtsgeschichtliche Parallele. Von Professor Dr. SAMUEL OETTLI. Leipzig: A. Deichert'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung Nachf. (Georg Böhme). 1903. M. 1.60.

Professor Oettli has compared the code of Hammurabi with the Israelitish law in a careful, calm, and eminently fair manner. He does not detract from the Babylonian code, but recognizes frankly its excellences, and, in comparing the two codes, points out the striking similarities. Quite justly he emphasizes that the lack of the religious element in the Babylon-

ian code must not be used as an argument for its inferiority in comparison with the Israelitish, for there existed doubtless in Babylonia as well as in Israel minute cultic and priestly statutes. The code must be taken for what it intends to be, a code of *civil* law. In Israel the so-called Book of the Covenant contains, also, almost exclusively civil laws; and it is here, and in Deuteronomy, which is based on the Book of the Covenant, that we find most similarities between the two codes.

The similarities are so striking formally as well as materially, that the conclusion that the Book of the Covenant was dependent on the Code of Hammurabi cannot be escaped. But just how the mediation between the two was effected historically we can only conjecture. Oettli is not quite so favorable to the hypothesis of the ancient Semitic law which was referred to in the last number in connection with Jeremias's and Grimme's essays. He calls attention to the beginning of the migration of the Hebrews from the Euphrates region to Canaan at this time and to the Babylonian character of Canaanitish civilization in the second millennium B. C. At any rate, he concludes, we must not think of the Israelitish tribes as being on too rude a plane of civilization at the time of the founding of the nation; and, again, we cannot well deny any more the possibility of the origin of the Book of the Covenant during the Mosaic period or shortly after.

The scholarly little book can be recommended very heartily to every one who is interested in the relation of the Babylonian to the Hebrew Law.

JULIUS A. BEWER.

DIE RELIGION BABYLONIENS UND ASSYRIENS. Von MORRIS JASTROW, Jr. Vom Verfasser vollständig durchgesehene und durch Um- und Uebersetzung auf den neuesten Stand der Forschung gebrachte deutsche Uebersetzung. Uieferung V. Giessen: J. Ricker'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. 1904. M. 1.50 (subscription price).

The fifth part of the German translation of this important book on the Religion of Babylonian and Assyria.

DIE GESETZE HAMMURABIS UND IHR VERHÄLTNIS ZUR MO-SAISCHEN GESETZGEBUNG SOWIE ZU DEN XII TAFELN. Text in Umschrift, deutsche und hebräische Uebersetzung, Erläuterung und vergleichende Analyse. Von Professor Dr. DAV. HEINR. MÜLLER. Pp. 285. Wien: Alfred Hölder. 1903.

Professor Müller has edited the laws of Hammurabi in transcription, supplied them with a translation into German and into Hebrew, and has given a commentary and careful analysis in which he compares especially the Babylonian and the Israelitish but also the Roman laws on the Twelve Tables. Here only the main results of his work can be summarized. The Mosaic law and the Babylonian law are very closely related to each other. But the Mosaic law is not derived from Hammurabi, because the formulation and the grouping of the Mosaic laws is more original than the laws of Hammurabi, which presuppose more complete conditions of civilization. Both are derived from a primitive code of law, which approached nearer to the Mosaic law in its formulation, grouping, and order than to the code of Hammurabi. This can be reconstructed from both these codices and the Roman code of the Twelve Tables. A definite relation of the Roman law to the Semitic law can be asserted; it came to Rome by way of Greece. This primitive law, which may be thus restored, must have existed already before Hammurabi as a well-connected system in definite formulation, grouping, and order. It was brought to Canaan at the time of Abraham's migration, not impossibly in written form on tablets. Moses received this ancient, simple law, reformed and purified it. The principles underlying the ancient primitive law are: (1) *talio* for blood revenge, (2) *talio* of evil intention,—not only the evil deed but also the evil intention is punished; (3) there is only one punishment for one crime, i. e. not a fine or corporal punishment in addition to capital punishment; (4) application of the idea of the *talio* to offenses in property-affairs.

There is a great deal of acute reasoning in the book. Of great interest are also the linguistic excursuses. Interesting

and valuable is the translation into Hebrew. The book will have permanent value, even though a number of details will have to be modified.

J. A. B.

A PRIMER OF HEBREW. By CHARLES PROSPERO FAGNANI. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1903. \$1.50, *net*.

This little Primer is a marvel of simplicity and clearness. For concise and lucid statement of the fundamental principles of Hebrew it has no equal. "Its object is to give a general survey of the principal phenomena of the language, with a view to putting the student, in the shortest possible time and with the minimum of arduousness, in position to begin reading and translating with the use of lexicon and grammar" (p. v).

That it will supersede Davidson's "Introductory Hebrew Grammar" seems to me quite certain, and probably all other *introductory* grammars, for there is none which accomplishes the task of introducing the beginner into the elements of Hebrew with so much success and, I might almost say, elegance and ease. I had occasion this winter to test Professor Fagnani's statement that the book can be used without an instructor, in the case of a student, who mastered the elements of Hebrew alone, with the help of Fagnani's Primer, in about the time that the author thinks is necessary, which would have been altogether impossible with, for example, Davidson's book.

There are some innovations in the book, e. g., the transcription of Hebrew into English with the use of Latin and Greek letters, e. g., *dā-βār*; the *shewa* simple is indicated by a simple dot, the 'Aleph and 'Ayin by a vertical line capped by a *spiritus lenis* and *asper* respectively; the object of the last transcription is "to make it level with the other letters, and to show that it is a constituent part of the word," but this is not unambiguous, because the vertical line may be taken for an "i," as experience showed. It is doubtless a step in the right direction when Dr. Fagnani substitutes the terms *Niqṭal*, etc., for *Niph'al*, etc., but the students will have to learn both sets of terms in this case, for the lexicons and grammars use the other set.

In his desire to bring the student to the Old Testament text as soon as possible, Dr. Fagnani has made the exercises extremely short,—intentionally so, for he knows that long exercises are repellent to the student. I wish, however, that he might be persuaded to prepare a little book of exercises which might go with the Primer, a sort of a reading-book, which might be bound together with the second edition or have its independent existence. There is, after all, nothing so instructive as example.

In Lesson XLI. should be added: "The Perfect singular third person feminine of all stems ends in *תה*."

JULIUS A. BEWER.

THE CONGREGATIONAL WAY: A Handbook of Congregational Principles and Practices. By GEORGE M. BOYNTON, Secretary of the Congregational Sunday-school and Publishing Society. 12mo. Pp. 221. New York, Boston, Chicago: The Pilgrim Press. 75 cents, *net*.

A useful compendium of Congregational usages and practices to take the place of previous ones prepared by Drs. Punchard, Dexter, and Ross. In the discussion of principles, however, Dr. Boynton favors a considerable departure from those which have guided the New England churches in matters of fellowship. He does not look upon the disuse of installation as a serious matter, but as a natural result of the abuses of the system which had crept into its practical use.

SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY IN ITS NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. By HENRY LAURIE, LL.D., Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy in the University of Melbourne. 8vo. Pp. 344. Glasgow: James Maclehose & Sons. \$1.75, *net*.

This is a delightfully readable book, and must be recognized as supplying a need where, perhaps, owing to the prevailing modes of philosophical thought, the lack is not felt as much as it should be. In fact, the time has come for an appreciative reëstimate of Scottish philosophy. Such a task can be performed only by one who can bring to it a thorough acquaintance with the wider and, as is generally believed, pro-

founder thought that emanates from the Continent, and that has well-nigh, even in Scotland itself, obliterated the philosophical landmarks of an earlier day. Professor Laurie's volume is historical in its primary aim and interest, but it affords an excellent starting-point for, and contribution towards, just such a task. Separate studies of the more important Scottish thinkers, especially Hume, Reid, and Hamilton, have made their appearance of late years, but nothing exactly comparable with this volume has come into print since the publication, in 1875, of Dr. McCosh's "*Scottish Philosophy*." We may even say that Dr. Laurie's book stands alone as a genuine history of Scottish Philosophy in its concatenations, and as an up-to-date exhibition, in the newer philosophical perspective, of the elements of permanent value in that philosophy.

Professor Laurie publishes his book with the special aim and hope that it will be of service to those who, "without pretence to be specialists in philosophy, take an intelligent interest in the history of thought." We are ready to say that the author seems all too modest in his estimate of his own work; for we feel assured, after careful perusal, that many who are considerably conversant with philosophical literature will experience a wholesome influence in reading this treatise, owing to its more than ordinary caution, fairness, and sanity. These qualities are, moreover, so combined with genuine metaphysical penetration and solidity of learning that, in perusing the book, one becomes possessed of the feeling that he is being guided by a steady and experienced hand. Perhaps we may say that the chapters on Hume, Reid, Hamilton, and Ferrier are chiefly interesting, not only because of their historico-philosophical subject-matter, but because the author's aptitude in philosophical criticism is seen at its best in these chapters. It would be very difficult, within the same compass, to more adequately and lucidly estimate the too-much-neglected Ferrier and his place in Scottish philosophy. Our perusal of this book, we may add, has put us all the more

in sympathy with those who have "a desire to return, by the paths of a new philosophy, to the Natural Realism of common sense, modified by a more exact and explicit statement of the dependence of all thinking things and all objects of thought on a Divine Mind" (p. 336).

Omaha, Neb.

D. E. JENKINS.

INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMICS. By HENRY ROGERS SEAGER, Adjunct Professor of Political Economy in Columbia University. Large 8vo. Pp. xxi, 565. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1904.

The conditions are changing so rapidly in the economic world that new text-books are demanded in Political Economy as frequently as in Chemistry and Physics. Indeed, in the natural sciences named, all the forces concerned have, no doubt, been in the world from the beginning, and new text-books are needed only because we are every year making new discoveries. In Political Economy the use of these discoveries introduces a really new force into human life. Moreover, the intellectual, and above all the moral, growth of the race bring into life forces that never before existed. The concentrated public opinion that compelled a settlement of the coal strike two years ago was a new force in the mining industry just as truly as dynamite when it was invented.

Professor Seager has produced a valuable book for present need. We dare not predict for it a long-continued vogue. It is not safe for any writer on these subjects to assume at the present day the air of finality which characterized John Stuart Mill's Political Economy. But for the present decade Professor Seager supplies in excellent form what our colleges need for their introductory courses. He reflects the uncertainties of the day when he gives us three very diverse definitions of sociology on his first page, and leaves us free to select among them. He reflects the best spirit of the present in his Chapter XXII., which strongly defends labor legislation, and shows a sympathetic though at the same time critical interest in New Zealand's experiments. Skill in exposition, and

breadth of outlook characterize the book. Teachers are to be congratulated who can put it into the hands of their pupils, and who can consult the abundant collateral reading to which it gives references.

A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.
By KARL MARX. Translated from the Second German Edition by N. I. STONE. 8vo. Pp. 314. New York: International Library Publishing Co. 1904.

The increasing interest in Karl Marx justifies the translation of this book, which was published nearly fifty years ago. There is a not unimportant body of socialists who regard Marx's "Capital" as an epoch-making book that is to dominate the future. No thoughtful student can doubt that Marx is to be reckoned with. This is so, not only from his large socialistic following, but also because he was a man of wide learning and a compact reasoner. One cannot read his work without feeling that many of his so-called followers have accepted his leadership, not because they have understood his argument, but because they are attracted by some of his conclusions. If they had ever grasped the discussions in the book before us, none of them, for one thing, could have clamored for the free and unlimited coinage of silver. The book is an important aid to the understanding of Marx, and for that reason deserves the attention of economists and still more of sociologists.

MAN'S PLACE IN THE UNIVERSE: A Study of the Results of Scientific Research in Relation to the Unity or Plurality of Worlds. By ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE, LL.D., D.C.L., F.R.S. Large 8vo. Pp. viii, 326. New York: McClure, Phillips & Co. 1903. \$2.50, *net*.

After having had so much obloquy heaped upon theologians for their geocentric theories of theology, it almost takes one's breath away to have one of the foremost scientific men of the world, ranking indeed as the equal of Darwin, writing a book to defend the thesis that, not only is the sun the center of the solar system, but the center of the stellar universe,

and that in all probability the earth is the only planetary body in the whole system on which it is possible for life to exist. This thesis is maintained with a breadth of knowledge and an acuteness of reasoning and sobriety of purpose which will compel the attention of all thoughtful men, and, if not carrying conviction to all, ought, at any rate, to stop the mouths of cavilers who deride the idea that the Son of God should have become incarnate and dwelt upon the earth to make atonement for the sins of mankind.

The volume is all the more important from the fact that it is not written from a theological standpoint, but from that of the clearest revelations of inductive science.

WHERE DID LIFE BEGIN? A Brief Inquiry as to the Probable Place of Beginning and the Natural Courses of Migration therefrom of the Flora and Fauna of the Earth. A Monograph. By GILBERT HILTON SCRIBNER. New edition. 12mo. Pp. xiii, 75. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$1.20, *net*.

This little monograph, published twenty years ago, receives new attention at the present time from the fact that its main position is now supported by much evidence which was not then accessible, but is now considered by many eminent authorities sufficient to give credence to the theory. The theory of Mr. Scribner is that life upon the earth necessarily originated near the poles, because there the temperature of the cooling globe would first permit the existence of living organisms. The hypothesis is worked out with much skill and learning, and is well worthy of attention.

THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE. By ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE. 8vo. Pp. 486. New York and London: Harper Brothers, Publishers. \$2.50, *net*.

Senator Beveridge has made two visits to the Orient: first, to study the conditions in the Philippine Islands; and, secondly, in 1901, to cross Manchuria and the Russian Empire in Asia, and obtain a comprehensive view of the conditions and pros-

pects of the great Slavic empire. He has improved his opportunities to the utmost, and, with the great facilities afforded him, has prepared a volume, treating of the Russian Empire in nearly every aspect, which is both popular and of great value. Its timeliness must secure the wide circulation for it which it deserves. Like most other travelers who have had occasion to study Russian institutions and peoples with care, Senator Beveridge takes a sympathetic view of the situation, and fully realizes that the Russian Government cannot be intelligently criticised without a profounder knowledge of the people and their history than most foreign writers have. The volume treats of the social, economic, and political affairs both of European and Asiatic Russia, and will enable the reader to form a very correct estimate of the natural causes which have led up to the war between Russia and Japan, and of the important principles that are involved in it. It cannot be called a pro-Russian book, but the author's mind is sufficiently judicial to enable him to state the Russian side with fairness.

AIDS TO THE STUDY OF DANTE. Edited by CHARLES ALLEN DINSMORE, author of "The Teachings of Dante." Illustrated. Large crown 8vo. Pp. xv, 435. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1903. \$1.50, *net*.

All students of Dante must welcome this indispensable aid to his interpretation, which contains almost everything that is necessary and helpful. The volume includes a survey of the history of Dante's time, by Dean Church and Prof. C. E. Norton; together with extended criticisms of his various poems by the same and several other high authorities. It is accompanied also by thirteen illustrations and by an extended bibliography, and a full index. The volume is admirably adapted for use in advanced classes in literature.

CHINA'S BOOK OF MARTYRS. A Record of Heroic Martyrdoms and Marvelous Deliverances of Chinese Christians during the Summer of 1900. By LUELLA MINER, author of "Two Heroes of Cathay." 8vo. Pp. 512. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. \$1.50, *net*.

A book of thrilling interest from beginning to end, giving to the reader a clearer and more hopeful view of missionary work in China than can be found in any other volume of its size. Out of the darkness of those terrible days at the beginning of the century the heroism of the Chinese Christians sheds a beam of light which will shine upon the pathway of the church to the end of time.

THE PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE, with Remarks on the Nature of Reality. By Rev. JOHNSTON ESTEP WALTER. Vol. I.—COGNITION OF THE REAL STATES AND OF REAL MIND. Vol. II.—INTELLECTION: or The Great Constructive Processes of Knowledge. 8vo. Pp. 302 and 331. West Newton, Pa.: Johnston & Penney. \$2, each.

This work is "a discussion, by the *a posteriori* method, of the fundamental Principles of Knowledge, and defense of the primary positions of Dualistic Realism. The work assumes that, since the idealistic diversion from Locke, led by Berkeley and Hume, there has remained an unfilled space for a consistent and adequate theory of *a posteriori* dualistic epistemology and realism, and attempts to supply a satisfactory theory. A positive stand is taken from the first against what is deemed to be the greatest and most far-reaching philosophical error of the time; namely, the doctrine of the Ideality of Space."

The design of the author is carried out with much ability, the discussion is marked with great clearness of expression and keen insight, and is worthy of a wide circulation.

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED.

American Baptist Publication Society, Philadelphia.

THE CHRISTIAN CONVERSATIONALIST; or, The Spiritual Apostolate, dealing with the Problems of Individual Work for Individuals. By RUFUS WASHINGTON WEAVER, ThD. With an Introduction by EDWIN M. POTEAT, D.D. 12mo. Pp. 112. 50 cents, *net*.

THE NEW DAY; OR, FRESH OPPORTUNITIES. A Book for Young Men. By President RUSSELL H. CONWELL, of The Temple College, Philadelphia, Author of "Acres of Diamonds," etc. Crown 8vo. Pp. 117. 1904. 50 cents, *net*.

THE GREAT AWAKENING OF 1740. By Rev. F. L. CHAPPELL. Lectures delivered before the Baptist Church of Evanston, Ill., the Second Baptist Church of Chicago, and other churches; published by request in *The Standard*, and used for the Gordon Missionary Training School, Boston. Crown 8vo. Pp. 144. 75 cents, *net*.

HANDBOOK OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. By HENRY C. GRAVES, D.D., President of the Boston Evangelical Institute. Prepared for the classroom and the use of students. This work is based upon the "Manual of Christian Theology," by Alvah Hovey, D.D., LL.D., with the Special Permission and Approval of its Author. 12mo. Pp. xi, 155. 1903. 75 cents, *net*.

THE YOUNG MISSIONARY. The Story of the Life of Annie Kennard Dowie. By her Mother. 12mo. Pp. 106. 1904.

The American Tract Society, New York.

THE TEACHING OF JESUS CONCERNING THE KINGDOM OF GOD AND THE CHURCH. (The Teachings of Jesus.) By GEERHARDUS VOS, Ph. D., D.D. Crown 8vo. Pp. vi, 203. 1903. 75 cents.

The Baker & Taylor Company, New York.

A LIBERAL EDUCATION AND A LIBERAL FAITH. A Series of Baccalaureate Addresses. By CHARLES FRANKLIN THWING, D.D., LL.D., President of Western Reserve University and Adelbert College. 12mo. Pp. v, 233. \$1.00, *net*.

The Friedenwald Company, Baltimore.

OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM IN THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS. By ADOLF GUTTMACHER, Ph.D. 8vo. Pp. 255. 1903. \$1.50.

Funk & Wagnalls Company, New York.

AS OTHERS SAW HIM: A Retrospect A. D. 54. With Introduction, Afterwards, and Notes by JOSEPH JACOBS. 8vo. Pp. 230.

The International Union, Boston.

DISCOURSES ON WAR. By WILLIAM ELLERY CHANNING. With an Introduction by EDWIN D. MEAD. 8vo. Pp. lxi, 229. Boston: International Union.

Longmans, Green & Company, New York.

FROM TALK TO TEXT; or, A Likely Story—Likely Enough.
By ADDISON BALLARD, D.D., Professor of Logic, New York
University; author of "Arrows; or, Teaching a Fine Art."
12mo. Pp. 190. \$1.00, *net*.

The Macmillan Company, New York.

THE DRAMA OF THE APOCALYPSE in Relation to the Literary
and Political Circumstances of its Time. By FREDERICK
PALMER. 8vo. Pp. viii, 192. \$1.25, *net*.

TRANSITIONAL ERAS IN THOUGHT, with special Reference to
the Present Age. By A. C. ARMSTRONG, Ph.D., Professor
of Philosophy in Wesleyan University. Crown 8vo. Pp.
xi, 347. 1904. \$2.

VOCAL AND LITERARY INTERPRETATION OF THE BIBLE. By S.
S. CURRY, Ph.D., acting Davis Professor of Elocution at
Newton Theological Institution; formerly Snow Professor
of Oratory, Boston University, and Instructor in Elocution,
Yale and Harvard Divinity Schools; President, School of
Expression, Boston. Introduction by FRANCIS G. PEABODY,
D.D., Dean of the Divinity School of Harvard University.
8vo. Pp. xx, 384. \$1.50.

The Presbyterian Board of Publication, Philadelphia.

THE GIFT OF POWER: A Study of the Holy Spirit. By JOHN
ELLERY TUTTLE, D.D. 12mo. Pp. 60.

KYRIE ELEISON ("Lord, Have Mercy"): A Manual of Pri-
vate Prayers. With Notes and Additional Matter. By H.
J. WOTHERSPOON, M. A., of St. Oswald's, Edinburgh. 16mo.
Pp. 168. 1904.

PREACHING: A Series of Brief Chapters. By THOMAS Mc-
BRIDE NICHOLS, Pastor of the Market Square Presbyterian
Church, Germantown, Philadelphia. 12mo. Pp. 74.

TEACHINGS OF THE LORD JESUS. By Professor W. S. BEAN,
A.M., D.D. With an Introduction by Professor C. R.
HEMPHILL, D.D., LL.D. 12mo. 40 cents, *net*.

The Robert Clarke Company, Cincinnati.

THE GRAAL PROBLEM from Walter Map to Richard Wagner.
By J. S. TUNISON, author of "Master Virgil" and "The
Sapphic Stanza." 16mo. Pp. vii, 134. \$1.25, *net*.

Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

THE CREATION OF MATTER; or, Material Elements, Evolution, and Creation. Thomson Lectureship Trust. By Rev. W. PROFEIT, M.A., Glenbuchat. 8vo. Pp. xi, 176. Imported. \$1.00, *net*.

DESCARTES, SPINOZA, AND THE NEW PHILOSOPHY. (The World's Epoch-Makers.) By JAMES IVERACH, M.A., D.D., Professor of Apologetics and Christian Ethics in the United Free Church, Aberdeen; author of "Is God Knowable?" "Christianity and Evolution," "Theism in the Light of Present Science and Philosophy," etc. Pp. xii, 245. 1904. \$1.25.

THE MESSAGES OF THE PSALMISTS. (The Messages of the Bible.) The Psalms of the Old Testament Arranged in their Natural Grouping, and Freely Rendered in Paraphrase. By JOHN EDGAR MCFADYEN, M. A. (Glas.), B. A. (Oxon.), Professor of Old Testament Literature and Exegesis in Knox College, Toronto. Pp. xxi, 334. 1904. \$1.25, *net*.

OUTLINES OF PASTORAL THEOLOGY for Young Ministers and Students. Translated and Edited by the late Rev. WILLIAM HASTIE, D.D., Professor of Divinity in the University of Glasgow. With Preface by the Rev. D. MACMILLAN, M.A. 12mo. Pp. xiv, 78. Imported.

THE BIBLIOTHECA SACRA

ARTICLE I.

THE ILLUSIONS OF A PERSONAL THEOLOGY.

BY THE REVEREND A. A. BERLE, D.D.

THERE are many indications that we are nearing the end of a revolutionary epoch in theology. On every hand there seems to be evidence that many of the theological fads and alleged improvements in thought and reasoning, as well as the application of the critical and rational instincts in an exceptional and peculiar manner to the materials of religion and the documents of religious authority and instruction, have at least reached the maximum of their attractiveness for pioneer spirits, and that we are in a fair way to return to the safe and sane highways of historical theology. In some respects this period, which now seems to be drawing to a close, has been a most interesting and fruitful one. We have styled it "revolutionary." But its revolutionary character was not shown in any specially violent outbreaks which characterized it, though it saw a few belated and absurd heresy trials, and witnessed a few rather heated controversies dealing with certain minor phases of theological thought. But it was none the less revolutionary because its processes were less violent but rather more fundamental on that account. The citadels of faith were assailed, this time, by men not conscious of overthrowing vitalities, but merely supposing that they were changing land-

marks. The most fundamental conceptions of religion were displaced by critics and theologians, as if these things could be made and unmade in a day. No point of view appeared to be to them other than just that. The identification of any series of views in a coördinate union with a series of convictions, with religion in its external expression, seemed to enter into the mind of hardly any one. The entire conception of religion being based on certain inward personal ideals and experiences, all external facts and authorities were dismissed either without deference or examined only with the vivisector's interest. Great emphasis was laid on the difference between "religion" and "theology," a difference which is real enough in academic circles, but which in many respects is perfect foolishness when applied to the practical administration of religious institutions. The exalted ideals of humanity were supposed to compensate for the loss of all external regulation and authority. The "person" was supposed to be of such value, that he was to be studied and ministered to at any cost, but especially at the cost of institutional religion. The universities and the churches alike fell eagerly into this way of thinking, with the result, that, while there seems to be a general agreement that there is more "religion" in the world than ever before, there is coincidentally also general agreement that the business of carrying on organized religious institutions is harder than ever. The maintenance of the church is a more serious problem than ever, the quality of the ministry is reported lower than ever, the number of those who seek this calling is declining, and the already complicated problem of the ministry of the church is made contemptible at the outset, by the still general agreement that no superior men go into the ministry in these days, and that therefore those who are coming out of the theological colleges must be of the "poorer

sort." Evidently the enormous emphasis upon the value of the individual man has not given that individual man a much deeper conception of his religious obligations, if these religious obligations have any sort of relation to the upholding of religious institutions. If there is more religion than ever in the world it is of a modest quality, which renders it unique in that respect, because none of the great religious bodies which should afford the natural channels for its expression and activity, seem to show any consciousness of the fact.

Nor is this all. Men still young can remember when many of the collateral religious instrumentalities which were supposed to be based upon the Christian church were characteristically religious institutions. The Young Men's Christian Associations form the most striking illustration of agencies of this class. But these are no longer distinctively religious institutions. The Young Men's Christian Association of Boston, for example, is now chiefly an educational institution, and might very properly, if any one were disposed to do so, have its right to freedom from taxation impeached on the ground that it is not carried on mainly for religious purposes. Its law school has lately reached such proportions and efficiency that the Association asked and was empowered by the Massachusetts Legislature to grant law degrees. How soon it will grant electric and mining engineering degrees and other degrees cannot now be foretold; but it is certain that, with its education furnished at lower cost than any avowedly educational institution can give it, by people who either give their services gratis or are maintained by other institutions, there is no necessary limit to its expansion in this respect. The same thing is true of other associations. Some have accentuated the educational element, and give themselves to it. Others have become gymnasias, with a religious meeting as annex. Still others have

become employment bureaus and employers' agencies. But, in most of them, the religious work, except in that broad, general, non-specific character, which is called "religious" only because it is said there is a "religious" motive behind it, is not only scarcely visible, but has often fallen into decay and desertion. Now it is possible of course that these institutions are more "religious" than they ever were. It is possible that they are more permeated with "religion" than they ever were. But, if this be true, why is it that the only features which accentuate that fact are the only ones which show signs of falling out of existence, and which most of the officials in charge admit to be the most disappointing departments of the whole work? In a similar way, the churches, also, tried this experiment. Institutional churches, so called, were begun with the assurance that the religious millennium was to be ushered in by them at once. After a dozen years or more, these churches, where they have not fallen into decay, are characterized by just such phenomena as are revealed by the associations for young men. They have become either trade schools or gymnasia or employment bureaus. On the churchly side, which is also the religious side, they have shown no gains, no permanence, no power for holding and ministering, that was not shown by the churches before them and better than they have shown it. The whole series of catchwords about ministering to the "whole" man, and "reaching the masses," and "going to the people," and the like, have become absolutely ridiculous in the eyes of those who know the facts. The urban demoralization goes on among churches of every order, except those which plant heavy endowments upon which the churches are reared. The so-called "down-town problem" is being met by no denomination, as a body, and in the isolated cases where there appears to be success, it is due to excep-

tional causes having nothing to do with the methods, but only with the money provided, usually not by the constituency ministered to. This is the simple truth about the urban situation about most of the denominations in the principal cities of the country at this moment. And all this comes about at a time when we are in the full swing of the doctrine of the worth of the individual man and the uselessness of institutions, except relatively, and when the "personal" ideal in thought, habit, conduct, and judgment of life has full sway. Evidently the fullest freedom of the individual is not working especially well for religious institutions.

Nor is the religious world alone in this demoralization. The legal profession is not less agitated and thrown into confusion. Here also the "personal" idea has gradually acquired a force and importance in the administration and interpretation of the law, which has made jurisprudence the despair of men trained in the older and more profound habits of that profession. Even the United States Supreme Court, the most exalted of such bodies probably in the world, whose decisions usually had in them a power and an influence nowhere equalled among civilized lands, shows the effects of this type of thinking. In the period preceding the last twenty-five years, decisions by the Supreme Court which did not represent substantially the opinion of the entire court were rare, and the dissenting opinions were, usually, in matters concerning the moot points of the law, which, while they afforded the materials for dissent, were not of a character which rendered the decision of the courts any less forceful; nor did they, in general, tend to show the court as being at war with itself in the habitual approach and mode of reasoning on the points of law involved. Of late years, however, this has all been changed. The court has more and more frequently rendered decisions

which not only did not represent the entire court, but were mere majority decisions, but not infrequently the members of the majority rendering the decision showed themselves governed by styles of reasoning which invalidated each other. The "personal" idea applied to the law has in some recent cases shown the highest court of the land to be a body by no means united in the most simple and elementary aspects of reasoning. A single judge has more than once impeached the reasoning of all his colleagues, though agreeing with them in the decision rendered! A single justice has changed his mode of reasoning diametrically in two cases which to the majority appeared to involve the same point! Nor has it been only one member of the court who has done this. Various members of the court have taken these anomalous positions. Thus the decisions have steadily declined in value, as indicating any course of sound and abiding constitutional interpretation. Eminent lawyers aver that the fact that a question has been decided to-day by the court in one way, by no means makes it certain that the point will not be decided in a totally different way when it reaches court to-morrow! At least two eminent lawyers and cabinet officers have recently found it needful to speak before the two most important law associations in the land on matters involving this very point. What careful theologians have been observing to be true in the sphere of religion and theology, careful lawyers have observed to be no less true when applied to the law and the courts. The overwrought and highly accentuated individualism in theology has demoralized the churches, and the "personal" standard in law has demoralized the courts. In both cases the highway of institutionalism and common standards was abandoned for a blind alley, with the result that always follows such a proceeding. Whenever a voice has been lifted against the sound-

ness of this experiment, either in law or theology, it has usually been hailed as the voice of an obscurantist or a pessimist lacking confidence in humanity. Thus the "personal" ideal has had full and fair trial. The only reason why we have not had the same effects in medicine, (though the quacks have always been among us, and are among us still,) is because the ethics of the medical profession is of so much higher quality than that of either the ministry or the law. The doctors to remain reputable have to reveal the formulæ by which they effect cures. And they are bound to give to their fellow-men all the information they have, which can help in ameliorating the pain of the world. This fact has protected medicine to a great degree from the charlatanry and the quackery of extreme "personalism," and has made everything that was true at once universally useful, and has made "personal" medicine impossible. In most of the sciences the thing was of course impossible. A "personal" botany or a "personal" chemistry would be too laughable to get itself even mentioned. History does admit somewhat of this kind of illusion or deception, and hence, in the study of history, the personal element has to be carefully watched to prevent blunder. But here the more careful critics are steadily insisting on citation of the authority and full bibliographies, which is nothing other than placing in the hands of the reader or critic, an instrument for preventing "personal" history. Nowhere, as in theology, has the "personal" idiosyncrasy acquired such force. Personal religion we can comprehend. A "personal" theology will soon be as foolish as a "personal" chemistry or a "personal" botany.

THE LABYRINTH OF THEOLOGICAL SYMBOLISM.

In tracing the lines back to the sources of the movement whose results we have just been describing, it may be re-

marked, that its beginnings, like the beginnings of every theological revolt, were perfectly serious and straightforward. The pathway of absolute rectitude is usually one of simplicity and unpicturesque evenness. Indeed, the essential difference between righteousness and sin arises in part from the very fact that the former tends to become a law of the whole, while the latter is almost always the attitude and habit of exception-
alness. What is true of the life of righteousness, is also true of the habit and practice of right thinking. It has little that is gaudy or fascinating about it. The highways along which the race has come, have become highways, because they have been found to afford the simplest, the least expensive, and the most expeditious ways of arriving at certain points. In the ordinary routine of its daily life, the mass of mankind has little time and less inclination for experiments, and has therefore left these for inventors and pioneers, and has held to the old ways until the new was substantially established, and the way reasonably clear, before casting off from the old lines. When the pioneers have struck a successful road and made a genuine discovery, men have always given adequate praise and usually handsome emolument to the discoverer. But history does not record the countless failures. For one poem of Tennyson or of Milton, how many thousands of humble verses there have been, the world over, that have never seen the light of publicity! But none the less there has always been in the human mind a readiness to accept the new, and follow the leading that seemed to promise better things. And as the routine lacked picturesqueness, men have broken away from rectitude, often, as it seemed to them, from sheer force of *ennui*.

Then again routine tends to blur individual distinctions and merge all men into a common and often uninteresting human-

ity. When, therefore, the symbolists came along with a doctrine that made every man imagine that in himself there was a mine of emotion and thought which nobody could understand but himself, and that this emotion as such was a costly, valuable thing, which was, in fact, the supreme thing in life, immediately there developed a great passion for introspection and self-analysis, which has given us what we see in Ibsen, Sudermann, Maeterlinck, and the rest. It had and has an undoubted basis. There is in every man something of infinite worth and capacity. His own emotions are of undoubted value to himself. But for each man to assume that his emotions are of that costly, alabaster-box kind which make him unique among men, is simply to confound a most vulgar commonplace egotism with a very complicated and elusive even if true idea. By and by the same spirit began to creep into criticism, and the literary and theological critics began to assume this same symbolic tone. The literary critics could discover a true poet by a certain something which "appealed" to them, and handed out ultimatums in criticism with a freedom that astounds one even in this productive age. The historical critics began to see things that the average eye could not see, and began to apprehend things that the average intellect could not discern. In short, criticism began to be symbolic without knowing it, and began to take on the hazy tone and talk in the vague and unintelligible fashion which discusses "tone" and "color" and "essence" and "inevitableness" and the like in things that ought to be subjected simply to the rational critical judgment which knows no tone or color or essence or inevitableness, except as these terms are understood by the mass of men using their ordinary faculties in the ordinary way. A few, of course, protested and insisted on using language and their reasoning powers rationally. But this only

earned for them the sobriquet of Philistines. Others saw that a storm of complication and verbal obfuscation was coming, and prudently retired to wait till the storm was over.

When symbolism appeared in the realm of biblical criticism, it was suitably attired of course. Instead of flaunting scarlet it wore a sober suit of gray. Instead of talking about the emotions, it talked grandly about the "truth." Moreover, as became its theme, it assumed the nomenclature and the physiognomy of learning, and there was let loose a perfect hurricane of "personal" interpretation of the Scriptures and a mass of "consciousness" of meanings in the text which the astonished church heard with something like wonder and awe. Men grasped their Bibles and tried to find what they were told was there and while they did not find it, they mumbled over the new formulæ and tried after the manner of certain kinds of Browning critics to see new wonders in the heavens and strange spectacles on the earth, of which nobody had ever dreamt in his philosophy. From the rage of the critical symbolists the theological symbolists took fire and then came the mass of "personal" theology and this when translated into terms of the life of the ordinary man meant "do just what you please and find out what 'appeals' to you and take that as your guide." The theological symbol for this attitude was "experience." Experience had a good history, and represented a sound and true thing. Christian experience is the basis of faith, and trained Christian experience provides the inspiration for sound Christian judgment and thought. When, therefore, the symbolists called their "personal" vagaries "experience," it seemed like a reaffirmation of an old and tried thing, and the label caught the multitude, and many Christians at once were sent into the by-paths of their own "experience" for new and more vital conceptions of Chris-

tianity. Many, finding that path not specially interesting, took along with them certain intellectual narcotics like Christian Science and other pseudo-metaphysical jargon, with which to drug themselves into continuance of effort till the spiritual and intellectual coma was finally attained. Many more, honestly striving, kept on for years, and found that, instead of being on a highway that led somewhere, they were lost in a labyrinth of alleged "higher personality," where the voices of fellow-travelers and fellow-pilgrims gradually ceased, and they were mocked only by their own solitude and spiritual barrenness. At this point, sometimes ecclesiasticism and prelacy have made an opportune appearance, and beckoned them into the fold of some "true" church, where they have safely abided since, with the spiritual life completely lost in an external symbolism almost as meaningless as the inner one into which they had been led, had been. The intellect stopped inquiry, and the march which began with such triumphant outbursts of freedom ended in the cloisters of a monastic guard-house.

Glancing back over the theological productions of the past twenty years, one is surprised to find how much of it has just this character. Its passionate assertion of the value of the individual, and of his supremacy in the matter of religious judgment, and the inviolability of his primitive emotions and instincts, and the godlike quality of his "natural" aptitudes and insights, makes one think that organized collective religion is a mere dream, and that Christianity is a sort of universal elective system, wherein each one takes and uses what he wishes, without any respect to his fellow-men; and not only so, but feels under no obligation even to indicate what it is that he has chosen, or why, or what it is all about. All he tells you is that certain "experiences" govern him. He advises you of the

existence of certain instinctive judgments. If you don't understand them, you are a Philistine. If you talk about collective duty, and urge the federal union of the race and the mutuality of the spiritual and the moral life, he at once charges you with setting up a papacy or inaugurating a campaign of sacerdotalism. Meanwhile you cannot understand what he is talking about and know nothing about it, except that he leaves off all religious activities, and fails in every relation in which the common fellowship of Christian people seeks to express itself and become effectual in good works.

This labyrinthine confusion in thought and demoralization in religious habits and action is almost universal. But the exponents of this confusion of thought, when confronted with its utter inadequacy to meet the great abiding questions of the spiritual life, universally greet you with a reminder that "religion" and "theology" are not the same thing. Assuredly not. No more is a man the suit of clothes which he wears. But if the suit of clothes he wears happens to be a suit of khaki, with a certain kind of buttons and other equipment, and in his hands is a repeating rifle, and around his waist is a cartridge belt, the man and his clothes become pretty nearly interchangeable things for the average uses of life. If he happens to have a mask over his face and a bull's-eye lantern in one hand and a revolver in the other, and orders you to throw up your hands, to assume that he is a philanthropist who is seeking to work out some beneficent plan for your spiritual growth, on the theory that the clothing is not the man, will probably result in a very rude awakening. Of course there is a difference between religion and theology. But to assume that these things have absolutely no relation, and that a man has to think only of himself naked, to fulfill himself and his work, is simply to land him in jail the minute he goes out into

the street where most people are clothed. He may say that his personality is "clothed." But to jail he goes, or to a clothing store in any event. He may say that his personality is outraged by this process of insisting that he shall wear the vulgar things which men wear in the ordinary, unemotional, plain routine of daily life. But the symbolism doesn't "appeal" to the officer, and he must simply get on something that shall not necessarily rob him of his symbolic clothing, but also give him a garb which classifies him for the rest of the world. This is a very fair illustration of what has been brought about by the so-called "personal" theology of which we have been hearing for twenty years or more. And at almost every stage of its development it has grown more and more grotesque and impossible.

PERSONAL THEOLOGY AND PERSONAL MORALITY.

The relation between theology and religion is one so intimate that it is hard to think of them apart. Of course in this statement it must not be supposed that the theology is of the academic or formal type. But if we understand by "theology" the ideas about God and his government, the world and his Providence, man and his nature and accountability, law and its application and regulation of life, pain and its meaning, by which men are governed, it is perfectly absurd to say that most men have no theology. They have probably no such obfuscating nomenclature as many theologians have, but if they have ideas on these subjects, and most men have, then it is also true that these ideas form the substantial and essential basis of whatever religion they have. And just here it might as well be stated outright, without any reservations, that it is impossible to respect a man's religion if one has no respect for the ideas on which it is based. The individualists in theology and morals have generally held that they could respect a man's

religion, and honor him in his observance of it, even though they had no respect for the ideas underlying it, and even believed them to be based on falsehood, on superstition, or delusion. But, while this is theoretically possible, for the actual life of men it is not possible, and generally does not happen. It has never been the fortune of the present writer to know a human being gifted enough to have respect for the religion of a man whose ideas about religion he held in contempt. Such a person would be a phenomenon. It does not lie in human nature, living in a finite world and dealing with the urgent, insistent problems of human life, to hold any such attitude long enough to make any material difference in the activities of life. It is one of those purely ethereal, academic suppositions like the mathematical conception of infinity, which means absolutely nothing and is merely a necessary term. Theological ideas and their morally correlated ideas are as closely connected with the average man's religion as anything possibly can be.

Christianity has had its splendid sway over the progressive races of the world because of the fact that it accentuated the collective unity of the race above all things, and offered to the individual a sphere of activity and self-expression which was universal in character and aim. "Go ye into all the world" is the keynote of the appeal to the dominating, conquering impulses of the Western nations which have become the leading exponents of New Testament Christianity. Among Eastern nations, where Christianity has attained power and a foothold in the New Testament sense, it has almost always involved breaking away from the isolation and the solitude of oriental religious conceptions. In a word, Christianity is social in its outlook, and contemplates social aims and social activities. Hence any theological interpretation which stands in the way of this social aspect of Christianity must be diametrically op-

posed to the central impulse of the gospel. This is exactly what the "personal" idea of theology or the idea of an "individual theology" does. A personal theology contradicts the social aims of Christianity. It seeks the isolation of the individual and his government apart from his relation to the race. It makes the criteria of action resident in himself rather than in the general collective conceptions of the brotherhood. It is a kind of modern monasticism without the virtues of the old-fashioned kind. It is also a species of intellectual egotism raised to the dignity and erected into a system of selfishness. To have a personal theology one must necessarily think of himself apart from the rest of mankind and the community, and this of itself is the sure road to spiritual isolation and exceptionalness, which usually results in spiritual death. Nor is there any freedom sacrificed or any loss of initiative in keeping to the general movement of the common mind. The collective mind of the race is, after all, more powerful, more discerning, and more discriminating than any single mind, however brilliant, can be.

A personal theology, however, as a mere fad or harmless amusement, might be endured. The dangerous and depressing feature about it lies in that it has, as its necessary, certainly usual, concomitant, a theory of "personal" morals. Here again we might be met with the assurance that there are no morals which are not personal, and this of course is true enough. But it is also true, and even more true, that morality to be effective must have its strength not in the perceptions of any one individual however gifted, but in the collective recognition of mutual and common obligations. The Mormon morality springs from the Mormon theology. If the theology is loose, vague, illy-constructed, lacking in clearness of outline, and especially in definiteness of ideas which give sanction and

authority to moral obligations, there will be a corresponding weakness and lassitude in the moral life. Hence it is not strange to find that concomitant, and as we believe as a result of it, with the prevalence of the ideas about "personal theology" and a superheated "personalism" generally, you have systems of "personal" morals also, which show a widespread and very general destruction of the moral bond in society. It is no wonder that observers of this social and moral sickness are asking, whether it is not possible to erect a "new hell." But what does the inquiry for a "new hell" connote? Does it not simply acknowledge that the binding power in morals lies in some sort of a theological conception? And does it not prove clearly enough that, even in the mind of a college professor, there is a necessary inherent connection between the kind of theology a man holds and the kind of a life he lives? Why ask for a "new hell" if hell is not an idea or a conception which will influence men to right action? It is a curious circumstance, too, that this cry for a "hell-made" motive to righteousness should arise from a Universalist source! The righteousness produced by the fear of hell may not be of the ideal kind, but it is certainly better than moral anarchy; and this is about what the widespread acceptance of the theories of personal theology has produced, when they have been translated into the habits and practices of the ordinary man.

The fact, however, is, that the weakening of moral bonds and the loss of spiritual authority by doctrines and institutions which formerly exercised them, is due not so much to changes of ideas, as to the fact that the attention and seat of authority in matters moral is placed where it has no right to be. Such insistence upon the "personal sway" is exactly what the Hay-market anarchists insisted upon as their right, and is what all breakers of the natural ties of social life insist upon. Often

the fundamental conceptions of life have not much or seriously altered, because life has in itself corrective forces which tend to make certain ideas hold their own, whether they are pleasant or not. Retributive justice is one of them. The certainty of some kind of retribution is so grounded in the human consciousness that it probably never will be taken away. The "fearful looking for" which is the accompaniment of a guilty conscience, does not depend on any theological system. But when these sanctions are confused in their operation, and the attention of men is directed to their own inner life, and this is held to furnish all the needful criteria for a sound and upright life, the resulting confusion ends in almost absolute moral obliquity. The distinguished lawyer who conducted the prosecution of a notorious political ballot-box stuffer in Long Island, who at the same time carried on the normal functions of a Sunday-school superintendent, believed firmly that the cross-examination showed that the criminal had so long focussed his attention upon his own primacy in that particular district that the notion of its being in violation of the fundamental laws of the land never occurred to him. This is exceedingly likely to be the case. Where the egoistic impulses are regarded as in themselves something excellent and authoritative, it is not likely that the altruistic interest will have much chance. In a similar way a self-centered theology is likely to produce a self-centered morality, and thus ultimates in no morality at all.

The alternative to this conception is not one which insists on "original sin" and the natural damnation of all men. It is simply saying that the glorification of man has been woefully overdone. It is simply revealing the fact that the absurd emphasis placed on what the individual thinks and feels, is not calculated to produce a sound religious life, and is not even profitable for him who does it. The much-deplored loss

of authority is not so much that, as it is the exaggerated and utterly vulgar self-centered laudation of humanity which makes man willing to be ministered to by everything in the heavens above, the earth beneath, and the waters under the earth, while he gives out nothing, assumes responsibility for nothing, and shirks all the natural obligations which the social body would impose upon him in its religious organization, on the ground that he must live his "own" life on some theory of "personal" theology. It need not be added that in those denominations where this theory has had largest sway, peculiarly the Congregational bodies, especially the Unitarians, the corporate sense is the weakest, and the power of reproduction and inspiration to the foundation motives of religious activity are reduced almost to the vanishing-point. This does not say that the Unitarian creed, in so far as it may be said to have a program or a creed, has not much excellent material for a healthy, useful, and happy life. But it has in its history so driven down the stake of the supremacy of the individual in theological thought, and utterly ignored anything like authority in the collective denominational consciousness, that the stake has pierced its vitals, and its disappearance is almost inevitable. The Trinitarian Congregationalists share, to the degree that this spirit prevails among them, the same listlessness on the side of denominational unity and aggressiveness.

It cannot be contended, with truth either, that this has not any moral significance. It has the greatest moral interest and importance imaginable. Where the denominational or collective claim is strong, the standards are subject to constant correction and scrutiny. Where the individual feels bound to stand in harmonious and contributory relations to his fellow-denominationalists, his altruistic sense is stimulated, and the law of the whole becomes large on his horizon, and powerful

in determining his action and distributing his energies. Whatever may be the effect in other spheres of activity, religious life and power cannot be maintained without a highly developed spirit of collectivism. When it is excessive, it leads to the repulsive forms of sectarianism and proselytism. But even this form of it, actuated as it usually is by a missionary impulse, is vastly to be preferred to the lassitude of approaching death. John Burroughs tells us that the sweetest song-birds in America are also the fiercest fighters. This is not another form of the argument for the strenuous, that is, the quarrelsome life. It is merely saying that the finest emotions spring where the sense of power, which usually is inherent in the sense of collective strength and unity, is the strongest. Thus the "personal" theory defeats even the expectation and hope of highly developed and interesting emotions. Extreme personalism means, ultimately, sterility, spiritual and moral.

INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM IN UNITY ONLY.

The mainspring of the movement and the type of thought with which we have been dealing was the desire for freedom in life, self-development, and faith. From one cause and another traditional theology had become impossible to some, irksome to many, and powerless with a great many more. Freedom hitherto has meant an attack on something or a revolt from something. Hence it was a natural supposition that institutional life of any kind stood for the reduction of the individual to some kind of bondage, and the church, and indeed all institutions which required any kind of subordination to the law of the whole, became in the eyes of many the instruments of oppression. Now in what has been said let no one suppose that there is the slightest intimation that it arises from any desire to interfere in the slightest with the natural and perfectly sound instincts of mature and growing minds. Freedom

is the most precious heritage which the Reformation has left us. The dogmatic positions to which it led us are more or less vulnerable. Protestantism is a misnomer for the position toward which the Reformation strove. It cannot be in the mind of any one who is familiar with the New Testament to resign the ideal of catholicity or of a catholic church. But it cannot, either, be in the mind of any one to give over the right of private judgment, or indeed any part of that freedom which has been gained at so great a cost and maintained with such difficulty. But the alternative of papacy is not anarchy. And to deny a pope or a bishop is not to create a million lilliputian popes, each only a trifle less ignorant than the other, and none with dignity, self-command, and power enough to regulate himself, much less furnish inspiration for others! Freedom, then, must be maintained and developed and the individual must be kept inviolate for his highest growth and effectiveness. How shall that be attained? The simple answer is, that true freedom for the individual will be found in the unity of the brotherhood, in the law of the whole. The authority which once was the pope's and which many people thought could be transferred complete and without modification to the Bible, lies in neither, but in the collective consciousness of the church, as that church is inspired by the Spirit of God. There also lies the individual's freedom, and there only. All the discussion which leads away from this ideal is simply wandering in the wilderness. Separation from the common consciousness, and from the highway of common aspiration, common victory, and common defeat, is simply the isolation that first has the beguiling atmosphere of the pleasing and novel mystery, but that ends finally in the bog and the mire of darkness and moral death. Surely the age in which we live is intelligent enough to achieve compactness and solidarity of purpose and action,

without the fear of tyranny or the anxiety incident to anticipated sacerdotalism! What shall be said of our epoch of its organizing power, of its use of resources, of its intellectual alertness, of its readiness to apply its knowledge, if in the face of its greatest problem, namely the preservation of its religious life and organization, its freest individuals are to be kept from effective unity by the fear of bishops and the scarecrows of a possible papacy? There can be no severer indictment of our time than to deny to us this power, and forever make the souls that seek for effective service flee to a false and superficial unity in outward forms, because we make petty and transitory personal standards the apparent court of last resort for the religious life, and make personal theologies the method of instruction in religious thought. The revolt which led away from the extreme and unwholesome institutionalism and traditionalism, which may perhaps have stifled thought and hindered self-realization in some directions, was not more oppressive, and certainly was not as absurd and childish, as the present situation, in which the freest bodies in Christendom cannot formulate enough principles of unity to act in unison in the great business of the kingdom. It is for the individuals to know that in the law of the whole their freedom is secure. It is for the church to recognize that the methods of the Spirit of God are various, and that its security lies in the highest individual types which it can produce. These two basal truths, freedom and fellowship, form the pillars upon which strength and perpetuity rest. The first we have achieved, it remains for us to see whether we can maintain the second also.

There is in all that has been said no single word that is to be interpreted as a backward step from the great essential principles of the Protestant position. But eternal protest is not the state of a church going onward in spiritual conquest and

growth. The Holy Catholic Church never has been divided, and never can be divided. And a genuine catholicity has nothing in it that can interfere with the largest enjoyments of personal enrichment, inquiry, or growth. But if there is to be kept open a highway, it must be a highway, not a blind alley. If the historic advance of Christianity is not to end, like the Rhine River, in extinction, then the stream must be kept wide and deep, and the little streams of individual self-interest and self-development, even in devotion and spirituality, must flow into the great channel of the whole. Where the individual Christians all feel it needful to have the ritual modified to suit themselves, and the individual theologians all feel it necessary to add their "personal" touch, and the masses of the church at large are kept guessing whether these varieties of thought belong to the same class or not and whether the words used mean what they seem to mean, and have to carry on a perpetual game of hide-and-seek with symbolical meaning and critical guesses and economic theologies, the church may live; but it will be a weak, ill-fed, anæmic thing. In no respect is the need of the church so great at this moment as in this matter. If the mass of thinking men and women will come from the lanes and by-paths of personal self-assertion and self-gratification in which they have been wandering into the great common road of historic Christianity, and if the religious thinkers and preachers will all join in a grand and united affirmation of the simple essentials of the Christian gospel, and use the vernacular of common life, and deal with the processes and the practices with which common men are familiar, the tramp of the swelling forces will itself make a resounding that will awake echoes of the triumphant revivals of other days. Liberty has been achieved. Whether we can achieve the unity which is its custodian and protection, is the pressing question of the hour.

ARTICLE II.

IMPENDING CHANGES IN CONGREGATIONALISM.

BY MR. GEORGE PERRY MORRIS.

SOMETHING more than the fact that a new century has begun, makes a diagnosis of the age opportune. Thoughtful men realize that they are navigating waters where currents meet and surge; or, to change the figure, that they are living at a time when the topography of systems of belief and forms of polity are being changed by the heavings of fires within.

Landmarks that once were thought safe to steer by, and as everlasting, are gone. New peaks to guide the mariner have emerged. The tremors of the upheaval unnerve many, just as does the earthquake's weird and ominous thrill. There is an atmosphere of uncertainty as to the future, a disinclination to dogmatize; the mood of the hour is one of toleration, not only because some think it a lofty mood, but because others deem it a prudent mood. Reverent agnosticism is now permissible where formerly joyful certitude was thought to be indispensable. These are all signs of man's intuitive feeling or reasoned conviction that striking changes have come recently in the realm of theology and the realm of polity, and that other changes are impending.

Here and there pioneers who have forged ahead, fought with the enemy, explored the new territory, and sounded the depths of its streams and riches of its mines are certain that a New Epoch for Faith has arrived. But, to change the figure again and abruptly, the ground-swell of the storm which a few

have outridden or are outriding is still giving many a navigator—clerical and lay—serious qualms as to whether his anchors will hold if he elects to lie by, or whether his boat will breast and surmount the waves if he sails out into the gale and on the open sea.

What are some of the signs of the times?

Philosophical materialism is passing, but practical materialism is rife. Whether more or less than formerly is an open question on which wise and good men disagree, and it is not a question pertinent to this discussion. But that practical materialism is sufficiently diffused and dominant to cause some of the purest of American patriots and most loyal advocates of democracy to be pessimistic as to the future, will be conceded by all who are in touch with the thought of the time as it finds expression in sermon, current literature, and conversation. The state as an institution waxes mightier as men concede to it collective power formerly carefully retained by individuals. The school, symbolizing learning, multiplies numerically, adds to its endowment at a prodigious rate, both through gifts of individuals and public taxation, and grows in favor with Democracy, whether deemed an instrument for culture or for utilitarian ends. *Per contra*, both the church and the family wane in prestige and relative place in the social structure under the disintegrating influence of individualistic tendencies and standards of belief and conduct.

Economically and politically speaking, the individual man is losing much of his former liberty of choice, at the same time that domestically, intellectually, and spiritually he is gaining more. Authority is shifting from office to character, from institutions to individuals. It is becoming intrinsic rather than extrinsic, personal rather than official, at least in the church and family, and to some extent at least in the state.

Last, but not least, emphasis upon the subjective aspects of human thought and conduct, clearer knowledge of institutional origins, the growth of doctrine and development of codes of ethics; a passing over into the realm of Faith and Conduct of Science's dictum as to the relativity of truth; and man's accumulating knowledge, derived through induction, of the infinite variety of point of view which differing heredity, environment, attainment, and ambition among men make not only possible but certain—all these are subtly but surely working against an aforesaid spirit of dogmatism, against confidence in the finality of definitions and fixity of forms which formerly were the bulwark of religion on its creedal and institutional sides, and this among Protestants as well as among Roman Catholics; for with the former the Reformation brought only a partial break with the static or deposit theory of truth.

Here it is a time of flux; there a time of crystallization. Varieties of intellectual and spiritual climate in the same community and in the same church to-day are as many as the varieties of climate within the borders of the United States. Some live in and are content with the ideals of an individualistic gospel, a Jeffersonian democracy, a master-and-servant order of industry; others believe in "a world a subject of redemption," a republic playing the part of an elder brother with dependencies in tutelage, and do not fear to see the state gradually made supreme in industry, all citizens being partners. Some abide with satisfaction in provincialism and sectionalism; others welcome enlarged nationalism, and intensified race consciousness. Some are loyal, convinced, and unalterable sectarians; others labor for denominational federation, and others for organic church unity. Some are of Paul or Apollos, some of Calvin or Wesley; and others are believers

in the supremacy of the present Holy Spirit, and call no man master. Some conceive of God as transcendent but only immanent in a very unmoral and unspiritual way; others believe in him as preëminently immanent; others as immanent but also transcendent.

Some conceive of the church as an end in itself; others as a means to an end—the Kingdom of God, instrument or means undergoing expected and proper eclipse or extinction as the end is gained. Some are in the stage of analysis of all the fundamental beliefs of philosophy, theology, or ethics; others have passed into the stage of synthesis or reconstruction; some know nothing of either analysis or synthesis, of either philosophy or theology, but, with mystic faith, and reliance on data derived from personal experience of God and his love, live untroubled in a troublous time. Some are still courtiers of Science, and think her sovereign everywhere; while others understand that her realm hath its strict bounds, and look forward with hope to serving once more with undivided loyalty in the realms of philosophy and theology.

It is to churches as composite as these conditions would imply, that the clergyman of to-day is asked to minister with satisfaction to all; and the wonder is that, even when his own mind is clear and his own pathway straight before him, he is able as often as he is to serve with wisdom and to mutual edification, and of course he does it best and most surely when he is deeply religious, and appeals to the universal religious needs and aspirations in language that is vital, because born of the experience of ordinary men in all times at all stages of history. It is doubtful whether the average layman to-day who is immersed in business or burdened with civic responsibilities is conversant with the intellectual, spiritual, and administrative

problems of the clergy; or, if he is conversant, declares as often and fully as he should his sympathy for the clergy. The minister's task to-day is vastly more difficult than his father's or his grandfather's task—if the minister chance to be of a long line of divines; and when he succeeds, his victory is that much the greater, and more deserving of recognition and praise.

To an age, then, which is more inchoate, turbulent, and complex than any which has gone before; which, thanks to applied science, has accumulated means of living a more complex outer physical life faster than it has accumulated ethical motive and spiritual inspiration for the inner life, comes a polity like the Congregational, its form and its traditions—intellectual, spiritual, and social—making for simplicity, individuality, and emphasis upon personality; and they face each other, the simple polity and all its traditions emphasizing individualism and personality on the one hand, and on the other the ever more complex social structure, disposed in many of its most effective functionings as an organism to sacrifice the individual for the many. What is to be the outcome of this clash?

Loyalty to type, but constant adjustment to environment, may be assumed as a sound policy for one concerned with the healthy growth of an institution whether political or ecclesiastical. Unprejudiced scholars' investigations of the origins of the church in its many forms show the past workings of that law; and we have but to look about us to see how the Episcopal type of church government, whether Roman, Anglican, or Methodist Episcopal, has been altered by the irresistible democratic, individualistic atmosphere of the United States, creating within bodies which are nominally Episcopal a very large and ever-increasing measure of Congregationalism. This process in this country has been the fruit of the impact of political ideals upon ecclesiastical. Democracy in state, and assertion

of individual rights in the forum, has been echoed in the church courts, and done its modifying work. Now there is seen clearly impending, as the result of economic and industrial changes and the ever-increasing influence of trade and commerce upon all political relations, national and international, a new era in which both state and church will be affected by the environment with its new ideals,—ideals that have to do more with administration than with belief, with service than with faith, with polity than with creed. And as the environment of the world has affected the church in this country in the past, congregationalizing Episcopacy, so the tendencies and ideals of the future bid fair to episcopize Congregationalism, the ultimate end seemingly being a polity which has place for both the supervising principle as it conserves effective administration, and the independent principle as it guards intellectual and spiritual liberty, ritual variety, and local, lay control of the purse, and choice of clergy.

No one facing the life of the American people to-day can deny that we live in a time when the humanistic, Hellenistic aspects and theories of life are competing with the Hebraic and Puritan ideals of our fathers; and the problem for the Christian church is to keep the ancient and honored Jew, and welcome the young and suspected Greek; and prove to each that there is room for him in the family of God.

Who is so ignorant or dense as to fail to see that this generation has an altered attitude toward Nature, and that there is a growing recognition of Nature's capacity to minister not only to man's physical betterment, but also to his spiritual elevation? Art, which, even where in former days it had its devotees among the descendants of the Puritan settlers of New England, was a closed preserve kept for the wealthy or well-to-do, is now becoming the open demense of the many. Jour-

nalism, popular education, cheap and comfortable modes of travel, and private generosity to museums of art plus intelligent vending of art-products by our merchants,—all these factors are conspiring both to stimulate and satisfy instincts which were latent in our forefathers, but which were either suppressed entirely or starved both in the home life and the church worship of most of our Pilgrim and Puritan ancestors; and this because there was no place for beauty in the philosophy of the day nor in its theology. The dominant note was that of ascetism, mortification of the flesh, and a boycott of that which was symbolical or æsthetic.

Now the beauty and holiness of bodily strength and perfection of physical development and functioning is taught in our public schools, urged in our newspapers, and inculcated in our homes. Spiritual and mental health are now known to be conditioned by physical health more than we ever dared believe in former times. Life in the open air and intelligent conservation of health are increasing the stature of our youth, enhancing their physical beauty and strength, and making them fitter for parenthood.

There is a revolt, too, based on reason and having the backing of science, against the ascetic standards of the past, and against the prohibitory mood. Temperance and sobriety are the ideal. Self-realization by proper development of all the powers, rather than by deprivation or extirpation of any powers, is a popular and increasingly commanding philosophy of life among the more intelligent and high-minded folk of this country. In addition, on the philosophical and psychological sides, there is a new conception of the valid place of the imagination as a factor in religion, a clearer understanding of the ancient origin of symbolism and its rational basis, and juster appreciation of the valid place of the formal and ritualistic as-

pects of religion kept within right bounds and co-existent with spontaneous prayer, testimony, and exhortation.

Some of the practical aspects of this phase of our problem are obvious, and pertinent to all the Reformed churches, but especially to descendants of the Puritans. Our fathers and mothers and we of this generation have been trained for our life in a world chiefly of the understanding. But our children in their public or private schools are being trained in the worlds of the imagination and the affections as well as in the realm of the understanding. Their school life, their play life, are lives of emphasis on beauty as well as on duty, on loving aright as well as thinking accurately and logically. This discipline, especially among girls, continues if they go to college; the impulse governs and the ideal abides when they become wives and adorn their homes, and train their children. It has a cumulative effect, shaping their attitude toward the drama, the opera, poetry, the plastic arts, athletic games, use of time in studying Nature, and the like.

Nevertheless, most of the Protestant churches go calmly on, expecting that children and youth so trained and so regarding life, will, when they enter the realms of religion and of social worship, still be satisfied with the barren meeting-house, the ascetic ideal in ethics, and the chance that the preacher in his spontaneous prayers and in his sermon may appeal to the imagination and to the feelings of his hearers as well as to their understandings.

No one can compare what *is done* unchallenged now in our leading non-liturgical denominations with what *was not done* a generation ago, without realizing that, in our larger centers of population and in our wealthier churches at least, there has been some adaptation of services and code of conduct to the spirit of the age. But it has been in the main the choice of lo-

cal churches, the influence of individuals in the pulpits; it yet has to get the sanction of denominations as such, or to profit by any constructive ecclesiastical statesmanship directed toward enrichment of the worship of all the churches, and toward formulation of a less rigorous, saner, disciplinary code.

This humanistic movement has too many agents, educational, journalistic, and social, back of it to be resisted. An ever-increasing number of people each year, the dwellers in the small towns as well as those in the cities, are affected by it. Failure to reckon with it, to adapt polity and message to it, will mean a lessened hold of the church on sections of the population that hitherto have contributed much to the strength of the churches, namely graduates of schools and colleges, and the traveled well-to-do.

Churches with polities that limit the authority of executive officials, that emphasize the rights of local churches, that assert the voluntary principle, are being made aware also of another group of social phenomena which are adverse to the democratic, loosely coördinated polity of Congregationalism, or the representative polity of Presbyterianism.

In the state life of to-day it is a time when emphasis is being put upon the common race-tie rather than upon tribal differences, upon imperial rather than upon national or provincial prestige, upon federal powers rather than upon state rights; and if it be a matter of municipal government, then upon the city's welfare as a whole rather than on neighborhood wishes. Moreover, democracy, in its distrust of its legislative representatives, is not only relying more and more upon power delegated and vested constitutionally in executives, to bring to pass such ends in government as it conceives best for itself, but it is putting more and more discretionary legislative power into the hands of administrative officials, finding that it

makes for celerity of execution, efficiency in action, and honesty of administration. Likewise in matters of legislation, there is a disposition to make it as uniform in its provisions and range as possible, local caprice or whim or honest conviction even counting for less with lawmakers than formerly. Differentiation of individual belief and practice, if making for social waste or inefficiency, is being abolished. The ideal of political government to-day is a maximum of efficiency and economy with a minimum of interference with individual rights and points of view, but the emphasis is coming to be more on duties, less on rights; more on the social good, less on the individual's preference and will.

Much the same condition of things is found if we turn to the administration of the international policing of the world. Military authority centralizes more and more in a general staff of experts, who, both in peace and war, study out those courses of strategy, those policies of equipment and handling of masses of men, on which victory in war hinges. Their joint opinion and common policy, the product of combined expert advice, is seen to be a safer reliance than the genius of any individual extemporizing his plan of campaign after war is declared.

In commerce and industry the movement of events is all in the same direction. Combination and not competition is the word of the hour. A maximum of product with a minimum of expenditure of capital, of superintending skill, of labor, and of consumption of raw material; avoidance of all duplication of unnecessary machinery, and swift destruction of all machinery that is superseded; recognition of special creative and administrative aptitudes; employment of the expert,—these are some of the ideals which hover before our captains of industry in their effort to better American industrial and commercial conditions while they forget not to enrich themselves at the same time.

If we turn to education, the drift is the same way. The district as a school unit has passed away; the town with its central school and free transportation of pupils to it has taken its place as the unit of administration. Authority is centered more and more in expert superintendents and principals, and less in local boards of education who are direct representatives of the parents of the pupils. In many of our States where the educational system is crowned by the state university, its curriculum and standards influence and shape the curricula of the secondary and primary schools of the state, rather than they deciding its courses. In education, the expert has arrived, and with him and with uniformity of administrative scheme the vagaries of the non-expert and the independence of the local community and the individual parent are passing.

To be sure, along with this emphasis upon the larger units in government, this centralization of power in the hands of executives, boards of strategy, superintendents, etc., there also is—in the realm of the State for instance—frank recognition of the fact that municipal affairs must not be interfered with unduly, and that there often has been too much explicit, special legislation by States on matters better left to local officials. Never more than now in the art of war was it so important that privates and subordinate officers should have intelligence and initiative, and ability to fight out the battle after it has begun, each man for himself. Smokeless powder and new weapons of war have forced entire reconstruction of strategy, and diminished the importance of officers in time of battle, and have greatly magnified the importance of the private soldier, his intelligence and his initiative. Never did moral worth and individual capacity count for more in business than they do to-day with the vast concentration of power and responsibility in the hands of fewer men, nor was the need

of these qualities ever more acute in the ranks of organized labor, as the number of trades-unionists increases and their activity and power wax; while, in the sphere of education, the dominating thought with our best educators, back of all their concentration of administrative authority and uniformity of action on broad administrative and pedagogical lines, is the hope of conserving the individuality of the pupil.

The point to be kept in mind, however, is, that in statecraft, in the art of war, in commerce and industry, and in education, where "community of interest" is the watchword, where closer articulation of administrative parts is going on and centralization of power, and where economy of operation, swiftness of movement, and a maximum of results are the aims in view, the motive for it all is not the overriding of rights, but the better execution of duties; not enduement with power for power's sake, but for what power may do for beneficent ends. No one really believes, for instance, that this country is any less of a democracy in essence because the Federal Executive, with the flight of time and the evolution of the nation, has come to exercise power not definitely delegated to him, and which, as to the specific form it may take, is left to his own discretion. Nor do any of us really think that the transformed United States Army, with its general staff and up-to-date scientific scheme of organization,—the fruit of Hon. Elihu Root's marked gifts as an administrator,—is to be an instrument for our own oppression or the subjugation of others, or any the less effectively administered because scientifically organized. Nor do we as parents rise up and howl with indignation because our educational curricula, and our expenditures for education to a greater extent than formerly, are less a matter of our own determining and more that of experts.

Now it is men of the world, laymen in the pews, more or less conversant with the reasons lying back of these transformations in the administrative realm of the state and of business (but fully aware of them as facts), who come to inspection of the administrative side of American church life, and note inevitably the emphasis of individual or local independence, the absence of any vivid, abiding sense among the Christians of a given community of their mission to it as a community; the failure to federate for natural and legitimate ends; the competition within denominations and among denominations of agencies having the same ends in view; the duplication of theological seminaries, colleges, academies, periodicals, and missionaries, all aiming for the same thing, but calling for rival sets of officials and duplication of gifts. Facing the contrast between the way of the world and the way of the church, the layman begins to ask, whether it may not be now that the church has come to a point where it must be affected by the world, as well as the world be affected by it.

In the movements toward organic Christian unity between Presbyterian, Methodist, and Congregational brethren now taking shape in Australia and Canada, it has been very evident that the laity have favored the effort being made, if for no other reason than that it would put an end to the wasteful competition on home missionary fields, that it would settle educational problems involved in the rivalry and maintenance of competing theological schools and colleges, and that it would conserve the effective basal principles of both Congregationalism and Presbyterianism, namely the independence of the local church and the fellowship and supervisory power of the churches as a group. Along with the theoretical idealism of the clergy making for organic unity, along with the disintegrating influence on old opinions of investigations of church

historians showing the natural origin of polities and their primitive adaptation to conditions, suggesting present like adaptation, goes this demand of the laity, who control the state, pay the taxes for war, carry on the world's commerce, and endow the great schools and colleges, who are saying to those who would make much of old causes of difference, such as baptismal rites, metaphysical distinctions in Christology, apostolic origins and ordination, etc: "A truce to all your divisive cries and jarring notes. Get together in the spirit of adoration of a common Master, and joint service of men, quit doing twentieth-century tasks with machinery several centuries old, and stop your wasting rivalry."

Being in this mood, and under the spell of great dominant ideas in church and state, industry and education, that are to rule for this generation at least, the laity are in a mood to force the ecclesiastical reforms they deem necessary, by starving their opponents who obstruct, if it becomes necessary to use such drastic measures. One thing is certain, the laity of the country will not put money out freely for church uses until there is ecclesiastical reform. Pending which, they will give the Young Men's Christian Association unlimited capital because of its flexibility, swift adaptation to new conditions and problems, and concrete results easily ascertainable, as easily so as on any other capital invested. Money will continue to flow into the treasuries of libraries, colleges, hospitals, and altruistic agencies at a rate never approached in any other land at any other time. The Christian church will only get the layman's money on a generous scale when it develops ecclesiastical statesmen, and there is crying need of such in every denomination to-day—men who will rise above the controversies of past centuries, sacramental, doctrinal, and political, and will impress upon

their sectarian associates that the twentieth century has its own vital problems for the church, no one of which is so important just now, as the adaptation of the forms of institutional religion to the century's ideals of belief and service. Religion was never so strongly intrenched; institutional religion never was so weak relatively in men's hearts and so on the defensive.

ARTICLE III.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A POLITICAL SYSTEM
IN THE EARLY CHRISTIAN CHURCH

BY THE REVEREND FREDERICK W. HASS, S. T. B.

THE contrast between the original form of government in the Christian church and the forms prevailing at the time of Constantine the Great strikes us, at first notice, as being a remarkably strange manifestation. When Christianity first appeared, it consisted of a group of twelve friends, rallying about one who was their leader and whom they called Master. Among themselves the disciples were all equal, and the instruction of the Master was to the effect that they should remain so; that, if any one of them should desire to be the greatest among them, the same should be the least of all and the servant of all. Therein he himself set the standard. Not only were the cares of the little band borne by him, but, in a never-to-be-forgotten scene, he had performed for them the menial task of feet-washing, in order that he might impress upon them the lesson, that, among his disciples, not the greatest acquirements, but the greatest service, should be the mark of honor. It was a purely paternal form of government,¹ and, with one exception, i. e., Judas, the disciples seem to have been fully won over to it. From the account of the church at Jerusalem we learn how they sought to introduce it into that congregation.

Three hundred years later, this form of government has been largely superseded. The organization of the church has

¹ Ritschl, *Die Entstehung der Alt Katholischen Kirche*.

been almost entirely transformed. Instead of a paternal form of government resting upon the equal suffrage of all, we have a highly developed form of aristocracy. There are three chief dignitaries,—the bishops of Rome, Antioch, and Alexandria. Of these three, one, i. e., the bishop of Rome, is already obtaining a growing advantage over the other two, which eventually led to his claiming supremacy over them. Below these three are numerous other bishops; associated with these latter, and to a large degree dependent upon them, are other officials, such as presbyters, deacons, and teachers. All these officers are separated by rights and privileges from the lay members of the church. Their positions are generally held for life, or else until they take a step upward in the organization; and, while the laity still influence, both directly and indirectly, the election of these officers, yet the layman as such is not considered at all equal to even the least of these. The church has become an immense hierarchy. It has made a great departure from the Master's ideal. Yet, as we study this development closely, we find that, under the conditions of that time, it was perfectly natural, and perhaps inevitable.

The beginning of Christianity was the beginning of a revolution. Not such a revolution as affects chiefly the political life of a people, as did the English Revolution of 1648 or the American Revolution of 1776; but rather such a revolution as was the Reformation or the great French Revolution. These latter differ from the former in the respect that, while political changes may be a part of their program or may take place because of them, yet such political changes are not the principal object in view. Their purpose goes deeper than that: they seek to affect the very foundation of the social fabric. The political changes wrought by the Reformation were not at all its purpose, and do not completely measure its influence.

Rather the Reformation grew out of the fact that mankind had come to understand again the worth of the individual soul in the eyes of God; which is an entirely different thing from a political change, and is much more vital. Again, the changes in forms of state government which characterize French history from 1789 to 1815 are of themselves not sufficient to give a true idea of the importance of the French Revolution. That movement is important rather because it banished the last remnants of feudalism from Western Europe. Both these movements were the results of a social development which had been going on for generations. Both were bound to come sometime in some form or other, because the spirit which occasioned them could not find free expression in existing institutions. Hence it must modify or destroy these.

This applies even more fully to Christianity. Bringing to the world a new message, which contained as one of its principal features the fact of man's kinship to God, it must perforce build up for itself a new system of ethics. It must also make war upon all existing institutions which could not express this high ethical standard. Now, to the ancient world, the individual had no worth in himself: only as a citizen of the state did he possess real worth. Only in connection with the state could the individual claim the rights of personality: apart from the state he was despised, and considered unworthy of attention. This is the moral principle which underlay all jurisprudence, and its application for the ancient world was general. The philosophers who show us the real spirit of ancient ethics always describe the state as the highest end and purpose. All virtuous activity was included in its service: aside from such service nothing possessed moral value. This is the standard by which all actions were judged, and upon which all institutions were founded.

But, to all this, Christianity could only give its uncompromising protest. It had learned from the Master that a man made an unprofitable bargain in gaining the whole world if he thereby lost his soul. It had come to believe, that, long after the world, with all its states and their power, had passed away, the soul would still exist immortal and indestructible. It possessed a profound sense of the authority of conscience, of the reality of sin and righteousness, of the dissimilarity of Providence and Fate. Hence it could not accept the codes of ethics which had been handed down from the past. The new principles compelled Christianity to create anew the forms of human life and activity. In his thought and in his worship, at work and at business, at home and in society, in times of peace and of war, the Christian was compelled to vary his methods from the methods of those about him. At first, the importance of this change in life methods was not estimated at its real worth. But it was not long before its true significance dawned upon both the Christian and the heathen. It could not be otherwise: the cleavage was too absolute. Already we find Paul calling upon the Corinthian Christians to come out, and be separate from the uncleanness of those about them; and to the Philippians he wrote that they were in the midst of a crooked and perverse generation, among whom they shone as lights in the world. Such calls as these were repeated again and again by the successive leaders in the church.

To understand how great was the cleavage between Christian and heathen life, we need only consider the attitude of Christianity toward a few of the institutions of the times. For example, let us take the case of slavery. The lack of a proper estimate of the worth of the individual soul or of any idea of an universal humanity, and with this the utter absence of anything like international law, had, as a natural result, the cus-

tom that all prisoners of war became slaves, and all their descendants remained so. Designed for all those kinds of work of which the free citizen of the state felt ashamed, they were deprived of all rights of men. They were regarded as chattels rather than as persons; at the best as only a secondary class of persons, with which idea a classification of them with other animate and inanimate property was thoroughly compatible. These were the conceptions held by Plato and Aristotle. It is true that certain of the Stoics later modified these opinions, conceding personality to slaves, and describing their lot as accidental rather than inherent. But these conceptions never became general among the heathen, and there never was any real attempt to outline a code of duties toward slaves to be respected and obeyed by the free. On the contrary, Roman history to the very end is full of incidents showing the most cruel and inconsiderate treatment of slaves by their masters. Even men like Cicero¹ had seemingly no appreciation of the sacrilege to humanity.

Christianity found this institution full grown, yet it immediately attacked it. Not openly and directly, for that would have been to engage in a political revolution at an unseasonable time; but by the equally certain though slower and more indirect method of emphasizing the Christian principle of brotherhood. Christian masters no longer looked upon their Christian slaves as mere servants, but also as beloved brethren. Numerous instances are given of masters freeing their slaves,² "because their sonship with God put an end to their servitude to men." In all classic literature there is no analogy to Paul's letter to Philemon. Yet the early church included this letter in the canon, which proves their continued position in opposition to slavery.

¹ Sheldon, *History of the Early Church.*

² Schaff, *History of the Christian Church.*

Or let us take the question of poverty. Since, to classic thought, only those actions are virtuous which are directly connected with the service of the state, a very low estimate was placed upon the service of the common laborer. In order to find time to serve the state, a person must be largely free from the necessity of manual labor, must have leisure from petty personal cares. It is only to be expected, then, that, at the height of classic culture, we should meet with an aristocratic contempt of manual labor, as of something which made a person incapable of virtue, and darkened the mind. To be sure, the state needed farmers and tradesmen. But such persons should not have part in public affairs; they do not deserve the privilege of citizenship; their work has only indirect value. From this aristocratic notion, one can judge how little consciousness there must have been as to the duty of charity toward the poor. Poverty was considered to be an evil, against which a person must by all means guard himself. It was thought that it dishonored a person, and that only the vicious could be willing to carry the burdens it brought. The poor man was thought to be incapable of honesty and wisdom; he was expected to be a liar and a perjurer. And when it happened that the honesty and wisdom of some poor person could not be denied, the conviction still held that even the greatest virtues could not cover the shame which poverty brought.

But in Christianity this estimate is entirely subverted. It is the poor to whom the gospel is preached, and the rich will hardly enter the kingdom of heaven. A certain predisposition to trust in God is assumed when dealing with the poor; but a genuine faith in God is expected to be lacking to the rich in the degree in which they trust in their wealth. Christ himself had announced the equality of rich and poor in rela-

tion to the kingdom of God, when he declared the providing, fatherly care of God for all. His own appearance among the lowliest was proof to the church that the beggar and the emperor were equal in the eyes of the High Judge. And so the church regarded wealth as having moral value only when the power which goes with it was used in the service of God and man.

Probably the greatest divergence between Christian and heathen life is seen when we consider the relation of both to family life. In classic thought, family life was virtuous, because only thus could the state be supplied with the best citizens and soldiers. The depths of degradation to which this low conception of marriage led, are indescribable. The relations between the sexes became rotten through and through; first in Greece, and then in Rome. It could hardly be otherwise, since there was no worthy ideal. This ideal, however, was supplied by the message of Christianity. The peculiar application of the principle of love which Christ had announced, gave the marriage bond a significance in the Christian church which it never could have had under classic philosophy. In order to show the sanctity of family life with a Christian setting, Paul compares the marriage relation to the relation existing between Christ and the church. Men were to love their wives as Christ loved the church, and wives were to obey their husbands as the church obeyed Christ. The declaration of the church fathers also proves that the words of Paul did not remain empty talk; but that, under God, they became the means of a thorough reorganization of family life in the church. With this was given the foundation of a whole new system of morals.

In regard to these fundamental questions and to many common usages,—such as, emperor worship, libations, and

sacrifices to idols, pulbic games and the bearing of arms,¹—the effect wrought by the higher conception of the worth of the individual soul can be clearly seen. The principles of Christianity were raising up a different kind of life than was lived among the heathen. Between the two systems of life there could be no compromise: they were diametrically opposite to each other.² There must be a battle to the death. Either the Christian principles must prove themselves unworkable, or the institution founded upon classic philosophy must be destroyed.

In order to be successful in this struggle, Christianity was compelled to reorganize itself. It must detail specific duties for certain persons, and then set apart fit persons to fulfill those duties. The church gradually became conscious of the task it had undertaken. It gradually came to realize that it was a world-wide movement, and must organize a world-wide system of administration. This administration gradually came to include almost every detail of life. The first officers of this administration were the apostles. The next officers after these were the seven deacons chosen at Jerusalem, whose duty it was to care for the widows and others who were specially needy. But soon other officers are needed. In order to settle the disputes to which the Christians, as human beings, were still liable, it was next found necessary to institute boards of arbitration, as Paul advises (1 Cor. vi. 1-4); for the Christians could not hope to get satisfactory decisions in a Roman court. If the judge really gave justice according to Roman law, that might still be very far removed from the Christian conception of justice, since the moral standards were so different. Then, as the church soon came to have special legislation concerning slavery, charity, marriage, worship,

¹ Tertullian, *Apologia*, xxxviii.

² Aristides: *ὅτι ἐν τῶν τετάρων.*

and general conduct, it was but natural that these boards of arbitration should develop into regular courts, which should judge all offenses against this special legislation. Therefore we soon have the bishops, elected from out the boards of presbyters to a permanent presidency of the same, with special duties in the way of chief justice.¹ These officers were especially needed in the troublous times of the development of the church doctrine. To the bishops were also confided special duties in connection with the general education, upon which the church from the beginning placed great emphasis.

But in all this work,—charity, legislation, judiciary, and education—we have left the field which naturally belongs to the church, and have entered the domain which, by general consent, ought to be covered by the activity of the state. The germs of a state lay in the very foundations of this administrative system; and, as it was developed, the church itself developed into a semi-independent, political body, a sort of republic within, yet distinct from, the imperial government. It was the need of this extended administration in the early church which was the direct occasion of that development of political forms which is so characteristic of its later history. So perfectly were these forms of state government developed, that, when Constantine the Great decided to recognize the Christian religion officially, it was only necessary to recognize the legality of the courts, in order to embody the whole administration of the church into the machinery of the government of the Empire.

Whether or not this development of a political system was the cause of the religious decline which only a little later becomes so apparent in the life of the church, will probably always be an open question. The defenders of the system give

¹Lightfoot, *Dissertation on Paul's Epistle to the Philippians*.

other and seemingly good reasons for this decline. On the other hand, there has always been a tendency in some circles to place great emphasis upon this development as being the cause of much evil, as being even an indication of an absence of the Holy Spirit. Thus church reformers have generally insisted upon going back to the first, or at least to the second, century, for their ideals of church government. The movement was toward those forms now characterizing the Roman Catholic Church; and many of those to whom this denomination is only the Babylon of the book of Revelation, have given to the primitive church the chief blame for all those things which they have found objectionable in Roman Catholicism. But the facts of the matter are that the church was compelled by the nature of its task to take upon itself some definite form; that nothing was more natural than that it should therein accommodate itself to the prevalent Roman forms of government, and might even do this unconsciously, as Ramsay¹ argues; that the great majority of Christians thought it necessary to organize in this manner; that they emphasized the dignity of their church officers because they thought this the best way to guard against heresy and schism; finally, that the wisdom of the plan seems to be proven by the fact, that, while there were large sections of the Christian church which would not unite organically with the early Catholic church, nearly all these have disappeared, and we owe the vital Christianity of to-day to the labors of those who labored within the main organization.

It is the common result of a thorough unprejudiced study of these times, that one leaves such study with a strong admiration for these early Christians, and a devout thankfulness to God for their self-sacrifice and work; with a more lively

¹ *The Church in the Roman Empire.*

hope for the future of the church, and a greater faith in all mankind. Says Harnack: "If one takes into consideration that the foundations for everything orthodox up to the present day were laid in the second century, one can only wonder at the magnitude of the work done. To the reproachful questions: 'How was it possible that you could depart so far from your original form? What has become of you?' the church at the beginning of the third century might have answered: 'Well, I have developed into this. I have been obliged to throw off much, and again to take much upon myself. I have been compelled to do battle; my body is covered with scars, and my robe is covered with dust. But I have won victories and have done constructive work. I have beaten back polytheism; I have shown the worthlessness of a state religion, and have almost destroyed this monster; I have not hearkened unto the seductions of a profound religious philosophy, but have opposed successfully to this last the thought of an almighty God of creation; finally, I have built a great building, a fortress with turrets and bulwarks, wherein I guard my treasures and protect the weak.' Thus she might have answered, and she would have spoken the truth."¹

The Christian church was destined to be a social power because of the contrast of her ethics to antique culture, already approaching the last stages of decay. Because of circumstances, she was compelled to establish such fixed forms as would keep her externally independent and internally harmonious. Thus, as a state within the Roman state, she came out of every persecution purified and strengthened; and she finally awakened universally the idea, already existing in the minds of Trajan and Pliny the Younger, that she must either be destroyed or else would bring about the destruction of the

¹ *Wesen des Christenthums*, p. 122.

imperial government. This thought occasioned the last and most terrible persecution, the one under Diocletian. But when this also miscarried, Constantine felt himself compelled to formally recognize the church. In doing this, he put the seal upon the most wonderful social revolution in the history of mankind. Yet it was a political idea, and not a religious conviction, which led Constantine to this step; and it was not to the church as a religious body, but to the church as a political power, to which he sacrificed the hitherto prevailing principles of imperial government.

ARTICLE IV.

THE BIBLICAL CRITICISM OF THE PRESENT DAY.¹

BY THE REVEREND ABRAHAM KUYPER, D.D., LL.D.—TRANSLATED BY THE REVEREND J. HENDRIK DE VRIES, D.D.

BUT some of you may say, Is there no good whatever in the biblical criticism of the present day? Is it merely a stumbling over straws and a game of critical splitting of hairs? Or have you not heard of the very serious charges which are laid against the views of the ancient church? Did not these grave assertions, which, in spite of ourselves, compelled our scientific mind to agree with them, ever disturb your scientific conscience? And, if so, how can you harmonize your beautiful confession with them?

In response to which inquiries, allow me a single word, which, if it does not engage itself with particulars, holds itself true to principle and motive.

First, as it appears to me, the gigantic labor which our critics have devoted to the Scripture, is by no means lost. On the contrary, I have the firm conviction that in the end, and under God's gracious disposal, even the excesses of the most radical Scripture-anatomists will be productive of good. How could it ever be unimportant and to no purpose, as far as principle and reverence allow it, to study the origin of the Holy Scripture in the processes of its entering upon existence; to point out the seams where the pieces of the shining robe have been so beautifully woven together; and in a better way than was ever done before to frame, if not with mathematical cer-

¹ Concluded from page 442.

tainty at least with conjecture, the circle in whose midst, the author by whom, and the time in which, a book of Scripture originated? So little do I aim at the abandonment of these studies, that I would no sooner sanction an official ban upon these vivisectional excesses and physiological indelicacies with the *Corpus Scripturæ* than with the *corpus humanum*. But if, in the circle of the medical sciences, these vivisectional excesses and physiological violations of common chastity are not prohibited by law, has not the nobler-minded *medicus* the right, in virtue of the principle itself of his science,—i. e. in the name of the human character that belongs to it, because it has the home for its object,—to protest against these shameful cruelties, and the no less shameful indelicacies, as indecent and unlawful? Or, is it not true that in his bodily appearing man ceases to be worthy of the honor of furnishing an object for a separate science, when, treating the animal cruelly and himself having become bestial, he degrades himself to being little better than a *corpus vile*? And have we no equal rights, when it concerns the *Corpus Scripturæ*, to enter our complaints on the ground of the absence of feeling in the vivisectioners and the offensive profanities of the Scripture-physiologists; not in spite, but in the name, of our science; both because, by their actions, the principle itself of theology is violated, and because a patchwork quilt such as they make the Scripture to be does no longer reward the trouble of scientific investigation.

I welcome the finest perception by the senses (*αἰσθησις*), also, in the domain of criticism. But even as our nerves and brains, the critical organ also can suffer from hyperæsthesia, so that it cannot do other than observe incorrectly; thus reaching that inharmonious condition which makes every noise seem louder, every touch more startling, and every uneven-

ness the rougher to its sense. Such a hyperæsthesis becomes a power that governs the patient, the irresistible impulse of which is heightened by one's very efforts to resist. Wherefore not every one who announces himself needs to be heard, nor is all criticism indiscriminately to be taken into account, but it must first be determined, by the principle of theology itself, whether we deal with a normal observer, or with one who, abnormally excited, is not able to criticise correctly.

Finally, the Holy Scripture condemns the world and the spirit it that governs it. Hence nothing can be more natural than that this spirit of the world, which has made itself so strongly felt in this age, should bend its energies toward the breaking-down of the authority of the Scripture. Either it must bend before the Scripture or the Scripture must bend to it, and it cannot be otherwise than that the spirit which inspires the world, must wage inexorable war against the spirit that inspired the Scripture. The antithesis formed by the two is diametrical. And since we also, who are investigators of the Scripture, have drunk of the spirit of the world, the danger is possible that our biblical criticism may adopt a tentative character, whereby, under the mask of honoring it, our study of the Scripture may tend to undermine its authority. This presumption has indeed become a probability by this single fact, that many men who attach no significance whatever to the Scripture, and scarcely believe in it at all, devote to it the best parts of their life and the choicest of their powers.

The principle of theology itself, therefore, must needs watch against the degeneration of her scientific and sacred character, both as regards the extent of the principle, the æsthesis of the investigator, and that which determines the tendency of the investigation. Hence I do not plead for conservatism. If that were my aim, I could readily make my task much

lighter by setting up Reuss against Kuenen, Schultz against Reuss, and the collaborators of Lange's Commentaries against Schultz, in order finally to assume for my own responsibility only so much as the most conservative have yielded to the claim of criticism. But what would this avail? For the sake of secondary considerations, conservatism merely disparages theories whose validity one is bound to honor, and principles to whose spread one is prepared to devote his energies. There is no strength in this. And therefore I make no appeal at the bar of conservatism, but ask the encyclopedia of our science, what the proper principle of theology here both allows and disallows. And when, with respect to this radical question, we grant that theology, as was shown in the beginning of this article, having not the *creaturely* but the *Creator* as object, takes no observations, but, in direct distinction from all other sciences, *becomes* sensible of facts, so that in the science of theology it is not the spirit of the subject but the spirit of the object which is the active investigator, it follows immediately that all study, which, as shown by its results, has ceased to be the instrument in the employ of God the Holy Spirit, falls, *eo ipso*, outside the boundaries of the theological domain. This is a position which, from the nature of the case, is absolutely devoid of strength to our opponents, and therefore is not intended for those, who, after having embalmed theology, i. e. "the science of God," have proclaimed that the science of "Religion" is queen; but which I maintain in its entirety in the face of every one who still professes with us to be priests in the temple of *theology*.

As long as we desire to be theologians, we may never raise the building of our science, save under and in the service of God the Holy Spirit, since he is our only Architect and Master-

builder. Thus if, as a measure of safety, we apply this principle first to another part of this science, we, as theologians, are in duty bound to dismiss the free-will services in the domain of ethics of both Martensen, the mediating theologian, and Van der Goltz, the full-blooded ethical, since the one condoned and called good the violation of an oath, and the other the violation of the commandment of honesty in persons of high station [Von Bismarck was here referred to]. The works of both these masters fall short of the seal of the Holy Spirit, and are as such, *eo ipso*, refused admittance, as contraband, at the theological frontier, where the blade of the cherub glitters, and the *Spiritus Creator* is worshiped as *Omnium Solus Doctor*.

If now we apply this same standard to the study of the Holy Scripture, the leading thought which we reach will be as follows:—

1. That every view, according to which what is holy can appear in the form of a lie, and by which, under the use of the shameful invention of the so-called “pious fraud,” the Holy Spirit is made to counteract his own deepest character, must be rejected, as being based upon an erroneous investigation. To pretend, for instance, that in books which one accepts as canonical the Holy Spirit represents myths as history, and places before us a *vaticinium ex eventu* in a false form as prophecy, is to attribute absurdities to that Spirit which are inconsistent with his integrity.

2. Each theory—and this will be considered a little more at length—must equally be dismissed, whose result antagonizes what the Holy Spirit asserts in the Scripture concerning the Scripture.

No one denies that the Holy Scripture comes to us with an absolute principle. It asserts, indeed, that, all “wisdom” of the world is “foolishness”; that only the Spirit, who

speaks of himself as the searcher of all things, can teach us wisdom; and that, for this reason, every creaturely spirit must subject itself in its thinking, speaking, and acting, now and eternally, to that Spirit. This places us before an absolute dilemma; a choice with no way of escape. For this principle must either be contested, by doing which return is made to the wisdom of the world; or this principle must be accepted, and this gives it the right of way across the entire domain of our studies. With those who chose the first member of this dilemma, we can have no further dealings here: for them there exists no longer any Scripture. But of those who made the better choice, and who with joy and with an undivided heart have said "Amen" to this absolute Scripture-principle, we ask in all seriousness, "What claim is made in the Holy Scripture which it announces concerning itself as *Scripture*?"

And here our way separates itself irrevocably from that of the ethicals. For when we reach this point, the ethicals say: "This you must determine from the facts as they present themselves to you in that Scripture; and if you find errors there, it but shows, *eo ipso*, that the Scripture does not pretend to be infallible." This, however, is no correct process of reasoning, and I reject it on these two decisive grounds: (1) because, sanction to pass such a judgment is only conceivable when one is in possession of the autographs themselves,—for, as the case now stands, it is possible that errors have crept in later on in what was written without error; and (2) because the self-witness of the Holy Spirit concerning his own work is far more authoritative than the judgment which you, O fallible man, form on the ground of this work of the Spirit. In a child, indeed, it would be presumptuous and disrespectful if he formed conclusions from his father's doings that are contradictory to the conscious self-witness of the father; and

how can you dare to pass criticism upon the self-consciousness of the Scripture when you have no other standard in hand than that which you assume to find in the Scripture?

And, therefore, I neither ask Rothe nor Rübiger what the Scripture claims to be, but the highest interpreter of the Scripture-organism itself; to-wit, the Christ and his anointed apostolate. If, then, Christ and his apostles declare that the Scripture of the Old Covenant is very really inspired, and that by this inspiration it is of binding authority even to the extent of the individual word; or, to cite a single point in detail, if, with a lifted finger, the Son of God says to me, "Thus and so has Daniel the prophet spoken; my disciples, consider it!" and I, like the ethicals, should form a contrary conclusion notwithstanding, then I would deem that I had forfeited the claim to the name of theologian, and I would consider myself to have entered into a flagrant contest with the real principle of my science, since I contradicted the Holy Spirit in the self-conscious declaration of his absolute interpreters.

3. Every critical study of the Holy Scripture must be rejected as being foreign to theology, which is governed by a philosophical principle which evidently reacts against the principle of the Holy Spirit. And this canon especially interprets a good deal.

Let us consider this in the following four points:—

(1) Indisputably the entire Scripture-study, especially that of the Old Testament, is at this moment governed by the question, whether there was a fall from holy to unholy, or whether there was a gradual ascent from the lower to the pure and holy. This question returns in three stages: First, with Adam; then with Israel in the wilderness; and, finally, with the early Christian church. And because this question is now answered in the negative, the hamartiology of Genesis iii. must be the

product of phantasy; the nobler parts of the thorah must not be attributed to Moses, but lie at the end of the Israelitish development; and the consciousness of the Christian church must only ripen gradually. And now I ask, "Is there a tendency to be noted here, or not?" And when I know, that the elimination of the fall is at present the principle of all philosophy; that the idea of such a fall is most deeply insulting to the pride of the human spirit; and that the Holy Spirit condemns the wisdom of the world in this very point; that, in giving holy gifts to Adam and to Moses, and graces and powers on the day of Pentecost, the Holy Spirit exhibits the divine majesty, and in each subsequent falling away our deep corruption, is it not folly itself for us theologians to be train-bearers of a Scripture-study which at each of these three points secularizes the Scripture?

(2) Seeking an accord with the Holy Spirit, the spirit of the world runs again and again after *Synergism*, in order, by accentuating human activity, God's inworking may not merely be limited, but destroyed, particularly in its absoluteness. Likewise there is a tendency at work in the biblical criticism of the present day to undertake the same contest against the *sovereignty of inspiration* which Arminius waged against the *sovereignty of grace*. For whereupon does the denial of prophecy rest other than upon the denial of God's immovable decree? What is the humanizing of inspiration other than a repeated protest against a grace, which, being irresistible, never fails of its purpose?

(3) The "wisdom of the world" constantly seeks to reduce the immediate work of God in history to ever smaller dimensions, and cannot rest until the factor "God" has entirely disappeared from the same. In like manner, the Scripture also, which lays its witness in the scale against this very process of

the wiping out of God's name, had to be distilled until creation passed away in a Darwinian evolution; the miracle went hiding; inspiration was reduced to an unobservable touch of a soul unconscious of that fact; and, finally, the human author appeared so one-sidedly in the foreground that at length there remained no higher honor for the Divine Author (*Auctor primarius*) than the service of a laudatory editor with the people who still believe.

(4) It has ever been a trait of the wisdom of the world, and it is this especially in our days, to class the idolatries of the nations who do not know God, as very honorable forms of religion under the self-same category with the religion of Jesus. Its philosophical principle, that there is no wall of separation between the sacred and the profane, compelled and still compels it to do this. But this was bound of necessity to overthrow the whole Scripture-study, especially that of the Old Testament. The simple change of the name by which henceforth all idolatry, however defiant its character might be to the only true God, is called "religion," is a criticism on the Old Covenant that condemns its entire world-view. And so it came to pass, that, wholly contradictory to the teachings of Scripture, Israel's religious development was explained to have sprung from the same root as that of the heathen, and, finally, the nobler idolatrous nations were represented as co-operators in the work of establishing what Israel, yes what Jesus, confessed.

Thus we see that this irresistible spiritual impulse of the philosophy of our age to transpose in every way the "*Deus-homo*" into the "*Homo-deus*," was bound of an iron necessity either disdainfully to cast off the whole Scripture or, when piety refrained from this, to take apart the joining map of that Scripture and put it differently together again, till at

length, in direct opposition to its own principle, the Scripture had guaranteed or subscribed this false hypothesis of the "wisdom of the world" with its seal. This, however, shows to us no less that that theologian tears up his credentials, who, instead of opposing hand to hand this process of roughly pulling out the leaves of this most precious of all the roses of Sharon, is either sufficiently cowardly or thoughtless to allow himself to be carried along by this current of the humanizing of the Scriptures and to present it under pleasing colors to the masses.

That, after the subtraction of all this, there still remains serious objections at several points to the absoluteness of the inspiration of the Scripture, we neither deny nor hide, even though one readily sees to what small dimensions this mountain of insurmountable obstacles has already fallen away. This, however, does not remove the necessity that, so far from passing lightly by the still remaining objections, the scientific theologian must look them squarely in the face, always bearing in mind this fourfold consideration:—

1. That some of these objections flow from the undeniable fact that the perfect autographs do not lie before us, but an imperfect text, which is a text with errors.

2. That the writing down by the Holy Spirit of what was inspired has nothing in common with the protocolization of an authentic official report, but that the several events and truths, yea, the same events and truths in their many-sided significance, have been brought to the canvass by the Highest Artist with a diversion of color and many-sidedness of interpretation which may indeed confuse the near-sighted cabalist, but which by its delightful harmonies fills the master-student, standing at a distance, with heavenly raptures.

3. It remains indeed the calling of apologetics to bring

out the passages of Scripture that sound contradictory to each other, in their real, even though it be covered, harmony. Hence the need of *loci paralleli*, not after the style of the departed supranaturalists,—ah, they, indeed, had no more theology!—no, but in the spirit of the Juniuses and Voetiuses; a spiritual, no narrow-minded Harmonistica; not a pitiful amateur effort, but a logical interpretation of our sense of representation by paying attention to the *πότε; πῶς; ὑπὸ τίνος;* and *κατὰ τίς.*

4. If, then, there still remain seeming inexplicables, *cruces interpretum*, in the Holy Scripture, before which not I,—for that implies nothing,—but all confessing theologians stand, even then I do not hesitate a moment to say it in the hearing of the whole scientific world, that, facing the choice between leaving this question unanswered, and with the simple-minded people of God confessing my ignorance, or with the learned ethical brethren from scientific logicalness rejecting the infallibility of the Scripture, I firmly choose the first, and with my whole soul shrink back from the last.

For, to say with Rothe and his followers, that there are myths in the Scripture; the creation-narrative is pious phantasy; phantasy likewise the narrative of the fall; the prophecies are products of a higher-tensioned spiritual life; the testimonies borne by Christ and his apostles concerning the Old Covenant are devoid of normative power; the apostolic representation of the truth is equally little normative and binding; even the image of the Christ which they outline and paint is not fixedly reliable; and then solemnly to declare that the whole Scripture from Gen. i. 1 to Rev. xxii. 21 is their *Word of God*, is more than I can do; it is too bold for me; it looks wonderfully much like a *protestatio actu contraria*, which I hear, but of which I have no understanding. And when, more-

over, I observe that in the circles of these "faithful" ones the modernizing vivisectioners are widely known, and that, on the other hand, the orthodox champions of inspiration—such as Gausen not only, but also such men as Hodge and Philippi; yea, even Beck and Mehring—are scarcely known at all, then, in all seriousness, I am filled with apprehension for the future; then I seem to hear the rushing sound as of rapidly falling waters; and I feel the "zeal of God" come over me which compels me to reject a "word of God" so-called but which is fallible, as a *contradictio in terminis*, which exchanges fixedness of principle for half-measures, and which, while ever going backward, with the face turned toward Christ, constantly separates itself but further from the "Christ according to the Scriptures."

And should any one still answer that, judging as I do, I myself am not justified, since I acknowledge errors, if not in the autographa, at least in the texts at our service, then let me remove this latent objection by this other question, whether, if you held in your hand a cup of pure gold but whose edge is slightly damaged, and I held in my hand an entirely perfect cup but of gold which is not real, you would say, "It is all the same to me: I will cheerfully take your imitation in exchange for my *golden cup*?"

III.

As has been shown, the biblical criticism of the present day deprives the church of her *theology*, and robs her of her *Bible*. What remains to be demonstrated is, that it also attacks the church's right to her liberty in Christ, or, if you please, consigns her to the embraces of the worst, because intellectual, kind of clericalism.

A troubled soul, tossed with tempest and not comforted, is

filled with anxiety, and thirsts after certainty. In the heart of one who is so apprehended of the Lord, even though he be a plain day-laborer, the sacred things of the Almighty have found a lodging, and therefore in the depths of his soul the powers of hell antagonize those sacred things. Thus a conflict is waged as of giant-forces in his breast, and that oppresses him; he sees no way of escape; he faints beneath its tension, except He who is compassionate takes compassion on him, and sets him up upon the *Rock of the Word*. Only when he stands on *that Word*, does the oil of gladness drip in his soul instead of mourning, and the garments of praise begin to shine forth in place of the spirit of heaviness, and the man breaks forth in singing the praises of Him who has set him free from bonds; also from those oppressing bonds of dependency upon man, who at best is but a creature of dust. For to obtain real peace, an unshakable faith, and a full development of powers, our soul must, in the depth of depths and forsaken of all men, depend on God Almighty alone. To draw one's being immediately from God's own hand, consciously and continuously, this renders one invincible, enables one to become heroic, and makes us surpass ourselves. This was the secret of the power by which Calvinism once astonished the world. That forms character, steels the will with energy, and sets man, the citizen, the confessor of Jesus, truly free.

But how does the Lord impart this assurance, with and without the intervention of man, to the numbers of his elect, and through them to the church? We should look this question sharply in the face, for there are many reasons, because of which the Scripture, such as the churches and especially the laity have it in these days, in itself falls short of this certainty. In the first place, as far as we know, all the autographa of the books of the Holy Scripture have been lost, and we have

nothing at our disposal save incorrect manuscripts. Again, the number of books belonging to the New Testament has never been absolutely and infallibly fixed; even in the days of the Reformation heated conflicts were waged about the canonicity of more than one book. And, in the third place, what the ordinary layman can have, is never more than a translation of the original, to none of which translation the seal of infallibility is ever attached. If now with regard to the Scripture the church occupied the deistical viewpoint, that, after having created the word, the Holy Spirit abandoned that Word to itself, all the benefit of the inspiration would be lost to God-seeking souls. But this is not the case. Despising every form of deism, the church interprets the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Scripture in the sense of a rich and quickening theism, and the Reformed churches especially, in this also surpassing the Lutheran sister-church, have ever maintained that the Word by itself never amounts to anything, and never produces power other than as the instrument of the Holy Spirit, and hence, in all ages, has *never* been abandoned of that Holy Spirit. Her confession is, that by revelation the Holy Spirit has prepared the material out of which the garment of the Scripture should be woven. When that material was prepared, the Holy Spirit has inspired the individual pieces of Scripture in successive times. After that, through the agency of the church, the Holy Spirit has gathered the books which had been so prepared and finished. Furthermore, the Spirit has watched over the text of the Word which he had inspired. The Holy Spirit has no less irradiated the translations in which that Word was to come to the nations. That same Holy Spirit has ever afterward himself interpreted that Word through the official preaching, and has mingled it with faith in those that are called unto life. And with no one of God's

elect has the Holy Spirit rested, until the Word, infallibly inspired centuries ago, bare fruit equally infallible in that soul, as though it had been inspired for the sake of that soul alone.

The Holy Spirit effects this purpose in two ways; which as *fides humana* and *fides divina* must sharply be distinguished. *Fides humana* which is *fides*, and therefore equally surely proceeding from God, is the reliance which the church places in the authority of the Spirit's work by means of the organism of the church, which aims at the canon, the determining of the text, the translation and the exegesis of the books. Concerning each of these, therefore, a brief word.

What books form the canon, is by itself as unquestionably certain as it is to the anatomist, what members do or do not belong to a normal human body. The Scripture is an organism. Nothing can be added to it or taken away from it. It is complete in the fullness of numbers and entirety of its parts. The question, however, whether at each given moment the church is in the possession of the anatomical tact which is necessary with a firm hand to decide upon each part of the Scripture, or each book that is presented with this claim, must be answered in the negative. That certainty fluctuates as the waters of spiritual life in the midst of the churches swell in volume or contract. But so far from lessening thereby the confidence of the laity, the Holy Spirit has so disposed the parts of Scripture, that those on which the life depends have never been doubted, and in the books that have never been doubted the stream of truth flows in all its fullness; and subsequently the Holy Spirit has directed also this canonical work with so firm a hand, that the generous recognition of by far the most books astonishes us far more than the continuous doubt expressed concerning a very few.

With respect to the text of the Sacred Scripture, the same

confession is in place. There is no official text in the original language for the New Testament, and the *textus receptus* is certainly stripped of much beauty by errors. Of this, however, we likewise confess that that text has not been abandoned to chance, but has been watched over with tender care by the Holy Spirit. It cannot be granted that, when finally, in the counsel of God, the great moment had come in which, some four centuries ago, the Word of God was to enter upon its vast circulation through the press, the text which was then chosen under the appointment of God can have been an indifferent one; a most imperfect and an almost hopelessly impaired and injured one; and it must rather be confessed that it is entitled to a peculiarly prominent place in the front ranks on account of its eminently historical significance. At the hand of other manuscripts the *textus receptus* may and must be subjected to corrections, but, disrobed of its spiritual preference, it never needs to make room for older witnesses as a castaway *per se*. For myself, at least, I have never felt the logical stress of the argument, that a manuscript of the fourth century, *eo ipso*, is a more correct copy of the autographon, than a manuscript of an early origin but perhaps following an older and therefore a purer text.

The direction of the Spirit also included the *translations*, even though it be least of all in absolute measures. Consider it well, that now in the translations alone, and not in the original, the Word *exists* for thousands who thirst after the living God, and who without that Word will never find Him. Even literary men declare that both Luther's version and the Dutch *staten-Bible* are such surprising products of sanctified genius, that, apart from a higher inspiration, they can scarcely be explained. Such translations by the church, as the pillar and ground of the truth, and offered to the laity in the very

prosperous period of her spiritual life, are for this reason the Bible to the people; to theologians indeed ever appealable to the original, and never in itself to be taken as authority, but of so great value nevertheless and of such spiritual significance, that, under the Spirit's leading, the layman is entirely justified who binds his conscience to this translation, and not to a text that was foreign to him.

And, finally, as to the exegesis of the Scripture, here also the Holy Spirit is the real exegete and, in difference of opinion, the *Supremus Judex*. This judicature the Spirit exercises by laying out the lines of the truth in the confessional standards of the churches; by impelling the preaching and the study of the Scripture in those lines; and even when, in the instrumental use of the Word, He accustoms the souls of believers to that fixed course.

But, however much this providence of the Holy Spirit may be able to quicken a *fides humana* in the churches, it does not finish the work of the Holy Spirit. For this human faith can never give absolute assurance, and Calvin himself recognized that an unregenerated man, provided he is a man of thought, cannot be convinced by us of the theopneusty of the Scriptures. The semi-somnolent masses may be held in rein by ecclesiastical authority, but independent, thoughtful spirits never. Not as though there were separate rules for rich and poor, but because, as Twisten correctly observes, "the absolute faith on the divine character of the Scripture can never rest other than on the immediately divine witness." For if human reason were ever able to demonstrate the divine, then reason would stand superior to the divine, and thus, *eo ipso*, the divine character of the divine word would be destroyed.

However much our fathers depended upon the theistic and

unceasing activity of the Holy Spirit with the Word, they have never attributed any higher value to the *fides humana* than of being a preparative and directing work, and their real power and actual strength has never sprung from any other source than the immediate Witness of the Holy Spirit. This Witness of the Holy Spirit was not taken in the Lutheran sense, as of a "*Spiritus Sanctus in ipsa Scriptura loquens et testificans*," and much less still in the heavy sense of our present-day theologians, as a harmony of the reflex of the Spirit in us with the reflex of the Spirit in the Scripture; but a witness of the Holy Spirit which is born, as Calvin puts it, when that same God the Holy Spirit who spoke centuries ago through the mouth of the apostles and prophets enters into my heart, and by a supranatural witness imparts to me the indisputable assurance: I, God-myself, have inspired this Scripture, this divine Word.

This touches the heart of the question. He who has received that witness stands immovable as a wall. He who has not received it, undulates as a wave of the sea. And every effort of man to replace this witness of the Spirit by one's own demonstration, is sinful, falls short of the glory of God, and never accomplishes its purpose. All children of God receive this witness at his appointed time, so surely, that even the ethical theologians who came to life, after they had played through their entire *repertoire* of negations, had to come back to the church and confess that, after all, "this is the Word of our God!" And therefore, it is this witness of the Holy Spirit which breaks the teeth out of the mouth of all clericalism; which, after the removal of every middle-link, binds the soul immediately to God; and thereby enriches each layman with that invaluable right of spiritual liberty, from which heroic courage, firmness of character, and real love of freedom

are born. This is the fulfillment of the jubilant prophecy, that a man need no more say to his brother, "Know the Lord," for that all shall know him, even from the least unto the greatest. Or, if you please, call it the holy, divine, and only real equality which brings the profoundest scholar to his knees by the side of the humblest house-mother, with an assurance in the heart which is absolutely similar and unmovable.

But, and this is our complaint, the newer Scripture-study injures, likewise, this beautifully ordered state of things. It turns loose what was fast; it lifts each piece of the Scripture out of its grooves; and, unwilling and helpless, the laity are delivered into the hands of the men of Semitic and classical studies. Of course nothing remains of the translation, and youthful preachers who have scarcely an elementary knowledge of the original languages will, with appeals to the original text, substitute the translation by their own idea, until the humble layman is forced to exclaim: "What a wretched translation I have! Would that I could read Greek and Hebrew myself!" But even this is not the end, misguided soul; for, hear how they tell you in all varieties of ways that the original text itself is hopelessly impaired, even to such an extent that the manuscripts offer no sufficient result, and turn on turn the conjecture-process must be risked; and then,—oh, the height of self-conceit, of which, drifting with that stream, I myself was guilty,—we see young men coming fresh from the academy who deem themselves fully matured and justified to train their wits by practicing the art of making conjectures at the expense of the Holy Scripture. And even if that were all. But then the poor laity must furthermore be told that *this* narrative is a myth, and the other has come to us from Parseeism; that not only with respect to editorship but also with respect to the *content*, the books of Moses are of much

later origin; that the reports of the creation and of the fall are sacred phantasies; that Daniel was a pious fraud; yea, even that the word of the apostles cannot be normative, neither for our confession nor for the picture which we form for ourselves of the Lord. To all this the laity must listen; and when it concerns the confessional standard, they are told, that God's Word, apart from every formula of faith, is the proper confession of the Reformed Church. And when one asks, "Do you mean by this the Scripture?" the answer runs, "No, but merely God's word in that Scripture." And when further it is asked, "Is it what is there recorded as God's word?" again the answer runs, "No, it is not that. The prophets called it so in a metaphorical sense, but it was really the product of their own thoughts." And this is what the church of God feels deeply hurt about, and against which she rebels with all the intensity of her thirst after liberty and zeal of fidelity to a sacred charge. She smarts under it as under the jeers that impugn the seriousness of her heart, and as under a game at the expense of the needs of her soul. It stings her as the insult of a jeering clericalism, and in the name of the Lord she resents it.

For, though I well know that even thus the Holy Spirit *can* and does work an inward and certain witness in the regenerated soul, by all this the historic consciousness is weakened;—and moreover, aside from the regenerated and the redeemed, there are still the children of the churches, and it makes the blood rush to the face to see how mercilessly and unpardonably cruelly these vivisectioners of the Holy Scriptures deal with the souls of our children.

For of course, when the Scripture is open to question as they say it is, a common copy of our version becomes an almost worthless volume; the country-pastor is the only one who can explain it from his books; the Orientalist and the Græcist

become the seers of our days, whom all Israel must counsel; and the specialty in introduction-studies becomes the High Priest of a new-born church, before whose oracle the astonished masses bend their knees.

Add to this that, in consequence of this all-disintegrating criticism, every new preacher has other things to proclaim in the self-same congregation; also, that this theistic, never-ceasing activity of the Holy Spirit is ignored; yea, that above all else the testimony of the Holy Spirit in the same way as inspiration is either weakened after the Lutheran style, or in the Fichtean sense is subjectivated,—and, in all seriousness, I ask, Is it said too much, is it spoken too crassly, when, after having exhibited this vivisection that has presumptuously been applied to the Scripture, as the corruptor of our theology and the annihilator of the Bible, I at length no less seriously brand it as an avenue to clericalism; and that therefore, as a free-born son of a nation which purchased its liberty from Spain and on the ground of this Testimony of the Holy Spirit, I protest against this violation of the right of the churches and this injury worked against the liberty of the laity?

I have come to the end of my task, and my threefold protest against the biblical criticism of the present day has been entered. I find no fault with what is done by those who are outside, nor with what has been done by any in the capacity of Semitic philologists. But I deplore that in the domain of the church of Christ, and in the very temple of the sacred theology, the Holy Scripture has been so roughly handled by those who profess themselves to be Christian theologians, that at their hand the Holy Bible has been recklessly and unsparingly carved and torn loose in its several parts, and has had its organism remodeled after philosophical hypotheses. I think

I have shown with logical accuracy both the encyclopedic, dogmatic, and ecclesiastical ruin which this critical vandalism has perpetrated, and, that I might shun the very appearance of spiritual cowardice, I have boldly and candidly set over-against this my own confession respecting the Holy Scripture. I did this in the still consciousness that, with no cover or fingers over my eyes, I looked the criticism squarely in the face; condoned and mollified nothing; and that with an honest, scientific conscience I stand immovably firm in the confession of the inspiration by the Spirit. I am quite prepared that this will occasion surprise with one, bitterness with another; but why should I be denied the right to speak, when it has come to this pass, that even they who confess the name of Jesus offer the incense of approbation to the most radical anatomists of the Scripture? God the Lord has granted me the courage of my conviction, and though this conviction may seem utter foolishness to our modern Greeks, and to our ethical Israel a stone of offense, I hold myself fast to it, even as all the dear people of God have embraced it these nineteen centuries, as "the Power of God," a power given us of God not for the pleasing of our pride, but for the making sure of our salvation.

And if with this I take my departure both from my modern and ethical opponents, I say to the moderns among my critics, "Even though, as it seems to me, you wander and err, yet with you there is logical consistency; for, as you say, the Scripture is a scripture like other books, entirely human of origin; and therefore there is no inspiration either, no more regard for the elect who call for certainty, and the whole *sancta theologia* is metamorphosed into the science of religion." To the ethicals, on the other hand, who, because they still confess the holy name of the Lord, are still my brethren; to them I say: "Smelt

away the philosophical alloy from the pure gold which still hides in the kernel of your faith. Be done with that limping on two mutually excluding principles. Choose once more a form that will suit the glorious life in which you also desire to lave and satisfy your soul. Above all, have pity, have mercy, upon those who are deeply hurt, because they are the church of the living God." And if the younger among them were to ask, if then they must violate their insight and do violence to their scientific conscience, I would answer, "No; never do that. It is never safe to do anything against the conscience, and no difficulties of conscience may ever be called conquered before they are conquered indeed. But if you would do violence, if you would try your strength against something, oh, then, in the name of the Lord, let me urge you to do violence indeed against the highness of our human thinking, cast your biblical criticism, and not the Bible, into the melting-pot, and, as theologians, and as shepherds of the flocks, cease from aspiring to be anything else, or anything higher than small in your own wisdom and correspondingly more richly endowed instruments of the Holy Ghost."

ARTICLE V.

NEW LIGHT ON THE PSALMS.

BY THE REVEREND ROBERT CAMERON, D.D.

THE writer has just read an advance copy of one of the most remarkable books¹ that have come from the press during the past hundred years. Unless one is laboring under a misconception of its importance, this book will create a greater sensation amongst the scholars of Christendom, and will become a greater factor in securing a return to sane thinking, than any event since the modern methods of the destructive critics have "had the floor," and have secured the ear of the Christian public. And yet, the fundamental facts upon which the book is based, are so simple, so self-evident, and in such harmony with every phenomenon in the Psalter, that one can only wonder why the discovery had not been made by others during the past two thousand years. The achievement of the author illustrates what a small amount of careful research and independent thinking there is amongst men of reputed learning, after all the boasting made in behalf of modern scholarship.

It is well known amongst all students of the Scriptures, that the titles of the Psalms—that is, their superscriptions and subscriptions—have been a source of great perplexity to the commentators and expositors. This is true amongst the Jewish scholars as well as amongst those of the Christian faith. In fact, one part of the titles has been given up in despair. In

¹*The Titles of the Psalms.* By Joseph William Thirtle. London and New York: Frowde.

general terms these titles may be ranged under three heads: (1) the authorship and character of the psalm; (2) the historical circumstances out of which the psalm had its growth; (3) the place of the psalm in the service of the temple as indicated by such words as "To the Chief Musician." As to the first two classes of psalms, the only difficulties that have arisen have had their origin in the prejudices and preconceived notions of the expositors; but, when we come to the last class of titles, the case is entirely different. Everything is inconsistent, contradictory, and confusing. Neither Jew nor Christian, neither narrow evangelical nor broad latitudinarian nor spiritualizing mystic, has been able to thread his way through the jungle. Neither the reverent student who believes in the consistent unity of the Bible as a whole, and of the Psalms as a part of that whole, nor the flippant sciolist who talks about "sources" for which he had no evidence, and scraps and redactors and editors that never had an existence outside of his mental conceptions, could solve the problem. The difficulties have existed for more than two thousand years—they defied the ingenuity of the greatest scholars two hundred years before the days of our Lord. Dr. Delitzsch, speaking of these titles, says: "The LXX. found them already in existence, and did not understand them. The key to their comprehension must have been lost very early." By common consent, then, the key to an understanding of the musical titles of the Psalter has been hopelessly lost for more than two thousand years. How was it lost, and how was it found? The answer to these two questions, together with a few consequences that follow, is the essence of what we have in hand.

It is of importance that we take into consideration the condition of the ancient writing. It is conceded, that neither in prose nor in poetry were there any paragraph divisions, such

as we use at the present day with good results, to assist the eye in reading and the mind in understanding. The material was run along on papyrus or parchment or vellum without any break, and without any system of punctuation. In legal circles, where they draw up documents involving millions, it is the mark of good form to-day to affect this ancient custom—only, it is the custom to use capital letters at the beginning of the sentences. But even this feature did not characterize ancient writing. Hence it was often difficult, because the documents followed each other in such close proximity, to distinguish the one from the other.

Now the book of Psalms presented just that problem when the LXX. undertook their work of translating the Hebrew into Greek. Psalm followed psalm in the Hebrew text, and psalm follows psalm in the Greek translation. The only indications that one psalm ended, and another had begun, were the terms “Michtam,” “Maschil,” “by David,” “by Asaph,” “by Solomon,” “a Psalm,” “a Song.” Where these were found, the material was broken up and separated. But where none of these terms were found, and the psalms were what the rabbis called “orphans,” it was the custom to combine one or more of them together, both in the Hebrew manuscripts and in the early codices of Christian writings. The Psalter was in this compact form when the LXX. completed their work.

It is self-evident that *if* the psalms were originally written with *one* title at the beginning, giving its authorship and origin, and *another* title at the end, designating its musical use in the temple service, then the ending of one psalm might easily be bracketed by mistake with the beginning of another psalm following. In other words, the dividing line could easily be drawn in the wrong place. In this way, the psalm that had a title showing its nature, its authorship, and the

circumstances out of which it was born, would have a musical setting for a place or occasion in the temple altogether out of keeping with its contents. In modern times it would be like singing a funeral hymn at a wedding feast, or, having a hymn written for private devotion, chanted at a public thanksgiving, or a day of national humiliation. And this is exactly what has happened to many psalms at the hands of the LXX., and the whole of Christendom has followed, like "Israel following the sins of Jeroboam, the son of Nebat, wherewith he made Israel to sin—they have not departed therefrom."

This disorder continues until to-day. It is in the King James's version and it is in the standard American version. Indeed, it is in all versions of the psalms—Jewish, Roman, or Protestant. The musical title that belongs to the *end* of the psalm that precedes, is linked to the literary title which stands at the *beginning* of the psalm which follows. Hence, being out of their true places, they give no intelligent account of themselves—they are as much out of place as the sword of a king in the hands of a preacher; they throw a cloud over the psalm that they ought to illuminate; they baffle the ingenuity of expositors; and lexicographers, being "off the scent," have made guesses and suggestions that are neither creditable to scholarship nor helpful to devotion. For two and a half millenniums these musical titles have either been buried or silenced by learned lumber, or, when allowed to speak, their voice has confused and bewildered those who have lent attentive ears.

But, granting this, how could a knowledge of such a simple fact drop out of sight and out of mind? how, especially out of the Jewish mind? This is too large a question for the limits of this article. But, when one calls to mind the vicissitudes of the Jewish people from the days of the destruction of

Jerusalem by the forces of Babylon, down to the heroic period of the Maccabees, it will not be hard to believe that the cruel massacres of the rulers and of the priests, the awful persecutions, that drove from mind and heart every thought except that which gathered about food to sustain life, and shelter for its protection, the burning of the temple and its blasphemous defilement by invading tyrants, and the scattering of the Jewish people into every quarter of the globe, with plunder and plague, and fire and sword in hot pursuit,—it will not be hard to believe, that when a little respite came, and an attempt was made to reëstablish the ancient order “according to the commandment of David, and of Gad the king’s seer, and of Nathan the prophet,” no one was found possessing the key to the rubrics, no one retained the national tradition of the use of the musical marks, and, to this day, no representative of any family of the “scattered nation” has come to the front to disclose the lost secret. It was lost out of national consciousness more than two hundred years before Christ, and it is too late to hope for its recovery from that source now.

A singular custom which obtained amongst the Jews during their captivity in Babylon, and which still obtains amongst the orthodox portion of the nation to-day, will throw light upon the way in which this tradition dropped out of memory. The orthodox Jews refused then, and they still refuse, to sing the songs of Zion in a foreign land. They wail and weep and cry out in their synagogues, but they never sing. “By the rivers of Babylon we sat down, yea, we wept, when we remembered Zion. Upon the willows in the midst thereof we hanged up our harps; for they that led us captive required of us songs, saying, Sing us one of the songs of Zion. How shall we sing Jehovah’s song in a foreign land? If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cun-

ning, and let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth, if I remember thee not, if I prefer not Jerusalem above my chief joy." No joy apart from Jerusalem, no song outside of the Holy Land, and no harps while the temple is in ruins. In a foreign land the songs of the theocracy were exchanged for the woes of the captivity. They refused to sing these songs of Zion, and their refusal induced vocal atrophy, and produced mental oblivion. It thus came to pass that the Jewish men who made the Septuagint translation, knew nothing of the liturgical use of the psalms in the temple. There was no longer a chief musician, Asaph left no successor, and the glorious traditions of the golden age had faded away.

Now let us consider the recovery of the key to the liturgy, which in time will restore the Psalter to its primitive use in the nation. In the near future, when, according to the infallible predictions of the inspired prophets, the Jews return to their ancient home, in unbelief towards Christ, and when they rebuild the temple and reestablish its services according to the appointments of the Law and the Kingdom, this key will be of great importance to the lovers of Zion. It has been recovered just in time to serve the interests of the Jews when restored to Palestine, and to serve the interests of the church in its battle against the unbelief of the enemies who have found a lodgment within its own citadels.

Why was not this key discovered centuries ago, and fitted to the lock that opens the door? It lay upon the surface; it has been seen and handled by millions of believers as they have thumbed over the leaves of the prophets; it was stumbled over by thousands of Jewish rabbis and Christian scholars, but it was never recognized, never picked up, and never used.

Every one will see that, if even *one* psalm could be found, anywhere in the Old Testament, *standing alone*, that psalm

would furnish the typical example, the authoritative standard, for all the others. If two such psalms could be discovered, and if they should agree in the arrangement of their rubrics, then the difficulty would seem settled. For, it is beyond a question, that these puzzling titles could not be misplaced in a case where a psalm stood all alone by itself. Now, if, after such a discovery were made, the titles should be readjusted to the psalms, and if thing should fit to thing, as the shadows in the unruffled bosom of a stream answer to the forest and to the stars of the heavens above, then doubt is impossible, and faith is a necessity to every sane mind.

Two such psalms have been found, the titles have been readjusted to the Psalter, and the utterances of the respective psalms respond to the note of the rubric. These psalms are found in the third chapter of Habakkuk, and in the thirty-eighth chapter of Isaiah. The former is a psalm-prayer of the prophet, and the latter is a song or poem of the King after his supernatural recovery from a fatal disease. Here is found the key to the misplaced, misunderstood, and vexatious titles of the psalms. In both of these isolated psalms, the liturgical lines are found in their true place, revealing the confusion that has obtained so long in the Psalter, wherever a musical rubric appears.

In Habakkuk the superscription reads thus: "*A prayer of Habakkuk the prophet upon Shigionoth.*" Now when we come to the end of the psalm a subscription is added as follows: "*To the chief singer on my stringed instruments.*"

In Isaiah, at the head of the psalm, we have the occasion of its writing given thus: "*The writing of Hezekiah, King of Judah, when he had been sick and recovered from his sickness.*" Then at the end, and forming a part of the psalm itself, we read: "*Therefore we will sing my songs with stringed*

instruments all the days of our life in the house of Jehovah."

In the first of these psalms we have at its opening a literary description of the class to which it belongs, viz. that it is a prayer, assigning its authorship to Habakkuk, and describing the character of the composition as Shigionoth, or outcries in praise. Then when we come to the close of the psalm, we have a liturgical note "to the Chief Singer" or Musician. Here, then, we have the key to the titles: a *literary description* at the *beginning* of the psalm, and a *musical rubric* at the *end*. Out of the mouth of a second witness these facts are confirmed in the psalm found in the thirty-eighth of Isaiah. It, too, opens with a literary heading and closes with a musical note. True, we do not exactly have the name of the chief musician, as the one to whom the psalm was committed, but it is safe to assume that its royal and religious author would see that the Levites would do his bidding according to the service of the temple. He would have it sung "with cymbals, with psalteries, and with harps according to the command of David, and of Gad the king's seer, and Nathan the prophet."

Thus, out of the mouth of two unimpeachable witnesses, whose dumb lips have been speaking through their written words for two thousand five hundred years, but whose voices have never been heeded until now, we have it definitely determined that the *literary* title of a psalm should be placed at its head, where it has always been. But the musical title should be pushed forward from the head of one psalm to the foot of the other psalm that precedes it. The title at the beginning may tell whether it is a song, a psalm, a *michtam*, or a *maschil*; it may state whether the author is David, Asaph, Solomon, Moses, or one of the sons of Korah; it may tell of the circumstances under which it was written, as it does in thir-

teen of the psalms; or it may make known the object for which it was composed. But every other title or description belongs to the foot of the preceding psalm. Thus, we shall have a distinction made between authorship and historical origin on the one hand, and liturgical application and use in worship on the other.

As a further confirmation of this wonderful discovery, the author, in a private letter, assures me that Lieutenant Conder, so well known at the head of the Palestine Exploration Society, has, over his own signature, written to say that the oriental psalms and hymns on clay tablets which have come under his observation, have an arrangement exactly corresponding to the one which is so plainly stamped upon the psalms in Isaiah and Habakkuk.

Now, suppose we accept the testimony coming from these two isolated psalms, and its confirmation arising out of the examination of similar productions of contiguous nations, at a date of from five hundred to fifteen hundred years before Christ,—the date that corresponds to the traditional view concerning the time when these psalms of the Old Testament were written,—then, does the key fit the lock? Does any new light come to the individual psalms affected? Do we have any clearer insight into the service of the temple, and the calendar of the nation? Is there a verisimilitude in the results that follow? All of these questions can be answered promptly in the affirmative. And thus we have at last, without doubt, discovered the true and original arrangement of the psalms in their use in the temple services. All the results of this simple but far-reaching discovery have not yet come into view. A few of those that are very obvious may be briefly named:—

1. We have surely come to the end of all attempts at explanations that have never explained. There will no longer

be an effort to find an echo to the musical settings, as they now stand, in the contents of the psalms which follow. No longer will expositors try to make Gittith or Shoshannim mean musical instruments, as the massoretic scholars suggested and the Christian commentators adopted. Nor will the more modern tendency to follow another Jewish school, making these terms catchwords of popular airs, or "ragtime songs" of foreign nations, repel us, because of their absurdity. The musical instruments and popular airs are as absent from any historical data, or monumental allusions, as are the now famous "original sources" and the J. P.'s and other "Jays" of the destructive critics. The lexicographers could not define so as to fit the apparent use, and the expositors could not explain the contents of the psalms so as to correspond to the meaning of these titles, and they gave vent to their imagination while they published their guesses.

2. The Hebrew lexicographer will be saved much needless toil in a bootless effort to adjust the plain meaning of a term to its environment in a psalm. The word *Alamoth* means "maidens," and the word *Shoshannim* means "lilies." There is no dispute—no possible dispute—respecting these words. But as soon as they appear among the psalm titles, their signification is changed by the imaginations and guesses of lexicographers who have produced weak, worthless, and foolish explanations "from the bottomless ocean of things unknown." These men have stumbled in the dark, without the key that opens the door for the dawn of light, and we must set them and their learned guesses aside out of our path, and return to the primary, natural, and obvious meaning of the words which will readily adjust themselves to the new psalms with which they are now to be identified.

3. This key will open the door through which we can see

the liturgy of the temple service as related to the psalms, in a new, intelligent, and attractive light. The chief musician is evidently the director, the leader, the precentor, or chorister of the modern song-service. The psalms are presented to him for consideration, acceptance, and assignment to their proper place and use. Thus it became both a psalm of David and of the musician—David's by creation and the musician's by adoption. The two settings were similar to those in modern hymnals, giving the name of the author of the hymn first and the author of the music after.

In this new light we discover, not merely a collection of poems, but a well-arranged hymnal in the Psalter, not arranged in different parts of the book, but under distinguishing titles. Hence, we find songs, prayers, meditations, and homilies, to be rendered by singers with the accompaniments of players on appropriate instruments of music. These musical notes, restored to their rightful places, show that the various psalms have been selected with reverent care, with deep insight into fundamental truths, and with the best of judgment. Although we may not yet discover the complete calendar as conceived by David, and as realized by Solomon and his successors, yet we do see plainly that the rubrics indicate the elements of appointment for the great festivals of Israel, and for other occasions of national commemoration and national experience. And in the whole of Jewish history it is manifest that the highest aim was to have everything done "according to the commandment of David." Hence, we have in Solomon's appointment of the Levites, Jehoiada's provision for service, Hezekiah's revival, Josiah's solemn pass-over, Zerubbabel's work at the restoration, everything done "according to the commandment of David the king."

The following facts will serve as illustrations of this dis-

covery. Few of the musical terms have excited greater interest than *Shoshannim* and *Gittith*, but not until now do they find a voice, a setting, in the psalms, and a place in the Jewish calendar. *Shoshannim* means "lilies" and *Gittith* means "winepresses." The one title suggests *spring* and the other speaks of *autumn*; the one tells of beauty and fragrance and the other of plenty and peace. Flowers and fruit fall into line with combinations of great significance in the monumental and literary history of Israel. The garments of the high priests were fringed with lily-shaped bells and pomegranates; the temple was adorned with carvings of lilies and pomegranates; the furniture given by Ptolemy Philadelphus was adorned by the carving of lilies and clusters of grapes; purple flowers and golden vines ornamented the doors of the Temple of Herod, and the candlestick of gold had its adornments in the figures of lilies and pomegranates. Moreover, the monuments and the half-shekel coins, recovered from oblivion, also have their tracings or stamps of the lily-flower and the bowl of wine. Aye, even on tombstones, and in the Jewish catacombs at Rome, these symbols of flowers and fruit appear.

Now for the explanation. The Passover was celebrated in the *spring*, when the flowers began to bloom in the meadows, and the Feast of Tabernacles was celebrated in the *autumn*, when the fruit was gathered and "the presses burst out with new wine." The Passover spoke of the birth of the nation, while the Feast of Tabernacles told of its majority when it entered upon its inheritance; the one told of the making of the nation, while the other recalled Jehovah's care in its preservation. Jehovah both redeemed from bondage and spread a table in the wilderness for the redeemed. He was the *Redeemer* and the *Keeper* of Israel. These two feasts, the one at the begin-

ning of the year and the other at its ending,—the one when the winter was past and the flowers appeared on the earth, and the other when the summer was ended, the vintage was gathered, and men were in “joy before the Lord according to the joy of the harvest,”—became associated, by the time David came to the throne, with lilies and winepresses. By an association of season with festival, by that subtle tendency of simple people to link the material with the spiritual, and by a touch of poetic taste not altogether wanting in the Jewish mind, “for the lilies” was placed under the Passover psalms, and “for the winepresses” was placed under the psalms set apart for use at the Feast of Tabernacles. As these two feasts began and ended the calendar year, and as they were memorials of the essence of all that Jehovah had done, and promised to do for Israel, in redemption and preservation, they became the national symbols on coins, in sacred services, in present sorrow and in future hope. Even when placed over the tombs of the dead, their dumb mouths still spoke in touching tones, declaring that the sleepers beneath belonged to the Pesach, when the lilies blossomed, and to the Succoth, when the grapes were pressed. They belonged to the Redeemer and Keeper of Israel, and *they* were the redeemed and the preserved by Jehovah. The God of the Jew was the God of the living and not of the dead.

The Passover psalms rehearse the oppressions of those that rise up against the people and cry for deliverance, and they also acknowledge that deliverance has come. But the Feast of the Tabernacle psalms—those that celebrate the harvest home—have quite another note. Here is one:—

“Give ear, O Shepherd of Israel;
Thou that leadest Joseph like a flock,
That sittest upon the cherubim, shine forth!”

"Thou broughtest a vine out of Egypt;
Thou drovest out nations and plantedst it."

"The mountains were covered with the shadow of it,
And the boughs thereof were like cedars of God."

No comment is necessary to show how the sentiment of this psalm fits into the pious reflections appropriate to the feast.

But, in addition to these, we have psalms for the choir of virgin women, and also for the choir of circumcised men; psalms for seasons of national humiliation and others for seasons of rejoicing; psalms commemorating great national struggles and victories, and events of national importance. A singular but certain discovery is made that the Jews also had their national anthem—their *Aijelet hashshahar*—literally "the hind of the dawn." This is at once delicate, poetic, patriotic, and full of glowing promise. It is a figure of speech expressing the feelings of the heart's desire when gratified by the passing of the darkness and the coming of the morning. It pictures the gratification of the long-deferred desire of David for sanctuary privileges and for national peace and prosperity. "Thou hast given the king his heart's desire, and hast not withholden the request of his lips. Thou settest a crown of fine gold upon his head." But, later on, there is a tinge of the "politics" and "knavish tricks" in the psalm when it turns toward the enemies of the nation: "Thine hand shall find out all thine enemies, the Lord shall swallow them up in his wrath. They imagined a device which they were not able to perform." All this is concerning David, who was the swift-footed child of the nation's morning. He always was the nation's hero, towering above Abraham or Moses in Jewish pride. He captivated their vision like the dawn of an oriental morning.

4. Some apparent contradictions, as well as much confu-

sion, will be removed from the psalms. As it now stands, Psalms lxxxviii. is a song of the sons of Korah, and a Maschil of Ethan the Ezrahite—two different statements as to the authorship of the one psalm. Hereafter we will not be obliged to ask, in the language of Dr. Delitzsch, "Which notice is the most trustworthy?" They are both trustworthy and true, like the whole of the Scriptures when freed from the marring of man's hand. Each heading has a psalm of its own.

In Psalm lvii. the most beautiful adjustment of title to contents is made, and a puzzling problem is removed. At the head of Psalm lvi. stands the title *Jonath-elem-rehokim*, "the dove of the distant terebinths," but there is no allusion to either dove or terebinth in that psalm. Drs. Green, Hengstenberg, Delitzsch, and others, however, have observed the connection between this title and the *preceding* psalm, but no one seems to have had the slightest suspicion of the misplacement of the titles of this, and the rest of the psalms. With this discovery, however, it is most touching to read: "Oh, that I had the wings of a dove; then would I fly away, and be at rest. I would lodge in the wilderness." It was written by David at the time when Absalom was a traitor at heart, plotting to usurp the throne of his father, even at the expense of becoming a regicide and patricide. Ahitophel, smarting under the wrong done to one of his "kith and kin," in the house of Uriah, had ceased to be Premier in the king's cabinet. He had been David's familiar friend, with whom he had taken sweet counsel, but now he was his deadly enemy—a political trickster behind the scenes pulling the wires that moved the puppets in the front. David, seeing the coming storm, and dreading the dangerous treachery, longed to hide himself in the distant forests, where he might brood over his

sorrow like the moaning dove. How beautifully the psalm responds to its old title restored to its true home after an absence of two thousand five hundred years!

5. This discovery opens the way for consideration of the Psalms as a whole. No reverent scholar has ever doubted that he had reached the throbbing heart of a living book when he came to the lyric cadences, the poetic conceptions, the plaintive pleadings, and the jubilant praises of the Psalms. But the key to their unity was lost, and the clear light of the Psalms, as focused through the Christian lens, has never yet been obtained. We shall now see that the whole book, beginning with "the blessed man," and ending with "everything that hath breath" blessing Jehovah, has a sympathetic response to the experience of Christ, first of all and most of all; then with the elect race of Israel and with the church, during all the ages of the past, since the inauguration of the kingdom under David, and down through the ages to come, until David's Son and Lord shall possess the kingdom that he may deliver it back into the hands of God the Father. The Psalms record the exercises of the Spirit of Christ, whether in his own individual person, or in the Jews of the past, or in the church of the present, or in the hearts of the restored and regenerated Jews of the millennial age. When this vital chord of the Psalms is recognized, and when their prophetic, as well as historic, setting is restored, then, the imprecatory psalms, which have been such a stumbling-block to the ill-taught child with narrow outlook and limited horizon, will tower up with a grandeur and a glory worthy of a God of love, whose sense of righteousness is as the whiteness of light and whose majesty is above the heavens—preceding, marching through, and surviving the succession of the ages. The God of the Psalms is "glorious in holiness, fearful in praises, doing wonders."

If there was a fitness during the past in the direct destruction of Israel's foes by the hand of Jehovah, because the whole of his purposes of grace towards the race of men were linked with that chosen people, will it be less fitting, less worthy, of God to repeat, under similar conditions, these acts in the future? What about that coming day, when the "man of lawlessness" becomes "the beast" of prophecy, and when the world wonders and follows in his train? Will it not be worthy of the Spirit of Christ, as it will then be embodied in the martyr saints, to sing: "Arise, O Lord, and let thine enemies be scattered. Take hold of shield and buckler, and stand up for my help. Let them be put to shame that seek after my soul. Let them suddenly go down to the pit."

6. This discovery throws great light upon the antiquity of the Psalms as a finished collection of lyric poetry. It will go far to settle, if indeed it does not completely settle, many questions raised by modern men of reputed scholarship.

It is conceded that there are no manuscripts of the Old Testament extant where this confusion of titles does not exist. The earliest versions into Greek and Syriac show their existence by variant translations, in a vain effort to conform title to psalm. There is not a shadow of doubt that this confusion existed between 200 and 300 B. C., when the LXX. completed their most important work. "To the Chief Musician" was translated, *eis to telos*, "for the end," and these words occupy the same line as *psalmos tou David*, and similar literary headings, showing that the key was gone. They were utterly at sea as to the meaning of these titles, and hence they bracketed the title belonging to the *foot* of one psalm with that which rightly belonged to the *head* of another. Indeed, the LXX. had no thought of a director, or chief musician, in the temple service, and they transferred into their text *Alamothe*

and *Sheminith* in Greek letters, thus confessing that they knew nothing of female and male choirs. The same confusion is seen in all ancient Hebrew texts, and it appears in the Vatican and Alexandrine codices. Now, with these facts before us, it logically follows that the Psalter is much older than the Septuagint version, made not later than two hundred years before Christ. How much older we may not definitely determine just yet. As the College of the Great Synagogue at the time of Nehemiah was succeeded by the Sanhedrim of the days of the LXX., it is extremely improbable that the psalms could have been compiled and their titles attached after the return from the captivity. Religious customs amongst a people cherishing such a veneration for the past do not go out of fashion and out of mind even in centuries, unless there is some break or revolution in organic existence. The knowledge of temple psalmody, the existence of the precentor, the terms designating psalms to feasts, the existence of the male and female choirs, indeed every liturgical note, was absolutely out of mind long before the days of the Maccabees. With Keil we may say: "The singing was lost with the extinction of Solomon's Temple, so that, in the post-exilic Temple-worship, only feeble remnants survived." Accordingly, we are compelled to conclude that the music of the psalms and the meaning of the rubrics passed away with the destruction of the first temple. If one post-exilic psalm (137) has been added, this would not affect the fact that the collection was already in existence. In the words of Dr. Robertson: "Here at least we have a psalmist who looked back fondly to the *old* songs—songs of Zion, songs of the Lord of pre-exilic times." The fifty-one psalms which bear the mark of the chief musician are scattered through every book of the Psalter, except the fourth. But the fourth book contains the psalm which celebrates the trans-

fer of the ark from Gathrimmon to Mount Zion, pushing it back to the days of King David. Moreover, it is beyond dispute that the division of the Psalms into books took place after the unfortunate confusion of the titles, as may be seen by a glance at Book II., where the title "For the Chief Musician" stands at the head of the first psalm, instead of being placed at the foot of the last psalm in Book I. Had the division into books been made before the key was lost, this title would have been put in its right place. The fact is, the Psalter is the same in number and in order as it was at a very remote period—long before the dawn of the Christian era. It has been bound together by verbal chords which have preserved its contents and order, although their meaning was misunderstood by the post-exilic men to whose keeping these oracles of God were entrusted. With the exception of our present break into verses, psalms and books, their number and order, are exactly the same as they were in days of the Second Temple.

I do not press this matter further than to call attention to the fact that the rubric of the chief musician was attached after the psalm came into existence. Indeed, the psalm may have been in existence centuries before the director did his work under the instruction of Solomon and the Levites, "according to the command of David the king."

These musical titles, under this new light, must be reckoned with in all future discussion. They push the date of the Psalter far back beyond pre-exilic times—in fact, back to a date that corresponds with what had been called, in derision, "the traditional belief" of the origin of these religious poems. The psalms must antedate the musical notes, and the musical notes had been made, used, lapsed out of mind, and utterly forgotten, at the return from captivity. Prior to that event, the very latest date to which these psalms could be as-

signed is the period of revival under King Josiah. This will compel us to the belief that the psalms must have come upon the scene at the exact time when they profess to have lifted their honest heads above the horizon.

7. Lastly, this discovery will help to restore David to his rightful distinction in the authorship of the psalms, and our Lord to his rightful supremacy in the minds and hearts of those who are posing as scholars. If the present collection of Psalms existed, just as we have them now, at the time of the LXX., then there is no room for a single contribution to the collection in the days of the Maccabees. All, or nearly all, of the Psalter must have been complete when the prophets of the Restoration laid down their labor with their lives. But at that time seventy-three out of one hundred and fifty psalms were ascribed to David, and thirteen more of them have historical inscriptions fitting into events in the life of the king. Besides this, the name of the king is found in twelve other psalms. David has the preëminence in the praises of the temple as well as in the government of the throne. Hence, while the name of Moses occurs six hundred and fifty times in the Old Testament, that of David appears nine hundred and fifty times. He stands preëminent amongst the obedient servants of Jehovah—a man after God's own heart—and also preëminent amongst the poets, the heroes, and the kings of Israel. He is both the hero of the Old Testament and also of the book of Psalms.

If the modern fad to find editors, instead of authors, must continue to obtain in the imaginations of the critics, and to obtrude itself into biblical research, still it must not be forgotten that these imaginary editors, at a very ancient date, made the name of the poet-king second to no other in the collection of the psalms. Discuss or discard the titles, their very

existence at that remote period has to be accounted for, as well as the oblivion into which they fell. And there can be no explanation so satisfactory as the one that is obvious, natural, and historic. David was the greatest king of the Jewish nation, and he was the very man,—emotional, sensitive, God-fearing, strong in his keen sense of righteousness, and brave in his intense hatred of sin—the very man from whom these pious poems could come. Further, this discovery of the proper place and meaning of the musical titles shows that commemorative and national services were held in the temple in honor of David, in the days of the chief musician. Psalm viii. shows that David is the champion who went out between the camps in the time of a nation's crisis; for it is evident that no people celebrate fireside fame or private heroism in public song.

It follows, therefore, that our Lord was right when he spoke of what David said in the psalms. For more than a quarter of a century the hearts of those who believe in the supreme deity of Christ have been either bleeding with pious sorrow, or boiling with righteous indignation, at the flippant way in which professed scholars and (God save the mark) *professed* Christians have said that "Jesus did not know," that he was "limited in his knowledge by his environments and his opportunities," that he "may have accommodated his teaching to the ignorance" of the people of his day, when he spoke of Moses as the author of the Pentateuch and of David as the composer of the psalms. Let us hope—although one cannot but confess that it is hoping against hope—that this new light on the old psalms may suggest to modern students the fitness of having more modesty and less assumption; more seemingly reverence and less unseemly pride; more of the sublime conceptions of the "Roundhead" and less of the shal-

low pomposity of the "Cavalier," in their future speculations and published findings. Let us hope and pray that this old light of bygone days, dropped out of the consciousness of the successors of the patriarchs and prophets, and buried beneath the learned labors of the lexicographers and expositors, but now recovered and placed upon its divinely appointed lamp-stand, and shedding its lustre upon the meaning, the past use, and the prospective outlook of the Psalms, and revealing the national experience of Israel, as well as the personal struggles and hopes of God's saints in ages gone by, may lead men to recognize that there are some things which *they do not know*, and some things which our *Lord did know*. May we all learn that it is better to let the Scriptures judge the man than for the man to sit in judgment upon the Scriptures. May these leaders of modern thought learn that the best of all is to give to Christ the same preëminence in judging of the authorship, the truthfulness, and the abiding character of the whole of the Scriptures, which they affect to give him in the peerless perfection of his personal life, and the elevated character of his matchless teachings.

ARTICLE VI.

THE DIACONATE: A NEW TESTAMENT STUDY.

BY THE REVEREND ROBERT E. NEIGHBOR.

THE evangelical denominations are not in agreement as to the office and functions of the deacon. This, however, does not indicate the perversity of the theologic mind, but rather the meagerness of the New Testament records in regard to the diaconate and the consequent difficulty in determining the matters variously pertaining to it. In the Episcopal and Methodist Episcopal churches it constitutes the lower of two "orders" in the ministry; and accordingly the deacon, though not ranking as a full "priest," is, nevertheless, a minister in the sense that he is authorized to preach and is placed in charge of congregations. In the Methodist Episcopal churches he is required to prepare for it by taking a prescribed course of study, and then, after having passed a successful examination, and being also of approved character, he may be formally "ordained" a deacon. In due time he is advanced to the full priesthood by passing an examination in a second course of study, provided there be no bar to his advancement on moral grounds.

In non-episcopal churches, on the other hand (with perhaps the exception of the Lutheran), there is but one "order" in the ministry, and the deacon's functions are therefore non-ministerial. He does not preach,—or, at least, preaching functions are not regarded as included in his office. Among Presbyterians he has charge of only the temporal and

secular affairs of the congregation, while in Baptist and Congregational churches he is not restricted to this, but assists the pastor as a sort of qualified adviser in the general supervision of the church's spiritual interests. He is not, however, a preacher; if at any time he preach, having ability to do so to the edification of the congregation, he is not considered as doing it in virtue of his office as a deacon. In Baptist and Congregational churches, therefore, the deacons collectively constitute a kind of pastor's cabinet, and divide with him theoretically, at least, the responsibility of the church's welfare. In practice, however, they sometimes, it must be confessed, add to his responsibility; and since they stand to him in the relation of the many to the one, they not infrequently overrule his larger knowledge and experience by their prejudices and unwisdom, limit his efficiency, and hasten his resignation.

It is sometimes offered as a criticism that the deacons content themselves, as a rule, with officiating at the Lord's Supper in the distribution of the bread and wine to the membership; but there are pastors who would consider themselves fortunate if their deacons could be persuaded to limit their official activities to that simple and innocent service. On the other hand, a body of deacons composed of wise and experienced and godly men, thoroughly loyal to both the pastor and the church, and cordially recognizing their true relation to him and to it, knowing the duties of their office and being qualified for them, is an undoubted tower of strength to the pastor and also to the church. Such deacons there are, and they are worthy of being held in very high esteem for their work's sake. Happy the pastor who, instead of having to manage his deacons as well as his church, can rely upon their co-operation, is strengthened by their wise suggestions, and rejoices in the assurance of their personal sympathy.

As this article is a New Testament study, and as also the various opinions held and carried into practice in regard to the functions and qualifications of the deacon by different denominations are supposed to rest upon the New Testament teaching, we may enter at once upon our investigation of what the New Testament actually does and does not say on the subject. We begin by examining the three words which we find it using, namely, the verb *diakōnēō*, and the nouns *diakōnia* and *diakōnōs*.

The verb *diakōnēō* is used twenty-seven times, and is variously applied as follows: to the service rendered by angels, by the Son of man, by men and women; by Martha busied with the preparation, necessary, as she thought, for the suitable entertainment of her Lord; by the king who himself waited upon his servants at the banquet; by the seven brethren of the church in Jerusalem who superintended the distribution of relief to the dependent Hellenist widows in its membership; to the service rendered by Timothy and Erastus to the apostle Paul, and by Onesiphorus when the apostle was in Ephesus; to that rendered by Paul himself to the church in Corinth considered as an "epistle of Christ," the epistle having, as he says, been "deaconed" (translated "ministered") by him; and to that which he rendered to the poor saints in Jerusalem by means of the collections made for them among the Gentile churches. The man who serves and follows Christ is, according to Christ's own declaration in John xii. 26, the "deacon" of Christ. The leading idea in the word is thus very plainly that of service in a subordinate capacity to one of higher rank. It is translated variously by such words as "minister," "serve," "administer," and by the circumlocution "use the office of a deacon" in the passage where it occurs in connection with the noun *diakōnōs* as a church officer.

The noun *diakōnia*, which corresponds to the verb just noticed, indicates the thing diakonized, if we may so say, and it occurs thirty times. It also is variously rendered in the Revised Version by the words "serving," "ministering," "ministration," "ministry," "charge," "relief," "office," "service," and "administration." The apostolic function enjoyed for a time by Judas Iscariot is spoken of by Peter as his *diakōnia*; the *diakōnia* and the apostleship are classed together and united in the same person, as in the case of Judas just now mentioned, and in that of Paul by himself in his Epistles. Barnabas and Saul returned from Jerusalem to Antioch, having fulfilled their *diakōnia*; Paul, addressing the Ephesian elders who met with him at Miletus, desires "to finish his course with joy, and the *diakōnia* which he had received of the Lord Jesus to testify the gospel of the grace of God," and later, when he had reached Jerusalem, he recounted "what things God had wrought among the Gentiles by his *diakōnia*," and in writing to the brethren at Rome he "magnifies his *diakōnia*." In the First Epistle to the Corinthians he writes: "Now there are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit, and there are differences of *diakōnia* [A. V. "administrations"], but the same Lord." The household of Stephanas was worthy of special honor, not only because it was "the first-fruits of Achaia," but because its members had "addicted themselves to the *diakōnia* of the saints."

Contrasting the dispensation of the law with the more glorious dispensation of the gospel, he speaks of the *diakōnia* of death and of the *diakōnia* of condemnation, setting over against these the *diakōnia* of the Spirit and the *diakōnia* of righteousness. He says, also, that there had been committed to him "the *diakōnia* of reconciliation," and that, having "received this *diakōnia*, we faint not." He is solicitous that, be-

cause of the factions which had broken up the harmony of the church at Corinth, the *diakōnia* of himself, Apollos, and Cephas "be not blamed." He alludes to "the fellowship of the *diakōnia* of the saints." Again, in Eph. iv. 11, 12, he says that the officers provided by Christ for his church—apostles, evangelists, prophets, pastors, and teachers—are "for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the *diakōnia*, for the edifying of the body of Christ." He is glad and grateful that the Lord had "counted him faithful, putting him into this *diakōnia*"; that is, this apostleship of the Gentiles. He bids Archippus of Colosse "take heed to the *diakōnia* which he had received in the Lord, that he fulfill it," and he counsels Timothy to "do the work of an evangelist, and make full proof of his *diakōnia*." Finally, we have the question asked in regard to the ministry of angels in the present gospel dispensation: "Are they not all ministering (*leitourgika*) spirits, sent forth for *diakōnia* for the sake of those who are about to be the heirs of salvation?"

Evidently the predominant conception in all these passages is that of service rendered in the discharge of obligations imposed, but there is nothing to indicate the existence of a special order in the church known as a diaconate; the nearest approach to it is in the case of Archippus. But here it is to be noticed that his *diakōnia* is said to be *ēn kuriō*, and not *ēn ekklēsia*. Timothy, also, who is encouraged "to make full proof of his *diakōnia*, was not a "deacon" in the sense of filling an office so known in the church; on the contrary, he is exhorted in the very same sentence to "do the work of an evangelist," and we know, from the entire tenor of the Epistles addressed to him, that he had the superintendence of the church or churches, and was rather therefore an *ēpiscōpos*; that is, a bishop or pastor. He was not a deacon. The

fact is, that, as the verb *diakōnēō* means "to serve," so also the noun *diakōnia* means "service," and that—as all these and other passages, that might have been quoted, show—in the widest sense.

The other noun is *diakōnōs*, and means the individual who discharges the duties involved in the *diakōnia*. It occurs in twenty-eight passages of the New Testament—eight times in the Gospels, not so much as once in the Acts of the Apostles, and twenty times in the Pauline Epistles. Peter, James, John, Jude, and the book of Revelation furnish no example of its use, nor of either the cognate noun or verb. It is translated in the Gospels twice by the word "minister," and six times by the word "servant." In the Epistles, "minister" renders it sixteen times, "servant" once, and "deacon" three times. That is to say: Out of eighty-five passages in which either the verb, or the noun for the person or the thing, occurs, it is translated only five times as applying to an ecclesiastical office known as the diaconate. And these five instances are all, with the exception of the superscription to the Epistle to the Philippians, found in 1 Tim. iii. 8–12, where the qualifications of a deacon are set forth.

The following examples of the application of the word are both interesting and suggestive: The servants at the marriage-feast at Cana are the deacons on that occasion, and the fifth verse in the story may be read thus: "And his mother saith unto the deacons, Whatsoever he saith unto you, do it." And also the additional statement in verse 9: "But the deacons which drew the water knew." In Matt. xxii. 13 we read (translating literally): "Then the king said unto his deacons, Binding his feet and hands, cast him into the darkness which is outer." Jesus says, as reported both by Matthew and Mark: "Whoever would be great among you, let him

be your deacon" (Matt. xx. 26; xxiii. 11; Mark ix. 35; x. 43). He applies it also to his disciple in John xii. 26, saying: "If any man serve me, let him follow me; and where I am, there shall my deacon be." Paul says (Rom. xiii. 4) of the civil magistrate: "He is the deacon of God to thee for good." He does not hesitate to call Christ "a deacon of the circumcision for the truth of God." He and Apollos are each of them "deacons" by whom the brethren of the church of Corinth believed (1 Cor. iii. 5). In the second epistle to the same church he declares, that God had made him and his fellow-workers in the sphere of Gentile Christianity "able deacons of the new covenant" (2 Cor. iii. 6), and later on he speaks of "in all things approving themselves as the deacons of God," and he asks concerning those who had been seeking to undermine his authority within his own special sphere of work: "Are they deacons of Christ? . . . I more." He speaks of false apostles who transform themselves into apostles of Christ, and then of Satan who sometimes appears as an "angel of light," arguing that, if this be so, "it is no great thing if his deacons also be transformed as the deacons of righteousness" (2 Cor. xi. 13-15). To the Ephesians and Colossians he writes that he has been made a deacon of the gospel, and to the latter he also says that he has been made a deacon of the church. Timothy, he says, is "our brother and a deacon of God in the gospel of Christ," and he exhorts him: "If thou put the brethren in remembrance of these things, thou shalt be a good deacon of Jesus Christ, nourished up in the words of faith and good doctrine, whereunto thou hast attained." In Gal. ii. 17 he will not permit a gospel of justification by faith to be charged with the unholy living of professed disciples, and indignantly asks, if Christ can be *hamartias diakōnōs*=of sin a deacon, or a deacon of sin.

Of course, in none of these passages from Paul's Epistles, nor yet in the words of Christ quoted from the Gospels, is there any reference to an ecclesiastical officer known as a *diakōnōs*. In all of them the word is used in its general sense of one who renders service and ministry. Neither Paul nor Apollos, neither Timothy nor Christ, were deacons of any church. Neither was this office in contemplation when the Lord, rebuking the unholy ambition of the Twelve, said that whoever would be greatest among them should be their deacon. This is evident and no one thinks of affirming otherwise.

But how about Tychicus and Epaphras of Colosse? Have we any ground for supposing that they held this office? Of the former, Paul writes: "Tychicus, the beloved brother and faithful deacon in the Lord"; and of the latter: "Epaphras, the beloved fellow-bondsman of us, who is a faithful deacon of Christ for you." Neither the King James's translators nor the Revisers thought so, for they both translate the word by "minister" as the general term expressing service rather than official position. And so far as I know it is not claimed by any that these two brethren were deacons in the official sense. In the case of Phœbe, however,—possibly to afford some sort of support, which, though slender enough, is as good as there is in the New Testament for the office of deaconesses,—it is claimed by some that she was an official deacon of the church at Cenchreæ. The Revisers seem to favor this notion; for, while retaining the word "servant" in the text, in agreement with the Authorized Version, they insert "deaconess" in the margin. But this, in view of the general use of the word in the Epistles, is wholly without authority, and is no more justified in her case than in those of Tychicus and Epaphras.

The investigation thus far may be summarized, then, as follows:—

1. The Acts of the Apostles—the book which tells the story of the founding of the church in Jerusalem and of churches throughout Syria, Asia Minor, and Greece—is absolutely silent with reference to an ecclesiastical diaconate. It does not even contain the word “deacon.” This is certainly somewhat remarkable.

2. The apostle Paul makes no mention of deacons in his lists of church officers in 1 Cor. xii. 28 and Eph. iv. 11.

3. The only passages in the New Testament to which we must look for proof of the existence of such an office in the early church are Phil. i. 1, where deacons are named in connection with bishops in the superscription of the Epistle, and in 1 Tim. iii. 8–13, where the deacon’s necessary qualifications are described. But it may be remarked, in passing, that a single Scripture of unquestioned import is as decisive as a hundred in settling a matter of this kind. These two Scriptures are sufficient so far as they go.

4. Neither of them, however, says anything about the functions of these officers. What these were must be gathered largely from the meaning and use of the word, and (since the functions of an officer and his qualifications are necessarily correlative) from what is laid down as to these latter.

We will proceed therefore to consider the deacon’s qualifications as set forth in 1 Tim. iii. 8–13, after which we shall be prepared to determine perhaps what the nature of his service was.

1. The deacons were to be “grave” men. The Greek word is *sēmnōs*, and of its signification Trench says: “The *sēmnōs* has a grace and dignity not lent him from earth, but which he owes to the higher citizenship which is also his; being

one who inspires, not respect only, but reverence and worship. In profane Greek, *sēmnōs* is a constant epithet of the gods—of the Eumenides, the *sēmnai theai*, above all. It is used also constantly to qualify such things as pertain to, or otherwise stand in very near relation with, the heavenly world. . . . How to render it in English is not very easy to determine. . . . Grave and gravity are renderings which fail to cover the full meaning of their original. . . . The word we want is one in which the sense of gravity and dignity, and of these as inviting reverence, is combined; a word which I fear we may look for without finding." The deacon, therefore, was a sacred person, and his demeanor and character were to be such as to inspire, not only respect for himself, but reverence for his office—an office of the church of Jesus Christ. The church and its Lord were to be honored among men by the dignified and honorable bearing of the deacon, and the electing authority must take care for this in his choosing.

2. Deacons were not to be "double-tongued"—a very good rendering of the word *dilōgōs*. Dr. Boise explains it as "not ambiguous or doubtful in what they say." The word is not used elsewhere in the New Testament, and so the translation here cannot be compared with that in other passages. Dr. Boise's gloss may be accepted as correct. Etymologically it means saying the same thing twice, and of course differently each time, and thus saying one thing while meaning another—in other words, unreliable in speech.

3. They were not to be "given to much wine"—in other words, temperate men in an age when wine-drinking was common and often indulged to excess. Cf. Eph. v. 18: "And be not drunk with wine wherein is excess [dissoluteness], but be filled with the Spirit." If this was the rule for the church as a whole, how much more must it not be regarded as such by the deacons?

4. "Not greedy of filthy lucre" is the next qualification laid down. The deacon must not be an avaricious man; literally the words mean "greedy of base gain," as Dr. Boise explains them in Titus i. 7, where they occur in respect of the bishop. In the present passage he says, "not sordidly greedy of gain."

5. The deacons were to be men who "hold the mystery of the faith in a pure conscience." That is to say, they were to be men having faith, and having likewise a good conscience as the sphere in which faith and all the great truths of the gospel are held; for, as another has well said: "Without a good conscience there can be no clear view, no just comprehension of spiritual truths." The deacons must be men who illustrate their faith by their conduct, and also the doctrines of Christianity, proving thus that "the faith" is with them something more than a creed confession, even a practical power in life.

6. The deacons before being inducted into office were to be "proved"—tested, examined; and then, if found blameless (*anēgklētoi*) to "use the office of a deacon." But this word translated "blameless" really means "unaccused," and is used by only Paul among the New Testament writers. In his Epistles it occurs five times, being rendered once by the word "unreprovable" (Col. i. 22), but elsewhere by "blameless." Says Archbishop Trench: "It is justly explained by Chrysostom as implying not acquittal merely, but absence of so much as a charge or accusation brought against him of whom it is affirmed. It moves, like *amōmōs*, not in the subjective thoughts and estimates of men, but in the objective world of facts. It is an epithet by Plutarch accurately joined with *alōidōrētōs*" (unreproached, and therefore akin to the "having a good report of those that are without," which is among

the qualifications of the bishop). Trench continues with a reference to the ritual of his own church: "In a passage cited above, namely 1 Tim. iii. 10, there is a manifest allusion to a custom which survives in our ordinations, at the opening of which the ordaining bishop demands of the faithful present whether they know any notable crime or charge for the which those who have been presented to him for Holy Orders, ought not to be ordained; he demands, in other words, whether they be *anēgklētoi*, i. e., not merely unaccusable but unaccused; not merely free from any just charge, . . . but free from any charge at all—the intention of this citation being, that if any present has such a charge to bring, the ordination should not go forward until this has been duly sifted." The word used by the apostle means, according to this, that the deacon is not only to be blameless, but unblamed. He is to be not only a good man, but also a man of good report.

7. The remaining qualifications refer to the deacon's family relations. "Even so must their wives be grave (*sēmnai*), not slanderers, sober, faithful in all things. Let the deacons be the husbands of one wife, ruling their children and their own houses well,"—or, as Dr. Boise translates, "standing honorably at the head of his own household or family." The reference to "wives" is thought by some, for various reasons, to be to women acting as deacons, i. e., to deaconesses. But whether it be or not needs not be discussed here. The chief matter is clear enough, namely, that the family relations of those who bear this office must be commendable—such as do not bring reproach upon themselves or the church.

To sum up: The deacon must be a man of high personal character, adorning the Christian profession; a man of unworldly spirit, not absorbed in the affairs of the world nor possessed with a mania for money-getting; one who has the re-

spect of the community, and against whom there is no reproach or slander astir, for, if so, it must be investigated and removed before he can be regarded as qualified to serve in this office; he is also to be the wise, patient, kind, approved head of his own family circle. The deacon contemplated by the apostle was certainly not a man chosen because of his availability, his ambition, or his popularity, but was a man carefully sought out among the brethren of the church for his peculiar fitness for the responsibilities involved in the office he was to fill.

By whom was he selected? As this article is wholly a Scripture study, a passing word as to what the New Testament indicates in regard to this may be expected. It is to be noticed that the several instructions we have been reviewing were given to Timothy, and not to the church as a body. If it be said that they were given to the church through Timothy, still it is true that the apostle expected him to see that the church complied with them. The word "must" is also employed, and this certainly suggests that the apostle expected his requirements in the appointment of deacons to be attended to and obeyed. It would seem, therefore, that even though the suffrages of the church were given, Timothy himself was to carefully supervise the election, and to see that the apostolic conditions were complied with. In the selection of the seven brethren on the occasion narrated in Acts vi., the apostles kept the matter in their own hands for final approval, saying to the church: "Look you out among you seven men of honest report, full of the Holy Ghost and wisdom, *whom we may appoint* over this business." The church was merely to nominate (as we should now say), after which the apostles would "appoint," if, upon canvass of the appointees, they were found to measure up to the full standard of the require-

ments laid down beforehand, namely, that they should be men of "honest report, full of the Holy Ghost and wisdom." The matter was by no means thrown absolutely into the hands of the members of the church.

If our Congregational polity had been kept within the bounds of the New Testament models, and the bishops of the churches had always been such men as were contemplated by Paul, appointments to the diaconate would be made now also with the approval, and in view of the approval, of the pastor, rather than with his tacit consent. Too frequently he finds it prudent to accept in silence what he is powerless to change. If any one is constrained, in defense of the modern practice of a popular election to a sacred office, to take issue with what has just been said, we would remind him that the only passage in the entire New Testament which touches, even remotely, upon the method of choosing deacons is this incident in Acts vi., and that neither here nor anywhere else is there a hint that these important concerns were left absolutely and without corrective to the whims, prejudices, or caprice of a popular assembly.

It may be noted, too, that there is no hint anywhere in the New Testament (except in Acts vi. 6) of the ordination of deacons by the imposition of hands, or any formal ceremony.¹

Passing now to the consideration of the deacon's functions,

¹ A scholarly friend, who has given special study to the subject, is of the opinion that the word "elder" as used in the New Testament, includes *all* ecclesiastical offices—pastors, bishops, and deacons alike. If this can be made out, it will follow that, in such passages as Acts xiv. 23,—“And when they had ordained them elders in every church,” etc.,—the ordination included deacons as well as those to whom the term is commonly understood to apply. But this has not yet been made out fully, and it is certainly a theory which would not readily suggest itself to even a studious and careful reader of the New Testament. With all respect to my friend, it seems to me that the “if” in this case is a tolerably large one.

we are again embarrassed by the silence of the New Testament. It gives us no definite information, and we have no warrant to import anything into it. We can only rest whatever opinions we may hold upon the meaning of the word, upon the common New Testament use of it, and upon the nature of the deacon's qualifications as laid down by the apostle Paul.

As to the etymology of the word itself, I find this in Dr. Marvin Vincent's "Word Studies": "*Dōulōs*, perhaps from *deō*, to 'bind,' is the *bondman*, representing the permanent *relation* of servitude. *Diakōnōs*, probably from the same root as *diōkō*, 'to pursue,' represents a servant, not in his relation, but in his *activities*. The term covers both slaves and hired servants." He also has this: "to be a *follower* of a person; to attach one's self to him." Archbishop Trench, in his "Synonyms," agrees with this, but is more explicit. He says: "The difference between *diakōnōs*, on the one side, and *dōulōs* and *therapōn* on the other, is this—that *diakōnōs* represents the servant more in his activity *for the work*; rather in his relation, either servile, as that of the *dōulōs*, or more voluntary, as in the case of the *therapōn*, *to a person*." He then points out that, in the parable of the Marriage Supper, those who go out to bring in the guests are the king's *dōulōi*; those who execute his sentence against the man who had not on the wedding garment are his *diakōnōi*. The idea in the word, as distinguished from *dōulōs* and *therapōn*, is therefore that of *personal attendance*, and, as applied to the ecclesiastical office, it suggests that the deacon is the personal attendant of the bishop or pastor within the sphere of the church's service. The passages already abundantly quoted from the Gospels and Epistles uniformly show that the service rendered by *diakōnōi*, whatever kind of service it might be, was such as is rendered

by those who stand in a subordinate and also personal relation. Within the sphere of the church, however, the duties and office of the deacon are sanctified and ennobled by the sacred character of the church, whose servant he is. His personal character is to accord with, and sustain, the dignity of the office. It is, nevertheless, a subordinate office to that of the bishop, whose personal assistant he is to be.

My own judgment is that the New Testament deacons were men who performed any of the various subordinate services of the church, and that they were under the supervision and direction of the *episcōpōs*, or bishop. He, as the word *episcōpōs* shows, was the church's overseer, who had the general charge of all its interests, and these brethren, chosen from the very best of the membership, were his personal assistants. To illustrate: The pastor is responsible for the order and becoming administration of the Lord's Supper, but he needs in the service the assistance of a number of brethren of the church. These are, for this service, its deacons. Similarly the pastor has, or he ought to have, the oversight of the Sunday-school and the Young People's Society, two most important departments of the church for the prosecution of its work along special lines. But this is not to say that he should be the "superintendent" of the one, or the "president" of the other. Both superintendent and president are, for these services, the pastor's assistants, i. e., his "deacons." They do not, as such, "run" the Sunday-school and the Young People's Society as independent organizations with which the pastor has nothing to do, or, if he have, only on sufferance.

Even what we call the secularities of the church, such as we commit to boards of trustees, finance committees, etc., were considered in these churches, which were the models for all time (in at least the fundamental principles of their organiza-

tion), of such importance in their relation to its general welfare, that the apostles required the seven brethren, nominated by the church in Jerusalem for so simple a matter as the distribution of relief, to be "men full of the Holy Ghost and wisdom." And there can be no question that our church finances, benevolences, and general business matters, would be, as a rule, in vastly better condition than they are now, if we were more careful to entrust their management to men distinguished in the church for similar practical wisdom and piety. But all such service as this comes within the range of the diaconate. It was in the hands of the deacons—within the New Testament meaning of the word. The apostolic churches knew only one "Board," and that was the Board of Deacons. The purpose in view in the creation of the office was to enable the pastor, or bishop, to devote himself, with less interruption than would otherwise have been possible, to the ministry of the word and to prayer. This is the legitimate inference, albeit only an inference, from the statement in the sixth chapter of the Acts.

I do not mean that, according to the New Testament, the various affairs of the church now entrusted by us to various boards and committees, would be administered by the few brethren whom we are at present recognizing as deacons. This would be to place the affairs of the church of all kinds in the hands of a few men—which would be undesirable. What is meant is that the word "deacon" carries in the New Testament a wider scope of application than we now allow it. It extends to a much larger range of service than now, so that the men (or women) who compose these several boards and committees would all be included in the church's diaconate. The fact is, there are no secularities in the church, strictly speaking. We call them such only for convenience'

sake. The care of the church's finances, the oversight of its property, etc., are as much spiritual duties as the service of the bread and wine at the Lord's Table, for example; and the men and women to whom such matters are committed need to be—even as those were in Jerusalem, who were chosen to distribute relief to the Grecian widows—"full of the Holy Ghost and wisdom."

The results, then, of this investigation are as follows:—

1. The early churches were under the supervision of a person known as bishop, pastor, or elder, according as one aspect or another of his work or character was in contemplation, and it was only he who—except for the single instance given in Acts vi. 6—was solemnly set apart to his office by the formal ceremony of ordination or the imposition of hands. That is to say, there is no rule laid down anywhere for the ordination of deacons; and in the absence of such a rule it is as invalid to *insist* on the ordination of deacons as to insist on the imposition of hands as a method of imparting the Holy Spirit immediately after the administration of baptism.

2. As it soon became necessary, under the multiplication of the bishop's duties, to relieve him of a part of them, the nomination of personal assistants was asked for, in order that he might be more at liberty to attend to the spiritual side of his work.

3. Such, however, was the conception of the dignity and sacredness of the church as the body of Christ, and of the vital relation of all its interests, secular and sacred, to each other, that only men of the highest Christian character, as indicated by the words "full of the Holy Ghost and wisdom," and by the qualifications laid down by the apostle Paul, were deemed worthy of having entrusted to them even its temporal affairs.

4. All these assistants and coadjutants of the pastor, what-

ever the particular duty of each, or of groups of them, constituted the church's diaconate. In relation to the church they were the pastor's fellow-workers; in relation to him they were not independent of him, but officially subordinate to him. Nevertheless their office was one of great dignity. It was a dignity derived from that of the church itself, for which no service necessary to her prosperity could be considered menial; and they were also themselves to dignify their office by their lofty and irreproachable Christian character as exhibited both in their business life and their home relations.

In conclusion, the only divergence of the present practice in churches of the Congregational polity from the New Testament models, as herein set forth, seems to be that they have limited the sphere of the diaconate, and then—notwithstanding the theory that there are only two offices in the New Testament church, namely, those of the pastor and deacons—they have been obliged to supply the vacancies thus made, by appointing boards and committees, which, too, have been generally composed of men of lower grade. Furthermore, they have not been as careful as they ought to have been, with the apostolic teaching before them, in the selection of men for a diaconate of even this limited range of service, and thus they have lowered the moral standard of the office, greatly to the detriment of the church and the efficiency of the pastor. Finally, the proper relation of the deacons to the pastor has not been properly maintained. Too frequently they have been the pastor's critics instead of his assistants and fellow-helpers. Cheerfully acknowledging the many exceptions, which there are among our churches, of boards of deacons composed of brethren who exalt the dignity of their office, adorn the gospel they profess, serve the church with utmost fidelity, and by their wise counsels and timely sugges-

tions contribute to the stability of the pastorate, we are constrained to admit that in the most of them, and these perhaps the weaker churches, which can the less afford to be careless in this matter than the stronger ones, such departures from the New Testament standard for the diaconate as we have noted may be found, and the inevitable consequences are lowered church efficiency, more or less friction in the membership, and shortened pastorates.

The case in Acts vi. 6 cannot be quoted in support of the ordination of deacons in our churches now, because those seven brethren were not deacons at all as we have now limited the functions of the office, although they were such (as we have shown) in the New Testament meaning of the word and the scope of duties covered by it. That is, we must readjust our notions of the office, and bring it up to the apostolic or scriptural standard, making it inclusive of all service rendered the church other than that of the pastor, before we can quote the ordination of the Seven as a precedent for the ordination of those whom we call deacons.

ARTICLE VII.

AN APPEAL TO THE NEW SCHOOL OF
THEOLOGY.¹

BY MR. PHILIP HUDSON CHURCHMAN.

WHEN we turn to discuss the great question of the Higher Criticism, we find almost the same thoughts awaiting expression in different form. First comes approval of the principle. I have seen conservative lips curl in scorn at the mere mention of "the accursed thing": I have heard talk about "laying foul hands on the ark of the covenant." Shall we need to repudiate such nonsense? My conservative brother, what were the Reformers but higher critics of things that all men then held to be divine? Did not Jesus Christ apply the pruning-knife of criticism to many things thought sacred by good men of his day? Do not you yourself apply the principles of literary criticism to the Bible when you explain that much of the pious talk in the book of Job comes not from God, but from Job's worldly friends; or are you not using historical criticism when you admit it to be possible in antediluvian chronology that "the names denote an individual and his family spoken of collectively," and that "the longevity is the period during which the family had prominence or leadership"?² Are you not doing something that your forefathers would have condemned? Are you not indulging in the pernicious right to probe and to change one's mind?

¹ Continued from p. 529.² These sentences are quoted from a Bible dictionary of a most conservative type.

No sane man will imagine that this discussion is aimed at the Higher Criticism as such; the indictment is against its contempt for scholarship that has not reached its own radical conclusions, and against its preponderatingly negative attitude. We should remember that the New School has no patent rights on these tardy epithets, these remarks that "no intelligent man accepts that notion nowadays" or that "scholars and scientists rejected this idea long ago." These weapons which the ordinary liberal uses so generously against his conservative brother are just as handy for the Unitarian against the liberal who still accepts miracles; for the ethical culturist against the Unitarian if he believes in prayer and responsibility; for the agnostic against the ethical culturist if he insists on the ethical significance of life; and perhaps, even, for the materialist against the agnostic. I do not think that conservatives get full credit for their profound scholarship in this flippant age, nor that calling "tardy names" will mend matters much. What better illustration of this spirit could be found than a recently published remark made by a foreign critic about an American preacher whom he was eulogizing? "Of course," said he, "thinking men disagreed with him on many points." "*Thinking* men," forsooth! Is not that intolerable? Granting that much, if not most, scholarly opinion is with the critic in many of his views, what right has he thus dogmatically to ignore the ripe scholarship on the other side, and to award to his own school the modest title of "thinking men"? Take another case. A certain higher critic has been much attacked (unwisely and sometimes not too kindly, it seems to me), and behold an apostle of liberalism asserts that all this opposition is due to "invincible ignorance or unchristian malice." This is being "broad" and "liberal"!

The advanced school's contempt for hostile scholarship,

and its calm assertion that it has the support of all really intelligent people, is aggravated by its desire to pose as a school of purely scientific investigation without prejudice leading in either direction. One of the articles we shall discuss presently, contains the statement that the higher critics have "no theories"; "they simply investigate and report what they find." Well and good; that is the only way to reach the truth in any sphere. The candid physicist or philosopher should proceed on no theistic assumptions; and the candid critic, on no Christian presuppositions regarding either the spirit or the letter of the Bible. But to begin with no assumptions, and to reach no conclusions, are somewhat different. The first is agnosticism of the proper sort, permitting the most dogmatic conclusions; the second precludes religion. Somehow we cannot think of Jesus Christ as saying: "I am an investigating scholar without convictions. I do not know whether God is your Father, nor whether my word is authoritative in religion; I am simply examining and reporting what I find. I have no positive message." And then we are not apt to picture the apostles as men of "no theory," after their contact with Jesus, their experience of his life and teaching, and especially after a certain rather famous Easter morning. Some of them, at least, probably had "no theories" at first; but they have left upon the world the impression that of all men's theirs were the most positive theories, the most fervent opinions, the deepest convictions man has known. If higher critics pretend to have reached conclusions that may be called Christian in any real sense, then there are some things about which they have no business to have "no theories."

Worst of all, most disheartening, most perilous, is the indiscriminate insistence on the havoc wrought by the Higher Criticism in traditional beliefs. Frankly, one might get the

idea that all is over. Perhaps we can find God in nature; possibly philosophy may guess at immortality; the conscience is fairly sure (at least *so long as our heredity and environment are religious*) to suggest duty; "but," thinks many a man, "as for certainty in Christ, it is gone; Genesis is primitive tradition, Jonah a foolish tale, and modern scholarship is sure to destroy the other marvelous features as it has these; sooner or later miracles, and with them revelation, must go." Now this is not advanced as the true conception of modern critical work. Many of us would accept *The Outlook's* dictum that, while the result of the Higher Criticism has been to remove the Old Testament records so far from the events that they are supposed to record as to make them historically dubious, yet it has pushed the New Testament documents back to the time of the apostles, so that their testimony is reliable. We need not worry about Genesis and Jonah; but it is our great comfort to know that men of skeptical and radical tendencies, after rejecting so much of the old beliefs, have, through purely intellectual processes, reached the conclusion that the kernel at least is credible. But the common idea of the Higher Criticism is far different. It is regarded as the death-blow to Christianity; and I maintain that this view is eminently justifiable when we consider the attitude of these critics themselves. In fact, those of us who think otherwise have probably had to fight our way through the slough of despond to our present knowledge of their almost concealed positive teachings. Teachers, preachers, and writers of this school are known to the public, not as defenders, but as destroyers of the faith. One is famous for his ridicule of "the Jonah myth"; another is known for his attack on the Pentateuch; a third thinks that the Fourth Gospel and the Acts are not reliable; and where will you find one who will come out boldly, and

in ringing tones proclaim his belief in the Christianity that sent Paul and Peter out on their fight against sin and doubt, —the supernatural religion, based on the conviction of Christ's resurrection and authority, the only kind that will convince, convert, and regenerate this unbelieving age? No doubt these men believe all this, but *why* do they not talk more about it?

The public opinion may be wrong, but it is justifiable. The reason men misunderstand the higher critics is that the critics themselves spend, in preaching negatives, and in telling us what fools conservatives are, time that they ought to use in giving the world something positive. I turned the other day with a keen sense of expectancy to an article of this sort that appeared recently in a leading religious journal. Its reassuring title¹ and its opening words justified the hope that here at last was one who would separate the wheat from the chaff, who would talk of positive results, and stop harping on "what we have outgrown." I confess that I laid down the article with a feeling of disappointment. With the writer's clear and convincing statement of the rights of the Higher Criticism I have a hearty sympathy. Besides, it is a pleasure to record that he makes several assertions of a strongly positive nature. "Higher critics," he says, "have not lost their faith in Christianity, their love for the church, nor their belief in the Bible," of which they "are the true defenders." They have "killed Ingersollism" and "redeemed the Bible from infidelity." There need be "no fear for the future." The evolutionary view helps us to believe that "God has been inwardly speaking to" man, and at the same time it "confirms what is highest and truest" in the Bible. "If at times its [the critical school's] studies seem to make it a critic of the

¹ "Where We Are," by Rev. T. T. Munger, D. D., in the *Congregationalist* for October 18, 1902.

church and its creeds and institutions, it as often explains and vindicates them." Now for all these thoughts of an enlightening and positive sort, I am deeply grateful; but it seems a thousand pities that such a convincing, calm, generous, and moderate article as this should so brilliantly illustrate those failings of the New-school theologians upon which our attention is now centered. So, while we cheerfully admit—nay maintain—its positive value, we are inclined to use it as a striking concrete example of the weaknesses of the school; but be it remembered that we are dealing with it as a type, and not stirring up personal controversy. It is to be noted then, first, that the writer's attention is centered solely on the Old Testament, and here upon negative results as far as *historicity* is concerned. (To be sure he carefully informs us that the Revised Version "removes the only textual basis for the doctrine of the Trinity,"—but that is only in passing, nor is it altogether constructive, either.) Now I am not here to fight for Genesis and Jonah as if Christianity rested on their being verbally historical. Most of us know better—or think we do. But when a minister of the gospel is telling the Christian public "where we are" in this criticism fight, is it right or wise in him wholly to ignore the New Testament? Do Luke's Gospel and the Epistle to the Romans contain something more than "poetry, myth, and legend"? If they do, would it not be well to say so? Or is this question of no moment?

Furthermore it may be well to "draw the line at the spirit instead of the letter," in studying the ancient stories of creation; but when you do so, you must be ready for two searching questions: (1) your skeptic is going to ask you why you accept so readily the spiritual teaching of these stories; have they any more claim than Browning or Mother Goose? (2) he will want to know about the "spirit" and the "letter" in

the New Testament; and if you here cling to historicity, he will perhaps wonder why higher critics as a class are so timid about making this assertion; or if you admit that here, too, only the spirit is important, he may say something disagreeable about the honesty that allows you to dodge this issue, or something contemptuous about the power of such a "poetry-and-myth" religion to attract rational men.

So much for the negative spirit. Turn next—and it should be remembered that we are dealing with this article chiefly as a type—turn next to the writer's cheerful acceptance of the charge of naturalism. I shall plunge into no scholastic quibbling about the supernatural and the natural; but I have a right to ask the reason for believing that "God is inwardly speaking" to man in the Bible more than in other books that flatly contradict it. If it be true that "it is easier to explain this patriarch [Abraham] than to do away with eternal law" (evolution), then I want to know if you apply the same canons to Jesus Christ (frankly I don't worry much about Abraham); and if here you cannot "do away with eternal law" that forged Mahomet and Brigham Young—if you have no Christ with peculiar claims, no authoritative revelation, and no visible victory over death,—then do not ask me to accept him as my moral leader, or at any rate to take my ideas of God from him. And then if you will tell me that I am making absurd statements about the Higher Criticism, I sincerely hope you are right; but you must allow me to remind you that you cannot prove your statement by reference to this article that purports to tell us "where we are."

Of course critics and scholars must be honest, and should not preach what they do not believe; but, if they have reached that misty region where all is doubted except a hazy idea that there is a God somewhere and that "Jesus" taught a pretty

good philosophy of life, is there not a grave question whether they have a right to label themselves the successors of Paul and John in teaching "the faith once delivered to the saints"? I have several friends in a theological seminary famous for its modern views, and one of them in a conversation on this very subject frankly admitted that the atmosphere of his seminary is coldly negative and destructive, and that such teaching is no preparation for men from whom the world expects a positive message. "This," he went on to say, "is the weakness of our school of thought, and I have often remonstrated with my companions on this point." Some graduates of this same institution were recently pursuing their studies in Germany, and they there were much thrown with an American woman of an avowedly pessimistic, cynical, anti-Christian type of mind, who always had a sneer ready for religious people, and for whom the phrase "any power there may be above" would seem to be the clearest idea of God possible. Now beyond question these young theologians had a right to "exercise their intellectual freedom" and "leave the beaten track of conservatism"; but may one not question the value of theological teaching, or ask what, forsooth, is this sort of "Christianity," which left on the mind of this poor melancholy woman the impression that (to use her own words) "the professors and students of this seminary did not believe the Bible any more than anybody else, and had given up the idea that Christ is the Son of God"? Such expressions, to be sure, may mean a great variety of things, but the *evident influence of these graduates of a theological seminary was to hasten the extinction of the last sparks of faith this woman had*. Such is the result of much of the higher criticism of our times.

I refer to men who sedulously, if not gleefully, record the progress of the most extreme types of higher criticism in

Christian circles, or the defeat of the orthodoxists in some professional appointment; who are always ready almost to extol "educated men who are turning from the church," as if this were primarily the fault of the church, and as if excuses for inexcusable irreligion were not just as welcome among the educated as among others; or who promptly take up the cudgels to defend no matter whom—even to agnostics—against conservatives honestly endeavoring to serve Christ by their criticisms—eager, I say, in such service, but with never rebuke for the most radical teachings, never a demurrer, though all that is best in Christianity be at stake in the appointment to some chair of theology—this I say is a peculiar business for teachers of religion. In doubt-ridden Germany, do you think that Adolf Harnack's chiefest influence is to attract agnostics to a Christianity of any sort, or to weaken the faith of the more orthodox? If it is the latter, is he a useful Christian teacher? Or Dr. Martineau, why is he busied—in spite of his splendid philosophy and his firm spiritual convictions,—just as much, if not more, with antagonizing the scholarly Liddon, as with combating Huxley and Hæckel, men consistently hostile to the most elementary sort of religion?¹ Against what is it wise, in an age of doubt, to direct our most emphatic antagonism,—against what we consider conservative stupidity, or against agnosticism? I can think of our religion as a great fort to be held against a vast horde, most of whom hate our purpose, but some of whom doubt the strength of our cause. In this fort there is dissension. There are those who cling to "the good old ways." Swords and battle-axes were used by the fathers; they want no powder nor Gatling guns. Every petty redoubt and trench must, at

¹ To be sure, Harnack and Martineau represent a more rationalistic type of thought than the theologians under discussion, but they serve well to illustrate our point.

any cost, be as stubbornly fought for as the citadel itself. Change our policy? why that is ruin! Compromise with our comrades in arms who do not agree with us? Give up the traditional ideas? Death first! But another school of warriors is gaining power in this fort. They believe in all that is new and modern—sometimes simply because it is new. Many a redoubt and bastion they would surrender because they believe it untenable. The old weapons, too, are behind the times. Now what is their attitude toward friend and foe? Conciliation of one and defiance of the other? Far from it. On the one hand there is vituperation for the stupidity of the “moss-backs” who do not share their high intelligence and their new views. On the other, in the face of friend, foe, and neutral, there is enthusiastic advertising of changes and losses, of worn-out weapons to be rejected, of position after position to be abandoned. Seldom a word about the new and better weapons that replace the old, nor of the splendid citadel that their very critical examination has shown to be more impregnable than ever. Why not? God knows. Is that the way to defend a cause? Let the prevalent opinion about these warriors be an answer.

Speaking broadly, the whole religious world is harmed by this fatuous misplacement of emphasis on negative results. But there are certain classes of people who would seem to be doomed to be the greatest sufferers from it in the near future. Just now its influence appears to be more or less limited to the educated, in obedience to the law of all intellectual movements. The harm already done here needs no further discussion. But I ask you to contemplate the diffusion of this spirit among the uneducated, men who love God with all their heart rather than with all their mind; whose faith is sturdy and sincere, but whose thinking is apt to be merely a re-

flection of what is going on about them. Is it comforting to contemplate the effect of all this destructive teaching—unaccompanied by a something of a positive nature—on the great mass of simple, pious Christians? A certain professor of theology has asserted that the new view of the Bible (his own view) is bound to have an unfortunate effect on the popular attitude toward the book. Exactly; and the trouble is that professors of that ilk have been clamorously telling us how to reject our old notions without suggesting a new theory that shall be equally positive and equally Christian.

Think too for a minute of the young candidates for the ministry. A certain clergyman of the most radical school maintains that the present dearth of students of theology is to be blamed on "the creeds." Conservative bodies, it would seem, are cramming a lot of unessential dogmas down the unwilling throats of young men who lean toward the ministry, but who have accepted certain modern notions in science, philosophy, and criticism. Obviously this is partly true. Much of the blame can be placed right here.¹ But just as much, if not considerably more, of the responsibility is to be accepted by the radicals themselves. Imagine a cautious, thoughtful, half-skeptical young man in his last year of college life. He has always expected to be a clergyman, but his ardor has recently become cooled. Why? He has been gradually learning of a powerful school of theology, claiming all the real scholarship on its side, which apparently foretokens the collapse of Christianity. Things he has firmly believed from his youth up are unhesitatingly ridiculed. Thought is said to be continuing its steady rejection of all this traditional nonsense. Is anything now left? Will anything be left in another generation? Ominous silence on the part of the critics. You say that this young man has grossly misunderstood the results of

Higher Criticism, and of course you are right; but is it any wonder that he has done so, in view of the attitude of the critics themselves? or that his final decision is to renounce a career in which he could have but a wavering, half-negative faith? This is the case of an honest man. The hypocrite (I have known not a few of this sort) who first loses his interest in religion, or who ceases to be even decently moral, and who then attributes his desertion of the ministry to the loss of faith due to the trend of modern scholarship, is sure to seek support in the results of the Higher Criticism; and where will you find a public expression of theirs to condemn him?

Think further of the missionary. He naturally is a little behind the times. He leaves home young and perhaps has no time to keep up with the changes of thought. He has been spending his life preaching what he has firmly believed to be the gospel as taught by Christ and the apostles. Now imagine some keen Brahmin, or wide-awake Buddhist, or perhaps some oriental disciple of Spencer,—think, I say, of such a man who may have discovered some of the recent “scholarly” publications of certain radicals. How long do you think it would take him to find your missionary, and chaff him about the approaching collapse of his religion as evidenced by the purely destructive nature of these books? Suppose the missionary have a sufficiently clear grasp of the situation to reply: “Yes, many of our theologians and critics have changed their views of certain less important things, but they are stronger than ever on the underlying principles.” Would he be believed? Would he not at once be met by an embarrassing, “Prove your statement”? and could he do so without great difficulty? Is it not a crying shame that these heroes who follow in the footsteps of the great first missionaries should be subjected to embarrassment and ridicule because certain

bumptious and one-sided critics spend their energies parading negative results? Tell me, is the Higher Criticism as now understood (incorrectly to be sure, but most justifiably) likely to help or mar the work of the missionary?

V.

Our argument is ended. We have first admitted our sympathy with the New School of Theology, and then emphatically urged its weakness. These, in our opinion, are its contempt for the piety and scholarship on the other side of the question; and the impression it generally makes of being really antagonistic to any Christianity worthy of the name, because it is continually and vigorously proclaiming negative views. These great faults, together with a glance at the constituency, and at certain other fallacies of the school, we have discussed. The insufficiency of the arguments is painfully apparent to their expounder. In addition to incapacity for sound logic, from which the keenest of us suffer now and then, a debate of this kind is made difficult by the fact that in the last analysis the criterion is human experience; and, even if the limits of space and patience did not prevent an exhaustive scientific marshaling of evidence, this same varied human experience might give a far from unanimous answer to our questions. Nevertheless, we shall hope that some candid minds have only been needing a systematic exposition of the case to admit the facts, and that the evidence derived from quotation and instance may convince others. Of one thing there is no question. This is not a cold, unfeeling disquisition of no more than academic interest to its writer. It comes from deep conviction, and is the result of intellectual struggle extending over a long period. No wonder then that the writer feels anxious about these critical times, and longs to accomplish

something by this discussion. It is his honest opinion that the essence of his contention will be admitted. The New School has been making mistakes, and most thoughtful people know it. What then is needed? A radical change of method.

An attempt should be made to conciliate conservatives; but, even if this fails, we must have a strong stand for positive convictions—a clear, ringing declaration from pulpit, magazine, and professional chair that we still believe in the apostolic and evangelic Christianity, in spite of our newer and larger views. Such is the tone of Professor Clarke's winsome book "An Outline of Christian Theology," because, as *The Outlook* says, it is a help to those "who have accepted in whole or in part the new philosophy, and would like to see it reconciled with the old faith." Such I should think would be the influence of Dr. Gladden's "What is left of the Old Doctrines" if he has attained the object announced in his preface to "show that the Christian may cling to his historic faith in the face of the most recent discoveries in science and in criticism." Even when judged through the perhaps distorting medium of an unfriendly review, the recently published book on "The Christian Point of View" by Professors Knox, McGiffert, and Francis Brown, of Union Seminary, cannot fail to impress one as a step in the right direction. Most conservatives and not a few moderates would, I am sure, consider its position as near the danger line of radicalism as a Christian should go; and in its teaching many might miss some of the robust beliefs that they think they find near the heart of gospel and apostolic teaching. Some might even be so bold as to suggest that subjective religion-building has played too large a part, and objective study of our only sources too small a part. These questions we waive. The refreshing thing that even our hostile reviewer lets us see, is the unequivocally posi-

tive nature of the teachings contained. There is little or none—speaking loosely—of your gloomy destruction and misty negation; but there is, instead, an outspoken virile profession of a real Christian faith. The dominant note is its loyalty to Christ as the center and authority of our religious beliefs.

We cannot say how this position was reached—whether by the logic of the older apologetics of the apostles or by some new road,—but one cannot fail to see that such teaching is a long, long way from rationalism or naturalism—yes, even so far that some who scorn an external seat of authority might dub it credulity and superstition. Right in the very preface we find the authors saying of their articles that, “with variety and even divergence as to matters of detail, *they agree in laying supreme emphasis on Jesus Christ as the source, standard, guide and authority in Christian life.*”¹ Is there any doubt about the positive content of such a declaration of faith as that? Professor Knox, in discussing the “Problem of the Church,” first laments the “painfully slow” “progress in winning the world to Christ,” and then maintains that, discarding natural theology and church symbols, we must go to God “directly and only through Christ.” This view of religion, he thinks, if “adopted with full consciousness of its meaning in our systems, will revolutionize theology, and more, adopted with full power in our lives, it will revolutionize the world”; and, we are tempted to add, if believed, preached, and emphasized, in contrast to the misty nothings some liberals are preaching, it will give a virile rationality to our religious thought that will make us feel we are dealing in certainties, in spite of the recent negative trend. Professor McGiffert speaks of “Theological Reconstruction.” In spite of his ultra-ethical point of view, who but the most bigoted conserva-

¹ Italics are ours.

tive could object to his plea for a reconstruction accomplished on the basis of "the historic figure of Jesus Christ and the revelation which he has brought," "the real starting-point in the Christian theology"? All the Christian world can indorse clear, ringing declarations of this sort, and join their writer's hope that there would "ultimately be a greater transformation than any church has witnessed since the Reformation."

Dr. Brown's message is similar. He deals with "The Religious Value of the Old Testament," and his criterion is "the Christian test," "the teachings, life, and spirit of Jesus Christ." "Whatever does not accord with these lacks religious value for us, whether it stands in the Old Testament or in day-before-yesterday's sermon." Men who talk like that understand our age and our world. I dare say they are radicals. No doubt they have discarded many of the older beliefs; but here is vigorous, loyal Christianity proclaimed in no halting accents. When men talk that way, we cease feeling that we have outgrown the sturdy faith of Paul and Peter, we still realize that we have something—yes everything—left. Mr. R. F. Horton's "Revelation and the Bible" is a work of similar import. For a sane combination of distinctly modern views and of sturdy Christian faith it has few superiors. We need more such books and more such teaching from professors and editors and preachers. In no sense is this a plea for a stifled intellect. Let examination and the weighing of evidence go on, no matter where they may lead us. If the result of these be the loss of faith by some honest and good men, we can but wonder and grieve; but this is not the case with the New School. These men are said to be (and I believe that it is true) as firm of faith as any. Then let them speak out. This school stands high in popular favor; it could turn the tide of speculation into Christian channels if it would but carry on a vigor-

ous campaign against unbelief. To many observing minds the reaction against skepticism has already set in. But many a battle remains to be fought. Can any one doubt the glorious result if that school of men who have stripped Christianity of much that was not essential and have been mistakenly thought hostile to the faith,—if these same critics—should make it their practice from now on to minimize negative results, and should bring comfort to friend, consternation to foe, and conviction to the hesitating, by systematically proclaiming the positive elements of the real faith that they have always held?

Just how should this be done? Well, let us not be dogmatic about the method. Perhaps a series of articles in our public press by eminent “heretics” on the positive element in modern religious thinking, would be a good tonic for the average man. The pulpit, too, and perhaps courses of lectures in our large cities, would be proper channels for such teachings. I can think of intellectual communities, in this country and elsewhere, that would be fine missionary fields for radicals who would be willing to stop berating conservatives, and who would like to preach a little positive religion to the indifferent,—places where ethical regeneration is as sadly needed as a religious revival; where you will not only find hostility to the confusion of prohibition with temperance, but where indifferentism has spread the teaching that a “good fellow” is perfectly justified in “celebrating” now and then; where men are not simply decrying Puritanical restraints in literature and on the stage, but where they are fiercely chafing under “artificial, conventional repression of normal, natural instincts”; where you will meet not simply the hatred of orthodox religion and morals, but a passionate or a sullen murmur against the creed that life means effort, struggle, battle—

not for ourselves, but for God and the race; where not only is orthodoxy scorned, but where "liberal" ideas both moral and religious prevail, where God himself and belief in the soul's existence have no place, and where, furthermore, the ethical significance of life has no strong foothold, where virtue and vice are—with Taine—regarded as predetermined products like sugar and vitriol, where purity is a fanatical struggle against legitimate impulses, where charity itself is useless sentimentality, life a delusion, temporary pleasure the only good, death a sad end to a meaningless existence. Or perhaps irreligion may take the "devil-may-care" form. Men of this creed are no sombre pessimists. "Life is sweet," you hear them say; "the end is certain; the hereafter is improbable; let us eat, drink, and be merry, for to-morrow we die." If these are not literally and universally true pictures, they have at least many individual examples and are tendencies we may well fear. For release from this despondency and moral impotency or this optimistic indifference I look to but one source, and that the pure, vitalizing impulse of a real belief in Jesus Christ "as he is revealed to us in the Gospels."

As to the content of the teaching to be expected of our reformed radical, a similar reticence must be observed. All we shall venture, is to generalize a bit. In the first place, it should obviously be catholic, that is to say, just as inclusive and tolerant as one can be and avoid inconsistency, *and this means toleration for old views as well as for new ones*. Secondly, it must be outspokenly Christian. We shall not make a sharp definition of what this means, but shall venture to mention a few things it obviously does not mean. It hardly seems to be enough to be an honest seeker after truth: Nietzsche's philosophy and Zola's views on marriage are not generally thought to be Christian, though Nietzsche and Zola

may have been sincere men. Nor is mere virtue all of the Christian religion. John Stuart Mill and John Morley may be noble types of manhood, and more acceptable to God than many a "believer," but I hardly think we should dare refer their teachings to Jesus or to Paul as samples of the religion that the founders of Christianity thought the world needed. Furthermore I cannot see how any one whose belief ends with God can think that he is teaching the full spiritual content of our religion. Lastly, even Dr. Harnack maintains, if one may rely on a newspaper report, that "any judgment confusing Christ with the other masters must be rejected"; and with this backing I should like to enter a demurrer against the "Confucius-Buddha-Jesus-Goethe" brand of Christianity.

The common liberal tendency to pat the ethnic religions on the back is just a bit exaggerated. It is well for us, no doubt, that we have begun to recognize the divine hand in all religions; but it is time that some New-school theologians reached and preached definite convictions on certain points about which Christianity and other religions differ as day from night: whether, for instance, we are to believe in the vague and doubtful God of Buddha, the tyrant God of Mahomet, or the personal, loving God of Christ; whether we shall look forward to absorption into the infinite, to an eternity of lust, or to a Christian heaven. Perhaps, too, your boasted spiritual consciousness will not settle these questions. It may be better for us if we are thrown back on the derided principle of authority—not of church, nor even of book, but of the Son of God; possibly even the twentieth century is not too intellectual to learn of him. Argue as we may, there are generic differences between Christianity and most heathen religions, and if we have any beliefs at all we must have a rational basis for our choice of them. The writer of this discussion

has frankly and emphatically taken his stand for a supernatural religion that finds its center in a supernatural person and part of its evidence in supernatural events. He has done so because he can put no other interpretation on the words of those who knew what Christianity was in the beginning, if any one ever knew; because he believes such a view to be philosophically admissible; and, more than that, because he feels that this sort of religion is rationally demanded by a world like ours. But some think otherwise. They consider Christ the world's Redeemer, and its Guide in things spiritual and moral, without our belief in the so-called supernatural. Let us have no quarrel with them. Let us all only preach Christ. I cannot comprehend the logic of such people, and it must be admitted that I am hedging a little in thus compromising with them; but I am glad of their conclusions, meager though they seem to be. Far be it from me to impose my conception of Christianity upon them. All I say is: "Friends, speak out your message; preach God, life everlasting, Christ, duty, destiny, hope, to an ignorant and sinful world; but have a little toleration, too, for your brother whose old-fashioned views you may not admire, for he is a soldier in the same army with you."

Finally, there are two cogent reasons why a New-school attack would lead to victory over the irreligious forces of our day. 1. Conservative apologists are regarded with no little suspicion of bias, whether because they really are not open-minded, or because their opponents—Christian or non-Christian—have forced this reputation upon them by continuous insinuation—whether, I say, it be from one cause or the other, or from both, Old-school apologists for Christianity are not generally thought to be as free from prejudice as are the radicals; and so, persuasive and defensive statements of religion

made by the latter class would appeal with double force to the doubting. 2. A great deal of our present-day doubt is obviously emotional rather than intellectual, it is a *feeling* of hesitation rather than a *conviction* of erroneous conclusions—due, I suppose, to the absurdly extreme and even false conclusions it was fashionable not a great while ago to draw from recent discoveries in science and in criticism. Now, I say, that it would be a downright surprise to many people, if certain scholars and preachers whose negative work we have described, should consistently and enthusiastically, from now on, lay emphasis on the positive side of their belief. Quite aside from any specific arguments these men could urge—and I doubt not that their way of looking at things would persuade some never reached along older lines of thought,—their very presence among the outspoken champions of a real, virile Christianity would have against emotional doubt a counteracting influence whose power I should not care to limit.

The strategic moment to strike has come. What looked like defeat proves to be only retiring to more tenable ground. This retreat has drawn on the enemy, discouraged our soldiers, and turned neutrals against us; but it can be used as a feint; a firm stand, a defiant display of colors, and a swift return to the charge would have a tremendous moral and practical effect. A crying need has been pointed out. Does any one doubt its existence? Various remedies have been broadly outlined and the call to arms is sounding. Will the New School heed the appeal? Who will take the lead?

ARTICLE VIII.

THE MALADY OF SAUL, KING OF ISRAEL.

BY EDWARD M. MERRINS, M.D.

"YE daughters of Israel, weep over Saul. . . . How are the mighty fallen!" This text has furnished the theme for many noble and eloquent sermons; and not great preachers only, but great artists, poets, and musicians have also felt the singular fascination of the tragic career of the first king of Israel,—“the half-shrouded figure that stands erect and state-ly, but touched with such unutterable sadness, at the very threshold of Jewish kingly history; that still attracts, and touches, and interests, and still appeals across the ages to human sympathy, in spite of crime, and error, and madness, and defeat.” In the crucible of modern historical criticism, however, the facts of Saul’s life seem to be melting away into myths and unwarranted redactions, and it is a very shrouded, ghostly creature that is now left to us. We are told that neither the outer nor the inner life of the heroic king is intelligible. It is hinted that his malady may have been nothing more serious than “that heightening of the physical powers under the influence of rage against Yahweh’s enemies, which characterized the successful great warriors and athletes.” But as such wild moods are found in substantial creatures of flesh and blood, there is a series of questions which dissipate the malady entirely. “Was it a melancholy produced by a wild longing for battle? Was it but the morbid reflex of the prophetic inspiration of Saul’s heroic period? Does the story of the witch

of Endor suggest it was a frenzied anticipation of evil for Saul and his people? Is it historical at all?"¹ And so these our actors were all spirits, and are melted into air, into thin air, and the unsubstantial pageant fades, and leaves not a rack behind. Perhaps a reconsideration of the narrative, accepting the facts practically as they are stated in the sacred records, will enable us to identify the disease from which Saul suffered, and to that extent at least will help to preserve his history as that of a real though sorely tried human being. That he should be classed among "the shipwrecks of faith" may be unavoidable, yet the sympathy which can be touched with the feeling of human infirmity, physical as well as moral, may extenuate the misdemeanors for which the unfortunate king has been severely judged, and induce pity rather than condemnation, when his affliction is more clearly understood.

The relation of moral evil to physical infirmity is often very close, and in few diseases are the two more inextricably tangled than in epilepsy. As we believe this was the malady of Saul, a brief description of it must be given to furnish the matrix into which the various scattered allusions to Saul's disorder may be fitted.²

Epilepsy is a disease of the nervous system characterized by sudden attacks of unconsciousness, which may, or may not, be accompanied by convulsions. Abstaining from fine distinctions, it may be said there are the following ways in which the disease is manifested: (1) *le grand mal*, in which unconsciousness is profound and prolonged, and the convulsions are general and violent; (2) *le petit mal*, in which unconsciousness may be momentary, and convulsive movements very slight or absent; (3) psychical epilepsy, in which mental

¹ Encyclopedia Biblica, art. "Saul."

² See Allbutt, *System of Medicine*, vii. and viii.; Osler, *Practice of Medicine*, and other medical works.

and emotional disturbances may appear in the intervallary periods, entirely independent of the convulsions. There is still another form,—cortical or Jacksonian epilepsy,—in which the convulsions are confined to a single limb or set of muscles, and consciousness is retained; but, as it is due to an irritative lesion of the brain such as may be caused by injury or some abnormal growth, no further reference will be made to it.

Le grand mal.—In a typical attack of *grand mal*, the ushering-in symptom is generally a peculiar, momentary sensation, either physical or psychical, known as an “aura,” from the old idea that the arteries contained air, and that the rising of this air produced the sensation. The patient then utters a strange, unearthly cry, becomes unconscious, falls headlong to the ground, and the whole body is thrown into convulsions. The fall is often sudden and violent, as if the epileptic were hurled down by some invisible, external force, and may be such as to occasion serious injury, or involve him in mortal danger from burning, drowning, or other accident. During the convulsions the patient seems to choke, foam issues from the mouth, the teeth are fixed, the hands contracted, the eyes distorted. After a variable time the convulsions cease, the patient lies in a state of exhausted relaxation, often sleeping for some hours, and then awakes mentally clear, but feeling sore and bruised. A vivid and accurate description of such an attack is given in the New Testament by the distressed father of the boy brought to the Lord: “Master, I beseech thee to look upon my son; for he is mine only child: and behold, a spirit taketh him, and he suddenly crieth out; and it convulseth him that he foameth, and it hardly departeth from him, bruising him sorely,” and “ofttimes he falleth into the fire, and ofttimes into the water.”¹

¹ Luke ix. 37-43; Matt. xvii. 15.

Attacks usually occur without any obvious exciting cause; but annoyance, fright, or any sudden mental emotion may induce them. In some cases they occur only in the night, so it is possible for a person to be epileptic for years without himself or any one else being aware of it.

Pre-paroxysmal stage.—It must not be supposed, however, that all seizures commence in this very sudden manner, like a bolt out of the blue. Those living with epileptics can often predict a seizure days beforehand, by observing some mental or physical change in them. They are nervous, restless, sleepless, and cannot properly perform their usual duties; or sulLEN, moody, lethargic; some show impairment of memory, others are troubled with hallucinations, or with delusions of persecution; many are irascible, quarrelsome, inclined to commit personal assaults on the slightest provocation; and there are those in whom the nervous excitability increases as the attack draws near, who give way to uncontrollable outbursts of furious violence, during which murderous assaults are committed, often on relatives and friends, but sometimes on persons against whom the epileptic has a grievance real or imaginary, so that the assault in such cases seems to be the result of pre-meditation. Actions performed in this condition may not afterwards be remembered.

Some patients are aware themselves an hour or two beforehand when an attack is impending by their depression, disquietude, or apprehension, or by such physical symptoms as a slight trembling, or a sensation as if the limbs were heavily weighted, and so have time to prepare for the seizure.¹

¹ For a curious illustration of this preparation, see the New York papers for May 16, 1904. Passengers on a trolley car "were surprised when the car reached Lexington Avenue, to see the motorman shut off the power, apply the brakes, step down into the street and begin to go through contortions." Later, "the motorman said he was subject to epileptic fits, and knew when they were coming on."

Auræ.—The immediate warnings, or *auræ*, are manifested in a variety of ways. Among them are the emotions of fear, terror, the fixed idea of some impending calamity, the sense that whatever is being done is morally wrong, a dreamy condition, giddiness very often, and peculiar sensations referred to some part of the body, or connected with the special senses of hearing, sight, smell, or taste. The auditory warning may be the sound of a bell, whistle, music, or distinct voices. The visual warning may be a flash of light, stars, objects of various kinds, persons, scenes. Occasionally the warnings of the special senses are associated, especially the auditory and the visual. A very important characteristic of sense deceptions, is the powerful and irresistible influence which they may exert over the entire thought and activity of the patient.

Le petit mal.—In *le petit mal*, the disease usually manifests itself by momentary unconsciousness and giddiness. "Suddenly, for example, at the dinner-table, the subject stops talking and eating, the eyes become fixed, and the face slightly pale. Anything which may have been in the hand is usually dropped. In a moment or two consciousness is regained, and the patient resumes conversation as if nothing had happened." There is therefore nothing appalling to the onlookers, as in *grand mal*, but in many of these cases the effect upon the mental condition of the patient is far more disastrous than in the convulsive form.

Post-paroxysmal stage.—After the attack, some epileptics may remain in a most dangerous mental condition perhaps for days, especially after *petit mal*. Certain of them are troubled with hallucinations which are systematized into delusions; others are noisy, violent, perverse. There are those who pass into a state of automatism resembling somnambulism, unconsciously performing acts with so much apparent

intelligence that to others they appear to be volitional. These acts may be relatively harmless, as when a patient undresses himself wherever he happens to be, probably under the vague sense that something is wrong and he ought to go to bed; or they may be very serious indeed, as the committal of homicidal acts of violence. Thus one patient whose automatic condition following the seizure generally lasted for ten days, quarreled with his wife while in this state and shot her dead. As his murderous act appeared to the juridical mind to have been the result of sane premeditation, he was convicted of murder and sentenced to be hanged. Afterward, on account of some legal technicality, he was released. Six months later, while again in this abnormal state, he committed suicide. Anger, violence, retaliation for imaginary wrong, purposeless acts, assaults, murder, have all been recorded as occurring during this post-epileptic state. On emerging from it, all remembrance of acts performed during its continuance may have disappeared.

Intervallary period.—Between the attacks, some patients are in quite their normal condition, but sooner or later there generally take place a blunting of the higher mental qualities, and impairment of memory, especially for recent events.¹ In others there appears the condition known as “psychic” epilepsy. “The essential feature of psychical epilepsy is the disturbance of consciousness. Patients are confused, move and act in a mechanical or automatic manner, and often present evidences of illusions, hallucinations, and delusions. They wander aim-

¹ As total loss of memory may occur for a variable period in all cases of epilepsy, Saul's failure to recognize David when the latter was about to encounter Goliath, may perhaps be thus accounted for; but Abner's lapse of memory cannot be so easily explained, except, perhaps, on the ground that he assumed it was the whim of the irascible and capricious king not to recognize David, and, courtier-like, fell in with it.

lessly about, and do not appear to recognize any one, but will sometimes reply incoherently to questions. Occasionally they assume fixed or peculiar positions,¹ or gaze steadily at one point. In some instances they display a heightened excitement, and again a gloomy stupor."² Numerous criminal acts have been committed while in this state.

Effect of epilepsy on mind and character.—Epilepsy may coexist with a healthy growth and development of the intellectual faculties, and a very high degree of intelligence and even genius may be associated with it. Julius Cæsar, Augustus, Napoleon, Peter the Great, Pascal, Petrarch, Mahomet, Molière, Handel, and many other great men were epileptics; indeed, Lombroso somewhat pessimistically defines genius itself as a symptom of hereditary degeneration of the epileptoid variety. It is not until the fits become frequent,—those of the *petit mal* being the worse,—that the mental faculties become seriously impaired. Nevertheless, even when no definite, observable mental weakness is present, certain peculiarities are common to the whole class of epileptics, and dominate their character, such as an explosive irritability of temper, and a state of

¹ Compare the remarkable lines of Browning, descriptive of the attitude in which David found Saul, when the latter was in one of his abnormal periods :—

"At the first I saw naught but the blackness : But soon I descried
A something more black than the blackness—the vast, the upright
Main prop which sustains the pavilion : and slow into sight
Grew a figure against it, gigantic and blackest of all.
Then a sunbeam, that burst through the tent-roof, showed Saul.
He stood erect as that tent prop, both arms stretched out wide
On the great cross-support in the center, that goes to each side ;
He relaxed not a muscle, but hung there as, caught in his pangs
And waiting his change, the king-serpent all heavily hangs,
Far away from his kind, in the pine, till deliverance come
With the spring-time,—so agonized Saul, drear and stark, blind
and dumb."

² Defendorf, Clinical Psychiatry, p. 340.

mind which makes them more than ordinarily susceptible to religious impressions. They are apt to be influenced greatly by the mystical and awe-inspiring, and may believe themselves to be inspired; they are scrupulous about the forms of religion, but there is not always a corresponding moral elevation. This aspect of religion need not occasion any disquieting reflections, for, as Professor James well says, "In the psychopathic temperament we have the emotionality which is the *sine qua non* of moral perception; we have the intensity and tendency to emphasis which are the essence of moral vigor, and we have the mysticism which carries one's interests beyond the surface of the sensible world."¹

We are now ready to see whether the study of Saul's life and the various allusions to his disorder, justify the conclusion that he was an epileptic. Of the preceding conditions and history which form the background, as it were, of every case of chronic disease,—the parental diseases and weaknesses, the hereditary tendencies, the childish ailments of the patient, his mental and physical peculiarities,—we are quite ignorant. All we know is that Kish, his father, was a man of substance or honor, and that Saul's early years were spent on his father's farm. Granted that he was an epileptic, a peaceful agricultural life, with little or no mental perturbation, would have been most favorable to his healthy development. But the times were dark and stormy; the people were kept in a state of perpetual turmoil by their disastrous wars. Every time the youthful Saul was compelled to go to a Philistian smithy to sharpen "his ploughshare, and his coulter, and his axe, and his mattock," his soul must have burned with indignation at the humiliation imposed upon him and his people, and the longing to be free from the restrictions of the helot must have

¹ James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 25.

been intense. Many fierce questions arose in his heart which remained unsolved until Samuel answered them. When first Saul appears on the scene, he is a handsome youth of extraordinary stature: "from his shoulders and upward he was higher than any of the people." In this excess of bodily development may there not lie the physical basis of his later abnormal mental condition? Some of the cases of gigantism, if not all, are pathological, being closely related to a disease called acromegaly, in which the morbid growth of the bones is accompanied by symptoms of mental disorder.¹

The nation, weary of the rule of the incapable and morally worthless sons of Samuel, had requested the aged prophet to find for them a king. On a certain day it was divinely revealed to him that on the morrow a visitor would call upon him who was to be anointed for the office. Saul duly appeared, and immediately won Samuel's heart by his handsome appearance and engaging qualities, and by his unaffected modesty when it was made known to him that he was chosen to be king of Israel. He spent the day and night at Samuel's house, and during that time high converse passes between the two, the prophet answering all the questions in the youth's heart. Saul's religious fervor and zeal, and his openness to instruction, made a deeply favorable impression on Samuel, and it was not an official kiss, but one of personal affection, that he gave him as a farewell salute. Whether at that time there had been previous attacks of the malady we cannot tell, but Saul was presumably at that age of early adolescence when they very commonly begin. It must have been in a strange state of emotional excitement when he left the prophet's house early the following morning, and was told that, among other

¹ Lannoy and Roy, *Rev. Neurolog.*, January 31, 1903; *Lancet*, March 14, 1903; art. "Giants and Dwarfs," *Lancet*, August 6, 1904, pp. 406 407.

wonderful events to happen before the day was over, he would find himself prophesying among a band of prophets, and his whole nature would be changed. The prophets of those times were not of the highest order. It may even be they were men after the fashion of Mahometan fakirs, or dancing and howling dervishes, who express their religious exaltation in most eccentric ways.¹ Many of them, no doubt, were epileptics. An eye-witness, in describing the Doseh or Trampling of the Egyptian dervishes, says of the devotees that "some writhe in agony, some swoon, some are in fits, while still with foaming lips they strive to murmur the praise of Allah."² At the present day the Siberian Shamans, who profess to have intercourse with spirits and operate in a state of convulsive exaltation, choose their pupils by preference from among epileptic children.³ "But that good Spirit who seeks men more than they seek him, in condescending to use poor human language for the purposes of religion, must also have stooped to the picture language, to the rude instruments, symbols, and sacraments of an early or undeveloped faith."⁴ So it was with Saul. "The Spirit of God came mightily upon him, and he prophesied among them." In such company and in a state of religious ecstasy, the overpowering excitement may easily have culminated in an attack of epilepsy. Certainly on a later occasion when we find him again among the prophets, and he undresses himself,—a frequent occurrence during the epileptic state,—“and fell down naked all that day and all that night,” disordered in mind and under the vehement agitation of a spirit, as Josephus records, the details point strongly to an

¹ Cornill, *The Prophets of Israel*, p. 13.

² Gordon Cumming, art. "Egyptian Dervishes," *Gent. Mag.*, N. S., xxix. 545.

³ Lombroso, *The Man of Genius*, p. 40.

⁴ G. A. Smith, *The Twelve Prophets*, i. 16.

epileptic condition.¹ May not also the strange hiding of himself when the lots were being drawn as to who should be king, be accounted for in the same way, the excitement, as the lots drew nearer and nearer, bringing on the attack? Further, would not this explain why the sons of Belial despised him, and brought him no present, and contemptuously asked, "How shall this man save us?" in spite of his physical stature and strength being such as to immediately commend him to those who desired a warlike king? To their disparaging remarks Saul made no reply: "he was as though he were deaf." This may mean that he was only dissembling his resentment, a supposition which his subsequent conduct does not warrant; or, on the other hand, it may mean that he was in the dazed condition of the post-epileptic state.

The sacred historian states it was an evil spirit that troubled* Saul. That epilepsy was due to supernatural agency we know to have been the universal belief in former times. As far back as the Stone Age, holes were bored in the skulls of epileptics to afford a means of escape to the spirits supposed to be imprisoned within them. In fact, the name *epilepsia*, "a falling upon" as by a spiritual agent, was given to the disease by the Greeks, in the belief that its startling manifestations must be the work of some unseen agent of demoniacal ferocity and strength. Similar views were held by the Romans, who called it the "comitial sickness," because the polling for the *comitia centuriata* was null and void if any voter was seized with epilepsy while the votes were being taken. The Arabs also looked upon the subjects of epilepsy as being under supernatural influence; Mahomet's fits, for example, being regarded by his followers, and probably also by himself, as evidence

¹ 1 Sam. xix. 24; cf. also, xviii. 10.

* The verb translated "troubled," means to "fall suddenly upon, or startle."

of his inspiration.¹ This evil spirit is said to have "terrified" Saul. We have already seen that among the psychical auræ is the sensation of fear, of terror, or a fixed idea that some frightful calamity is impending. Another little detail is furnished by Josephus, who says: "Some strange and demoniacal disorders came upon him, and brought upon him such suffocations as were ready to choke him."² Hippocrates, also, in his description of an epileptic seizure, says, "The patient seems to choke," the breathing often being interfered with during the whole attack. Moreover, David's music is said to have made Saul breathe more freely.³ Other symptoms pointing to epilepsy are the instability of mood and conduct, and the wild, uncontrollable outbursts of furious violence.

Saul furnishes many illustrations of the strange instability of character which is one of the most striking mental features of the epileptic. At times he is brilliant, daring, confident of success, as in his early conflict with Nahash, and on many occasions when "he fought against all his enemies on every side, against Moab, and against the children of Ammon, and against Edom, and against the kings of Zobah, and against the Philistines, and whithersoever he turned himself he was victorious." At other times, as when the hulking brute Goliath defied him and his army, he is apathetic, despondent, afraid. When the people wished to put to death the sons of Belial who despised him, he is magnanimous, and declares, "There shall not a man be put to death this day"; yet he can mercilessly slaughter helpless priests, with their wives and children, for showing hospitality to a man he thinks is his foe. He persistently pursues David with murderous intent, and then, overcome by David's generous forbearance to raise his hand against the Lord's

¹ Muir's *Life of Mahomet*, p. 7.

² *Antiq. of the Jews*, vi. 8. ³ 1 Sam. xvi. 23.

anointed, he cries out: "Is this thy voice, my son David? And Saul lifted up his voice, and wept. And he said to David, Thou art more righteous than I; for thou hast rendered unto me good, whereas I have rendered unto thee evil." In such moods Saul is lovely and pleasant, "for these patients will sometimes be found marvelously sweet in disposition, benevolent, affectionate, and considerate"; yet quickly his mood changes, and he pursues David with the same bitter hatred as before. He is so morbidly pious as to be willing to kill his son in order scrupulously to fulfill a rash religious vow; but over and over again, when plain commands are laid upon him, he displeases Samuel by his thoughtlessness and disobedience, so that he has to be told that obedience is better than sacrifice. In his desire for the purity of religion he puts out of the land all those with familiar spirits, wizards, and other traffickers with the powers of darkness, yet in a crisis of his life he seeks the services of the witch of Endor. It is hardly necessary to give further illustrations of this changeableness.

Of the sudden outbursts of fury and acts of homicidal violence characteristic of the epileptic, which may occur immediately before or after a fit, there are several examples. More than once while David is trying to soothe him with music, Saul hurls his spear at him. His anger is kindled because David is absent from a feast, and during the course of his inquiries he gives his son Jonathan the deadliest insult one Oriental can give to another by reviling his mother, accuses him of being in collusion with David, and then casts his ever-ready spear at him to smite him.¹ Similarly, the epileptic Na-

¹ According to a venerable supersition, epileptics were always worse at the new moon. Says an old English writer: "And this is proved in menne that be lunatike or madde, and also in menne that be epulentike [epileptic], or having the falling sickness, that be mooste greeved in the beginning of the new moone." By a coincidence,

poleon, at a time when Prince Metternich was most necessary to him, insultingly asks him, how much money he receives from England for defending her interests; on another occasion he throws Prince Louis violently out of the room; on yet another, he kicks Senator Volney in the stomach. Saul can also be more deliberate in his cruelty. He tries to kill David by sending him on a military expedition against the Philistines. When that scheme fails, he tries to murder him at night, and David is only saved by the ready wit of his wife. Saul's massacre of the priests and of the Gibeonites shows the same merciless, fanatical spirit as the inhuman execution of the eight hundred captives of the defeated clan Bani Ko-reitza by Mahomet,—another epileptic.¹

The treatment of Saul's malady by music is quite consistent with its being epilepsy, as music from the earliest times has been employed as a healing agent, and more especially has it ever been held that it has power to soothe the savage breast. Pythagoras and Xenocrates recommended it in the treatment of mental disorders, and many centuries later, Ferinelli, the eminent singer, is said to have cured Philip of Spain of homicidal mania by singing ballads to him daily. In various ancient Egyptian papyri, incantations are prescribed for similar conditions. It was believed that words and sounds emitted at the favorable moment with the "correct voice," had power over the gods to make them do the will of the performers.² As epilepsy was held to be an obsession, music would this outbreak of Saul occurred at this precise period (1 Sam. xx. 24). One is inclined to reckon as good fish everything that comes into the net, but without indorsing this superstition, it may be said that in an age when persons so afflicted believed in the baleful influences of the moon, it is quite possible that such belief and the consequent anticipations, would have a tendency to make the recrudescence of their mental disorder coincident with the appearance of the "new moon."

¹ Muir, *Life of Mahomet*, p. 330. ² Maspero, *Dawn of Civilization*.

naturally be used to restore the patient to his normal condition. It was not simply when Saul was overcome by mental depression between attacks, that David played and sang before him; he played during the actual seizure to exorcise the evil spirit. "And it came to pass when the evil spirit from God was upon Saul, that David took the harp and played with his hand: so Saul was refreshed, and was well, and the evil spirit departed from him." The word translated "refreshed," means more exactly, "to breathe freely," which, as we have already observed, is in favor of the malady being epilepsy. When the violent convulsions ceased, the evil spirit was supposed to have taken its departure; but the playing may have continued during the dreamy post-epileptic state to keep him soothed. When Othello is overcome by the conviction of Desdemona's unfaithfulness, and falls prostrate, Iago tells Cassio that Othello has fallen into an epilepsy. Cassio suggests rubbing the temples by way of immediate treatment. Iago replies:—

"No, forbear;
The lethargy must have its quiet course;
If not, he foams at mouth, and by and by
Breaks out to savage madness."¹

David's musical performances were not always successful in preventing these subsequent outbreaks of savage madness. Several times with the lyre still in his hand did David have to run for his life from the murderous spear of Saul.

It has usually been assumed that Saul's malady was hypochondriasis or melancholia.² But in melancholia the social feeling almost invariably tends to disappear. The patient has no pleasure in society, and avoids it; he is solitary and egotistical. Saul was sociable; it is no hyperbole to say that he was lovely and pleasant. Again, in melancholia, the feelings which have anger as their fundamental emotion are absent; all combative-

¹ Othello, iv. 1. 51.

² Bennett, *Diseases of the Bible*, p. 83.

ness is lost; the patient is meek, humble, and submissive. These are hardly the characteristics of Saul's malady as depicted in the Bible. In chronic dementia, saliva may dribble from the mouth, and perhaps it was close observation of a person so afflicted that enabled David to successfully simulate madness at the court of Achish, the king of Gath; but this is a symptom common to the later stages of various mental diseases when the patients have become complete wrecks, and David may often have come across such cases. There is nothing to indicate that Saul had reached this terminal condition.

It has also been held that his case is a typical one of recurrent paroxysmal mania;¹ but, as an attack of mania rarely passes off under three or four months, this diagnosis is not congruous with the narrative. The same objection would apply to the diagnosis of *folie circulaire*, which consists of periods of exaltation, depression, and sanity, following each other in regular succession.

We pass now to the closing scenes of Saul's life, and the gloom is unrelieved by a touch of hope or brightness. The Philistines had again declared war, and Saul feared the issue. Samuel, his early friend and faithful counsellor, was dead, and there was no one else to whom he could turn for help; the priestly caste was alienated from him, and their intercessions on his behalf were inefficacious; he prayed himself, but the heavens were as brass, no response came, and this deepened his consciousness of estrangement from the Most High. What with the recurring seizures of his incurable malady, and intense spiritual depression, he felt he was a beaten man before the battle began: "When Saul saw the host of the Philistines, he was afraid, and his heart trembled greatly." His

¹ Hastings, Bible Dictionary, art. "Saul."

hopefulness and courage were clean forscent. In desperation he sought intercourse with Samuel through necromancy. Changing his kingly raiment for ordinary costume, and with a headband or mask over the upper part of his face to prevent recognition,¹ he went at night with two companions to the witch of Endor, one of that class he had formerly tried to exterminate. Whether she actually had the power of holding intercourse with the dead, who can say? There are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our philosophy, and if modern psychologists who hold no brief for the truth of the biblical narratives are inclined to think that incursions into the subliminal consciousness of man may be made by supernatural powers, it is not for us to contend otherwise. However that may be, the interview must have been a striking one. The woman in mortal fear of being entrapped by her unexpected visitants and denounced by them to the authorities for pursuing an unlawful calling, refusing to proceed until assured of safety by solemn oath; the king in a state of nervous tension, full of gloomy anticipations of coming disaster, his fears and nervousness made more profound by weariness and want of food (for he had eaten nothing all day), and by the solitude of the place, the darkness of the night, and the feeling that he was engaged in an unholy enterprise,—all the circumstances being such as to put him exactly in that condition when a return of his malady might be expected. The woman commences her incantations, and in reply to her question, "Whom shall I bring up unto thee?" the king names Samuel. He was the one who in God's hand had placed him on the throne, and had held the kingdom together during a dark and stormy period. Could he not do something, or suggest some course of action now? In his excitement, as the in-

¹ Cf. 1 Kings xx. 38.

cantations proceed, the king removes his headband, so uncovering his face, and the woman recognizes him. "And when the woman saw Saul, she cried with a loud voice: and the woman spake to Saul, saying, Why hast thou deceived me, for thou art Saul?" Again the king assured her that she had nothing to fear, and the woman continued with her incantations. Trembling with excitement, the king asked, "What seest thou?" The woman said she saw a god coming out of the earth, and further described him as an old man covered with a robe. If the above reading of verse twelve be correct,¹ it does not necessarily follow from the text that she actually saw Samuel. Josephus says that Saul "bade her bring up to him the *soul* of Samuel." In any event her task was very easy. Her vague description satisfied the vehement anticipations of the king, and convinced him the old prophet was invisibly present. If he had seen Samuel himself, his questions to the woman would have been needless. "And Saul perceived that it was Samuel, and he bowed with his face to the ground and did obeisance." The nervous strain now induced the preliminary symptoms of an epileptic attack.

The warnings which precede an attack of epilepsy often take the form of certain ideas which are generally of the nature of complex sense-perceptions related to vision. Not only may a sense of fear, for example, be accompanied by the vision of some cause for it, but the more elaborate visual sensations are such as to involve a psychical process weaving the whole into the semblance of coherence. A remarkable instance is that

¹ Ancient scribes were liable to confound the two names, Saul and Samuel, for evidence of which it is enough to refer to 1 Sam. xi. 7, where the rival readings, "after Saul," "after Samuel," stand side by side; and 1 Sam. xxviii. 12, where the cry of the witch of Endor is said to have been called forth by the sight of "Samuel," a palpable error (as Perles has pointed out) for "Saul" (Encycl. Biblica, art. "Saul").

of a woman who saw London in ruins, the Thames emptied to receive them, and herself the lonely survivor.¹ This combination of visual sensation with definite thoughts concerning it, may be discerned in many other forms. Now the one thought, the paramount desire, in Saul's mind at that time was to see or to hold converse with Samuel. Such an intense longing would be extremely likely to furnish the background, as it were, for the psychical auræ. Sir Walter Scott relates² that, shortly after the death of Lord Byron, he was one day reading with great interest an account of his habits and opinions. Having finished the subject, he was passing from his sitting-room into the entrance-hall, when suddenly he saw, right before him and in a standing posture, the exact representation of his departed friend, whose recollection had been so strongly brought to his imagination. He stopped for a moment, so as to notice the wonderful accuracy with which fancy had impressed upon the bodily eye the peculiarities of dress and posture of the illustrious poet, and the vision vanished. Sir Walter was sensible of the delusion, and dispelled it. But epileptics are not able to distinguish between the real and visionary; with them the delusion is very real, and often persists into the post-paroxysmal stages of the attack. Thus "M. W. has visions of a heavenly visitant appearing to her, after which she has a fit. When recovering she continues to see the same figure in the sky, and imagines she is an angel called to heaven; she answers the voice and makes repeated attempts at flight." It is thus seen that the last impression in consciousness before a fit may be revived after the paroxysm is over and held in the consciousness again. This has been called the epileptic echo, and it may take the form of a directing voice,

¹ Allbutt, *System of Medicine*, vii. 775.

² *Demonology and Witchcraft*, p. 45.

an imperative idea, or a fixed delusion. With Saul it was the definite impression that he had conversed with Samuel, who had foretold that on the morrow he and his people were doomed to defeat, and death awaited him and his sons.

After the auræ, "Saul fell straightway his full length upon the earth." The attack came upon him, expended its force, and left him exhausted: "there was no strength in him, for he had eaten no bread all the day nor all the night." In spite of her unholy calling, the witch seems to have been a kind-hearted woman, and deserving of the praise given her by Josephus with a generous hand. Seeing the king was "sore troubled," she persuaded him to take some refreshment. Strengthened in body and quieter in mind, but with an unshakable presentiment of coming disaster that tended to bring about its own fulfillment, the king and his companions then returned to the Israelite camp.

On the morrow, "the Philistines fought against Israel, and the men of Israel fled from before the Philistines, and fell down slain in mount Gilboa." Saul and his sons were very hard pressed. "And the battle went sore against Saul, and the archers overtook him, and he was greatly distressed by the archers." It is confessedly a difficult task to make a coherent narrative of what follows, but in the light of this understanding of Saul's complaint the writer thinks it can be done. Plutarch states it was reported of Julius Cæsar,—who our readers will remember was also an epileptic,—that in one of his campaigns, as he was drawing up his army and giving his orders, he had an attack of his old distemper; and that upon its approach, before it had overpowered and deprived him of his senses, as he felt the first agitations, he directed his people to carry him to a neighboring tower, where he lay in quiet till the fit was over. Is it not easily conceivable that

Saul, weary, wounded, and despondent, was overcome during the battle in like manner? He too felt the approaches of his ailment; but for him there was no quiet refuge where he could stay until the evil was overpast; and he knew when the Philistines found him in that helpless condition, that whatever malice could suggest would be done to him. He therefore wanted to die at once, it was foreordained he should, so he appealed to his armor-bearer to thrust him through. The armor-bearer would not, "for he was sore afraid." May be, from his intimacy with Saul, he also discerned the epileptic state was approaching, and perhaps feared the consequences that would happen to him if he killed a man in whom an evil spirit was already beginning to exert its malign influence. Leaning for support upon his sword from sheer weakness, Saul then turned to an Amalekite who was standing near, and made a similar appeal to him. But his physical weakness now overcame him, and he fell heavily to the ground, wounding himself with his sword in doing so, for his senses were confused. Still he struggled to make himself understood: "Stand, I pray thee, over me," he said to the Amalekite, "and slay me; for anguish [giddiness, cramps, convulsions] ¹ hath taken hold of me; because my life is yet whole in me." And so he passed into a merciful state of unconsciousness. His life *was* yet whole in him; it was not a mortal wound by his own hand that stretched his kingly form in the dust, but this terrible ailment, which had been the torment of his life and the ruin of a noble career.

¹ The Hebrew word אַנְגוּשׁ translated "anguish" occurs nowhere else, and is of doubtful meaning. The Rabbins interpret it, some "cramp," others "giddiness." The former is the most probable (*Speaker's Comm.*). Why not "convulsion" instead of "cramp"? The other translation, "giddiness," fits in well, however, with the theory of epilepsy, as this is the most common symptom of all, immediately preceding the convulsions.

The Amalekite, who did not have the scruples and fears of the armor-bearer, and "was sure that [Saul] could not live after that he was fallen,"¹ brought the troubled life to its earthly close.

No wonder Saul has been reckoned among the shipwrecks of faith. Certainly the ending of his life could hardly have been more disastrous,—his army defeated, his sons slain, the succession to the throne passing to another line, the personal sense of estrangement from God and man, and then his violent death with no glimmering of hope beyond, nothing but the darkness of Sheol. And yet, when we consider how greatly he suffered in body and mind, and that much of his spiritual infirmity was almost certainly due to his nervous disease, may not the glorious prophecy put in the mouth of David by the modern poet after all be true?

"O Saul, it shall be

A Face like my face that receives thee ; a Man like to me,
Thou shalt love and be loved by forever ; a Hand like this hand
Shall throw open the gates of new life to thee !
See the Christ stand !"

¹ 2 Sam. i. 10.

ARTICLE IX.

NOTES.

**WHAT CAN CHRISTIANS OF THE WEST DO FOR THE
MUSLIM RACES OF TURKEY?**

WHAT American missionaries are doing for the Christian races of the Ottoman empire is well known. Their evangelistic work has developed into churches which are becoming self-supporting and self-propagating, a sure pledge of permanence. Their work of education through schools, once wholly eleemosynary, now shows a total under instruction of twenty-four thousand, while their higher schools and colleges, for both sexes, are filled to overflowing with pay pupils, and the graduates of these institutions are preachers, teachers, physicians, and business men, leaders in society and in affairs; and that quite as much in the Gregorian Armenian, and "Orthodox" Greek communities, from which they come and to which they return, as among the Protestants.

Upon the foundation of the Bible, which the great Bible Societies send forth, in many languages, in numerous editions, one hundred thousand volumes a year, the Publication Department at Constantinople builds up a Christian literature, periodical and permanent. Theirs is the only fountain of wholesome reading of more than ephemeral value. Their average yearly output has been ten million pages.

In recent years hospital and dispensary work has been greatly and most successfully extended, while the emergency work of relief in times of famine, pestilence, and other calamities, sometimes employs well-nigh the whole missionary force, and wonderfully extends the normal influence of the Christianity represented by such philanthropic enterprise. All these lines of work are in evidence and on record, known to observing Christians everywhere.

At present, at least three-fourths of the populations directly under the control of the Ottoman Power are Muslim in religion,—Turks, Arabs, Koords, Circassians, Albanians, and others. What can Christians of the West do for these races? This is no new question. It was asked two generations ago. It is, it has always been, an urgent question. We must confess that there has been much groping for a practical answer.

For missionaries working among the adherents of another religion than their own, it is necessary not only to become thoroughly acquainted with that religion, but also to come into sympathy with that religious sentiment which is everywhere found; and this sympathy will become deeper and more yearning where the religious spirit has become stifled or atrophied by the blind guides, who have undertaken to direct, and by the baleful narcotics which have attempted to satisfy, religious aspiration.

Whatever may be true concerning other Oriental religions, no charge of vagueness can be made against the religion of Islam. Here we find a clearly defined creed, a theology largely Jewish, a theology which asserts the unity, and also every natural and moral attribute, of God. The name of the religion, Islam, is exactly translated by the word "Surrender," which means the surrender of the human to the divine will. This is a doctrine of practical significance and value in the lives of Mohammedans.

Islam has also a sharply defined cultus consisting of five required duties; viz. 1st. The formula "*La illah illa Allah, weh Mohammed ressul Ullah*," which every faithful Muslim repeats at least five times each day. 2d. Formal worship, exactly prescribed, both as to the words and the attitudes to be adopted. This is not *prayer*, for which there is a different word. 3d. Fasting, i. e., a month of fasting by day, coupled with unlimited feasting by night. The 4th and 5th duties are Alms and the Meccan pilgrimage.

Islam has also an ethical code. This differs from the ethical code of Christianity in three respects. 1st. It does not require absolute truthfulness, but permits, rather it commends and

commands deception, to any degree, toward those of other faiths. 2d. It requires mercy in general, but excepts aliens and enemies, as its whole historic record abundantly shows. 3d. In respect of social purity and chastity, while the requirement of Christianity is the domination of the sense by the spirit, Islam concedes large license to the demands of the sense.

Have we of the West a benevolent mission to devotees of Islam?

Let us recall, and in deep sorrow take note of, the fact that, until, in recent years, they have come in contact with evangelical Christianity, what Muslim peoples, from the beginning, *could* know of Christians and Christianity has been wholly lacking in winning power. Neither the Christianity nor the Christian life of Arabia or of Syria, in the seventh century, when Islam appeared, nor that of the Oriental churches in modern times, has been fitted, either to convince a Muslim of the deeper truth and more commanding spiritual claim of Christianity, or to win his assent to the Christianity illustrated in the lives of the Christians among whom he lives.

Moreover, intelligent Muslims—and there are many of them—are just as familiar as we are with the history of the Christianity of medieval Europe,—its devastating wars, its merciless cruelties, its colossal selfishness, its ecclesiastical tribunal, called in caustic irony the Holy Inquisition, its crusades into Muslim and into Christian lands, its expulsion of the Moors and the Jews, its stupendous hierarchical assumptions, its simony, its hypocrisy, its deep moral corruption.

Now if we ask the Turk,—in his native character no truculent barbarian, but a very human man, let us remember,—“What can we do for you?” need we be surprised if he replies, “We want nothing to do with your religion”? Let us accept it in all humility, but with more enduring courage, that it is a longer and more difficult road than is generally supposed along which we must lead men of Oriental races and of alien creeds to Christ, the Living Way.

Now let us see what the observing, fair-minded Turk of

to-day, when free to speak his mind, does say to us. Listen.

"We are watching your work among us, and we see, first, your schools. These, in the ability, the noble impartiality, the pure morality, that characterize their administration, challenge our admiration and our imitation, and attract our youth.

"Again, we recognize the purity and the exceptional value of the moral, educational, and scientific issues of your press. You care nothing for rumors or sensation in your news columns, but tell the truth. We say of your *Messenger*, 'It never laughs, and it never lies.'

"The heart of our people has been deeply touched by the treatment some of us have received in your hospitals, kind and self-forgetful beyond any care we ever received elsewhere or even dreamed of.

"We have also noted, as we have sometimes shared in, the benefit of your efforts to relieve suffering in times of distress, efforts limited by no conditions of race or religion. We like this evidence of philanthropic enterprise, with no ulterior or selfish designs upon our country."

Turks often speak to us in just this way. What shall be our answer to such a welcome as this? Shall we say, "We are missionaries of the Christian religion, and of the Protestant branch of the Christian church, and our sole errand is to convince you of the falsity of your ancestral faith, and to win you to faith in Christ"? Shall we say that? For one I hold that Christianity, and Christianity alone, deserves to be called a missionary religion, because it alone confers spiritual blessings upon men, with no expectation of personal or national gain to those who are its heralds. But for this very reason, viz, because it is purely and unqualifiedly beneficent, the representatives of Christianity in the East, as soon as they gain a correct conception of the conditions under which they live and work, learn that the way to reach Muslim peoples is not by religious discussion, but by winning them, through living a Christlike life before their eyes, and by bestowing upon them those blessings which they crave at our hands.

Christ healed the sick. We can do that, in these days, with

unrivaled success. Christ taught, in very simple language, that God is not only a sovereign, but our Father. Islam has not this doctrine in its creed: but how the human heart everywhere responds to this evangel. The response may be in a form different from that we looked for.

I once asked an Arab Koord, a dear friend of mine, who was led to believe in Christ by careful reading of the Bible, with the guidance of a deacon of the evangelical church in Mosul, just what it was that finally led him to accept the Christian faith, expecting him to point to some of those words of the Gospels which I knew had deeply impressed him. He replied, "It was a comparison of Islamic tradition concerning Solomon with the Old Testament narrative"!

Western science is a powerful uplifting lever to the Oriental mind. "I am reading your book on Natural Theology for the fifth time," said the governor of an interior city to me some time ago. "You have done our people a most valuable service," said a high officer of state to the translator of a standard book of Physical Geography. When the manuscript of my Natural Theology in Osmanly Turkish was before the board of censors, some years ago, all approved except one white-turbaned Turk. "What do you object to in the book?" they asked him. "To nothing in the book," he replied, "but one of *us* ought to have written it." And several years later a little book of very high moral tone entitled "Christian Manliness," was toned down as to distinctively *Christian* instruction, and offered for publication with the title "Manliness." Again a member of the Ulema objected. "We see nothing to object to in this," his colleagues said. "Yes," he replied, "it smells of Christianity all through."

To the insane desire of many to thrust the Turk, bag and baggage, not only out of Europe, but off the surface of this planet, let our answer be, "We will, please God, win the Turk to trust us, and, in all friendliness, invite him to share the blessings Christian civilization has conferred upon us." Suppose the Turk were every whit as bad as some represent; is not then the call more urgent and compelling, for us to go to

him, in deeper and more loving sympathy, with our hands full of our choicest, richest gifts?

We do open our schools to him. We receive him, when sick, into our hospitals. We offer him, through our press, the ripest and choicest things of our own language. Then let us be both patient and hopeful while we wait for his acceptance of what we offer.

Let us give a Muslim what he feels the need of and will be grateful for, and then let God, by his providence and Spirit, and through the winning power of a practical Christianity, accomplish all that for which we pray. Let us not forget our Lord's words, "The kingdom of heaven cometh not with observation," and let us work unanxious about any public heralding of the results of our labor.

For my own part, hoping for a few more years of service in the land where the greater part of my life has been spent, I will be well content to work along the lines of my department of effort, so soon as the needed additional funds are in hand, to prepare and issue books that tell of God's heaven and of the wonders of his earth; books that inculcate and illustrate those high ideals of moral teaching, of noble living, those sterling elements of character which find their exemplification in the true followers of the Man of Nazareth and of Calvary. In this way our work through the press will join on to the work of the Christian philanthropist, the teacher, the physician. So doing, we shall illustrate Christlieb's words, "The Christian is the world's Bible"; or these words of Whittier,

"Our dear Lord's best interpreters
Are faithful human souls;
The gospel of a life like theirs,
Is more than creeds or scrolls."

And shall we not assuredly believe that all we hope and pray for will follow in God's good time? If we are patient enough, faithful enough, prayerful enough; *if we show that we really care*,—we shall prove, in our relation to other races of men, the significance of our Lord's words, "Ye are my witnesses." That testimony, in its purity and in its fullness, is the one want of the Oriental world.

GEORGE F. HERRICK.

BALFOUR ON DESIGN IN NATURE.

It seems worth while to put into more permanent form the concluding paragraphs of the remarkable address of Right Honorable Arthur J. Balfour, Prime Minister of England, given in Cambridge, England, at the recent meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, of which he was president. After giving a summary of the new theory of matter, which seems to do away with the ultimate atom, and resolve everything into diverse manifestations of force, of which electricity is the fullest type, so that matter is now "not merely explained, but explained away," he closes with the following most powerful and convincing statement of the impossibility of maintaining scientific conceptions without involving the doctrine of design and of an intelligent Creator:—

"Now the point to which I desire to call attention is not to be sought in the great divergence between matter as thus conceived by the physicist and matter as the ordinary man supposes himself to know it, between matter as it is perceived and matter as it really is, but to the fact that the first of these two quite inconsistent views is wholly based on the second.

"This is surely something of a paradox. We claim to found all scientific opinions on experience; and the experience on which we found our theories of the physical universe is our *sense-perception* of that universe. That is experience and in this region of belief there is no other. Yet the conclusions which thus profess to be entirely founded upon experience are to all appearance fundamentally opposed to it; our knowledge of reality is based upon illusion, and the very conceptions we use in describing it to others, or in thinking of it ourselves, are abstracted from anthropomorphic fancies, which science forbids us to believe and nature compels us to employ.

"We here touch the fringe of a series of problems with which inductive logic ought to deal, but which that most unsatisfactory branch of philosophy has systematically ignored. This is no fault of men of science. They are occupied in the task of making discoveries, not in that of analyzing the fundamental presuppositions which the very possibility of making discoveries implies. Neither is it the fault of transcen-

dental metaphysicians. Their speculations flourish on a different level of thought; their interest in a philosophy of nature is lukewarm; and howsoever the questions in which they are chiefly concerned be answered, it is by no means certain that the answers will leave the humbler difficulties at which I have hinted either nearer to or further from solution. But though men of science and idealists stand acquitted, the same can hardly be said of empirical philosophers. So far from solving the problem, they seem scarcely to have understood that there was a problem to be solved. Led astray by a misconception to which I have already referred; believing that science was concerned only with (so-called) 'phenomena,' that it had done all that it could be asked to do if it accounted for the sequence of our individual sensations, that it was concerned only with the laws of nature and not with the inner character of physical reality; disbelieving, indeed, that any such physical reality does in truth exist;—it has never felt called upon seriously to consider what are the actual methods by which science attains its results, and how those methods are to be justified. If anyone, for example, will take up Mill's logic, with its 'sequences and co-existences between phenomena,' its 'method of difference,' its 'method of agreement,' and the rest; if he will then compare the actual doctrines of science with this version of the mode in which those doctrines have been arrived at,—he will soon be convinced of the exceedingly thin intellectual fare which has been hitherto served out to us under the imposing title of Inductive Theory.

"There is an added emphasis given to these reflections by a train of thought which has long interested me, though I acknowledge that it never seems to have interested anyone else. Observe, then, that in order of logic sense-perceptions supply the premises from which we draw all our knowledge of the physical world. It is they which tell us there is a physical world; it is on their authority that we learn its character. But in order of causation they are effects due (in part) to the constitution of our organs of sense. What we see depends not merely on what there is to be seen, but on our eyes. What we hear depends not merely on what there is to hear, but on our ears. Now, eyes and ears, and all the mechanism of perception, have, as we know, been evolved in us and our brute progenitors by the slow operation of natural selection. And what is true of sense-perception is of course also true of the intellectual powers which enable us to erect upon the frail and narrow platform which sense-perception provides, the proud fabric of the sciences.

"Now natural selection only works through utility. It encourages aptitudes useful to their possessor or his species in the struggle for existence, and, for a similar reason, it is apt to discourage useless aptitudes, however interesting they may be from other points of view, because, being useless, they are probably burdensome.

"But it is certain that our powers of sense-perception and of calculation were fully developed ages before they were effectively employed in searching out the secrets of physical reality—for our discoveries in this field are the triumphs but of yesterday. The blind forces of natural selection, which so admirably simulate design when they are providing for a present need, possess no power of prevision, and could never, except by accident, have endowed mankind, while in the making, with a physiological or mental outfit adapted to the higher physical investigations. So far as natural science can tell us, every quality of sense or intellect which does not help us to fight, to eat, and to bring up children, is but a by-product of the qualities which do. Our organs of sense-perception were not given us for purposes of research; nor was it to aid us in meting out the heavens or dividing the atom that our powers of calculation and analysis were evolved from the rudimentary instincts of the animal.

"It is presumably due to these circumstances that the beliefs of all mankind about the material surroundings in which it dwells are not only imperfect but fundamentally wrong. It may seem singular that down to, say, five years ago, our race has, without exception, lived and died in a world of illusions; and that its illusions, or those with which we are here alone concerned, have not been about things remote or abstract, things transcendental or divine, but about what men see and handle, about those 'plain matters of fact' among which common sense daily moves with its most confident step and most self-satisfied smile. Presumably, however, this is either because too direct a vision of physical reality was a hindrance, not a help, in the struggle for existence; because falsehood was more useful than truth; or else because with so imperfect a material as living tissue no better results could be attained. But, if this conclusion be accepted, its consequences extend to other organs of knowledge besides those of perception. Not merely the senses, but the intellect, must be judged by it; and it is hard to see why evolution, which has so lamentably failed to produce trustworthy instruments for obtaining the raw material of experience, should be credited with a larger measure of success in its provision of the

physiological arrangements which condition reason in its endeavors to turn experience to account.

"Considerations like these, unless I have compressed them beyond the limits of intelligibility, do undoubtedly suggest a certain inevitable incoherence in any general scheme of thought which is built out of materials provided by natural science alone. Extend the boundaries of knowledge as you may; draw how you will the picture of the universe; reduce its infinite variety to the modes of a single space-filling ether; retrace its history to the birth of existing atoms; show how under the pressure of gravitation they became concentrated into nebulae, into suns, and all the host of heaven; how, at least in one small planet, they combined to form organic compounds; how organic compounds became living things; how living things, developing along many different lines, gave birth at last to one superior race; how from this race arose, after many ages, a learned handful, who looked round on the world which thus blindly brought them into being, and judged it, and knew it for what it was—perform, I say, all this, and, though you may indeed have attained to science, in nowise will you have attained to a self-sufficing system of beliefs. One thing at least will remain, of which this long-drawn sequence of causes and effects gives no satisfying explanation; and that is knowledge itself. Natural science must ever regard knowledge as the product of irrational conditions, for in the last resort it knows no others. It must always regard knowledge as rational, or else science itself disappears. In addition, therefore, to the difficulty of extracting from experience beliefs which experience contradicts, we are confronted with the difficulty of harmonizing the pedigree of our beliefs with their title to authority. The more successful we are in explaining their origin, the more doubt we cast on their validity. The more imposing seems the scheme of what we know, the more difficult it is to discover by what ultimate criteria we claim to know it.

"Here, however, we touch the frontier beyond which physical science possesses no jurisdiction. If the obscure and difficult region which lies beyond is to be surveyed and made accessible, philosophy, not science, must undertake the task."

NOTES ON BRITISH THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

THE first series of Gifford Lectures by the Right Hon. R. B. Haldane, K.C., M.P., has been already reviewed by me in the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.¹ The second series has just appeared,² and will be read with even greater avidity than the first; for it deals with "Absolute Mind" and "Finite Mind," and is marked by the same brilliant qualities as its predecessor. It will be remembered how ably Mr. Haldane presented his own view of Hegelian idealism, and repudiated those neo-Hegelian expositions which present the Universe in terms of universals or thought-relations; further, how he took the Ultimate Reality to be Mind, within which all experience—possible or actual—was held to fall; also, how he seemed to fail of doing justice by the individual in relation to the Universal Mind, resolving it into mere phase, aspect, or appearance of the latter. The moral self or personality, I then pointed out, seemed not to receive its due, or to be consistently dealt with at all points. Other and more detailed matters—such as freedom and causality—were not very satisfactorily dealt with. Ends rather than causes furnished his clue to the universe, and were ably handled.

In the volume before us, Mr. Haldane's finding is that Ultimate Reality can be nothing but Mind—can only be subject rather than substance. Mind, he is always insistent, is not to be viewed as substance. He sets forth to inquire whether God as Mind must be personal, and what must be His relation to the finite forms in which self-consciousness appears, say, as in man. The volume is thus constructive, as its predecessor was critical.

Having supposedly got down to the bed-rock of Ultimate Reality as Mind, he inquires into the nature of mind. The exposition is not very new, but is freshly worded and conceived.

¹ See *supra*, pp. 176-178.

² *The Pathway to Reality*. Pp. xxvii, 275. London: John Murray. 10s. 6d., *net*.

The discussion of the soul (pp. 52-55) cannot be said to be either adequate or illuminating. The influence of Aristotle is very evident, but our author does not make so rich and helpful a use, as could have been made, of the great Stagirite's principles and suggestions in this connection. In particular also, while Mr. Haldane in some sort brings out the place of the soul—as "body on its ideal side"—in the developing world of evolution, there is a complete failure of justice to its ontological grounds. It is not really run back into any transcendent and creative spirit, as immanent ground or spiritual principle of the world-series. Indeed, the soul never seems to us so unreal a thing as when some modern philosophers undertake to describe it. Pursuing the discussion, Mr. Haldane takes us to a view of mind "living, concrete, self-conscious," with no exclusive dwelling on intelligible relations. After some passing criticism of Bradley and Royce, Mr. Haldane falls back on Hegel, who never seems to fail him, and to whom he owns a philosophical allegiance truly astonishing. One can hardly help envying such whole-hearted discipleship in philosophy—a rare possibility in our time.

Mr. Haldane's iterations as to mind not coming under the category of substance are, of course, right and necessary. At the same time, he should surely know that the category of substance has been, and can still be, used in this connection with advantage, because substance is taken only for the sake of bringing us into the realm of substantial being—not the mere state of becoming, and not the mere intelligible relations that are so troublesome to Mr. Haldane—and that such substance is taken, in its being and activity, to be active, intelligent substance, in fact, becomes *reasonable will*.

Mr. Haldane's representation of the relation of the finite consciousness to the Absolute Mind amounts very much to saying, God is Spirit, and we are spirit, and there is no more to be said. But that is much like not philosophizing at all. The painful thing is that we are told "there is only one reason, one mind, and that the mind as finite has not a real existence." This saying of Hegel our author calls "daring," and

certainly it is destructive of much for which a true philosophy must stand, unless taken as paradoxical in a harmless sense. But we are sorely tempted to think omniscience the foible of Hegelian philosophers, who stand within the "closed circle" of universal thought. To some extent Mr. Haldane shows us the pathway of reality, though he finds it necessary to tell us his universe is marked by "the movement that characterizes mind as mind"; what precisely he does not show us is "the pathway to reality." He feels driven to tell us we must not take a "short-cut" and make the unwarrantable assertion "I am the absolute God." But a philosophy has surely got further than it realizes when it seriously guards against so extreme a position, though one gladly gives Mr. Haldane the largest credit for his intellectual courage and candor. It is certainly in anything but a disrespectful mood that I say his philosophic method irresistibly reminds me of a hymn still sung in the churches, which closes with the lines—

"Come, Lord of Hosts, the waves divide,
And land us all in Heaven!"

Let this prayer be literally and instantly answered, and religious problems and disciplines would take speedy end. But it is just such a speedy end, landing us in the heaven of Hegelian idealism, that our author brings to us. "One reason, one mind," the "closed circle" of thought; and we are in the haven where all problems are at rest. Such is the impression made by Mr. Haldane's idealism—a divine philosophy, one might almost regard it, but not well adapted to men, who are beings that reason and discourse and look before and after. Mr. Bradley gave us the disappearance of reality; does Mr. Haldane now wish to add the further disappearance of the pathway to reality?

Now, after all this about "the finite mind" having "no real existence," Mr. Haldane tells us he has been showing the Absolute Mind as "requiring" and "conserving" the "finite forms." It seems as though the abstract intellectualism of Mr. Haldane's system were passing from us, and a "pathway to reality" appears after all. But it is a religious rather

than a philosophical one. It is the finite spirit working in moral freedom towards God. But our speculative needs have been left unsatisfied. No doubt, Hegel's lack of epistemological interest and inquiry has much to do with this. While philosophy in its comprehension reaches out to the universal,—does so by its very nature,—it ever, in so doing, preserves, as by infallible instinct, for the finite mind or soul an indefeasible worth—a worth sacred, eternal, real. 'Tis this failure to provide for real moral personality adequate place and worth that forms one of the deepest defects in Hegelianism. For Hegel, whom our author so closely follows, is unsatisfactory in dealing with the empirical person in relation to the concrete universal, which latter is for him the reality. The individual is held by him in too little ethical esteem, and he has no adequate account of the groundwork of human individuality.

Again, God as, "in some sense, self-conscious," seems very like the personality of Deity reduced to its lowest terms—a meager residuum. It may be doubted whether the disciple has here done justice to his master, Hegel, who can on occasion certainly speak far more inspiringly of personality. Personality, in its Divine and human aspects alike, is the sunken rock on which neo-Hegelian systems invariably come to grief.

The author's discussion of the Logos (pp. 161–164) is not marked either by fullness of knowledge or particular insight. He gives a very vulnerable exposition of the Logos passage of St. John's Gospel. Like Professor Caird in his Gifford Lectures, Mr. Haldane gives the utterly misleading impression that early apologists like Justin presented Christian thought only as a pale reflection of Greek speculation. Nothing could be further from the truth; as Justin says, when rating Plato for his lack of spiritual understanding, "it is not, then, that we hold the same opinions as others, but that all speak in imitation of ours."¹ No impression could be more erroneous than that Justin was a creature weakly formed by Plato; his "Address to the Greeks," for that matter, contains a damning

¹ *Apol.* i. 60.

indictment of Plato. The truth is, both Dr. E. Caird and Mr. Haldane betray failure to understand the real nature and significance of the teachings of the early apologists in respect of the Logos doctrine and its relation to Greek philosophy. They do not get beyond the surface of the subject.

Mr. Haldane has, in the closing Lectures, an interesting discussion on Immortality. It will be read with pleasure and interest, not so much for anything new, as for its freshness and power. But justice is not done to Ethics, the author's views sharing in the defective character of Hegel's as to the supreme value of morality and its ideals, as not marking the highest stage in the dialectic process.

Let it be said that, though this review has been mainly critical, it would be the absurdest of mistakes to suppose, either that these Lectures are wanting in conspicuous merits, or that the reviewer has lacked in appreciation of them. Their greatest merit seems to me this, that they wear a certain distinctiveness or uniqueness which makes them as valuable as any series of Gifford Lectures one can recollect. That surely should content any Gifford Lecturer. If we feel at times the too great subserviency to Hegel, there is consolation in the thought that Hegel may rest in peace, for that he is so fortunate in a disciple with the *mens naturaliter Hegeliana*. It remains only to be said that rarely does one have so much pleasure in reading such works, as the publisher of this volume (and its predecessor) has given us by so much beauty and clearness of printing and paper, making it most delightful to read.

Kilmarnock, Scotland.

JAMES LINDSAY.

ARTICLE X.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

OLD TESTAMENT PROPHECY. By the late A. B. DAVIDSON, D.D., LL.D., Litt.D., Professor of Hebrew, New College, Edinburgh. Edited by J. A. PATTERSON, D.D., Professor of Hebrew, New College, Edinburgh. 8vo. Pp. 507. New York: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons.

The scope of this work is best indicated by giving an idea of its contents. After an introductory chapter on Prophecy a Factor in Human History, we have five chapters treating of the history of prophecy from Moses to Elijah and onwards. This historical survey is given on fifty-nine pages out of five hundred. Then follow four chapters on Prophet, Names and Definition; Position of the Prophet in the State; The Prophetic State; The Source of Prophecy—Inspiration, chapters of a more general nature. Somewhat introductory are the chapters on The Prophetic Style and its Bearing on the Interpretation of Prophecy, on The Interpretation of Natural Symbolism in Prophecy, Typology in Nature and Revelation, and Typology in Scripture. The literary problem of the prophetic writings is illustrated by the Isaianic Problem. Thereupon the canonical prophets are classified, and their teaching is summarized, and the False Prophets are discussed. Messianic Prophecy is handled in three chapters, and so is Deutero-Isaiah, his Outlook on the Future, the Servant of the Lord, the Work of the Servant of the Lord. A chapter on the Restoration of the Jews concludes the book.

As will be seen from this outline, the book is not so much historical as systematic. Davidson's position on biblical criticism is too well known to need discussion here. He belongs to the conservative liberal school. Cautious, well-balanced, by the farthest removed from iconoclasm, he shrinks from uttering statements which may be brilliant and suggestive, but not tenable. Still, one wonders sometimes whether it would

not have been more advantageous if he had contributed something to the latest discussions on Hebrew prophecy. But one should not overlook that these are lectures intended to introduce his students to the study of prophecy, and not primarily intended for experts. His lucid style and popular presentation will make the book very valuable to theological students and laymen. Davidson's wonderful power of characterization of the various prophets, his penetrative insight into the very recesses of the heart, and his great ability of portraying the inner life are not met with so often in this book because of its scope, but I cannot refrain from citing at least one passage which in a sense is representative: "In the early times of prophecy, just as an abstracted ecstatic condition often accompanied the attaining of truth, so an excited demeanor often accompanied its delivery. Truth was new in those days. As it dawned on men they were shaken by it; and when they uttered it, it was with an excitation not unnatural to those who for the first time felt its power. The moral world was an undiscovered region to them; and as they sailed through unknown seas, and beheld one awful form after another rise to meet their eye, the grandeur of the view convulsed them with wonder and awe; and as Truth unveiled to them her sublime face, these Orientals could not but utter passionate exclamations of surprise and joy, and earnestly press on others what they themselves had learned. I have said Truth; it would be fairer to say *God*. It was He, indeed, that the prophet felt himself catching sight of,—He about whom were clouds of darkness; but, like some awful mountain hid in heaven, through breaks of the clouds and a momentary sinking of the mists, they caught but short glimpses of Him. . . . The history of prophecy renews itself in the individual soul at least many times. There is the dawning of Truth, awful or beautiful; the corresponding excitation; the growing of the light, until at last God's face is seen in peace. But just as here, so it was in prophecy. Excitation was no essential of it, neither was the abstracted state or vision" (pp. 87f.).

JULIUS A. BEWER.

THE THEOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. (International Theological Library.) By the late A. B. DAVIDSON, LL.D., Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis, New College, Edinburgh. Edited from the author's manuscripts, by S. D. F. SALMOND, D.D., F. E. I. S., Principal of the United Free Church College, Aberdeen. Crown 8vo. Pp. xi, 553. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1904. \$2.50, *net*.

This, like all of Dr. Davidson's writings, is marked by that thoroughness in detail, combined with skill in generalization, which gives great pleasure to the reader and a feeling of confidence in his conclusions satisfactory to all thorough students. The attitude of the distinguished author towards modern critical views is one which is, in the main, to be highly commended, though in many instances it would seem that he has surrendered unduly to its vociferous claims. The author maintains that, while "we do not find a *theology* in the Old Testament, we find a *religion*,—religious conceptions and religious hopes and aspirations. It is we ourselves that create the theology when we give to these religious ideas and convictions a systematic or orderly form. Hence our subject really is the History of the Religion of Israel as represented in the Old Testament" (p. 11). Relating to various topics which are under consideration, our author maintains that the "real derivation and meaning of the name ["Jehovah"] are wholly unknown" (p. 45). The ideas connected with it, therefore, are not to be derived from its etymology, but from its actual use by the Hebrews. To the people of Israel, Jehovah is "God saying *I will be*, God in the act of unveiling His face more and more, . . . or God as the constant One, the same yesterday, to-day, and forever" (p. 58). The whole discussion of the relation of the Hebrews to monotheism is most instructive and convincing. A great deal too much weight, he well concludes, has been attached by writers like Kuenen and others, whose object it is to demonstrate a progressive advance from a mere national particularism to a true monotheism, to such expressions as Who is like unto thee, O Jahweh, among the gods. "Such formulas may mean much or little,

according to the position of the persons in whose mouths they occur" (p. 64). Religion, the author holds, is first a practical faith in order to a pure life. With this practical faith there gradually rose a theoretical form of truth characteristic of later times. "But the doctrines were the same from the beginning" (p. 67). Jehovah was a personal name for God, describing him in his relation to Israel.

In this elaborate discussion of the names applied to God, one readily sees, though it was not the design of the author to bring it out, that the divisive theories of criticism based on the different names applied to the Divine Being in different sections of the Pentateuch rest upon a very insecure basis; for the different meanings attached to the names may have afforded a reason in themselves for the particular usage. The author's treatment of the idea of the spirituality of God as effected by the anthropomorphic expressions is admirable, as is his treatment of religion as symbolized in typology. In the necessity of depending upon types and symbols for the expression of the revelation which was being made lay the chief inferiority of the old dispensation.

"This condition of inferiority endured until Christ came, when there passed over the whole Old Testament a transformation, and it became new. The spiritual truths broke through the husks that had been needful for their protection till the time of their maturity came, and they stood out in their own power as universal.

"Another point of inferiority lay in this, that the truths had been made known piecemeal, and were not understood in their unity. But with Christ, the scattered fragments came together, bone to his bone, and stood upon their feet, organic bodies, articulated and living. It was the same truths of religion which Old Testament writers were revealing, and Old Testament saints believing and living by; it could not be any other, if they were truths of religion; but the truths were scattered and disjointed, and not apprehended in their organic oneness, and they were also clothed in material forms. This is all that is needful to be held of what is known as Typology" (p. 237).

The general conservatism of the author is illustrated in his views of the destiny of the wicked. While not speaking with great decision upon such subjects, he gives it as his impression "that the whole scope of the Old Testament is in favor of the ordinary view" that the souls of the wicked as well as of the righteous are immortal, and that the destiny of man is determined by his conduct in this world.

The volume deserves, as doubtless it will have, wide circulation among the more intelligent students of the Bible.

FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE. Sermons by W. R. INGE, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Hertford College, Oxford; formerly Fellow of King's College, Cambridge; Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Lichfield. 8vo. Pp. x, 292. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. \$1.50, *net*.

This volume of sermons is of special value from the manner with which it deals with a number of the most important controverted points in theology, particularly questions touching the relation of faith to knowledge. In the sermon on "The Risen Christ" he revives, and defends with great success, the familiar phrase of Butler, that "probability is the guide of life," and that we must be content in all practical affairs with evidence which is far less than demonstrative. The definition of faith which our author accepts is that of a living writer, whose name he does not mention, who declares it to be "the resolution to stand or fall by the noblest hypothesis." Enlarging upon this, the author goes on to remark, that "we *must* perforce stake much on evidence which does not amount to mathematical demonstration. Let those who are disposed to murmur at this ask themselves whether, in their best moments, they would really have it otherwise. Should we be glad, in our best moments, to see the Divinity of Christ proved like a proposition in Euclid? Should we wish to forfeit entirely the blessing on those who have not seen, and yet have believed? the last beatitude of the gospel, as it has been fitly called. For in what way can poor mortals show *love* to an omnipotent Being? In one way only—when He condescends

to ask us to trust Him. Then, indeed, we may do something to show our love" (p. 8).

In the twentieth sermon, upon "Liberal Catholicism," Dr. Inge deals with the questions at issue between Abbé Loisy and the Vatican and those of the Ritschlian school in general, insisting with great force that faith cannot act independently of intellectual convictions, and is not the mere servant of the will. "The intellect, like the will or the heart, was made for God, and is troubled until it can rest in God. . . . As regards the earthly life of the Incarnate Son of God, we must fairly face the question whether Jesus of Nazareth was what He professed to be, and what the society which He founded believed Him to be. We do not believe in two Christs—one of them a Galilean prophet of 'limited intelligence' and the other a half-religious, half-political organization with a very chequered record. . . . Liberal Catholicism, as represented by the Abbé Loisy, surrenders far too much in order, as it thinks, to get back all. It does not get back all. It saves the Creeds, but loses the Gospels; it emancipates the will, but degrades the intellect. It will be an evil day when the troubled faith of English Churchmen seeks refuge by this road" (pp. 290, 292).

But the sermons are by no means controversial. In the main they deal with practical affairs, and must take a high place in homiletical literature.

DIE RELIGION BABYLONIENS UND ASSYRIENS. VON MORRIS JASTROW, JR. Vom Verfasser vollständig durchgesehen und durch Um- und Uebersetzung auf den neuesten Stand der Forschung gebrachte deutsche Uebersetzung. Lieferung VI. Giessen: J. Ricker'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung (Alfred Töpelmann). 1904. M. 1.50.

The sixth part of the translation of Jastrow's "Religion of Babylonia and Assyria" contains the rest of the magic texts and the greater part of the chapter on prayers and hymns. Attention should be called to the fact that the subscription-price (M. 1.50 for each of the ten parts) will be raised after the completion of the book.

BUSINESS DOCUMENTS OF MURASHÛ SONS OF NIPPUR, dated in the Reign of Darius II. (242-404 B.C.). By Rev. ALBERT T. CLAY, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Semitic Philology and Archæology in the University of Pennsylvania. (The Babylonian Expedition of the University of Pennsylvania. Series A: Cuneiform Texts. Edited by H. V. Hilprecht. Vol. X.). Pp. xix, 87. Philadelphia: Department of Archæology and Palæontology of the University of Pennsylvania.

Only twelve documents are here selected for translation, but there are seventy-two fac-simile plates, and eighteen pages of photographs, besides autograph reproductions of 132 tablets and 48 photographs, with a Concordance of Proper Names in the Reign of Darius II., a List of Signs and their Values, and a general discussion introductory to the whole work.

It gives a wonderful sense of reality to this prehistoric period to read these business documents, for only one of which we have room. Shum-iddina spoke to the son of Murashû thus: "Let me put two of my oxen with two of thine oxen into thy pasture lands, and everything, as much as in those fields grows, by our work of irrigation, is ours in common. Afterwards the son of Murashû complied with his request and gave him oxen and seed; ox for ox, seed for seed. They have sworn by the king that whatsoever grows in it, shall be divided equally among them."

MONUMENT FACTS AND HIGHER CRITICAL FANCIES. By A. H. SAYCE, LL.D., D.D., author of "Fresh Light from the Ancient Monuments," etc. 8vo. Pp. 128. New York, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co. 75 cents, *net*.

The excuse for writing this little book is that, in the present confused state of the public mind concerning the assured results of the higher criticism, there has to be given line upon line, precept upon precept, here a little and there a little. A class of writers are now attempting to popularize the views of the destructive critics, and in their efforts are flooding the world with ill-considered and erroneous opinions which are positively misleading. Higher criticism has not disproved the historical character of the Pentateuch. It has not es-

tablished the contention that the prophets were before the law, and that the pre-Mosaic history is chiefly legendary and mythical. Those who assert that it has done so are misleading the public. This little volume of Dr. Sayce presents with great clearness and cogency the main arguments, derived from the study of the monuments, which go to establish the correctness of most of the disputed historical statements of the Penta-teuch. The fourteenth chapter of Genesis is strongly supported by the discoveries in Babylonia which relate to Hammurabi, who is the Amraphel with whose emissaries Abraham contended. The laws of Hammurabi, or Amraphel, so recently discovered, show the futility of the *a priori* arguments which have been so strongly urged against the early existence of the Mosaic code. In the light of the monuments it is highly unreasonable to suppose that the priesthood of Israel was of late origin. Nothing is more likely than that the history of Israel should have begun with an elaborate priesthood. If it had not done so, Israel would have differed from all other nations, and so have confuted the law of evolution, of which some critics make so much.

PSEUDO-CRITICISM; or, The Higher Criticism and its Counterfeit. By Sir ROBERT ANDERSON, K.C.B., LL.D., author of "The Bible and Modern Criticism," "Daniel in the Critics' Den," "The Silence of God," "The Gospel and its Ministry," etc. 8vo. Pp. 123. New York, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co. 75 cents, *net*.

Sir Robert Anderson is doing excellent work in holding the attention of Bible students to the illogical methods of the prevailing biblical criticism and to the incorrect and imperfect statement of facts upon which the reasoning of the leading critics is based. The author's experience in verifying the references of Dr. Driver is similar to our own. He was at first overawed and had his faith in the Bible shaken by the confident assertion of Dr. Driver that certain historical errors were fallen into by the biblical writers which would discredit the documents. But upon personal examination of Dr. Driver's statements it is soon made to appear that they are frequently

not in accordance with the facts, but are merely the repetition of statements made by previous writers which Dr. Driver could not have examined for himself. For example, Dr. Driver asserts that the Greek words in the book of Daniel *demand* a later date than that ordinarily assigned to it. Ten Greek words were all that were ever supposed to be detected, but it is now acknowledged that only three and possibly only two of these are Greek, and they are the names of musical instruments; while the monuments have made it clear that there were Greek colonies on the coast of Palestine long before the time of Daniel, and there is historical evidence that Greek adventurers early penetrated to the civilized centers of the East, so that nothing is more likely than that they should have carried musical instruments with them, and left both them and their names as legacies to the people whom they visited. Sir Robert Anderson is a lawyer of high standing and is able to teach the critics some most-needed and wholesome lessons concerning what constitutes proof.

ISLAM AND THE ORIENTAL CHURCHES: Their Historical Relations. Students' Lectures on Missions, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1902-03. By WILLIAM AMBROSE SHEDD, M.A., Missionary of the American Presbyterian Church to Persia. 12mo. Pp. vii, 253. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath-school Work. 1904. \$1.25, *net*.

Few persons are better prepared than is the author to treat the subject of this volume. In it the reader will find an important and helpful discussion of the whole history of the contact of Mohammedanism with Christianity, and so an important history of Mohammedanism itself. The author's conclusions concerning the course to be pursued by missionaries in the future are of great weight. In his view, conflict is inevitable, since the antagonism of the Koran to the principle of religious freedom is a permanent and essential element of Islam; but there are many elements of hope. The extent to which Oriental Christians have held on to their faith is an indication of greater results following the establishment of a

purser faith. Christian missionaries have followed three courses of procedure: (1) the Church of Rome has endeavored to absorb the Oriental churches; (2) the English Church has endeavored to maintain them in their present organization; while (3) the Protestant churches are establishing independent churches, which, in the opinion of the author, is the only policy destined to permanent success. Still he rejoices in the extent to which regenerating influences are at work in the national Armenian Church. For ultimate success, also, the author looks to the aid which is rendered by commerce; the increasing contact, in various ways, of Christian nations with the Mohammedans; and the establishment of increasing business relations inevitable to the present progress of civilization.

A HANDBOOK OF CHURCH HISTORY from the Apostolic Era to the Dawn of the Reformation. By the Rev. SAMUEL G. GREEN, D.D., author of "A Handbook to the Grammar of the Greek Testament," "A Handbook to Old Testament Hebrew," etc. With Full Dates, Chronological Tables, and Index. 8vo. Pp. xii, 628. New York and Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Co. \$2.50, *net*.

The value of this book lies chiefly in the logical order of its arrangement, in the accuracy and completeness of its presentation of details, in its brevity and its abundant chronological tables and full Index; so that, in fact, it has everything desirable for meeting the wants of most intelligent readers in this busy age of the world.

The typographical arrangement of the book is such as to facilitate consultation as well as to please the eye; while the footnotes supply the student with the necessary references to fuller treatises. The attitude of the author is throughout judicial; while his familiarity with the facts is such that the subject possesses the writer rather than the writer the subject. The volume must take its place as one of the most valuable of the popular compends of church history which have been prepared.

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